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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Importance of this research in macro-perspective 
The object of this study is the development of Singapore. However, the concept of 
"development" is controversial.' The main measures and indicators of development are 
socio-economic factors, which are quantitative in nature, such as gross national product 
(GNP), population (growth), life expectancy, number of people per doctor, per 
telephone and the number of (il)literates. This quantitative approach is related to the fact 
that the economy is the major development force in our world today. The current 
centres of power are being driven by economic rather than by military dominance. 
These economic power centres are mainly Western, except for Japan. Since the collapse 
- as widely perceived - of communism in the late nineties, Western neo-liberalist 
economic principles largely determine the development trajectory of countries. 
Development criteria initially were based upon fulfilment of the basic human needs of 
food and water, housing, health care, education and employment. For a long period this 
has been the cloak of development cooperation. The developmental mindset is mostly 
focused upon transforming societies in order to realise the abovementioned set of basic 
requirements for human survival. As a self-evident model, development efforts have 
been geared towards the system which had already attained the sought-after level of 
development just after the Second World War: the American 'way of life'. Since then, 
development has often been a process of spreading the influence of westernisation along 
with the distribution of economic aid. Failure of prevalent development models to 
achieve the global objectives of decreasing poverty, however, indicates that there are 
more relevant factors in development than economic ones. Since the body of literature 
has grown and more information has become available, more and more development 
workers, scholars and politicians acknowledge the importance of the role of culture in 
development processes. Verfielst stated that the Western materialistic development 
model had to fail, because it overlooked different local conditions and heritages. 
According to him, development is an all-inclusive process that is, in the final analysis, 
cultural. 
"For it is the idea of culture that gives both meaning and direction to economic 
activity, political decision, community life, social conflict, technology, and so 
on. It is in fact culture that gives development its raison d'être and its goal."2 
In the fifties unilateral technical aid played a major role in development cooperation. 
In the sixties the emphasis was on trade growth, in the seventies on fulfilment of basic 
needs and in the eighties on structural adjustment. But in the nineties the Newly 
Industrialised Countries (NICs) - East Asian countries in particular - have gained self-
confidence, which makes them emphasise international interdependence. The rapid 
economic growth in East Asia is a new phenomenon not only in the sense that it is 
happening for the first time in the region, but also in the sense that no previous burst 
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of economic activity has been so dramatic, recently or historically.3 In 1993 the World 
Bank published a report of a comparative study called "The East Asian Miracle".4 In 
this report Preston, the president of the World Bank, acknowledged the importance of 
"non-economic factors, including culture, policies, and history". 
Umehara regarded the Western imperative as an exhausted development model for the 
new world order. He argued that excessive individualism and decadent economic habits 
were unappealing and irrelevant to many non-Western cultures. Moreover, they could 
be destructive to the survival of the planet earth. According to Umehara, the "eternal 
cycle of the ages is turning to the East Asian civilisation again".5 Considering the 
growing global impact of the Asian NICs, it seemed of interest to study what is meant 
by the "East Asian civilisation" and what is left of it after industrialisation. A case-
study about the relationship between cultural and economic development in an Asian 
NIC like Singapore, could contribute to an understanding of the significance of the 
abovementioned global shift. From there on one may start thinking about further 
questions, such as to what extent this East Asian NIC could serve not only as an 
economic development model, but also as a cultural development model or how we 
could strike an optimum balance between Western and non-Western (in casu Eastern) 
values, which could direct development strategies. 
The relevance of such questions is derived from two major driving forces in the 
development of our world in the nineteen nineties. On the one hand, politicians and 
business people frequently use the statement, "The world is getting smaller every day". 
In this view it is generally assumed that the development of countries all over the world 
inevitably includes westernisation. It presupposes globalisation at all levels, including 
the needs of people from different cultures. This assumption is related to the idea that 
if certain needs - related to certain products - are not present yet, the need can and will 
be created. It forms an economic driving force, accompanied by commercial, financial 
and media power. On the other hand, ethnic and cultural minorities are claiming their 
right to self-development. According to Verhelst, imposed economic cooperation and 
unification with alienating mechanisms of international capitalism, threaten the cultural 
identity of people and countries in less powerful positions.6 Certain groups in Third 
World countries have already started searching for alternative development strategies, 
which leave their identities, with their rich cultural and spiritual heritage, intact. 
This dual process in global development raises the following questions: 
1. How can we create a world in which we can accept globalisation as a fact of 
life, but which respects and accepts cultural and religious diversity both through 
inculturation and acculturation? 
2. How can we prevent economic development from eroding and finally eradicating 
cultural diversity? 
3. How can cultural diversity contribute to various and more sustainable ways 
of economic development? 
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When we view economic development as synonymous with material progress and 
culture as encompassing non-material, spiritual elements, the question is: How to strike 
a balance between material and non-material development? 
1.2 Theoretical background 
Relatively little research has been undertaken in the realm of culture and economic 
development. Below are the brief introductions of the theoretical contributions which 
served as starting point for this study. 
Max Weber 
The relation between ethics and an economic system was first described by Max 
Weber7 in his well-known publication on the Protestant ethic and capitalism in 1930. 
As Weber is generally perceived as the founder of this line of research, his contribution 
is taken into account. Since the Second World War, Max Weber's status has undergone 
a revival from a "dead saint" into a "living thinker".8 Among Western-oriented social 
scientists, the significance of Weber's writings upon modem thinking has never been 
greater than it is today. 
Weber's starting point was his renowned analysis of the case of Germany and 
Bismarck's legacy. He managed to establish a historical linkage between the Protestant 
ethic and modem rational capitalism. He used generally well-accepted relations between 
values and behaviour in order to partially explain the genesis of capitalism.9 In the 
Protestant ethic of Calvinism, Weber found a religious impulse which was not 
conservative, but revolutionary. Calvinism, by sanctioning "this-worldly asceticism", 
served to cut through the traditionalism which had characterised previous economic 
formations.10 
Weber dismissed the claims of historical materialism by Marx. He disagreed with the 
notion that systems of ideas can be in any sense ultimately reduced to economic factors. 
Weber stated that one cannot draw a unilateral line of relationship between "material" 
and "ideal" factors. 
A key theme in Weber's writings was his emphasis on the independent influence of the 
political as opposed to the economic." In contrast to contemporary thinkers such as 
Durkheim, who regarded the modem nation-state primarily as a moral institution, 
Weber emphasised above all the capacity of the state to claim, through the use of force, 
a defined territorial area.12 Rather than generalising from the economic to the political, 
Weber generalised from the political to the economic. Bureaucratic specialisation of 
tasks constituted the most integral feature of capitalism. According to Weber a capitalist 
economy necessitates bureaucratic organisation. Socialisation of the economy would 
inevitably entail the further spread of bureaucracy due to central planning.13 
The historical circumstances of Western Europe were unique in having fostered the 
development of the rational state, with its expert officialdom. This was one major 
condition (among others) which facilitated the rise of modem capitalism in the West.14 
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A crucial, but largely unexplained aspect of Western capitalist behaviour was the 
entrepreneurial drive that led individuals not only to establish businesses, but 
simultaneously to endow their conduct with the highest moral significance. This is what 
Weber called the "spirit of capitalism". The question was what the historical origins of 
this normative framework were. To test his hypothesis that Protestantism contributed 
to the rise of Western capitalism, he began to compare the Wirtschaftsethik and 
institutional frameworks with other world religions. Weber thus used the Western 
Protestant ethic as a benchmark to compare other religions with. He worked out his 
implications from this original study in his books about the non-European 
civilisations.15 Although Weber thought that China's cultural background inhibited 
economic growth, economic success in East Asia after the Second World War has 
proven otherwise. Despite the criticism Weber received about his analysis of non-
European cultures - particularly China, as described in chapter three - Weber's broad 
perspective and comparative approach still remain relevant and an example to modern 
scholars. The Weberian perspective paved the way for more historical research into the 
cultural, ethical values which have been of influence on the economic development of 
a certain culture area. He was the one who introduced the notion that orientations and 
institutional patterns influence the way people behave, especially in the economic 
field.16 
Geert Hofstede 
A more recent study which established a relation between cultural roots and economic 
development, was that by Hofstede. He confirmed Kahn's "Neo-Confucian hypothesis", 
suggesting that a link could be made between the Confucian heritage and economic 
growth in East Asia. Hofstede conducted extensive research into work-related values 
of managers in the multinational IBM. He found four main dimensions explaining the 
differences between cultures: power distance, collectivism versus individualism, 
femininity versus masculinity and uncertainty avoidance. " The value dimensions found 
in an almost simultaneous study in the Asia Pacific seemed to correlate with Hofstede's 
IBM study, except for an unexplained fifth dimension. It appeared that the same set of 
basic values could be interpreted in both Western and Eastern ways. To balance the 
cultural bias, because the researchers were from the West, Hofstede's colleague Bond 
in Hong Kong devised a non-Western, in this case a Chinese, value survey. New values 
came up, such as "respect for ancestors" and "honouring and obedience to ancestors, 
respect for and financial support from the parents".18 This uniquely Eastern dimension 
was called "Confucian dynamism"19, whereby a long term and short term orientation 
were distinguished. The long term orientation consisted of perseverance, status-
sensitivity, thrift and a sense of shame. The short term orientation consisted of personal 
calmness and stability, saving face, respect for tradition and reciprocity of greetings, 
favours and gifts. The former orientation was more dynamic, future oriented, the latter 
orientation was more oriented towards the present and the past and thus more static. 
Respondents in China and the Five Dragons (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea 
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and Singapore) scored highest on the long term orientation index of the "Confucian 
dynamism" index.20 The case of Singapore will be discussed in chapter three. 
Hofstede acknowledged the important role of economic and political factors in the 
development of the Five Dragons. Firstly, the global market conditions offered 
opportunities for growing export-oriented economies. Secondly, the governments of the 
Five Dragons supported the local economy to capitalise on these opportunities. 
However, the correlation found between the ethics of "Confucian dynamism" and rapid 
economic growth was taken as proof that culture does play a role in economic 
development as well. 
William Theodore De Вагу 
De Вагу highlighted the intrinsic value of the Confucian culture in East Asian countries. 
He noted the common assumption that people ask what response the East Asian 
civilisations make to the West, not the West to Asia. Even where modernisation has not 
been simply equated with westernisation, the progress of the West has set the norm and 
the pace. Implicit in most studies is the view that East Asia has to catch up with the 
West. But De Вагу turned the question around: "How come the West failed to keep up 
with the progress of East Asian civilisations?"21 He explained the predominant Western 
tendencies in development as follows: 
"One answer, fairly obvious, is that 'progress' itself is a Western idea, and 
whatever the achievements of East Asians might be, the question would not have 
occurred, in those terms, to anyone who did not share the familiar assumption, 
namely, the progressive character and the undoubted superiority of the West. 
Yet it could be asked, in slightly modified non-Western terms (in this case, the 
normative Neo-Confucian language of East Asia): Why could not the West have 
measured up to the civilised behaviour of Confucian East Asia? Why could it 
not have acted in a mature, responsible way by getting its own house in order 
and staying home, as China, Japan and Korea were doing, rather than chasing 
around the world to make trouble for others?"22 
Lin Tse-hsu's letter to Queen Victoria in 1839 concerning the opium trade made a 
strong moral appeal in this respect: 
"Magnificently our great emperor soothes and pacifies China and the foreign 
countries, regarding all with the same kindness. If there is profit, then he shares 
it with the peoples of the world; if there is harm, then he removes it on behalf 
of the world. This is because he takes the mind of Heaven and Earth as his 
mind. We have read your successive tributary memorials saying: "In general our 
countrymen who go to trade in China have always received His Majesty the 
Emperor's gracious treatment and equal justice", and so on. But after a long 
period of commercial intercourse, there appear among the crowd of barbarians 
both good persons and bad, unevenly. Consequently there are those who 
smuggle opium to seduce the Chinese people and so cause the spread of the 
poison to all provinces. Such persons who only care to profit themselves, and 
disregard their harm to others, are not tolerated by the laws of Heaven and are 
unanimously hated by human beings... 
We find that your country is sixty or seventy thousand li from China. Yet there 
are barbarian ships that strive to come here for trade for the purpose of making 
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a great profit. The wealth of China is used to profit the barbarians. That is to 
say, the great profit made by barbarians is all taken from the rightful share of 
China. By what right do they then in return use the poisonous drag to injure the 
Chinese people? Even though the barbarians may not necessarily intend to do 
us harm, yet in coveting profit to an extreme, they have no regard for injuring 
others. Let us ask, where is your conscience?"23 
One may not fully agree with all the claims made by Lin, but he made clear the vast 
difference between the introvert pre-occupation of China with the cultivation of the soil, 
the self-cultivation of the person and the internal control of the society on the one hand, 
and on the other hand the historically expansive and extrovert West, which broke 
boundaries and limits. De Вагу pointed out that Lin showed a sense of lightness, which 
revealed an expression of the deepest conviction rather than complacency, as is often 
assumed by Westerners. He made clear that the Chinese had a 
"Neo-Confucian outlook - or more correctly 'inlook' - on the world as marked 
by a stubborn inner-directedness, a predisposition to look inward to what was 
central and primary, rather than outward towards what was peripheral and 
secondary. If this, to the West, seemed a haughty indifference to the rest of the 
world or an ostrich-like isolationism, to Neo-Confucians it only gave legitimate 
priority to the solution of internal problems and the satisfaction of basic human 
needs over involvement in external ventures of doubtful benefit to the 
people."24 
De Вагу emphasised that "human do-goodism" - the Westerners' reason for bringing 
the "benefits of civilisation" to East Asia25, could potentially have fatal consequences. 
Sulak Sivaraksa 
One recent outspoken non-Western response to the Western development model was 
provided by the Thai "concerned intellectual" Sivaraksa. He criticised both the cultural 
and material nature of development, which he saw as being interrelated. He observed 
that the current "national development" primarily entailed the building of roads, canals, 
parking lots and public parks. Trees had to give way to a "concrete jungle" and temples 
became transformed into shop houses. Commercial exploitation through the mass media 
made people, especially rural people, desire more than they actually needed. An 
"American brand of free trade, which is the worst kind of capitalism" was adopted, 
"exhorting everyone to work more in order to want more, to produce more, to waste 
more natural resources and to destroy the natural environment".26 
Sivaraksa identified two types of negative consequences due to this type of 
development. On the one hand, the more the rich developed materially, the more the 
poor suffered. Thus the main divide in the world was growing increasingly between the 
haves and have-nots. On the other hand, the direction of development in Asian countries 
entailed adopting the outer shell of Western society without probing its core. This was 
resulting in cultural disintegration. Sivaraksa thought that, in the long run, both the rich 
and the poor would suffer socially, culturally and spiritually.27 
Sivaraksa claimed that although political imperialism had come to an end, economic and 
intellectual imperialism had not. Among the Thais, he asserted that this had led to a loss 
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of dignity and a childish, helpless attitude. Many even looked down upon 
themselves.29 Eastern political elites imitated the lifestyles of their former Western 
masters and blindly wanted their countries to develop according to the Western model. 
According to Sivaraksa they were not interested in the preservation of their own culture 
and civilisation. "Asian peoples ... are still bound by models of modernisation which 
are essentially Western. But no longer can it be assumed that westernisation will be 
inevitable or good."29 In Sivaraksa's view the Protestant ethic in the West urged 
people to compete to survive, to rush to "get there first". Thus societies became violent 
and confused. 
Sivaraksa sought the solution in a kind of re-rooting process. Where development was 
concerned, his view was that material development should not be denied, but that it 
would be better to adjust the development imperative to the fulfilment of needs rather 
than the other way around. Furthermore, development had to match the real needs of 
the common people, not just those at the top.30 As a Buddhist he claimed that 
modernisation had limited benefit, whereas South East Asia and Japan had rich spiritual 
legacies which "needed to be inwardly taken to heart if we are to live in harmony and 
fulfilment, and which could offer alternate models for social and human 
development."31 
He therefore advised Asians to take an independent, self-reliant course and find the 
resource for an alternative form of development within the framework of their own 
cultural heritage. He thought that the counterbalance a new generation in the West was 
seeking, was already present in the East, but modem Asians ignored their spiritual 
heritage or did not bother about it. If one would be more detached from society, looked 
within oneself first to conserve inner strength, one could contribute more positively to 
society in the long run. The new should then be slowly added to the old. 
Sivaraksa sought the right path for development neither in capitalism nor in 
communism. Both had Western roots and he considered them harmful to religion. From 
a worldly point, the more desires are increased or satisfied, the further development can 
proceed. From the religious point, the more desires can be reduced, the further 
development can proceed. Sivaraksa thought that both capitalism and communism "lack 
an understanding of man, but still claim that they do everything for the sake of 
mankind".32 
In Buddhism and Confucianism one would find the cultural and spiritual depth, which 
not only could serve as a source for Asian development, but also play an international 
role. Both philosophies professed wisdom and compassion.33 In contrast to capitalism, 
materialism and technology, Buddhism was about peace of mind and loving kindness. 
It shared common characteristics with Christianity in that it emphasised social justice 
and quality of life, whereas capitalism promoted self-interest, greed and ignorance. 
Modern development encouraged competition and success, whereas Buddhism 
encouraged collaboration and content. However, collaboration in Buddhism is not to be 
confused with collaboration in communism, which was focused on economic matters.34 
In the former, collaboration aimed at working less for yourself, through which you 
automatically work more for the community. Sivaraksa emphasised that it would be a 
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long range project to find a balance in a changing society. One would have to proceed 
with patience. He pleaded with the rich merchants and politicians to use their wealth 
and power "in the right and proper way for the common interest".35 
Sivaraksa advocated reform more than revolution by insisting on seeking new values 
applicable to new situations rather than following established norms.36 
"We can't put the clock back. Nor should we, nor can we deny Western science 
and technology. But, can we accept it and at the same time keep the West at 
arm's length? Do not judge ourselves by their standards. Do not ape their 
fashions. Learn something about them. Learn something from them. But do not 
hasten to put their approaches into practice uncritically."37 
Sivaraksa's struggle against the de-rooting process of the Thai culture provided 
inspiration to study the impact of westernisation on Singaporean culture. 
Thierry Verhelst 
In the early nineties a critical, comprehensive analysis on development models was 
published by Verhelst, a senior project officer with a Belgian development agency.38 
From his wide experience with grassroots development in developing countries, he drew 
a number of general conclusions. He stressed the importance of "local knowledge and 
values for a people-centred path of development". 
Verhelst distinguished two types of development strategies.39 The first and most widely 
used was called "catching up with the West", based on Rostow's theory. Aimed at 
material growth, it is used by most large, official bureaucracies. In practice, this 
strategy had mainly failed to improve social conditions for the majority of the Third 
World population. The second type was a liberational development strategy, based on 
the dependency theory. The aim of this strategy was to enable a country to become 
independent from the global domination by the Western centres of power. 
The inability of these respectively right- and left-wing development models to eradicate 
the most dominant destructive conditions of poverty and malnutrition, was partly due 
to Eurocentrism, according to Verhelst. Both models were based on preconceived 
Western notions, which did not take local ideas and potential into account. 
Rist also showed how rigidly the concept of development has been projected onto 
developing countries by the West.40 He stated that "development" is a unilateral 
Western, economic concept, "advocated with such an air of truth and universality that 
it seems to be beyond doubt, like a religion".41 You do not doubt the existence of 
God; you can only discuss how to serve him well. According to Rist, this is the way 
how developmental problems are being confused with solutions. 
Verhelst suggested that, to break through the vicious circle of the current development 
strategies, alternatives for the Eurocentric models should be sought in indigenous 
cultures. The alternative would have to come from a distinctively different category of 
development strategies: neither by imitation nor by rejection of the West. "Energies, 
rooted in a deeper identity, from which development doctrines and theories have not yet 
been drawn"42, could serve as an alternative to the existing development models. 
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These energies should provide communities with the strength and dynamism to look for 
new paths instead of imitating dominant, pseudo-universal development models. 
Verhelst suggested that local cultural analysis, whereby culture represents the vital 
process that underpins all aspects of a given community's life, should complement and 
amend economic, social and political analyses in development strategies. Local 
communities themselves were important sources of knowledge about the differences 
between the old and the new culture. According to Verhelst, they had often succeeded 
in checking the alienating development that threatened them. He argued that: 
"There are other economic cultures than those of capitalism and socialism. With 
the West currently in a state of crisis, it would surely be sensible not to impose 
its model overseas, but rather to investigate what seeds of alternatives exist in 
the Third World. The apparent inevitability of the Westernization of the world 
is deceptive. The failures encountered by development prove this. Behind 
facades of Westernization, indigenous value systems remain intact. They are 
hard to kill. What is needed, is not a romantic return to an idealized past", but 
a lucid and well-balanced combination of inculturation and acculturation. Each 
people will have to forge its own modernity, its own new response to present-
day challenges. Yet this delicate exercise is prevented by the sheer weight of 
Western cultural imperialism.44 
The tragedy of the Third World is, therefore, profoundly cultural and 
spiritual, rather than merely technical, economic or political. If the cultural 
and spiritual basis is destroyed, one risks disaster. It is then that a society sets 
out on the one-way road of inertia and fatalism. " 
As examples of sources of indigenous wisdom, Verhelst cited technology, politics and 
law, resistance to the mechanisms of domination and own ideas about active 
commitment to a better society, religion and spiritual grounding. It would be the 
grassroots communities - the great mass of the poor, the oppressed, the exploited - and 
not the privileged and often very westernised minorities that "carry the hope of the 
Third World". Verhelst called for a cultural "re-rooting" of humanity to counter the 
ongoing global trend of cultural uniformity expressed by the "American way of life". 
He promoted the idea of self-reliance of states45. He pointed at the relationship 
between economics and politics and culture, which should not be overlooked. 
1.3 Problem definition, method and approach 
Problem definition 
This case-study analyses the relationship between the cultural and economic 
development of Singapore. The main problem definition was subdivided into the 
following research questions: 
1. How did Singapore's Wirtschaftsethik develop and to what extent did it 
influence Singapore's economic development? 
(culture — > economy) 
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2. How has Singapore's rapid economic development influenced its cultural 
development? 
(economy — > culture) 
The underlying questions were: 
* To what extent did Singapore's Eastern cultural roots shape its development 
model? 
* How westernised has Singapore become since its rapid economic 
development, superficially perceived as taking place according to a Western 
model? 
This research focuses on the mainstream cultural development, not on the poor minority 
in Singapore. The majority of the population is not poor and as such Verhelst's "great 
mass of the poor" does not exist. Moreover, the grassroots organisations are mostly 
initiated by and/or linked to the government. 
Method 
The development of Singapore was studied through formal as well as informal sources. 
The formal part consisted of research of the literature, statistics and governmental 
publications. Most of the literature was found in the National Library (in a special 
section about Singapore and Malaysia) and the Hon Sui Sen Library of the National 
University of Singapore (NUS). Most books and articles about Singapore were by local 
scholars, which mostly are more or less inclined to be pro-government. Relying on their 
contributions could therefore present a research bias. The situation in Singapore 
appeared to be complex. On the one hand Singapore is wellknown for its censorship of 
the mass media. Unfounded criticism of the government is dealt with rigorously. 
Billboards at the NUS showed letters from American fellows who were compelled to 
leave Singapore due to their critical attitudes. On the other hand, quite critical 
contributions by established local scholars were also found. The harshest criticism of 
their own society came from certain Singaporean politicians. Anonymous notes in 
library books, criticising the government and Singapore society, were not removed or 
hidden. Indirect criticism in the form of policy recommendations was not uncommon. 
Most of such critical remarks, however, were made with a constructive attitude and 
might not be recognised as critical by Westerners. Criticism of the government had to 
be read between the lines. The situation was sometimes confusing. A book like 'No 
man is an island' by James Minchin was not allowed to be on sale in Singapore, 
whereas Chee Soon Juan's critical books 'Dare to change' and 'Singapore, my home 
too' were available at a local bookshop. The opposition paper The Hammer by the 
Worker's Party was publicly sold on busy Orchard Road, although it was said that 
undercover agents were monitoring the sale. I have attempted to counterbalance the 
apparent handicap of government-biased information by searching for internal criticism 
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as well as external sources about Singapore in relevant areas. This dissertation is the 
result of the analysis of the available information in each area. Starting out with a 
critical attitude towards the Singapore government due to my personal Western value 
background which emphasises human rights, I have become more understanding and 
moderate in my opinion which undoubtedly will be reflected in my work. 
Another handicap presented by the predominant use of local sources was that some local 
scholars appeared to resort to tautologies concerning the existing political system in 
Singapore. Sometimes an interesting question was posed with far-reaching implications 
followed by an examination of several arguments concerning the question, but it 
invariably ended in a more prescriptive than descriptive conclusion, a typically Asian 
way. However, this handicap was easily overcome by separating the descriptive from 
the prescriptive and analysing the latter for its own purpose. 
The informal part of the research consisted of media analysis4*, oral history, 
interviews with key resource-persons and fieldwork in the form of participatory 
observation as defined by anthropologists and action research as defined by social 
psychologists. Action research is "a form of social research in which the researcher 
learns about certain group processes or change processes by actively participating in or 
manipulating certain aspects of these group- or change processes."47 From early 1991 
till the end of 1993 I lived and worked in Singapore while co-establishing and co-
managing a branch office of the Dutch training and consultancy bureau Boertien & 
Partners/Interface International Inc. During this period I conducted management and 
communication training for (mainly Chinese) Singaporeans, (mainly West European) 
expatriates and people in the region (mainly Malays). I also participated in local 
organisations such as STADA (Singapore Training And Development Association) and 
participated as a trainee in local training (especially experiential learning), lectures and 
workshops. On the one hand I was involved in CC (community centre) activities and 
charity work among the lower classes, and on the other hand I communicated with 
government officials and business people professionally. 
Both quantitative and qualitative data were used in this interdisciplinary research. 
Singapore showed a diversified pattern of ethnic, religious, cultural and social 
backgrounds, each worth a study in itself. For the purpose of this research, it was 
necessary to focus on and generalise to common trends in the overall development. 
Only when significant differences amongst various groups existed, relevant subgroups 
were used. 
Approach 
A holistic, interdisciplinary approach seemed to be most appropriate in this development 
research. Following the basic developmental principle of "development of, on behalf 
of and by the people"48, local knowledge was preferred over studies by foreign 
scholars. Huizer4' emphasised the inherent value of local knowledge. He pleaded for 
more acceptance of the peculiarities of non-Western cultures and their pluriformity of 
folkknowledge and "experiential science". These could serve as a basis for a more 
sustainable form of development. 
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Geertz explained the necessity and benefits of this research approach as follows: 
"I have been concerned with attempting to determine how the people who live 
there define themselves as persons, what goes into the idea they have (but, as 
I say, only half realize they have) of what a self, Javanese, Balinese, Moroccan, 
is. Not by imagining myself someone else, but by searching out and analyzing 
the symbolic forms - words, images, institutions, behaviours - in terms of which 
in each place, people actually represented themselves to themselves and to one 
another."50 
"The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less 
integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic centre of awareness, 
emotion, judgement, and action organised into a distinctive whole and set 
contrastively both against other such wholes and against its social and natural 
background, is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea 
within the context of the world's cultures. Rather than attempting to place the 
experience of others within the framework of such a conception, which is what 
the extolled 'empathy' usually comes down to, understanding them means setting 
that conception aside and seeing their experience within the framework of their 
own idea of what selfhood is. 
In the case of Singapore the high local level of education and the use of English as 
language medium, made the local knowledge more accessible than usual to a foreign 
researcher in a developing country. 
Undoubtedly the holistic approach based on local knowledge leaves "dozens of loose 
ends"52. But given that "the hallmark of modem consciousness is its enormous 
multiplicity"53 and given the risen awareness of "the uncertainty of knowledge"54 in 
culture research, this case-study does not strive to be exhaustive or unequivocal as a 
theoretical contribution. In its totality it merely strives to provide a better understanding 
of the development of Singapore as it is today. 
1.4 Outline of dissertation 
The outline of this dissertation follows the three main questions formulated in the 
problem definition. 
As an introduction, this first chapter indicated why this research was undertaken, its 
main questions and how it was done. The following is the general outline of this 
dissertation. 
In part one, a picture of the socio-cultural influence - in the broad sense - on 
Singapore's economic development is sketched. 
Chapter 2 places Singapore's development in its geographical and historical context. 
Chapter 3 describes the religious background of the Chinese majority of the immigrants 
in the island-state. It elaborates on the Weltanschauung of Confucianism and its relation 
to economic development. 
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Chapter 4 shows the pervasive influence of politics in Singapore on its economic as well 
as general development. The lack of a substantial opposition is discussed in the last 
paragraph. 
Part two analyses the influence of the recent, rapid economic development on 
Singapore's cultural identification process. It explores the extent of westernisation which 
Singapore has undergone as a result of the rapid modernisation. In other words: to what 
extent has Singapore followed the same development process as earlier developed 
countries. 
Chapter 5 explores the relation between modernisation and economic development, 
industrialisation and urbanisation in Singapore. It describes the economic as well as the 
socio-cultural consequences of Singapore's transformation into a modern Asian city-
state. 
In chapter 6 the development in socio-economic structures is analysed. Changes which 
have taken place in key class features are shown, in particular education, income and 
occupational prestige. The effects of the rapid economic development on the welfare 
distribution and the reduction of poverty in Singapore are examined. 
Chapter 7 addresses the key issue of part two. The cultural development of Singapore 
is discussed here in terms of shifts in values and norms in its recent past and in terms 
of future expectations and directions. Singapore's rapid ascent to join the ranks of 
developed countries is shown to have had its own re-rooting effects. 
Chapter 8 gives an example of one of these re-rooting effects: the development strategy 
of Singapore's main economic asset, its human resources. The role of education and 
training and the Wirtschaftsethik in human resource development (HRD) are highlighted. 
The third and last part of this case-study, evaluates the relevance of Singapore's 
development process to other developing and developed countries. 
Chapter 9 recapitulates the main themes of this research, followed by a number of 
conclusions, related to the initial research questions. Furthermore, the potential 
relevance of Singapore as a development model is discussed. This is done by 
deliberating on the factors which make Singapore unique and sharing some observations 
on Singapore's development process which could be pertinent to other countries. 
PARTI 
INFLUENCE OF CULTURE 
ON SINGAPORE'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
CHAPTER 2 
CULTURAL BACKGROUND 
IN HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 
2.1 Definition of "culture" and "development" 
The main hypothesis in this research was that on the one hand culture influences 
economic development, and on the other hand that the economic development influences 
the culture, as can be derived from Verhelst's statement that "culture is the raison 
d'être and goal of development".1 As the concepts of both culture and development are 
therefore pivotal, in this section their meaning and scope, as used in this dissertation, 
are indicated. 
2.1.1. Culture 
Culture is a complex concept and raises much confusion due to its various definitions. 
There almost seem to be as many definitions of culture as there are people who define 
this concept.2 It is not the pretention of this research to give or search for the proper 
definition, but due to its widespread use in this dissertation the underlying assumptions 
regarding culture have to be clarified. 
Van Nieuwenhuyze stated that Westerners use two kind of definitions of culture: a 
"segmentary culture", referring to the beautiful and good part of life, and an 
"encompassing culture", a framework of thought and acts. In non-Western countries 
only the latter definition of culture exists.3 In Western countries, however, the former 
definition is mainly used in the 'common sense' use of the concept. Scholars, whether 
Western or non-Western, tend to use an encompassing definition. 
Similarly Hofstede distinguished between "culture one", referring to civilisation and 
especially the fruits of that civilisation, such as education, art and literature, and 
"culture two" in the broad anthropological sense, a catch word for patterns of thought, 
feeling and behaviour. Making an analogy with computers, Hofstede defined culture as 
"the collective programming of the mind"4. He later added that the mental 
programming by culture only partly explains someone's behaviour, but it does indicate 
which reactions are probable and understandable from a person's historical 
background.5 
According to Fortmann, partial definitions, in which the contents vary with the 
perspective taken by the creator and the purpose of the definition, are mostly not 
contradictory, but rather emphasise different aspects.6 In the area of intercultural 
management and communication training, for example, Trompenaars found it useful for 
international business to think of culture as "the way in which a group of people solves 
problems".7 Groups of people organise themselves in such ways that they increase the 
effectiveness of their problem-solving processes. Trompenaars distinguished between 
three layers of culture. The outer layer shows the explicit culture in the form of 
artifacts and products, the middle layer reflects underlying norms and values and the 
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core layer is about assumptions about existence. Because different groups of people 
have developed in different geographic regions, they have formed different sets of 
logical assumptions.8 
Immigrant Pinto defined culture as: "An evolving system of from generation to 
generation transmitted rules, which a group of people (who feel they are a member of 
this group) - often unconsciously - obeys, and moreover a framework of reference of 
and for the behaviour and which determines the world view. "9 Pinto made a distinction 
between modem and traditional, in his eyes respectively Western and non-Western 
cultures. Modem cultures have a fine maze of behaviourial rules and traditional cultures 
a rough maze. Some cultures, as well as so called "second generation" immigrants, 
show a mixture of both. 
Broad, encompassing definitions are mostly found in anthropology. For Kluckhohn, for 
example, culture consisted of "patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reacting, 
acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements 
of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture 
consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their 
attached values."10 
A relatively recent textbook in anthropology, used in the university of Singapore, 
defined culture as: 
"... the total way of life of any society, not simply to those parts of this way 
which the society regards as higher or more desirable. Thus culture, when 
applied to our own way of life, has nothing to do with playing the piano or 
reading Browning. For the social scientist such activities are simply elements 
within the totality of our culture. This totality also includes such mundane 
activities as washing dishes or driving an automobile, and for the purposes of 
cultural studies these stand quite on a par with "the finer things of life". It 
follows that for the social scientist there are no uncultured societies or even 
individuals. Every society has a culture, no matter how simple this culture may 
be, and every human being is cultured, in the sense of participating in some 
culture or other."11 
Studies in plural South East Asia draw attention to the multi-dimensional aspect of 
culture. For example, Benjamin stated that the reality of a greater complexity of our 
world today is that individuals may participate in more than one culture at a time and 
that cultures are not necessarily confined to the boundaries of one society.12 
"The individual is not necessarily limited to a sole unvarying ethnic identity 
from birth: choice is frequently possible, sometimes from moment to moment 
... Always there is a continuous dialectic between individual human beings and 
the various cultures (or fragments of cultures) available to them. Culture is not 
a single uniform system in a person's mind, but the individual has the choice to 
accept or reject elements from all the cultures present in his social 
environment."13 
Benjamin emphasised that culture is not genetically transferred and is therefore not 
inherent to a specific human's nature. It is acquired by individuals through socialisation 
processes. Because individuals are mobile, this leaves room for variety within a culture. 
Cultures are thus dynamic, not static unchanging systems of beliefs, attitudes and 
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behaviour. Therefore one cannot find clear cut differences between the old and the new 
culture. Mostly people are in the middle of a transitional process with elements of the 
past, present and perhaps seeds of the future in other countries interwoven. 
Following Benjamin's differentiations, in this research culture was viewed as a 
dynamic, interactional sum total of the original solutions that a group of human beings 
has invented to adapt to their natural and social environment. Each culture will have a 
certain adjustment-relationship to the changes in its environment. All cultures on earth 
are developing to a certain extent. Cultures whose environments change most, will have 
to adapt more to survive. They will at least have to make a stronger reinforcement of 
the existing culture, if they don't want to change it. If external pressure increases, the 
culture will have to develop an internal answer. It is a dynamic process in which 
"culture-owners" have the option of letting it happen by dominant forces or becoming 
aware of the process and consciously trying to shape it themselves. 
A specific South-East Asian aspect of culture was that the area consists of a complex 
mixture of cultures. The more cultures individuals are confronted with, the more 
complex their cultural identity will be. Moreover, the more the culture(s) around 
individuals are changing over time, the more choices they will have (to make), thereby 
in itself creating a greater diversity in their culture, as choices may increasingly vary. 
Therefore, in the case of fast-changing, multi-racial Singapore, culture was seen as a 
pluriform, evolving value-system. 
In this research, the starting point was a broad, holistic definition of culture pertaining 
to the full range of human phenomena, including cognitive, affective, behaviourial, 
spiritual as well as material aspects. It was attempted to describe the "society's customs 
and ideas ... objectively and understood in the context of that society's problems and 
opportunities"14. Ember and Ember emphasised cultural relativism as the best scientific 
approach. This approach has met with some resistance from different sides. On the one 
hand, the relativistic, descriptive approach conflicts with the traditional Asian normative 
approach. Lu, for instance, warned for the danger that the attitude of scientism could 
give rise to moral scepticism, which some Asians deem responsible for the moral 
permissiveness in the West. He raised the question: "If moral values are really relative, 
why should any person commit himself to any system of moral values?"15 
On the other hand, cultural relativism was interpreted as the view that all cultures are 
equivalent. In this sense, Lemaire saw cultural relativism as an idealist, abstract protest 
against colonialism, eurocentrism and the westernisation of the cultures of the earth. 
Although cultural relativists have made an important contribution to anthropological 
thought by making people aware of the - mostly unconscious - influence of their cultural 
background on their perception, Lemaire thought that they were incapable of explaining 
the processes responsible for the westernisation of non-Western societies.16 Because 
it thus underestimated the realistic power distance between western colonial and 
colonised cultures, Lemaire saw cultural relativism historically in fact as a confirmation 
of the inequality of cultures.17 
Nevertheless, cultural relativism was taken as theoretical background, but in the sense 
Hofstede described it. He emphasised that cultural characteristics used to be viewed as 
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hereditary, but we now know that culture is acquired by nurture, not nature. Culture 
is transmitted by social environment, not by genes. Cultural relativism does not imply 
that cultures are equal, but it emphasises that there are no scientific criteria which allow 
us to think of a certain culture as superior or inferior to another culture.18 Cultural 
relativism does not mean that one does not apply any norms and values to oneself or 
one's own society, but it makes clear that one cannot easily judge another group of 
people or society without being aware of the cultural differences between that group and 
one's own, its roots and the consequences of those differences.19 
2.1.2. Development 
"Development" is the term coined after the colonial period at the end of the forties, 
early fifties, used to describe the former colonies and their changed relation with the 
former colonisers. It originates in the Western world and contains a systematic effort 
to continuously change the world to one's benefit, assuming unlimited possibilities 
based on technology.20 
The concept of development is generally equated with economic development. 
This research, however, started from a broad definition, such as in the definition of 
culture. It thus encompassed not only economic, but also socio-cultural, political and 
religious aspects. 
Development can be perceived in two ways: as transformation eo ipso and as progress. 
In this research the former neutral definition was taken as starting point. Development 
was only understood as "progress" if it was thus experienced by the people in the 
developing country of Singapore themselves. 
2.2 Historical background 
Although Singapore in its present state of an independent republic only exists since 
1965, the foundation for its modern development was laid long before. According to 
Chew, Singapore's history serves "not simply as 'background' for explanation, but very 
much [as] a substantive part of it" .21 
Singapore's early history remains rather vague. There are different stories and legends 
transferred orally. The original textbook for Lower Secondary pupils entitled 
"Singapore Social and Economic Developments from 1819 to 1965" even deliberately 
omitted Singapore's early history, because "the period [of Singapore's history] before 
1819 was covered with tales which are either mixed with legends or are too vague to 
be accepted as true..."22. Nevertheless, there is some consistency in other historical 
descriptions of Singapore before 1819. 
A third century Chinese account mentions P'u-luo-chung which is probably Pulau 
Ujong, "the island at the end of the peninsula"23. One of the earliest explicit written 
references is the mentioning of the settlement Temasele ("Sea Town") on the island, by 
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the Javanese Nagarakretagama. It was also referred to in the Wu Bei Zhi Chart, 
compiled from mariners' maps, amongst which the routes of Chinese Admiral Zheng 
He. It was also speculated that contact between China and Singapore had been 
maintained even in the Sung dynasty (960-1279 AD) as Singapore's strategic position 
was significant.24 
In the early eleventh century, Singapore - then known as Temasek - owed allegiance 
to the Buddhist Srivijaya empire based in South Sumatra.25 
The Sejarah Melayu (Malay Annals) first referred to Singapura or Simhapura in 1535. 
Legend had it that Sang Nila Uttama, son of Rajah Chulan of India, and the daughter 
of the god of the sea, saw a beast on the island and mistook it for a lion. In Sanskrit 
singha means lion and pura town. 
Legends also romanticised the founding of Singapore by Sri Tri Buana26, ruler of 
Palembang on Sumatra. He was said to have sought shelter from a storm on the island 
of Temasek by the end of the 12th century. There he saw an animal which he thought 
was a lion and established a settlement by the name of Singapura. He developed it into 
an important trading centre, visited by seamen from many countries. It lasted until 
1252, when Javanese expelled Dasia Raja, the fourth successor of Sri Buana. After the 
decline of the Srivijaya empire, Singapore was probably incorporated into the Hindu 
Majapahit empire in eastern Java. But the Javanese neglected the island and it lost its 
glory. The island and the Keppel Strait were merely portrayed as a dreaded pirate 
haunt.27 
In the late thirteenth century Marco Polo still gave a hearsay description of 
"Chiamassie" as a "large and noble" town on the island of "Malayur", which most 
likely referred to Temasek. But in 1330 a Chinese traveller, Wang Da-Yuan, referred 
to hostilities between Siam and Tan-ma-hsi or Tumasik. The latter was old Javanese and 
derived from tasek, lake or sea, so it might have meant an island. 
After the fall of the Yuan dynasty in 1368, the first Ming emperor of China reversed 
the policy of direct trading and forbade private merchants to trade in the Nanyang 
(South East Asia). Srivijaya's decline and the Chinese withdrawal took away 
controlling, moderating influence. The second half of the fourteenth century was a 
period of confusion and violence. Singapore was drawn into a prolonged conflict 
between Siam (now Thailand) and the Java-based Majapahit empire for domination of 
the Malay Peninsula. But neither exerted strong authority or protection, so the 
settlement of Temasek was subject to attacks by both Thais and Javanese.28 This 
period is not well-documented. The only information stems from travel journals, which 
stated that the "inhabitants of a settlement near Fort Canning" earned their living from 
piracy of Chinese junks. According to the Nagarakretagama, Singapore was overcome 
in one Majapahit attack, but rose to prominence again when Iskandar Shah, a prince of 
Palembang, came to the island. Shortly before 1400, the Majapahit forces chased him 
away. He fled to Muar and established the Melaka (Malacca) Sultanate a few years 
later.29 According to a seemingly contradictory account by the Sejarah Melayu the 
Palembang prince Parameswara was driven out by the Thais or a Malayan-Thai vassal 
state and Temasek was devastated. Turnbull stated that Parameswara was the one who 
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founded Melaka, succeeded by Iskandar Shah.30 Some light was shed on these 
confusing accounts by Pires who heard from Javanese informants that Parameswara 
later took the name of Iskandar Syah after his conversion to Islam.31 
During the hey-days of Melaka in the fifteenth and sixteenth century, many of 
Temasek's or Singapore's inhabitants emigrated there. Thus the island remained a 
small, insignificant fishing village under the sphere of influence of the sultanates of 
Johore-Riau. For about four hundred years the island remained largely uninhabited. 
Again it were external conflicts which formed the prelude to Singapore's modem 
development. The start of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe in 1795 saw the occupation 
of The Netherlands, then the central core state in the world system, by France. This 
resulted in the flight of Willem van Oranje to England, where he signed an agreement 
with Britain, generally referred to as the Kew letters. These "letters" temporarily 
released all Dutch possessions in the East to Britain. The intent of the Kew letters was 
to prevent Dutch possessions from falling into French hands. This way Malacca fell into 
British hands at the end of the eighteenth century.32 In 1814, after Napoleon 
Bonaparte's defeat, Britain officially had to hand Malacca back to the Dutch through 
the London Convention. But, realising the rising Dutch power, the British refused to 
return Malacca to the Dutch. The Dutch subsequently imposed restrictive tariffs on 
British merchant ships and occasionally attacked the British ships.33 This added to a 
longstanding rivalry between the Dutch and the British in the area. 
Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, lieutenant governor of the few British territories, had 
fought the Dutch on Java, the major island of the Dutch Indies. Raffles was known for 
his abolition of slavery. He also spoke with scorn of the tyrannic and cruel character 
of the Dutch and Dutch institutions.34 He showed interest in the Indonesian languages, 
history and customs. But the British government returned its possessions in the East 
Indies to the Dutch, because it deemed their economic value to be too low.35 Raffles 
was called back to Europe, but returned to the area a few years later, disappointed in 
the British interests in the East Indies. The British were entangled in a war in Atjeh. 
To strengthen the British position in the area and to ensure safe passage, Raffles went 
to Calcutta to convince the British governor general Moira of the necessity of a support 
point in the Straits of Malacca. Due to the importance attached to their China-India 
trade route as well as to halt the Dutch in their expansion from the Dutch Indies, the 
British then assigned Raffles to lead an expedition to secure a place of trade and rest. 
At first Raffles wanted Johor, but the Dutch had already renewed their contract with 
the Sultan. As a second choice he bought Singapore, hoping to make it flourish in order 
to change the British government's insight about the Far East.36 
The British had contemplated burning down the Malaccan fortress to deny the Dutch 
a safe base. But Raffles proposed the more diplomatic solution of the exchange of 
Malacca for Singapore, which then was part of the Johore-Riau-Lingga empire, 
including peninsular Johore, segments of eastern Sumatra and the Riau-Lingga 
archipelago south of Singapore.37 The Dutch gave in to the British in their claim on 
Singapore in exchange for the return of their Malaccan possession. 
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Raffles benefitted from the local political chaos at that moment. Sultan Mahmud from 
the Johore kingdom had died in 1812 and there was a succession dispute going on. His 
hereditary successor, his eldest son prince Tengku Long, was supported by Malay 
princes of the empire. The contesting younger son was supported by migrant Bugis 
from Celebes (now Sulawesi). The ethnically different Malay and Bugis were historical 
rivals for power in the Johore-Riau-Lingga empire.39 In 1813 the Bugis proclaimed the 
younger son, who also had the support of the Dutch, Sultan. It was unlikely that a 
Dutch-supported Sultan would give legal consent to the establishment of a British 
trading station on the island of Singapore. To resolve the dilemma, Raffles recognized 
Tengku Long as Sultan, promising him protection against the Bugis and the Dutch. His 
representative in Singapore, the Temenggong (a kind of Minister of Defence), had come 
under the influence of the Dutch and, such as many Malay rulers, had made trade 
promises to them. This Temenggong Abdul Rahman negotiated with Raffles and allowed 
him into Singapore hoping to ward off the Dutch and to re-unify the sultanate. 
Although prince Tengku Long was proclamated the new Sultan Hussein, the hope of a 
renewed strong sultanate was never fulfilled. On 6 February 1819 Raffles signed a 
treaty with the British-supported Sultan to establish a British trading port on Singapore. 
This gave the East India Company the right to maintain a settlement in return for an 
annual allowance of five thousand Spanish dollars to Sultan Hussein and three thousand 
to the Temenggong. Raffles wrote to his friend William Marsden: 
"In short, Singapore is everything we could desire, and I may consider myself 
most fortunate in the selection; it will soon rise in importance and with this 
single station alone would I undertake to counteract all plans of Mynheer; it 
breaks the spell; and they are no longer the exclusive sovereigns of the Eastern 
seas."39 
In the August 1824 treaty the East India Company acquired sovereignty over the island 
and its surrounding waters stretching ten miles from the coast. Pressure was applied in 
the form of withholding allowances to the Sultan until he reluctantly capitulated and 
surrendered Singapore.40 Malay rule over the island of Singapore was removed. From 
this "foundation of Singapore" onwards the island "was incorporated into the world 
economy".41 The Dutch let the opportunity to develop Malacca as competitor of 
Singapore pass by. 
Long before Raffles' arrival, the island was inhabited by a small group of Orang Laut, 
a generic term for different tribes who claimed ancestry from the Sakai hill tribes in the 
Riau-Lingga archipelago.42 They lived in small houses and huts at the mouth of the 
river and in boats at the wide part of the river, fishing and pirating along the river and 
the estuaries of the island.43 The latter activity earned the Orang Laut the nickname 
"Sea Gypsies". 
When Raffles arrived on the island, he found only small coastal kampongs of an 
estimated hundred and twenty Malays, whose livelihood consisted of fishing, and about 
thirty Chinese farmers, growing pepper and gambier (a source of vegetable dye used 
in tanning). After Raffles established the free trading port, initially Malays and Chinese 
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who fled the stem Dutch rule in Malacca, supplemented the population. They were soon 
followed by more Chinese from the southern provinces of China (Fukien and 
Kwantung, now Fujian and Guangdong). These were mostly landless peasants, artisans 
and petty traders. From southern India, Pakistan and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) arrived 
clerical workers, traders, railroad workers and convicts. From Johore and Negri 
Sembilan came a steady stream of Malays and in smaller numbers traders and peasants 
from Celebes (now Sulawesi), Sumatra, Borneo (now Kalimantan) and Java added an 
Indonesian flavour to the multi-ethnic island of Singapore.44 These people were 
attracted by the British appeal for settlers and workers. These early settlers were 
predominantly poor and illiterate or semi-literate, whereas the British and other 
European traders and colonial administrators were wealthy and powerful. This situation 
made the Europeans natural models of success for the poor immigrants who moved to 
Singapore to try to earn a better living than in their home countries.45 Therefore the 
new country Singapore, created especially to promote trade, saw mainly money-minded 
people, out to exploit every opportunity available in Singapore and the region, as its 
inhabitants. For the British they formed a docile and controllable workforce.46 
Confronted with the competing, different ethnic groups, Raffles was afraid of ethnic 
conflicts which could undermine the stability of the new trading port. Without military 
or police backing-up, he therefore segregated the various groups geographically. He 
used the baba 's (descendants of Chinese who had intermarried with Malacca Malays) 
as a compradore bourgeoisie to the British commercial community, because of their 
"general familiarity with the local social and cultural environments, their ability to 
speak Malay, and their eagerness to learn English [which] made them a 'natural' 
intermediary between the British and the Malays".47 The British divide et impera 
policies reinforced the trade and occupational specialisation and increased the linguistic 
and cultural gap between the ethnic and sub-ethnic enclaves. The British, other 
European and Hokkien merchants dominated international trade, the British and Indians 
were prominent in colonial administration and public works, the Cantonese and Hakkas 
specialised in building and construction and the Hainanese in food retail. Gradually 
disparity in income and wealth appeared and widened among individuals and ethnic 
groups as some trades and occupations offered more than others. Thus slowly a plural 
society evolved with closely bonded ethnic groups divided by culture, religion, language 
and social class.48 Thus the widely used "tripartite compartmentalization of Chinese, 
Malays and Indians" in Singapore was more camouflaging than revealing Singapore's 
ethnic diversity.49 
When Raffles returned to England in 1823, he roughly left some 4,580 Malays, 3,317 
Chinese, 756 Indians and 74 Europeans behind in Singapore.50 The population 
consisted of culturally, demographically and politically separate groups whose loyalty 
belonged to their homelands. They were merely temporary citizens who wanted to make 
money to send home to their families and fellow countrymen. Social cohesion was 
entirely lacking. 
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Nevertheless, Singapore kept on growing. From 1821 to 1825 trade increased seven-
fold, from 1.8 million to 12.1 million Mexican silver dollars.51 Singapore's 
development became more and more influenced by the Chinese. Chinese secret 
societies, the huis, controlled the opium trade with China from Singapore. By 1836 the 
Chinese population had grown to 13,700 and outnumbered the Malay population of 
12,500. 
Singapore's significance for the West started decreasing when England created the new 
trading place Hong Kong in 1842. But at the same time, seen from the Chinese 
perspective52, it attracted more adventurous immigrants. Increasing domestic political 
and economic disorder in China stimulated people from Fujian and Guangdong to 
emigrate to the Nanyang (present-day Southeast Asia) in great numbers, especially after 
the first five treaty ports along China's southeast coast were opened in the early 1840's. 
Again these were mainly poor workmen and coolies, while the others were mainly 
traders. 
Ng Chin-keong traced back the cultural heritage of these Chinese immigrants to the 
changing socio-economic conditions of the China they originated from. He showed that 
the migrants from South China had two distinct features: the pursuit of a better life and 
the willingness to adapt and change.53 Besides these common characteristics, these 
migrants arrived in Singapore already divided according to their Chinese stratification. 
In the rural areas in South China where they came from, frugality, hard work and 
collective effort formed the main values. These proved to be necessary to survive in the 
harsh circumstances. The Chinese society was structured along family lineages, most 
strongly developed in Fujian and Guangdong where the Singaporean immigrants came 
from. Here the mountainous landscape offered few agricultural opportunities which 
made cooperation necessary. Defensive alliances had developed against the threat of 
Japanese and Chinese pirates during the sixteenth century and against other lineages. 
These conditions created strong intra-lineage solidarity and interdependence, but also 
tension and violence. The local social structure was more vertically than horizontally 
organized, which limited the scope of cohesion. 
As the local lineages mainly coincided with the villages, they also formed an informal 
local government. The vertical configuration of the lineage helped preserve the social 
order and stability, because it prevented the rise of class- or professional-based 
organizations which could challenge the authority of the State.54 
Although the southern provinces were rural and at a great distance of the centre of 
power, they were not culturally isolated. Its population officially adhered to the social 
and political norms and values of the Confucian state. Broadly speaking, this meant a 
division of society into two classes. Those who laboured with their minds ruled and 
those who laboured with their physical strength were ruled.55 Therefore, scholars were 
attributed prestige and power, whereas merchants were ranked the lowest among the 
four occupation groups in the Confucian ideology. But the Chinese were pragmatic in 
their approach: trade provided more earnings.56 An "open-class environment" boosted 
the aspiration of the general public for advancement.57 The population was dynamic 
in its reactions to challenges; the growing overpopulation did not lead to declining 
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standards of living. On the contrary: a range of other economic activities besides 
agriculture, sprung up. One of them being the involvement in maritime activities. The 
ecological and economic constraints of the homeland triggered a substantial number of 
southern Chinese, especially Fujianese, to venture overseas. The Cantonese having most 
trade experience with Westerners through Hong Kong, became "the first independent, 
modern-minded commercial capitalists in Chinese history".58 
Although they were financially motivated to migrate, these Chinese were also closely 
linked to the so called high culture of Confucianism. The moral constraints of kinship 
and village attachment remained strong, but were less direct. The traditional, local 
social structure of market-town networks had made the southern Chinese geographically 
mobile and gave them a broad cultural horizon. Returning emigrants already gave them 
a more global awareness. Once abroad, the migrants could act more freely and 
independently than bound by the institutional restraints back home. 
It was a combination, therefore, of economic push factors and open cultural values, 
which stimulated them to strive for a more prosperous life for themselves as well as for 
their kin. 
The migrants continued their ancestral social structures in their new country. The socio-
cultural and economic environment they recreated in Singapore, resembled that of the 
treaty ports in South China (such as Xiamen, Guangzhou, Shantou). It was continuously 
fed by the arrival of fresh migrants, who also brought along their religious beliefs. Kin-
type and native-place bonds formed the basis of social cohesion, such as clan 
associations. It was this kind of family loyalty, which was one of the fundamentals of 
Confucianism, that helped to preserve the traditional values. The main difference of 
Singapore from the Chinese mainland was the absence of a gentry class with scholars. 
The greatest respect in the new community was for the rich merchants, because wealth 
itself was a symbol of success and a source of influence. These merchants became the 
natural leaders and the position of merchants was greatly enhanced. 
However, education continued to be highly valued, if it were only as a means to further 
advancement. This aspiration was inherent to the traditional Chinese value system. The 
educational curriculum reflected the economic adaptability of the cultural values. "The 
overseas settlement of Singapore", as Ng put it59, had become recognizably Chinese 
by 1860, as the Chinese constituted sixty-one percent of the population. The contrast 
between them and the Muslim and animist peasants of Malaya and Indonesia was stark 
from the outset.60 
Singapore gained special importance to the West again after the Straits Settlements, of 
which Singapore was part, were made a British crown colony in 1867 and the Suez-
canal was opened in 1869. Since then it grew into the most important harbour on the 
way to East Asia. By this time it became clear to the Singaporeans that the Confucian 
classics would be less relevant to their advancement in the current situation, and 
therefore modern and even Western education took its place. It was Confucian culture 
itself, which at its grassroots operational level stressed personal advancement and family 
welfare, providing the motivation for change and modernisation. Thus, development in 
Singapore evolved largely from a traditional source.61 
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Nevertheless, the changes did not take place without resistance The Chinese consuls 
in Singapore tried to reorientate the Chinese in Singapore to China Tso Ping-lung, 
appointed m 1881, "was appalled that Chinese identity could be so easily lost as 
evidenced by the Straits-born Chinese who were all too quickly shedding their Chinese 
roots "61 Chinese cultural nationalists, such as Tso, believed that Western and local 
(Malay) cultural values constituted threats to the Chinese community In the beginning 
of immigration into Singapore, there was an abnormal sex ratio of 3,266 males per 
thousand females in 1871 63 There were hardly any female migrants and the early 
settlers mixed with the local, Malay women Despite these intermarriages, ethnic 
distinctiveness remained Population growth was mainly due to migrational surplus 
Chinese culture acquired a dominant position in Singaporean society, partly because of 
the lack of Malay organisation and leadership 
Singapore's economic hey-days started after the First World War, due to the rapidly 
increasing need for tin and rubber, the traditional East-Asian export product, in the 
industrialised nations ** Migrants were attracted by the employment opportunities this 
offered and were allowed to flow in freely But it was not until the 1930's that female 
immigration started to have an impact on the Singaporean population Under the 
influence of world depression, the Aliens Ordinance of 1933 restricted immigration of 
males and allowed immigration of females Smce then, families were mainly formed 
according to ethnic origin and culture This way Singapore's population took root 
The thirties also confronted Asia, including Singapore, with the Japanese expansionism 
The British extended their military presence m Singapore, but gave priority to the 
defence of Great Britain itself as well as underestimated the cleverness and 
audaciousness of the Japanese tó During the Second World War, on 15 February 1942, 
Singapore fell into the hands of the Japanese army Almost four years of fierce struggle 
and great losses followed for Singapore The rule of Singapore by the "Tiger of 
Malaya", the Japanese general Yamashita, was characterised by poverty, hunger, 
disease, ignorance, widespread unemployment, overcrowding, appalling housing 
conditions, and the insidious corruption of public life66 Jamashita's guarantees for the 
safety of military and civilian lives appeared of no value Hundreds of Chinese were 
driven to Singapore's east coast to dig their own graves, after which they were shot m 
rows 67 
The Japanese used Malay police against the Chinese and Indians Μ Against the 
Chinese, out of suspicion of links with the resistance in China, against the Indians, 
because the Japanese fought against them in India and Birma (now Myanmar) This 
discrimination from the Malays increased ethnic consciousness in Singapore Inter-racial 
solidarity, which never had been strong anyhow, could hardly be found 69 
When the traumatic occupation by the Japanese during the Second World War ended, 
a new era had begun Singapore had been a prominent symbol of Western power in the 
Far East, but the place of the white man m the East would never be the same again 70 
Before the returning British, who made Singapore a crown colony m March 1946, could 
control the situation, riots broke out m Malaya as well as in Singapore First between 
the Malays and the Chinese, then followed by riots between the Malays and the Indians 
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According to Yong, "the outbreak of the 1948 communist insurgency in Malaya and 
Singapore led to greater religious consciousness as it dawned upon the Muslims that 
they would have to reckon with this reputedly strong atheist religion".71 Muslims 
formed the majority in Malaya. 
Reflecting international developments, the Chinese in Singapore became divided into 
three groups: pro-Beijing, pro-Taiwan and those who felt Singapore was their home 
(mainly the English-educated). Though ethnically the same group, these people had 
clearly different cultural and economic outlooks. The 1956 All-Party Report noted that 
nationalists, whether leftist or rightist, lacked any allegiance to Singapore as a mother 
country. Nation-building out of this plural society was to be a top priority for long-term 
political stability.72 
As the 1950's were marked by natural population growth instead of immigration and 
by long negotiations with England for independence, inter-racial solidarity and a power 
struggle between supporters and adversaries of communism became crucial issues. With 
the population remaining settled in Singapore and with the prospect of an independent 
nation, ethnic awareness came to the forefront. If Singapore were to be part of the 
Federation of Malaysia, the Chinese were to be a minority in their country. Whereas 
if Singapore were to become a completely independent state, the Chinese would be 
dominant and the Malays a minority in the island-state. 
In 1959 Singapore acquired the self-governing status from England. The Chinese 
dominated People's Action Party (PAP) won the elections. Because the party sought 
independence via a merger within the proposed Federation of Malaysia, it embarked on 
a programme to identify with the Malay population.73 When the Federation of 
Malaysia (comprising Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak) was formed in 1963, the 
PAP continued this effort. But the modernisation plans included building high-rise flats 
and the Malays were most reluctant to leave their traditional kampongs. Cultural 
differences came to a clash in racial riots in 1964. Eventually Singapore's secession 
from the Federation was decided upon and Singapore became an independent, sovereign 
and democratic republic in 1965. 
2.3 Geographical background 
As has become clear from Singapore's historical background, its geographical location 
not only made it a key strategic maritime location, but also boosted its commercial 
appeal. The Singapore Straits, forming the southern part of the Malacca Straits at the 
intersection of the Indian and the Pacific Ocean, is a water passage for ships connecting 
East and West. It is bordered by the Indonesian island of Sumatra and the East-
Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak on the former island of Borneo. Singapore has 
a sheltered harbour due to its calm waters without typhoons or hurricanes in the Malay 
archipelago with its many tiny islands. 
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Since the Malay peninsula lay across the sea route between China and India, the region 
has come into contact with traders from more developed areas since a long time. As 
navigation improved this route became especially popular.74 
With its 633 square kilometres75 Singapore is the smallest state in Southeast Asia. It 
consists of a main island and some fifty-eight islets and reefs, located centrally in 
South-East Asia. It is situated at the southern tip of the peninsula of West-Malaysia, to 
which it is linked by a short causeway between Woodlands and Johor Bahru and since 
1994 by a second causeway between Tanjung Kupang in West Johore and Tuas in 
Singapore. Nowadays Singapore largely consists of built-up city-area with an intensive 
infrastructure throughout the island. 
Again in relation to its strategic location, Singapore has become a major air-hub for the 
region in its modern history with millions of visitors each year. 
Singapore's socio-geographical constellation also had much influence on its type of 
development. Roughly speaking, Singapore formed a Chinese majority nation, but 
internationally a minority city-state surrounded by Malay neighbours. The anxiety for 
and objections raised to a "Greater China"76, formed an important part of Singapore's 
political history. 
Internally, Singaporean culture was of a hybrid nature with a history of plural cultural 
influences; originally more Malay, more recently predominantly British and Chinese. 
Officially one spoke of a tripartite division of "races" in Singapore into Chinese, 
Malays and Indians. However, this over-simplified Singapore's heterogeneous reality. 
The Chinese could be divided into many different dialect group communities, each with 
its own distinct subculture. In 1980, there were roughly 800,000 Hokkiens, 400,000 
Teochews, 300,000 Cantonese, 140,000 Hakkas, 130,000 Hailams (from Hainan), 
30,000 from Fuchou, 15,000 Shanghaiese, 13,000 Heng Huas (from Fujian) and 13,000 
others. The first three were each more numerous than the Malay population. The 
Indians included Pakistanis and people from different regions in India. Even the Malay 
community in Singapore, the most homogeneous of all, included people of different 
immigrant stock. It consisted of almost ninety percent Malays and ten percent 
Indonesians (Javanese, Boyanese and Buginese). As a group they identified themselves 
as Orang Melayu to distinguish themselves from the other ethnic communities in 
Singapore. Otherwise, the Malay community was far from monolithic. There were 
divisions along lines of sub-identification and of political affiliation. For instance, the 
Javanese lived apart from the other Malays. The only occasions where they were 
united, were religious (Muslim) events or a death.77 
The ethnic diversity was further emphasised by socio-economic cleavages. The Malays 
were not only the minority in the numerical sense, but also in the socio-economic 
sense.78 The Indians, although the smallest group, had relatively more social and 
economic influence than the Malays. 
On the one hand, Singapore's proneness to put modernisation over tradition, was linked 
to a set of attitudinal and behaviourial orientations, which Hassan called the Transition 
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Syndrome79. Singaporeans could be characterised by receptiveness to change, 
achievement-orientation, materialism80, individualism, aspiration for social mobility, 
economic rationality and acquisitiveness. These attitudes were identified as the 
facilitators of a rapid process of change. Hassan traced the cause for the Transition 
Syndrome back to two factors. Firstly, Singapore was a country of immigrants. For the 
young men material gain formed the main priority to be in Singapore. Therefore 
materialism, possibly individualism, commitment to work, readiness to change, 
innovativeness and social mobility were their prime values. Secondly, referring to 
Singapore's more recent history, urbanisation in a densely populated area might have 
enhanced Singaporeans' adaptive mechanisms. These demographical and sociological 
conditions in Singapore were conducive to "development of impersonal commodity 
markets, market mentality and rational bureaucratic organization, factors crucial in 
economic and industrial development within the framework of a free enterprise market 
system"81. 
On the other hand, Cheng82 linked the demographical fact that more than three quarter 
of the population was Chinese, to Singapore's reputation of commercial importance. 
2.4 Malay culture and economic development 
The importance of the ethnical factor can be understood more fully, if one considers 
the Malay attitude towards development. 
When Raffles started developing Singapore in 1819, the Malays had the deepest 
historical roots in the area. The Malay society was traditional and feudalistic in nature. 
The Malay identity was a very strong one. S. Husin Ali described it as follows: 
" .. .the term Malay includes a wide category of people not confined only within 
the boundaries of the Malay Peninsula, but extending to a larger area often 
referred to as Nusantara. The peninsular Malays constitute but a minor portion 
of people from the same stock, and the culture they inherit forms only part of 
a greater cultural heritage of the rest of the people in the area. What has set the 
Malays in this country [Singapore] quite apart from the rest socially and 
culturally has been the result of recent colonial history."83 
The British, such as the Chinese, were mercantilistic in outlook. Trade and commerce 
were their main pre-occupations. 
According to Hussin, "it was a historical tragedy for the Malays when the Sultan and 
Temenggong of Singapore threw away the opportunity of being involved in the trading 
business when it was offered to them by Raffles ... Instead, from then on they gradually 
drifted into becoming a depressed and deprived community. "M The Sultan disregarded 
the opportunity for education in India for his own children, offered to him by Raffles. 
His wife, the Sultan said, did not want to be separated from her child. Raffles was 
utterly dismayed at the response from the Sultan. He wrote: "What more can I do? 
With all my heart I desire to see an improvement in the lot of the Malay people. But 
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if your Highness does not wish it, it is your Highness's loss and later your Highness's 
son may grow up as 
ignorant and unprincipled as the other Malay rulers."85 
The neglect for education and the unwillingness to change had immobilised the ruler 
and his people. The Malay traditional rulers and their followers remained uneducated 
and decadent during the nineteenth century. The political and social setting of the 
Singapore Malay rulers was such that 
"their thoughts and actions were not geared to any form of economic 
development. Their behaviour traits were what could be termed as manifestation 
of "negative representations" which were the anti-thesis of the traits essential for 
economic development such as self-confidence, industriousness, perseverance, 
rationality, discipline and acquisitiveness. Such a fragile and backward society 
would be no match for the more dynamic and resourceful British and the 
industrious and persevering immigrants. In Singapore, with the influx of the 
immigrants from India and China, the Malays were outstripped demographically 
and economically within a few years after [Singapore] was founded."™ 
Malay boys began their first formal institution in August 1834. The Singapore free 
School admitted twelve Malay boys to attend the first Malay class. The number had 
increased to fifty by 1840. However, the Malay class was discontinued two years later. 
Response was poor due to indifference of Malay parents to British educational 
measures. They desired that their children should seek employment at an early age and 
they were prejudiced against their children receiving instruction under foreign teachers. 
Religious arguments played an important part in the Malays' unwillingness to accept 
English education. They feared being deculturalised and the older generation believed 
that English education would "Christianise" their children. 
Virtually all Malay Singaporeans were Muslim. They generally held religious values 
in higher regard than economic values, in contrast to the Chinese in Singapore, who 
generally gave priority to economic over religious values.87 The Islam was often 
associated with economic backwardness in the same sense that Max Weber thought 
Confucianism was inhibitive to the growth of capitalism in China, but Gammer argued 
that doctrinally, Islam and capitalism were not incompatible.88 Muslims did not have 
to repudiate the profit motive and its corollary, saving. The Islam did not disapprove 
of the capitalist ethic, provided that the enterprise would not be pursued in excess. 
However, the Islam entirely lacked an emphasis on the edifying role of labour itself, 
such as in Protestantism. As a result, tension between cultural-religious demands on the 
one hand and modern, economic demands on the other, played a central part in the 
economic ideology of the Malays in Malaysia. The Malays were confused by an internal 
conflict between the values of simplicity, hospitality and the futility of the excessive on 
the one hand and those of industry, frugality, self-reliance and adaptability on the other. 
A study of the traditional Malay culture, both oral and written, showed that both sets 
of attitudes were constantly present.89 
At the speed with which the Chinese and Indian immigrants laboured and progressed, 
the position of the Malays worsened rapidly. At the close of the century, the Malays 
were already in a state of economic oblivion. 
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Early twentieth century several attempts were made to analyse the Malay situation. The 
local Straits Chinese press attributed the Malay poor economic situation to "their slavish 
adherence to outmoded custom, the dissoluteness of their traditional leaders (interested 
only in opium, women and gambling), their lack of industry and ambition, their 
hostility toward anyone who showed exceptional talents, and their inability to practise 
mutual self-help. "90 
The Malay newspaper Al-Imam attributed the ills of the Malay community to 
"their domination by an alien race, their laziness, their complacency, their bickering 
among themselves, and their inability to cooperate for the common good."" Al-Imam, 
a religious reform journal, advocated that the society return to the true teachings of 
Islam to seek redress. 
The Malay writer Za'ba, published his ideas in the Malay Mail in 1923: 
"The Malays, as a whole, are a particularly poor people. Poverty is their most 
outstanding characteristic and their greatest handicap in the race of progress. 
Poor in money, poor in education, poor in intellectual equipment and moral 
qualities, they cannot be otherwise but left behind in the march of nations.. .The 
poverty of the Malays is an all-round poverty. That they are poor people in 
many matters goes without saying. But what is more distressing is the fact that 
they are also poor in all other equipment which can lead to success and 
greatness. 
They are not, however, naturally of poor intellect, or incapable of high morals. 
Potentially, they possess such qualities as much as do any other people. But the 
actualised part of this potentiality is still too poor to bear comparison with what 
we find in other progressive peoples in the country. 
Intellectually, the Malays are poor in knowledge, in culture and in the general 
means of cultivating the mind. Their literature is poor and unelevating; their 
domestic surroundings from childhood are poor and seldom edifying; their 
religious life and practice is poor and far removed from the pure original 
teachings of the Prophet. In short, the Malays cut poor figures in every 
department of life."92 
Besides their inhibiting socio-cultural environment with regard to economic 
development, the colonial policies were to be blamed just as much for aggravating the 
economic deprivation of the Malays. Government assistance for the Malays during 
colonial days was "extremely insignificant".93 Once the British completely controlled 
Singapore, their aim was to maximise the economic benefits to the British empire. This 
was done amongst others by a policy of uncontrolled immigration into Singapore. For 
tactical and strategic reasons, they did not attempt to increase the social mobility of the 
people through education and knowledge. If at all any attempt was made, it was 
confined to providing only primary vernacular education. The Malays were totally 
insulated from the English education system and were kept ignorant from the knowledge 
and skills associated with commerce and trade, which were the engine of growth of that 
time. The nature of the education for the Malays was revealed by W.H. Treacher, the 
Resident of Perak: " ...the vernacular education brought to their doors by a liberal 
government has not for its main object the manufacture of clerks, but that a lad who 
has gone through the school training is likely to be a better padi planter, trader, minor 
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or sailor than one whose early years have been passed in idleness in the village 
lanes."94 The colonial education policies for the Malay states were similarly extended 
to colonial Singapore. 
After the Second World War, in the fifties, the desire heightened to oust the colonial 
masters away from Singapore soil in anticipation of merger with Malaysia. But now the 
Malay development got caught up in the political developments of that time. When the 
People's Action Party (PAP) won the elections in Singapore in 1959, it first crusaded 
for merger with the Malay states. The PAP's strategies were strongly pro-Malay then. 
The PAP increased the economic opportunities for Malays of working class origin by 
providing jobs in public authorities and government service. Opportunities were created 
for promotion of "suitable Malay officers to the highest grades for which they were 
fitted"'5. The livelihood of Malay fishermen was diversified by the approval of the 
purchase of goats. The government also tried to convince commercial and banking 
sectors to engage Malays on their staff and train them for more responsible jobs to get 
them involved in trade and industry. But the complaint was that one could not get 
"sufficient numbers of qualified Malays to take up jobs in their businesses. "% 
The PAP's modernisation drive from independence onwards was not welcomed by the 
Malay community. The Malays appealed to the government for special assistance, based 
on "the phenomenon commonly practised in international economic cooperation...the 
philosophy of the 'haves' or the developed helping the 'have nots' or the 
developing."97 But the PAP held the position that it would not correct the socio-
economic imbalance directly. The PAP repudiated the model of giving special privileges 
to the Malays, such as the Bumi putera98 system in Malaysia. As an alternative to this 
Malaysian model, the PAP's way of helping the Malays was to "increase their ability 
and raise the amount of training and education they get so that they could live on par 
with other communities in Singapore."99 The PAP government announced that free 
education was to be extended for Malay students from the primary level (which was 
free for all pupils) to the secondary and tertiary levels. However, the Malay students 
to qualify for this free education, had to fall under the government's definition of 
"Malay": for instance, pupils of Indonesian origin born in Singapore were not 
considered Malay. The government's legal definition was different from the cultural 
interpretation of the Malay community. This caused quite some anxiety among the 
Malays. But there were too few legal non-Malays to make it an issue. 
In the constitution the concession was made that the government should "exercise its 
functions in such a manner as to recognise the special position of the Malays who are 
the indigenous people of Singapore."100 In order to win this minority's loyalty, the 
PAP attempted to involve the Malays in national affairs. The PAP's tactic was to give 
the Malays disproportionate representation in the party executive and in parliament.101 
Malay Muslims were granted special legal and administrative provisions to regulate 
their own religious affairs. Articles 15, 152 and 153 of the Singapore Constitution gave 
the Malays special rights. Article 15 guaranteed freedom of religion. Article 152 
charged the government to recognise the special position of Malays and to protect and 
promote their interests, including religious interest. Article 153 formed the basis for the 
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Administration of Muslim Law Act and MUIS (Majlis Ugama Islam Singapore)101. 
Unlike the economic and educational assistance, unexpectedly the indirect religious 
assistance had the most effect in the form of a gradual increase in the scope of the 
Islamic activities of the Muslims in Singapore.103 
Neverthelss, when Singapore, after a difficult merger period with a fierce verbal battle 
between the Chinese and the Malays, was separated from the Federation of Malaya, the 
Malay development in Singapore was stunted again. Psychologically, the separation 
with Malaysia was unbearable to the Malays in Singapore who became the minority 
again. While they were still in a trauma, the PAP government embarked on new 
policies and strategies. Towards the end of the sixties, the government's defence budget 
acquired priority over the educational budget. This was perceived by the Malay 
community as backtracking of the government on its previous policies, but not much 
was done about it. 
Because the PAP aimed at integrating with the international network of trade, commerce 
and communication, constant upgrading of education was needed. This meant greater 
exposure to and use of the English language. To avoid polarisation and to ensure 
cultural ballast, the government made it compulsory to study the mother-tongue, 
religion and literature. The Malays had to make quick adjustments to this new situation. 
The Malay teachers made their own proposal for the National Education System. While 
making English the first language, they deliberately emphasised the importance of 
Eastern values through mother-tongue, literature, major religions and learning of the 
national language (Bahasa Kebangsaan) for all students. This proposal was scotched by 
the authorities. 
Indirectly, the PAP offered the Malays better economic opportunities by better 
education as a means of self-improvement. More bursaries, scholarships and educational 
aids were set aside for the Malays. In 1967 a special committee of senior Malay officers 
was installed to advise the political leaders on the advancement of the Malays. The 
Malays' reaction to the educational opportunities was ambivalent. Many recognised that 
only education could upgrade the Malays' socio-economic position, but simultaneously 
they felt that it was a long-term solution. By the time the Malays were offered the 
opportunity to upgrade themselves, they found the other communities were way ahead 
of them both in education and economics. Events in the sixties and seventies seemed 
to make the Malays the 'forgotten few' amidst the rising affluence of multi-racial 
Singapore. The Malays feared that even with education they might not be able to 
compete successfully with the other communities strictly on a basis of meritocracy.104 
This way the Malays insulated themselves most from the other population groups.105 
They felt caught up in the waves of drastic political, economic and social developments 
in independent Singapore. Certain policies, such as the NS recruitment, reinforced the 
Malays' belief in the lack of governmental empathy and trust in the Malays. They felt 
a sense of hopelessness and ended up in the periphery of Singapore's national 
development, an ill-equipped and depressed community. They were lagging far behind 
the other ethnic groups in practically all fields of endeavour.106 
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In 1980, the Malays had the highest percentage (86.3 percent) of persons aged 10 years 
and over who had an education below secondary level (compared to 79.2 percent for 
the average national level). They had the lowest percentage (13.7 percent) with 
education at secondary and higher level (compared to 20.8 percent at the national 
level).107 In 1983, there were only 384 Malay undergraduates in the National 
University of Singapore and for the year '82/'83 there were 291 Malay students in the 
Singapore Polytechnic. Malay students were thus underrepresented in the academic 
circles, whereas in the vocational institutes 25 percent of the students were Malays. 
This general low educational level was reflected in the low occupational status of the 
Malays. In 1980, about 86 percent of the Malays occupied three main occupational 
areas of low strata: clerical, service and production sectors. About half of these worked 
as production workers in assembly lines. The Malays were glaringly lacking in the 
professional, administrative and managerial employment sectors.108 If they were in 
business, they were mainly involved in small-size business and manufacturing 
industries. 
The third socio-economic factor which strengthened the low status of the Malays was 
the type of dwelling they occupied. In a special meeting between first Deputy Prime 
Minister Goh Chok Tong and the MAB and the Malay activists in 1986, Goh stated that 
23.2 percent of the Malays stayed in one- or two room flats, while only 4.4 percent 
stayed in five room and executive flats. 
The development gap of the Malays was acknowledged by the government. Lee Kuan 
Yew referred to the Malays' poor socio-economic situation as follows: "It was because 
of the general view that Malays, unlike the Indians and other minorities, had not risen 
up through the school system and into the universities. The fear then was that our 
Malays would not be able to adjust and fit to the jobs as Singapore industrialises and 
they would not adjust to high-rise living as we became more urbanised."109 Brigadier 
general Lee Hsien Loong, Minister for Trade and Industry and second Minister for 
Defence, said that unless non-Chinese Singaporeans were assured of their place in the 
Singapore society, "we will never achieve peace, progress and prosperity for our 
Nation."110 
Concerning the development stagnation of the Malay community, the president of the 
Singapore Malay Teachers' Union (SMTU) called for research not only into the 
Malays' problems, but also on how they could fit into and adapt themselves to 
Singapore's economic development. This was not an easy task, as there were several 
structural differences in priorities between the Malay and the Chinese vision of society. 
Haji Sidek Bin Saniff, the Malay senior parliamentary secretary at the ministry of 
education, thought a strong and dynamic society could be accomplished by 
strengthening the society's structures, "namely faith, social, culture, administration, 
economics and politics."111 For the Chinese, faith was not an issue and certainly not 
the prime one. Their crucial concern was economic growth. 
Alatas had also attributed the Malays' lack of development to the "human factor" rather 
than to "objective factors".112 Central to this human factor was the "spirit to think and 
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the will to work hard". Alatas saw an internal change within the individual as the sine 
qua non before any external effect could be brought about. A group of intellectuals in 
society was needed to provide the leadership towards the revival of the spirit to think. 
Therefore education constituted a vital factor to break the Malay vicious cycle syndrome 
and escape the poverty trap. 
In the eighties three important gatherings had taken place by Malay-Muslim 
organisations to discuss their economic development and future. There were eight 
leading organisations in the Malay community in Singapore. Collectively, they not only 
mirrored the political, educational and socio-economic aspirations of the community, 
but also reflected the aggregate efforts of the community in seeking its own 
advancement. They could be considered as the main agents of change for the Malays. 
1. The Singapore Malay Union or KMS (Kesatuan Melayu Singapura) 
The KMS was active in the 1920's. Founder Mohammed Eunos realised the handicap 
of the Malay children in not speaking English, the "bread-earning language". The KMS 
wanted to shorten the vernacular education and extend English education to Malay 
children. Eunos also made the Kampong Melayu proposal, to set aside a piece of land 
for a Malay kampong in response to a plight of Malay settlers who had to move out of 
the city area due to economic development. This Malay kampong was the most 
successful contribution of the KMS to the cause of the Malays.113 
2. The UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) 
or PKMS (Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura) 
The UMNO was the other Malay political party besides the KMS that defended Malay 
issues since 1948, when Singapore became a separate colony. The UMNO played a 
political role in the constitutional development of Singapore in the 1950's and it joined 
forces with Malay non-political organisations in advancing the socio-economic and 
educational issues that affected the Malay community. When the government introduced 
English as the medium for instruction (except for the teaching of religious instruction, 
the Malay language and the Malay literature) without consulting Malay teachers and 
bodies, the Malays interpreted this as an attempt of anglicization. They feared that the 
Malay society would be deculturalised as a result of Malay students adopting new 
values contrary to their traditional beliefs and practices.114 
The highlight of the Singapore UMNO's agitation for the economic well-being of the 
Malays occurred when Singapore belonged to the Federation of Malaysia. They felt part 
of the Malay majority in the Federation and therefore expected some improvements in 
their socio-economic status. This was the period of rising expectations. But these were 
soon demolished after strong communalism led to the racial riots in Singapore in August 
1964. The Malays suddenly found themselves transformed into a minority group. They 
were in a psychological dilemma. Their political wings were abruptly clipped and their 
assertive strength through the political avenue lost. However, after separation, the 
UMNO continued its efforts by making its views known in matters which affected the 
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Malay community. For instance they submitted a need for a cultural definition of the 
Malay, the safeguarding of the rights of the Malay as the indigenous people and as a 
minority community and the creation of an ombudsman. The Constitutional Commission 
only retained the clause on the special position of the Malays as the indigenous people 
of Singapore and the creation of the Presidential Council, an institution for the 
protection of minority rights.115 
3. The Singapore Malay Teachers' Union 
or Kesatuan Guru-Guru Me lay и Singapura (KGMS) 
The KGMS was registered as a trade union in 1947. Originally it started as a welfare 
organisation in 1926. The three roles it had taken upon itself were, firstly, to improve 
the conditions of service of the Malay teachers, such as their salaries. Secondly, KGMS 
was active in the area of language and cultural development through congresses. 
Thirdly, for a long time it acted unofficially as a custodian of Malay education in 
Singapore. Again the theme of fear for deculturalisation of Malay pupils through 
adoption of new values was an issue. In combination with the fear of redundance of 
Malay teachers, the KGMS opposed the government's educational plans, particularly 
at a time when Malay hopes were raised of upgrading the level of Malay education. But 
as stated before, with separation from Malaysia Malay education in Singapore inevitably 
began its decline. Declining enrolment in Malay-medium schools began to show from 
1967 onwards. KGMS proposed an alternative national system of education. They 
pragmatically chose English as the main medium of instruction, but they also called for 
the teaching of the national language, which was Malay, to all non-Malay pupils. 
Finally, to ensure preservation of cultural roots, they proposed that all pupils should 
leam their mother-tongue including their own literature. For the Malay pupils, in 
addition, the study of religious knowledge would be included. KGMS tried to discuss 
this proposal with the Malay Affairs Bureau (MAB), the Malay political arm of the 
PAP, but in vain. The non-Malays and the government considered their ideas as 
chauvinistic and politically motivated. At the start of a new, multi-racial Singapore, Lee 
Kuan Yew commented: 
"Singaporeans are getting a little on the soft side. This will not do. We are all 
aware that a new situation is likely to develop in the region. We must nip some 
of these problems in the bud... They were both [Chinese and Malay language 
activists] playing someone else's game. They both stopped, but only after they 
knew we meant business. By the time we were prepared to act against the 
majority, everyone else got the message."116 
The Malay proposal was not acceptable to the Chinese majority, because of the 
downgrading of the status of the Chinese language in this educational system. 
Eventually, however, a modified version of this proposal by the KGMS has been 
emerging in the late eighties. By 1987 all pupils were attending a single, national 
system of education learning English and their mother-tongue. Though the study of the 
so called National Language never emerged, brighter students can now opt for the study 
of the Malay language as one of the foreign languages such as German, French or 
Japanese.117 
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4. The LBKM (Lembaga Biasiswa Kenangan Maulud) 
or Prophet Muhammad's Birthday Memorial Scholarship Fund Board 
The LBKM was the first collective effort by the Muslim community to raise funds at 
a national level for the educational benefit of Muslim children. Since 1965 LBKM had 
provided financial assistance to Muslim students and had become one of the leading 
organisations in this field."8 
5. The Majlis Pusat (Majlis Pusat Pertubuhan-Pertubuhan Budaya Melayu 
Singapura) or the Central Council of Malay Cultural Organizations Singapore 
The Majlis Pusat was formed in 1969 to uplift the social, economic and cultural status 
of Singapore Malays in a coordinated way. Education, employment and housing were 
taken as the main, interrelated problems of the Malays. Many problems sprouted from 
the National Service (NS) for Malay youths. A sizeable number of them were not called 
or enlisted for active military training, which disadvantaged these Malays in finding 
employment as it was obligatory to have completed NS first. Therefore they remained 
idle outside their own fault. After the painful merger period and the subsequent 
separation with Malaysia, the Singapore government did not seem to trust the undivided 
loyalty of the Singapore Malays regarding the security of the new nation.119 
Furthermore, the resettlement problems of the Malays from the kampongs into high-rise 
public housing estates were studied. According to these studies, the change in lifestyle 
from the traditional village to modern, urban life was socially most unsettling to them. 
The clearest area of conflict between the Malays and the Chinese majority was the 
PAP's housing programme. This was intended to fulfil the basic needs of the 
population, but for many Malays it meant the opposite. The relocation to Housing 
Development Board (HDB) flats completely disrupted their way of life. The Malays 
placed high social value on living close to other Malays with the same religion in Malay 
style houses. The Malays' tenacious adherence to traditional values was not on par with 
the government's intentions to urbanise and modernise Singapore as rapidly as possible. 
The PAP intended to "alleviate overcrowding"120 and the Malay style houses would 
take up too much space on the small island of Singapore. It was speculated that the 
Malays were most opposed to the government's development strategies because of this, 
whereas publicised studies showed consensus. But Chan pointed out121 that these 
studies into the satisfaction of Malays with the relocation scheme suffered from 
methodological problems. The extremely dissatisfied had left the HDB flats again and 
were thus excluded from the analyses. Those who remained, generally felt that the new 
living environment was a change for the better. 
6. The Malay members of Parliament (MP's) 
The MP's were extremely concerned when the Singapore Census of Population Report 
1980 revealed a low socio-economic status of the Singapore Malays. This meant a 
turning point in the Malays' attitude. Indeed, their poor education was related to their 
poor economic position which afforded them only the lowest level of housing in 
Singapore. The Malay MP's agreed on the need for a more systematic, coordinated and 
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stronger collective effort to meet this socio-economic challenge. They also recognised 
the need to include Malay community leaders and their organisations. They prepared 
a discussion paper focusing on the importance of education and the need to bring about 
"developments and changes in the socio-cultural environment of the Malay community 
in the manner that will speed up the general upgrading process."122 This way 
MENDAKI (Majlis Pendidikan Anak-Anak Islam) or the Council on Education for 
Muslim Children came into being in 1981. One of its efforts extended to the moral and 
religious education of Muslim children. By February 1982, MENDAKI had the support 
of eleven organisations representing educational, socio-economic and religious interests 
of the Malay community. Its new features were that both Malay political leaders and 
other community leaders were involved. MENDAKI's opening congress was the biggest 
ever and the first of such congresses to be endorsed by the government. Lee Kuan Yew, 
however, in his keynote address in 1982, emphasised the importance of MENDAKI's 
task to raise the living standard of the majority of the Malays, not only of the minority 
who made it to the top. He also pointed out to them the importance of the English 
language: "Language is the key to acquisitions of knowledge. If a student is unable to 
understand the language, then he is unable to receive information or knowledge in that 
language."123 
In 1989 MENDAKI was restructured and since then has promoted the educational, 
economic and socio-cultural development of the Malay/Muslim community. Goh Chok 
Tong proposed to divert the direct government subsidies for tertiary education to Malay 
students to a new fund to be administered by the new MENDAKI. This was received 
with mixed feelings by the Malay community. It felt that the government was abdicating 
from its direct responsibility to the Malays by this proposal. But the Minister-in-charge-
of-Muslim-affairs gave the assurance that the tuition fees would not be eroded in any 
way; they would only follow a different channel.124 In 1990 the proposal was accepted 
and the new fund started with a S$10 million government grant in 1991/1992. 
7. KEMAS (Kongres Ekonomi Masyarakat Melayu-Islam Singapura) 
or the Singapore Malay-Muslim Economic Congress 
An important event to the Malay community was KEMAS in 1985. It came about by 
a concrete proposal of the government to extend the withdrawal age for the Central 
Provident Fund (CPF)125 from 55 to 65 years. This would adversely affect the Muslim 
retirees who upon their retirement at 55 normally wanted to use their CPF-savings for 
their pilgrimage to Mecca. Out of the public controversy came the idea to set up a 
Malay-Muslim trust fund for these kind of purposes. The discussion also shifted to a 
more general level of the future economic prospects of the Malay community. KEMAS 
led to a special task force to formulate action programmes to uplift the economic status 
of the Muslim community. Their reports were represented to the Minister-in-charge-of-
Muslim-Affairs.126 
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8. The Malay Affairs Bureau (MAB) 
For the first generation leaders in independent Singapore it appeared hard to shed their 
negative emotions towards the Malays. Only in 1984, first Deputy Prime Minister Goh 
Спок Tong started bridging this gap. He suggested a special committee to look into the 
Malay problem. The Malay Affairs Bureau (MAB) was installed by the PAP as its 
Malay political arm. The MAB was expected to represent and articulate Malay interests 
within the party. The MAB group made presentations to the top non-Malay government 
leaders. 
The PAP government had achieved economic success for Singapore by going from a 
"philosophy of survival" to a thinking in terms of a "culture of success". During this 
development process the majority of the Malays in Singapore had shed whatever 
psycho-emotional attachments it had towards Malaysia. Their "enigmatic frame of 
mind" had been "Singaporeanised".127 Nevertheless, the MAB was interpreted as the 
government's actual willingness to resolve the problems. This wind of change in the 
government relieved the Malays. 
The feeling of mutual responsibility between the community leaders and the MAB 
towards resolving the Malay problem eradicated the dichotomy or the sense of 
separateness between the grassroots leaders and the political leaders of the Malay 
community, which prevailed in the seventies. Naturally, such a political arm had its 
limitations and constraints. It had to operate at the national level, which meant 
accepting the norms and values considered acceptable to the nation. On the other hand, 
the MAB was expected to portray and represent the interests of the Malay community 
in particular. For example, the two basic principles underlining the overall national 
interest of Singapore - the fact that it was a plural society surrounded by ethnically and 
culturally different countries - were multi-racialism and meritocracy, also dubbed the 
"2M philosophy". The first M, multi-racialism, was based on the principle that "each 
ethnic group has the right to exist and develop in a way it chooses within the context 
of a modernising Singapore".128 As such, each ethnic group was given the opportunity 
and freedom in the learning and preservation of its language, culture and religion. Thus, 
multi-racialism entailed the evolutionary growth of the diverse cultures and religions 
within a Singaporean milieu in a manner that did not destabilise the social harmony and 
tolerance that the government tried to build. The second M, meritocracy, was adhered 
to, because Singapore, devoid of natural resources, had to rely on its human resources. 
The Malays did not object to Singapore's two M's per se, but did bring up injustice in 
application. 
"From the wide spectrum of its ethnically-diverse population, meritocracy is the 
rational selection process. It simply means getting the right people to perform 
the right job. In other words it is the principle of "from each his best, to each 
his worth". Meritocracy stresses achievements and not ascription, ensures 
efficiency and prevents kleptocracy and above all it enhances productivity. 
However, the uneasiness and the occasional disquiet amongst the Malay 
community is not the merit of the 2M philosophy of multi-racialism and 
meritocracy, but over the apparent unevenness in the implementation of these 
principles."129 
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On the seven important issues that affected Malays in the sixties and seventies, the 
MAB made representations on two issues. The first was on the need for the government 
to provide suitable sites for mosques in the new satellite towns as a result of many 
mosques and suraus that had to give way for development. A verbal guarantee was 
given that sites would be reserved for religious purposes in all future housing estates. 
The second issue was the unresolved question of the NS for Malay youths. Here, in 
spite of the MAB bringing up the matter with the Central Executive Committee of the 
PAP, Malay youths were still not being called up for full-time service in the seventies. 
The latter issue was seen as an example of selective meritocracy and the uneven 
implementation of government's policy over its entire population. 13° 
In the eighties Malay youths finally were being called for full-time NS just like the 
others. Now the MAB had a task in resolving the uneasiness of the Malays with the 
"Speak Mandarin Campaign" by the government. NTUC Comfort taxi's131 carried a 
sticker saying "Nation Speaks Mandarin", which was experienced as offensive to the 
Malay community as Malay was the official national language. The MAB also assisted 
in seeking the building of alternative mosques in areas regarded as "sensitive Malay 
enclaves".132 
The disappearance of their kampongs made them a nostalgic memory to the Malays. In 
a land scarce area such as Singapore where national interest had priority over sectional 
interest, Malay kampongs had to give way to "development". The MAB perceived this 
type of development as necessary sacrifice to progress. It, however, requested the 
government to find some alternatives to preserve a Malay kampong. The government 
found this difficult to accept, but it agreed to a blend of the old and the new. The 
Malay kampong was to become a business centre with a Malay architecture. Shops 
could sell Malay traditional goods and Malay food, rented out to only Malay 
shopkeepers and caterers. This proposal initially generated much interest among the 
Malay community, but Gey lang Serai eventually turned out to become rather a tourist 
attraction than a kampong attractive to Malays.133 
The MAB also took on less major issues for the Malay community. For instance, the 
intended renaming of an acquired Malay settlement by the government to Hong Qing 
Estate. The Malay residents, who would be staying in the newly developed area, were 
unhappy over this new Hanyu Pinyin name. They associated Hong Qing with Hancing, 
which in Malay meant the unpleasant and nauseating smell of unwashed latrines. To 
some this sounded trivial, but to the Malays the thought of being ridiculed as residents 
of Hancing Estate was unacceptable. The government later decided to retain the original 
name and renamed the place again to Kaki Bukit Estate.134 
A similar example was the intention of the Housing and Development Board to paint 
Chinese zodiac signs on the walls of HDB blocks of flats. While the Malays accepted 
the reason to upgrade HDB flats with wall murals and graphics having cultural themes, 
the possibility of having their block painted with the pig sign would be repugnant to 
them. To Muslims a pig is an extremely unhygienic animal and a religious taboo is 
attributed to it. Finally, the MAB was assured by the ministry of national development 
40 Singapore, a modem Asian city-state 
that "Chinese zodiac signs will not be applied to residential blocks, but only sparingly 
on commercial buildings in HDB neighbourhood and new town centres."135 
Altogether, the more than sixty year effort by the Malay community to improve their 
lot through their various organisations was an uphill struggle. Except for the eighties 
there was no meaningful cooperation between the eight Malay organisations on matters 
affecting the interests of the whole community. They had limited results, because they 
operated mainly within their own organisational radii. Each organisation was left on its 
own to bring forth issues for the attention of the Malay community. The other 
organisations would, at best, lend their support by merely making public 
pronouncements of their views regarding these issues. It was left to the individual 
organisation to carry them through for public debate and support. The latter mainly 
revolved among the organisational spheres of the Malay community. Except for events 
in the eighties there was no participation or involvement from semi-official or official 
side, neither individually or organisationally. The limited success that was achieved by 
the Malay organisations in the 1920's (Mohammed Eunos Abdullah) and in the 1980's 
(MENDAKI), seemed to indicate that these achievements had only been possible as a 
result of some political linkage with the government. All efforts in the 1960's and 
1970's outside the political or semi-political arena, were unsuccessful. An evolutionary 
process and a moderate or rational approach to convince the government of the pressing 
needs of the minority community, had proven to be more effective than a revolutionary 
or confrontational approach.136 
It was not until the nineties that the Malays made concerted efforts to join the 
mainstream of society.137 They found themselves at an important crossroad. Two 
decades of self-help, notwithstanding their missionary zeal, had had marginal success. 
One of the reasons of the inertia of the community in not taking advantage of the 
modernisation process, was the fact that for a long time the development in Singapore 
had been confusing to the minds of the Malays over the need for change in a 
modernising society.138 The society had been 
subjected to modem and traditional stimuli both interacting and confronting each other 
simultaneously and continuously. Some, who were unable to comprehend and reconcile 
between the modem and the traditional, retreated in a sort of "cultural cocoon" and 
became "psychologically immobilised"139. The Malays formed the only community 
in Singapore which did not really consist of immigrants and therefore was 
psychologically less open to changes of any kind. 
They had been confronted with the reality of constant change in Singapore. If they did 
not keep pace with that change, they would fall behind. The government's emphasis on 
Singapore as a city-state and a global city, competing in the international league with 
the industrialised countries, could not be evaded any longer. The Malays decided no 
longer to be marginalised and to be included in the rat race. They no longer blamed 
their lack of development on neglect, poverty and absence of facilitating institutional 
factors. Their hopes were directed at the new generation of leaders in Singapore. The 
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MAB had raised new hopes. With official support greater results could be achieved. 
The Malay political elite, the members of parliament (MP's), were therefore seen as 
the backbone of change for the Malays. ш The participation of the Malay political 
elite in MEND AKI and KEMAS altered the organisational strategy and operation of the 
Malay community. They had begun to display a stronger sense of self-reliance which 
was reflected in the departure from the traditional uncoordinated and fractionated mode 
of operation. With the pooling together of common resources, both the community and 
the political elite could identify common objectives and map out common action plans. 
The Malays were now willing to cooperate to improve their own development process. 
They had needed a social incubation period to overcome their past frustrations with the 
colonial government and the disappointment of separation from Malaysia on the one 
hand, and on the other hand to become used to the Chinese Singaporean Wirtschaftsethik 
and social temperament. This change of heart was reflected in Sidek's "formula for 
success": 
"...after good leadership, is the following: 
First, hard work 
Second, hard work and 
Third, hard work 
There is no substitute for hard work. 
And there surely will, insya Allah, evolve the Sophisticated Malay in the very 
near future."141 
CHAPTER 3 
THE RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE 
3.1 Religious background 
An important part of people's cultural background is formed by their religion. 
From the psychological point of view of Fromm, religion helps to provide people with 
a framework of values.' Durkheim claimed a sociological relation when stating that 
"certain aspects or conditions of society generate the responses we call religious".2 But 
often it is "difficult to separate the religious .. from other aspects of culture... After all, 
the categorising of beliefs as religious or political or social is a relatively new 
custom. "3 In this chapter the main religious influences in Singapore are discussed, in 
particular their impact on Singapore's economic development. 
3.2 Ethnography of religions in Singapore 
In multi-ethnic and multi-religious Singapore religion was a sensitive issue. Considering 
its plural society, the government chose to be religiously neutral, while it 
simultaneously valued religions and promoted inter-religious tolerance. Sheares, the 
second president of Singapore, stated in his inaugural speech in 1974: 
"Constitutionally, we are a secular society. There is no official religion. This 
does not make us an irreligious or an anti-religious society ... No less in terms 
of our crowded and restless life in a city, religion can give a richness to 
individual life which makes him [the individual] the better citizen, both in what 
he gives to society and what he appreciates in society."4 
Singaporeans were allowed freedom of worship. In the 1992 publication of the Ministry 
of Information and the Arts5 Singapore counted seven religions: Islam, Buddhism, 
Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism, Judaism and Zoroastrianism. In a 1991 publication by 
the same ministry6 the latter three religions, plus the Jains, were assembled under 
"other religions". A small rest category of people without an official faith was labelled 
"Free Thought". The distribution in percentages was as follows: 
1. 58.9 was Buddhist, Taoist, Traditional Chinese Religionist 
or some combination of the three 
2. 15.4 was Muslim, the majority of them Malay 
3. 12.6 was Christian, the majority of them Chinese 
4. 3.6 was Hindu, almost all of them Indian. 
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Chinese Singaporeans 
The majority of the Buddhists in Singapore belonged to the Mahay ana school, in which 
cultural practices were often confused with religious practices.7 Mahayana or popular 
Buddhism, as practised among Chinese Singaporeans, emphasised the exemplification 
of moral acts as a means of accumulating merit or alternatively the avoidance of acts 
incurring demerit. The most outstanding feature of the practice of Buddhists in 
Singapore was the worship of the Bodhisattva Kuan Yin, the goddess of mercy.8 Only 
a small number of Singaporeans adhered to the more strictly religious Theravada 
school. 
About half of the population in Singapore would declare themselves to be "Buddhists" 
if asked for their religion. However, it was found that the Buddhists of Singapore did 
not share a unitary religion.9 "Buddhism" was used as a convenient religious label, 
whereas a large number of those who claimed to be Buddhists were actually 
practitioners of "Chinese religion".10 Most of the Chinese majority of the Singaporeans 
had a wide range of beliefs, practices and institutions. Chinese culture in Singapore was 
the end-product of various influences in the past. The character of the early immigrants 
and their economic motivations set the tone for the religious-cultural practice among the 
Chinese in Singapore.11 The early Chinese immigrants, divided along dialect lines, 
built their own temples to continue their religious practices brought along from their 
home-region. Each dialect group continued its own regionally differing beliefs and 
practices in Singapore. By the time Singapore became independent, there was only one 
fully developed Buddhist monastery in Singapore, but there was a proliferation of spirit-
medium cults and vegetarian sects. While the former existed as small, isolated and often 
transient organisations, the latter catered mainly to a special audience of immigrant 
women.12 Many of the rituals of the various Chinese sects13 were "part of a folk 
religion, an oral tradition without a fixed set of dogma's, doctrines, or a powerful 
priesthood. It's a syncretic religious system, drawing from many religious traditions, 
including Buddhism [mainly Mahayana school], Taoism [follow teachings of Lao Zi], 
Confucianism [Confucius, Mencius] and traditional indigenous beliefs."14 
At the end of the eighties and in the mid-nineties Buddhism showed a revival in 
Singapore. Some of the original temples were preserved as national monuments and new 
temples were built as well. They still served the needs of many contemporary 
Singaporeans. In the nineties there were about one hundred and fifty Buddhist 
institutions and on Vesak Day (celebrating the birth and enlightenment of Buddha) the 
Buddhist temples were crowded with worshippers.15 
Muslims 
Islam was introduced into Singapore and the region by Arab and Indian merchants in 
the twelfth century. By the fourteenth century it had become the principal religion in 
the region. But as Singapore developed into a predominantly Chinese state, the Islam 
did not get a strong foothold in Singapore itself. Singapore was thus a 'religious island' 
surrounded by Muslim-countries. 
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The Muslims in Singapore were mainly Malay. A minority of 14.1 percent of the 
Muslims was Indian. The Muslims in Singapore had their own Islamic Religious 
Council (MUIS) and Islamic Centre. Housing and Development Board (HDB) New 
Towns with a sufficient number of Muslims had their own mosques. 
Christians 
Christians were divided into Roman Catholics (109,000) and Protestants (176,100). 
Catholicism was brought to Singapore by missionaries soon after Raffles opened up the 
British trading port. The establishment of educational centres besides churches helped 
to steadily increase the number of Catholics. Until 1972 these Catholics fell under the 
jurisdiction of the bishop of Macau (Portuguese mission) and the bishop of Malacca 
(French mission). In the nineties they fell directly under Rome. 
Protestantism in Singapore originated about the same time as Catholicism. Protestants 
consisted of a number of different groups. The major four were Anglicans, Methodists, 
Brethren and Presbyterians. They were supplemented by three new groups in the 
19S0's: Baptists, Christian Nationals' Evangelism Commission (CNEC) and Bible 
Presbyterians. In the nineties Protestants included Lutheran and Seventh Day Adventists 
as well. The number of Christians in Singapore increased rapidly the past decennia. The 
existence of Christian primary and secondary schools explained the spread of 
Christianity16. 
Hindus 
Indians coming from South India constituted the Hindus in Singapore. Although a small 
minority, in the nineties they were still visibly present through some thirty Hindu 
temples as well as their colourful festivals and ceremonies. 
Inter-Religious Organisation 
In Singapore the concern for inter-religious development was taken so seriously that the 
Inter-Religious Organisation (IRO) was formed as the first such body in the world in 
1949. The IRO was to promote an ecumenical spirit among the different faiths. The 
inter-religious harmony was encouraged by fora, by presenting curriculae for various 
courses in schools, by inter-religious services in joint worship before the dedication of 
an officer or a building. Since 1970 the IRO also sent delegations abroad. Finally, the 
IRO reported on the progress of the inter-religious harmony in Singapore.17 
As a reason for the need to monitor the inter-religious harmony in Singapore, some 
major riots or clashes between different religious groups were regularly mentioned18, 
such as the "Maria Hertogh incidents" in 1950 and ethnic clashes in 1964, 1965 and 
1969. The first incidents were the result of a lawsuit over the custody of a 13 year old 
girl, Maria Bertha Hertogh. After her Dutch parents were interned in Indonesia during 
the Japanese occupation, she was raised as a Muslim by a Malay couple. When she was 
to be wed to a Muslim man, the Singapore courts ruled that she had to be returned to 
her biological parents. The lack of religious and racial sensitivity by the colonial 
government instigated riots in which eighteen people died and 173 were injured. 
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Although critics implied that these Maria Hertogh incidents were not just religiously 
based, but also due to foreign interference and a reflection of a colonial struggle against 
the white men19, the intensity of the resulting violence showed the need for efforts to 
establish religious harmony. 
The consensus in Singapore about the objective of religious harmony was reflected in 
the fact that Singapore was a secular state and had no official state religion.20 The 
constitution guaranteed fundamental liberties which include freedom of religion. 
However, if certain religious groups threatened the inter-religious harmony, they could 
be sanctioned. For example, Jehovah's Witnesses were not allowed to preach in 
Singapore. 
The IRO kept a low profile and was less known in Singapore than abroad. Certain 
religions supported it and others not at all. Taoists and Bahais were not involved, 
because they were not mentioned in the original constitution of the IRO. Although all 
other religions were represented in the IRO, Johnson noted that certain religions were 
"trying to encroach on one another's province" rather than cooperating.21 Day to day 
life, however, showed mostly a spirit of 'live and let live'.22 
3.3 Confucianism 
When asked about their religion, hardly any Chinese person would respond with 
"Confucianism". They would rather profess to an official religion such as Buddhism. 
Nevertheless, Confucianism is fundamental to Chinese thought. Although one cannot 
equate Chinese culture with Confucianism, because there are non-Confucian ingredients 
in the Chinese Weltanschauung, such as Taoism and Buddhism23, "the traditional 
values of the Chinese are basically Confucian in nature"24. 
Strictly speaking, Confucianism is not a religion in the sense of the general definition 
of "any set of attitudes, beliefs, and practices pertaining to supernatural power, whether 
that power be forces, gods, spirits, ghosts, or demons"25. Nevertheless, Confucianism 
appeared to have taken on the importance of a religion in the Chinese culture and in 
societies, where the Overseas Chinese form the majority, such as in Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Singapore, or where they form important minorities, such as in Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. 
Despite its significance, in the West little is known about Confucianism. 
Van der Leeuw pointed out that the Western image of Eastern thought had long been 
and often still is one veiled in mystery. While the People's Republic of China was 
sealed off from the outside world from the fifties to the eighties, the image of China 
as a society "rooted in a dark past compensated by a higher kind of wisdom"26 was 
widespread. Few people in the West realise that China had long been ahead of Europe 
scientifically and technically and that philosophy in China had at least the same 
flourishing and varied development as in Europe. Moreover, its level was comparable 
to the Western, Greek based, philosophy: with a written tradition, coherent set of 
philosophical notions, argumentation and accountability.27 
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Of all nations in the world China prides itself on the longest uninterrupted history 
regarding people (Han Chinese), language and culture. According to Van der Leeuw, 
Western scholars in philosophy and sinology have until recently primarily been 
interested in the part of the East that the West lacked, which was the more spiritual 
side. Thus the more conventional and rational Confucianism was less studied. A more 
realistic historical approach of Chinese thought, however, shows a world "in which 
rationalistic and mystical, scientifical and esoteric, conformist and anti-conventional 
streams of thought have existed side by side, generally like in the history of European 
thought."28 
Confucianism represents the more rational side, but it is a vast and vague subject. It 
means different things to different people. If one would go into the details of 
Confucianism, one would find that "our perception of Confucian culture may be 
different from person to person"29. This could be due to the lack of clarity of the 
Chinese philosophers, but nevertheless, scholars agree about the basic Confucian values. 
Historically, Confucianism does not refer directly to the person of Confucius, the 
latinised version of Kong Fu Zi, , as Christianity refers to Christ or the Islam 
refers to Mohammed (so that it has even mistakenly been termed Mohammedanism). 
Neither was Kong Fu Zi regarded as the main political ideologist in China. Shin 
mentioned Lao Zi as anarchist, Xun Zi and Han Fei Zi as Legalists, Mo Ti as 
humanitarian socialist and Shang Yang as absolutist as a few examples of other great 
political thinkers besides Kong Fu Zi.30 
Confucianism is rather a historical phenomenon than a static philosophy. 
"Confucianism" is the latinised term for rujia, literally meaning the School of Scholars. 
Confucianists did not regard themselves as one philosophy among others, but as the sum 
total of Chinese scholarship. It comprises the ideas and doctrines of all the 
Confucianists in the history of Chinese philosophy, i.e. including Mencius and Xun Zi 
during the Pre-Qin period (before 221 ВС) and many other Neo-Confucianists 
afterwards. The essence of Confucianism, however, is to be found in the works of 
Kong Fu Zi, Mencius and Xun Zi.31 
The originator Kong Fu Zi lived from 551 to 479 ВС. His position in Chinese 
philosophy is comparable to that of Socrates in Western philosophy. He probably did 
not write anything himself, but he taught a number of disciples and influenced others 
by his personality.32 Kong Fu Zi's ideas erupted from dissatisfaction with the 
corruption and decay of his own time. China was, and always has been, an agrarian 
state in which subsistence level living has been the lot of most people. Many powerful 
abused their power to enrich themselves. This prompted Kong Fu Zi to criticise the 
societal system and to emphasise that the state should serve the people. His idea that 
positions should be fulfilled only by those who are suited for that position, i.e. the 
virtuous, showed his lack of consent with the royal privileges.33 A value system was 
developed which placed constraint on the expression of individual desires and sponsored 
group sharing of limited resources.34 The self-sufficiency of the family-unit, based on 
its ability to manage its affairs well, was its only insurance against disaster. The 
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common budgets and property of the family formed a rational collective response to the 
surrounding circumstances.35 
Kong Fu Zi's ideas were only adopted widely as late as during the early Han dynasty 
(from 206 to 220 AD). Since Confucianism was upgraded to state doctrine during that 
period, it became known as conventional. The following millennium Confucianism 
contributed to the stability of the Chinese state and the flourishing of the highly 
advanced Chinese civilisation. 
The term "Chinese" usually refers to the Han people only, whereas China counts fifty 
five ethnic minorities as well. In the process of their assimilation into the Han "race" 
(as the Chinese generally refer to "people") as well as in the process of trading with 
foreigners, the mainstream Chinese culture was also influenced by the ideas of these 
minorities. In this way an amalgamation with the concepts of Yin and Yang and the 
Five Elements doctrine took place over time. During the Song (960-1279 AD) and the 
Ming (1368-1644 AD) Dynasties, Buddhist and Taoist ideas also permeated China and 
traditional Confucianism. After initial conflicts, both religions or philosophies became 
integrated in the existing Chinese culture. The thirteenth century brought about an 
intellectual consolidation between the three. Confucianism, which was mainly social-
psychologically oriented due to its sole emphasis on the relations between people, was 
complemented by the more spiritual Buddhism, which addressed the relation of humans 
with the supernatural, and by Taoism, which was oriented towards living in harmony 
with nature. These three major traditions were already syncretised before they were 
brought to Singapore. For example, Chinese Buddhism was not the Indian form of 
Buddhism, but assimilated through a Tibetan mentality and Tibetan practices.36 In 
China, Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism, after initial straggles, entered into a kind 
of peaceful co-existence, as if they had taken on different functions within the same 
overall framework.37 Therefore, one cannot simply regard the Chinese Weltanschauung 
as the sum total of these three religions or philosophies plus a number of local rural 
traditions and religious practices. 
The synthetic Chinese thought became known as Neo-Confucianism. This Neo-
Confucianism then spread through the greater part of East-Asia38 and flourished 
especially in the nineteenth century. It distinguished itself from traditional Confucianism 
in that it included a mentality of self-strengthening. One should start from taking 
responsibility oneself for coping with one's own situation, first through self-criticism 
and self-improvement, then by extending one's efforts to a wider field. It lacked, 
however, a strong sense of how these efforts should be directed towards national 
goals.39 Today, the widely used term of Confucianism usually refers to the amalgam 
of Neo-Confucianism. 
Blending in with other beliefs was not inconceivable for Confucianism40, until it 
encountered Western culture, symbolised by Mr. De (Democracy) and Mr. Sai 
(Science). Given the feudal structure of Chinese society, Western culture had to be 
rejected by conservatives. However, since the beginning of the twentieth century there 
had been a persistent search among Chinese intellectuals for the definition of a "new 
man" to replace the Confucian concept of man. This culminated in the May Fourth 
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Movement in 1919. Cultural and academic circles saw tradition as backward and 
irrational and agreed to overthrow the so-called "cannibalistic feudal ethics" of Chinese 
culture in the 1920's. The May Fourth Movement identified itself with what it 
perceived to be the main trend of Western culture stemming from the European 
Enlightenment, the drive for modernity. Chang, however, thought that the movement's 
humanism at least owed some of its impetus to the Confucian quest for the moral 
perfection of the individual and the society. The movement had a vision of a cultural 
renaissance in China, an Entzauberung, based on an almost religious faith in science.41 
The influx of Western values and norms with the cultural and historical relativisms that 
came along, had played a major part in the undermining of the Confucian values and 
norms. The eventual changes, however, were not as comprehensive as they first 
appeared to be. They took place more at the centre of Confucianism as a moral-spiritual 
faith and on the level of its overall pattern of values than on the level of individual 
Confucian values.42 
Both the May Fourth project and the Confucian humanism paled beside the rise of 
ideologies such as Chinese communism and Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of People 
in the course of the next decades. In 1949 China became a communist state under Mao. 
Recent Chinese history of the second half of the twentieth century has been a turbulent 
period for Chinese culture. China is still too much in the middle of societal 
transformations to seriously speculate how the relationship between the Chinese and the 
Western culture in China will develop. For the purpose of this research, however, this 
is not necessary, because Chinese migration to Singapore declined to a negligible extent 
after the Second World War. The values the Chinese Singaporeans brought along, were 
formed before the disruption of Confucianism in the mainland of China due to 
communism. 
This does not mean, however, that the development of Neo-Confucianism has come to 
a standstill outside China. To allow for the idea of modern re-interpretation of the 
original ideas and for variations in those interpretations, the term post-Confucianism is 
used. However, for the Chinese themselves there is less need to explain re-
interpretation and the simpler notion of Confucianism is generally retained.43 
Mostly, one of the following dimensions of Confucianism is emphasised: 
1. Confucianism as a scholarship or philosophy, also termed "Confucian ethics". 
2. Confucianism as a way of life for the common people. This dimension is 
referred to as "vulgar Confucianism"44, "bourgeoisie Confucianism"45, "social 
Confucianism"46, "popular Confucianism"47 and "folk Confucianism"48. 
3. Confucianism as a political ideology variously termed "imperial Confucianism", 
"state Confucianism" and "institutional Confucianism". 
Sometimes Confucianism refers to all three dimensions. 
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3.3.1. Confucianism as philosophy 
Confucianism is a practical, moral code or a philosophical value system of Chinese 
origin which has survived for over two thousand years (including the communist period) 
in and outside China. Kong Fu Zi's primary concern was how to transform people into 
moral beings. He drew a number of lessons from Chinese history, which are basically 
humanistic. 
The most crucial basic concept is ren, which has variously been translated from Chinese 
into English as love, benevolence, human-heartedness, perfect virtue or humanity.49 
According to Carmody and Carmody50: 
"The ideogram forjen [ren] represented a human being: jen is humaneness 
- what makes us human. We are not fully human simply by receiving life in a 
human form. Rather, our humanity depends upon community, human 
reciprocity. Jen pointed in that direction. It connected with the Confucian golden 
rule of not doing to others what you would not want them to do to you. Against 
individualism, it implied that people have to live together hopefully, even 
lovingly. People have to cultivate their instinctive benevolence, their instinctive 
ability to put themselves in another's shoes. That cultivation was the primary 
task of Confucius and Mencius." 
Ren encompassed moral concepts such as conscientiousness, filial piety, truthfulness, 
altruism and reverence.51 Kong Fu Zi taught that ren was a virtue achievable by 
everyone and it covered all individual Confucian virtues. The self-realisation of ren was 
not just a matter of self-transformation of human nature, but also a matter of 
communion with others, in fact inseparable from one's relationship with others. 
Therefore in Confucian terms, self-realisation does not pertain to the self only, but 
rather gains meaning when it is externalised to social and political areas. The basic 
principles are expressed in the Golden and Silver Rule, respectively "Do to others what 
you would like others to do to you" and "Do not do to others what you do not wish 
others to do to you".52 
The essence according to Mencius, is that human nature is originally good and every 
man has the moral potential to become a morally perfect man. The ultimate moral ideal 
is ren, the virtue of compassion and benevolence. To attain this ideal, a person must 
develop his moral potential as fully as possible and then he should try to establish 
rapport with others through love and considerateness. Conscience in relation to morality 
is therefore derived from one's responsibility towards other people, not from one's 
internalised responsibility towards God such as in the Western guilt-culture. Shame 
helps to maintain human relationships. Losing or giving "face" is of utmost importance 
in the Eastern shame-culture. 
To an orthodox Confucianist, moral values do not come from a church or society: they 
are part of the original make-up of man. Moral values are universal and are therefore 
not questioned. This belief is important to combat moral scepticism and relativism. To 
a Confucianist, the cultivation of moral character is primarily for the sake of the moral 
agent and not for others. Science cannot answer the question: Why should one be 
moral? In fact, it cannot give us reasons why man should have meaning in life. But this 
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does not prevent us from searching for the meaning in life.53 The central Confucianist 
perspective is the importance of morality in all human activities. 
Confucianists seek the rendao: "the way of humanity". Hwang54 specified this moral-
ethical set of beliefs and values as based on the concepts of ren, yi (righteousness) and 
//'. Li is sometimes interpreted as "rites", or as "good manners, or gentlemanly 
conduct"55. A core Confucian principle is Xiushen yi dao: "the practice of self-
cultivation", which urges an individual to study the dao diligently (haoxue), to work on 
it industriously (lixing), and to suffer a strong sense of shame (zhichi) when he deviates 
from the principles of dao. The Jishi yi dao consists of teachings aimed at inspiring 
intellectuals with a mission to benefit the world (jinshi) with dao. 
Some scholars argued that Confucianism comes close to a religion. According to 
Clammer, in South East Asia Confucianism had frequently taken on "the attributes of 
a religion in that Confucius himself (Kong-zi or Kong-fu-zi) and the teachings that have 
come down from him become venerated as supernatural entities."56 
Although followers may have given Kong Fu Zi a religious aura, he himself did not 
have such pretentions. For example, there was a fundamental difference between the 
Confucianist view of ancestor worship and the popular beliefs. Confucianist intellectuals 
were generally indifferent to supernatural beings, but they regarded "sacrificial rites 
favourably as the expression of sincerity, devotion, remembrance and love. [Whereas] 
the common people's belief in ancestor worship is somewhat different: they retain many 
of the superstitious elements of the ancient religion. They genuinely believe in the 
presence of their ancestors as spirits or souls during sacrifices. They are convinced that 
their ancestors are actually promoting their interests and assisting them in their own 
pursuit of worldly goals."57 Confucianists were aware of these common people's 
beliefs and condoned it, although they did not share it, because they upheld the moral 
values of filial piety, kinship loyalty and the importance of the family unit. Chinese 
pragmatism was clearly shown here. Kong Fu Zi did not make a statement on whether 
spirits existed or not. Rites and ceremonies could be performed as if spirits were 
present. Rites were perceived as valuable for their own sake. Although ceremonial 
behaviour had a religious background, Kong Fu Zi did not use religious concepts, nor 
did he speak about God or gods. His concept of t'ien (heaven) rather seemed 
synonymous with the way things happen or with destiny.58 Kong Fu Zi showed a 
certain respect for the supernatural without being particularly interested. Although Kong 
Fu Zi's ideas were thought to have contributed to the development of atheism in the 
history of Chinese thought, he was not an agnostic or sceptic. 
In Singapore the "folk Confucianism" often took the form of a religion. Kong Fu Zi 
was either venerated alongside a selection of other sages and deities, or he was 
worshipped as a deity in his own right. Even in the latter group one could distinguish 
two categories: there were those who clearly articulated their Confucian inspiration as 
distinct from Buddhism and Taoism and those who made little or no distinction between 
the "three religions". 
There was even a Singaporean version of the origins of Confucianism as a religion. One 
night, in the early fifties, a Chi-tong or spirit medium was possessed by a Shen or spirit 
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who claimed to be Kong Fu Zi passing through Singapore on a world tour to visit his 
students. The three Shens in that particular temple (Chi-Shan-tong) were his students. 
The next day one of these three indicated to the medium that they would be leaving to 
accompany Kong Fu Zi, who left instructions through the Chi (automatic writing on the 
proper methods of prayer) on Li. One of the students (Chu-xi) was appointed to look 
after things in Singapore. Chu-xi was still reported in the early eighties to be in 
Singapore to supervise.59 
A consequence of this visitation was the appearance of specifically Confucian priests, 
who, however, regarded Taoism and Buddhism as complementary and non-contradictory 
to Confucianism. Therefore the activities of these priests were very similar to those of 
Taoist and Buddhist priests, which made it hard to recognise them as Confucian priests. 
All this indicated that the Confucian priests were not exactly "missionary minded". The 
propagation of Confucianism as an ideology rather than as a religion was left to laymen, 
who were supposed to have a profounder cultural view of Confucian beliefs. 
Religious Confucianism was mainly shown in the veneration of Kong Fu Zi as an 
educational shen. Education had always been of great significance in Chinese culture 
and the Singapore Chinese continued this tradition.60 It were especially mothers with 
school age children and children themselves, mostly of working class origin, who 
worshipped Kong Fu Zi privately for good study results. They generally had no interest 
in Confucianism as a moral system or philosophy. 
The pragmatic Chinese Singaporean attitude was also shown in the fact that for a free 
dinner at the temple the bulk of the people showed up, whereas it were just the elderly 
men who performed the respect paying rites. 
3.3.2. Confucianism as way of Itfe 
Redding stated that it is difficult at a practical level for Westerners to comprehend the 
way in which the power of Chinese tradition still permeates everyday life. As so much 
of their life is conducted in a dialect of Chinese, and as so many of their emotions are 
concealed from public view, the Chinese are less transparent than people from other 
cultures. Their tradition is thus conveyed in attitudes more often than in declarations, 
in nuances of behaviour and in eventual courses of action rather than in open 
discussions of the rights or wrongs of an issue.61 
Hofstede and Bond described the four key Confucian principles in the daily life of the 
Chinese as follows62: 
"1. The stability of society is based on unequal relationships between people. 
The и lun or five basic relationships are ruler/subject, father/son, older 
brother/younger brother, husband/wife and older friend/younger friend. These 
relationships are based on mutual, complimentary obligations: the junior partner 
owes the senior respect and obedience; the senior partner owes the junior partner 
protection and consideration. 
2. The family is the prototype of all social organizations. 
A person is not primarily an individual; radier, he or she is a member of a 
family. Children should learn to restrain themselves, to overcome their 
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individuality so as to maintain the harmony in the family (if only on the 
surface); one's thoughts, however, remain free. Harmony is found in the 
maintenance of an individual's "face", meaning one's dignity, self-respect, and 
prestige. The use of our own word "face" in this sense was actually derived 
from the Chinese: losing one's dignity , in the Chinese tradition, is equivalent 
to losing one's eyes, nose and mouth. Social relations should be conducted in 
such a way that everybody's face is maintained. Paying respect to someone else 
is called 'giving face'. 
3. Virtuous behaviour toward others consists of treating others as one would 
like to be treated oneself: a basic human benevolence - which, however, does 
not extend as far as the Christian injunction to love thy enemies. 
As Confucius said, if one should love one's enemies, what would remain for 
one's friends? 
4. Virtue with regard to one's tasks in life consists of trying to acquire skills 
and education, working hard, not spending more than necessary, being 
patient, and persevering. 
Conspicuous consumption is taboo, as is losing one's temper. Moderation is 
enjoined in all things. " 
An essential part of the dao for the people is filial piety, which is the root of all other 
virtues. Therefore the emphasis in Confucianism is on human relationships, particularly 
those relationships within one's own family. The underlying idea is that if a man does 
not have a sense of gratitude and affection towards his own parents, he cannot be 
expected to harbour love and concern for others. Filial piety does not only affect one's 
own family, but the moral climate of the whole society. Although Kong Fu Zi was 
aiming more at the spirit of filial piety than its form, these principles bear the seed of 
nepotism, to which it has often led in China. Filial piety was even upheld at the expense 
of social justice.63 
Confucians held moral principles in high regard; so high that they taught that people 
should sometimes even sacrifice their lives for the sake of morals. Lu argued that moral 
values are "social in nature; they are for the purpose of harmonizing human 
relationships."64 Every human deep in his or her heart would yearn for a good contact 
with fellow human beings and therefore should deem moral values important. 
The Confucian social ideal is a harmonious society in which role patterns are in tune 
with each other. The li or rite is perceived as the key to proper public behaviour and 
thus order in the state. This still forms an underlying motivation for many actions in 
Confucian societies today. 
This importance of Confucian morality to the Chinese is often veiled to outsiders due 
to the absence of a missionary drive to preach religious beliefs on the one hand and 
their high motivational drive for material wealth and social status on the other. More 
manifest is the Chinese pragmatic and instrumental or rationalistic attitude in dealing 
with men and economics. The people of the Sino-influenced cultures have been to an 
unusual extent pragmatic-empirical problem-solving, rather than submissive and 
fatalistic in a problematic situation.65 The Chinese economic mentality and behaviour 
was and still is based on cost-benefit calculation. As Topley66 described: 
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"...people do not usually tum to Western ideas because they come to believe 
them more "true" than the traditional ones. Rather, they follow some Western 
practices because they find them effective in some circumstances and some 
Chinese practices for similar reasons. People may move in and out of Chinese 
and Western traditions, at least at the present time. The effect is the proof - if 
it works, it is true." 
According to King, the Confucianism Max Weber tried to analyse never took root in 
the overseas countries the Chinese emigrated to. In the post-Confucian era, "the 
strategic imperial Confucian institutions are all dead or deconstructed in the Chinese 
societies in East Asia. But, Confucian social-cultural beliefs and values have found new 
and more dynamic expressions in non-Confucian institutional settings."67 Certain 
virtues which Confucians emphasised, such as ordinary personal virtues, virtues of 
compassion and fairness68 as well as the cultivation of the individual, the emphasis on 
the family, the duty to bring honour and glory to the family69, were often deemed to 
be still valid. It was this "social Confucianism" or "vulgar Confucianism" - a set of 
Confucian beliefs and values shared widely by the man-in-the-street - which guided 
social conduct. It was even suggested that the Chinese family values could serve as a 
prime indicator whether a society was still Confucian or not.70 
3.3.3. Confucianism as political ideology 
The third dimension of Confucianism as state ideology is related to the first two 
dimensions. As the highest ideal, Confucianism does not put forward individual rights, 
but one's obligations to the community. People should function from a set of concentric 
circles in the following accumulating order: "Cultivating the person ... regulating the 
family ... governing the state ... pacifying the world" 71. 
Despite his criticism of the rulers of his time, Kong Fu Zi was not a democrat in the 
Western sense. He did think the people should have a say in their governance, but once 
they had given their mandate to a ruler they were to respect and obey him. In return, 
however, the ruler ought to be a good governor to the people and display integrity. The 
ruler was supposed to bring peace to the people by performing the correct ceremonies. 
This belief in the power of rites originated from the belief in magic. The proper 
behaviour of the ruler should keep the world order in harmony, because the ruler 
formed the link between the macrocosmos and the microcosmos.72 A true ruler was 
to be an example and like a father to his subjects. The ruler-people relationship in Kong 
Fu Zi's eyes was a prototype for society in the sense that it was supposed to be based 
on mutuality. The Confucian ethic of loyalty to seniors, which is strictly defined in a 
hierarchical, paternalistic society, stands opposite to the Western emphasis on individual 
freedom of expression of thought and personal liberties. 
The link between the state, society and morality was not only inherent in Confucian 
theory, but also in the way it generally functioned in China. On the one hand the 
Confucian philosophy included a state ideology, while on the other hand there was a 
political basis to philosophise in China73. This is not to say that all China's rulers 
behaved in the true Confucian spirit. Many deviated from the Confucian ideal in the 
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sense that nepotism and corruption flourished. But those were excesses in Chinese 
history; they did not belong to Confucianism. What is meant is that the Chinese state 
generally took and was attributed a certain moral power. As Shils pointed out, 
Confucian intellectuals had been "unique in the world in their sense of responsibility 
for sharing in the government in a responsible way. They did not withdraw from 
political responsibility. They did not generally take a holier-than-thou attitude which is 
common among Western intellectuals in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They 
have a sense of civil obligation for guiding the emperor along the path of right 
action. "74 
In a more recent period, Chinese intellectuals have become familiarised with Western 
thought. Nevertheless, the latter has not been integrated into Chinese thought as 
smoothly as Taoism or Buddhism. The attitude towards Western thought could generally 
be characterised as pragmatic. De Вагу noted that the Confucian order "was in the final 
analysis more fundamentally moral than it was rational".75 
3.3.4. The link between Confucianism and economic growth 
Max Weber 
Max Weber, the first important scholar to study the relationship between Confucianism 
and economic development, did not acknowledge the Chinese potential for 
modernisation. He tried to explain why capitalism did not develop in China, the cradle 
of Confucian culture. He based his arguments on the difference between the Confucian 
ethic and the Protestantism found in Holland, England and North America. He did not 
analyse the causes for China's "backwardness", as some of his contemporaries were 
doing, nor did he seek answers for causes of historical events, but he tried to fit in his 
understandings of Confucianism and Hinduism in his total understanding of the 
relationship between economy and society. His examination of China served as a 
negative case against which he developed his theory of Western political and economic 
transformation76. He knew European history well and noted the difference between the 
political, social and economic effects of Protestantism - especially Puritanism - on the 
one hand, and the upholding of the principles of family, empire and the supporting 
institutions by Confucianism in China on the other. But Weber lacked the depth of 
knowledge about China as he possessed it for Europe. This way he made his chief 
mistake by arguing that Confucianism would prevent capitalism from developing in 
China. 
On the Singapore Conference on Confucian Ethics and the Modernisation of Industrial 
East Asia in 1987 it was concluded that Max Weber did not know very much about the 
Confucian ethic or the modernisation of East Asia, but that he somehow managed to 
make people think about them in a certain way.77 The Weberian perspective paved the 
way for more historical research into the ethos of influence on the economic 
development of a culture area. Weber established an important direction of investigation 
with continued relevance. 
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Criticism on Weber's theory 
Nevertheless, Weber's work evoked a critical body of literature of objections.78 
Schluchter analysed Weber's theory of the Chinese ethic and found a few major flaws 
in his analysis.79 
1. under-estimation Chinese achievements 
During Max Weber's lifetime the source materials about China were limited.80 By 
today's standards his analysis demonstrated a central defect, because he did not take 
into account the powerful changes which had taken place between 1000 and 1500 A.D. 
These changes enabled later researchers to speak of an era of Chinese superiority in 
practically all areas. In fact, the Chinese sciences were ahead of those of the West at 
least up until the twelfth and thirteenth centuries A.D., especially in the natural 
sciences. Moreover, their development, with the exception of alchemy, had practically 
nothing to do with Taoism, contrary to what Weber tried to demonstrate.81 
2. Euro-centrism 
Weber faced the problems of every comparative cultural analysis. Points of comparison 
have to be chosen and concepts must be oriented around them. These points of 
comparison and concepts originate in that culture for whose understanding the 
comparison is ultimately undertaken. Weber's analysis of other cultures thus always 
remained related to his interest in the unique character and genesis of the rationalism 
of Western culture. He therefore naturally showed a kind of "heuristic 
Eurocentrism".82 Weber's writings were steeped in the traditions of European 
liberalism. He constantly reaffirmed his advocacy of the values of "man's personal 
autonomy" and "the spiritual and moral values of mankind".83 
To understand the different ethical systems in the world, Weber had developed a 
comparative sociological theory of religion. 
As a result of a multi-stage process of abstraction, the human world was "doubled". 
That was the case if persons, things and processes no longer remained simply what they 
were, but also became symptoms or symbols of another reality, of a Hinterwelt of 
"souls", "gods" and "demons". The relationship of these latter "entities" to humankind 
was ordered by symbolic means. This process constituted the realm of "religious 
action".84 
Weber made a distinction between magic and religion. A certain degree of ethicalisation 
of social relationships was decisive for the "escape" from magic. If escaped, three 
concepts applied: cultural religion, world religion and salvation religion. The fields of 
meaning sometimes overlapped, but were not identical. 
Although every ethical religion was considered a cultural religion, not every cultural 
religion was a salvation or world religion. A cultural religion only became a salvation 
religion if it developed an ethic or doctrine of salvation in which it this-worldly or 
other-worldly redemption was promised. It only became a world religion once it had 
great multitudes of confessors of the faith. In Weber's view in two cases not all three 
terms applied. Judaism was for him a salvation religion, but not a world religion. 
56 Singapore, a modern Asian city-state 
Confucianism was a world religion, but not a salvation religion. It was the distinction 
between salvation and cultural religion which was of systematic importance.85 In his 
conclusion Weber tended to blur his own distinction between religions by equating 
religion with salvation religion. 
Weber's guideline in studying China was why China did not bring forth indigenous 
modern capitalist or even modern bureaucratic development. He came up with three 
reasons to explain "this absence in China of modern development in the European 
sense": 
1. the nature of "religious'' sources 
2. the material and ideal interests of the carrier strata 
3. the nature of the structural configuration.86 
adi. 
The notion of salvation was absent in Confucianism and thus in the Western sense it 
possessed neither metaphysics nor philosophy. That which could be considered as 
philosophy lacked the "character of a speculative system" and "logic adequate to 
professional discourse". Confucianism used parables instead of rational argument87. 
The writings were based upon heroic epics, which in the course of a "systematic 
purification" were transformed into something ethical.88 
The world-view of Confucianism was based on an impersonal and eternal divine order, 
not a personal God such as in Protestantism. A kind of "ethical cosmos", not an ethical 
god arose. The Chinese power protected the eternal order encompassing both heaven 
and earth. The demand that the relation between the heavenly and the earthly be one 
of harmony, was one expression of this "protection". In this way, this harmony gained 
redemptive significance. 
The Emperor as "Son of Heaven" was recognised as representative of the human order 
vis a vis the numinous and of the numinous vu a vis the human order. Weber viewed 
this emperor primarily as a "rainmaker" given ethical significance89 and claimed that 
the Confucian world-view, unlike those of the other world-religions, was anchored in 
magic. Confucianism was merely a "rational systématisation" of magic.9" He 
characterised China by an unbounded optimism and an "unbroken and continued 
existence of purely magical religiosity".91 The irrationality of this magic contrasted 
with the intellectualisation characteristic of modern capitalism, which was intimately 
linked to the rationality of human conduct. Confucianism therefore represented in 
Weber's view a stage of cultural development transcended by ascetic Protestantism.92 
But a "cultural religion" could not ultimately be grounded in magic. Weber's thought 
thus showed internal inconsistencies. He tended to blur his own distinctions between 
kinds of religion, such as equating religion with "salvation religion". 
Schluchter disputed Weber's claim that Confucianism was founded in magic by stating 
that it was ethically founded, despite Weber's "correct claim that this ethical foundation 
was transformed in a socio-political and not in a religious direction".93 Schroeder 
noted that Weber's perception of Confucianism as magically founded could be attributed 
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to the fact that Confucianism had no notion of a fate in the beyond, nor any 
metaphysical basis for an ethic of salvation."4 
However, Weber emphasised that Confucianism never stripped this world of its 
meaning. Confucianists regarded it as basically good, the best possible of all worlds, 
capable of standing in harmony with the transcendental world. It was bad rulership or 
bad behaviour which caused deviations. Therefore it was always up to humans to 
overcome disharmony by good rulership and good behaviour. Directly manipulable 
spirits were worshipped in order to achieve worldly ends. Harmony between heaven and 
earth was to be preserved and this harmony would, in tum, lead to material welfare and 
security. 
In contrast stood ascetic Protestantism which radically denied this world's intrinsic 
meaning. This world was sinful and meaning had to be created by God through man as 
his tool. This notion set the stage for a restructuring of this world from scratch in the 
name of God's glory. Such a spiritual potential for world transformation did not exist 
in Confucianism.95 
Weber did not distinguish sharply enough between the masses and the intellectuals. In 
contrast to the West, in China the Culture-bearers never intended to eradicate magic 
amongst the masses. China's intellectual culture was mainly upheld by a particular 
status group. Weber thus underestimated the development potential of the intellectual 
culture in China. 
ad 2. 
Weber attributed an important role to the carrier strata of religions, as they were 
perceived to have influenced in the most determinant fashion the practical ethic of their 
respective religions. The carrier strata formed the qualities, the features which 
distinguished their ethic from other ethics.96 
In China a specific status group was educated to produce a system of 
Kulturmenschentum.91 Over centuries an examination system was developed, which 
was the most important instrument guaranteeing individual qualification. The resulting 
exclusivity was very accommodating to the material and especially the ideal interests 
of a socio-economic stratum of genteel state prebends. This stratum gave the sources 
a practical, or even a political direction, constructing a sober, politically practical 
rationalism out of them, which sought to support inner-worldly happiness by 
administrative means. This happiness was measured not solely by the welfare of those 
ruling, but by that of their subjects as well, by that of the people. This did not 
transcend the framework of the patrimonial state, however. The support of welfare 
remained oriented to the postulate of substantive justice as upheld by tradition. 
Integration into the world, not salvation from it, was its ultimate goal.98 
For Weber, the idea of self-cultivation of the Confucian literati constituted a lay or 
status ethic rather than a religious ethic in the narrow sense. These literati were not 
priests, but rather a group of people whose status and cohesion were based upon the 
passing of the Confucian examinations and a certain way of life. In the other world-
religions, intellectuals typically promoted a separate religious doctrine of salvation, 
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because they were in competition with other - and especially political - strata. The 
Confucian literati, however, possessed a monopoly of power. They formed the leading 
stratum of political office-holders. Since China was a stable patrimonial bureaucracy 
with relatively tranquil political relations, the ethic of this stratum could become firmly 
entrenched." Confucianism represented within Asian development the purest type of 
"political religion". It completely dispensed with salvation and all possibilities of 
thought and methodical living based upon it. Analogously, ascetic Protestantism 
represented the purest type of salvation religion in the Western context. It raised the 
ethic of salvation beyond all its ritualistic and legal-ethical variants to an ethic of 
conviction, of ultimate ends. Moreover, it combined this new ethic with a purely 
soteriologically directed salvational technique of this-worldly asceticism such that a total 
pattern of life conduct emerged. Both positions were rational and aimed at a specific 
treatment of the world. Yet their motives and their consequences were completely 
different.100 
ad3. 
In Weber's view, the central and local Chinese strata confronted each other directly, 
politically unmediated by intermediary feudal or bourgeois strata. This bureaucracy did 
not possess structures enabling it to penetrate the realms of life outside the village. It 
lacked adequate overall integration, precision and efficiency. The political monopoly 
of the patrimonial bureaucracy on the central level was strengthened with the 
pacification of the Empire, since this meant the disappearance of external forces of 
opposition. In Weber's view, this was yet another significant contrast to the situation 
given in the West.101 
A difference between Confucianism and Western protestant Puritanism was that the 
Puritans did not discuss the state very much, except out of desires to have freedom of 
religious expression. What they were concerned with was the economy, freedom of 
economic action, whereas Confucianism regarded economic activities as secondary and 
the state as the primary.102 
Weber's key thesis was the absence of strong, autonomous forces, which could have 
broken the link, economically, politically and intellectually, between the primordial 
mechanisms and those of the patrimonial state. According to Schluchter, this passage 
summarised Weber's central argument in his book "China": 
"Consequently, practical rationalism, the intrinsic attitude of bureaucracy to life, 
free of all competition, could work itself out fully. There was no rational 
science, no rational practice of art, no rational theology, jurisprudence, 
medicine, natural science or technology; there was neither divine nor human 
authority which could contest the bureaucracy. Only an ethic congruent with 
bureaucracy could be created and this was limited solely by considerations of the 
forces of tradition in the sibs and by the belief in spirits. Unlike in Western 
culture, there were no other specifically modem elements of rationalism standing 
either in competition or in support of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy in China was 
grafted upon a base, which, in the West, had been essentially overcome with the 
development of the ancient polis. Hence, the culture of this bureaucracy can be 
considered an experiment which approximately tests the practical rationalism of 
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government by office prebendaries and its effects. Orthodox Confucianism 
resulted from this situation."103 
What Weber did not see was that, even though the basic elements of modernisation did 
not evolve from the Confucian system itself, the Confucian ethic encouraged individuals 
to exert themselves on behalf of the persistence and prosperity of the group to which 
they belong. This kind of social motivation pushed the Chinese to look outside their 
traditional cultural system for the sake of benefits to themselves, their families or their 
nation. According to Hwang, this motivation made it possible that science, technology, 
bureaucratic administration and a formalistic legal system later have been transferred 
from Western to Eastern societies.104 
3. Over-polarisation 
Of all Weber's studies of world-religions, the "Religion of China" was presented as the 
clearest counterexample of his Protestant ethic thesis.105 
Rationalisation and the rationalism consequent to it, existed for Weber in all cultural 
religions, even in magic. Decisive was the analysis of which spheres had been 
rationalised and in which direction.106 
Weber distinguished between two pure types of rational action: 
1. Zweckrationalitaet (purposeful rationality), in which the actor rationally assesses 
the full range of consequences entailed by the selection of a given means to 
achieve a particular end 
2. Wertrationalitaet (value-rationality), in which an individual consciously pursues 
on overriding end with single-minded devotion, without "counting the cost". 
Weber contrasted both of these with irrational action.107 
According to his methodological scheme, the "moral" was logically quite separate from 
the "rational". Weber wholly rejected the conception that the sphere of the "rationa" 
could extend to the evaluation of competing ethical standards. What he often referred 
to as the "ethical irrationality of the world" was fundamental of his epistemology. 
Statements of fact, and judgements of value, were separated by logic. There was no 
way in which scientific rationalism could provide a validation of one ethical ideal 
compared to another. The unending conflict of diverging ethical systems could never 
be resolved by the growth of rational knowledge.108 
Weber not only polarised between the rational and irrational this way, but also between 
the objective and subjective. 
"The objective validity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively upon the 
ordering of the given reality according to categories which are subjective in a 
specific sense, namely, in that they present the presuppositions of our knowledge 
and are based upon the presupposition of the value of those truths which 
empirical knowledge alone is able to give us... .But these data can never become 
the foundation for the empirically impossible proof of the validity of the 
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evaluative ideas. The belief which we all have in some form or other, in the 
meta-empirical validity of ultimate and final values, in which the meaning of our 
existence is rooted, is not incompatible with the incessant changefulness of the 
concrete viewpoints, from which empirical reality gets its significance, Both 
these views are, on the contrary, in harmony with each other. Life with its 
irrational reality and its store of possible meanings is inexhaustible."109 
As Weber showed in his studies of India and China, the rationalisation of systems of 
ultimate beliefs could take numerous different forms, involving various combinations 
of the three elements in "rationalisation": 
1) the "intellectualisation" (from its positive side) or the "disenchantment" 
(Entzauberung) (from its negative side) of the world 
2) the growth of rationality in the sense of "the methodical attainment of a 
definitely given and practical end by the use of an increasingly precise 
calculation of adequate means" 
3) the growth of rationality in the sense of "ethics that are systematically and 
unambiguously oriented to fixed goals". 
The specific form of social and economic development of Western Europe embodied, 
according to Weber, a combination which was quite distinct from the directions which 
rationalisation had taken elsewhere.110 Preceding rationalisation in the West entailed 
amongst others the formation of rational jurisprudence, an irrational impetus to the 
disciplined pursuit of monetary gain and the bureaucratic division of labour. The latter 
became characteristic of all major social institutions with the further development of 
capitalism. This bureaucracy functioned mechanically, and therefore had no need of the 
religious ethic in which it was originally grounded. In the further capitalistic economic 
development, through the commitment to scientific progress, most forms of social 
relationship had become transmuted into conduct which approximated the Zweckrational 
type.111 Although capitalism itself could not confer meaning. "Who - aside from 
certain big children who are indeed found in the natural science - still believes that the 
findings of astronomy, biology, physics or chemistry could teach us anything about the 
meaning of the world...If these natural sciences lead to anything in this way, they are 
apt to make the belief that there is such a thing as the "meaning" of the universe die out 
at its very roots.""2 
The consequence of the Entzauberung of the world is that the transcendental values 
which confer meaning otherwise exist only in "the brotherliness of direct and personal 
human relations", or become projected in the forms of mystic withdrawal. Those 
individuals who could not "face the fate of the times' could take refuge in such 
withdrawal, either into the traditional churches, or into one of the newer cults. But such 
people would thereby forfeit the capacity to participate directly in politics.113 
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The intellectualisation characteristic of modern capitalism was intimately bound up with 
the rationalism of human conduct, according to Weber. The "alienative" effects of the 
modern social order, are in fact derivative of bureaucratisation.114 
Puritan rationalism meant rational mastery of the world. Confucian rationalism meant 
rational adjustment to it. To Weber, in spite of continuous actual and apparent analogies 
to Western culture,115 Chinese culture represented a radically contrasting system of 
life governance. It represented another world, as it was conflated with magic.116 
Weber therefore overpolarised the concepts of the Protestant and the Confucian ethic. 
Classifying Confucian rationalism as "adjustment to the world" did not do justice to the 
independent, critical position of Kong Fu Zi and Mencius towards the insufficiency of 
the kingdom of their time. Weber did not distinguish clearly enough between the 
Confucian civil servants and the founders and creators of Confucian philosophy.117 
Confucianism was supposed to lack the driving effort to rationalise one's own actions, 
the actions of others and the appointment and disposition of its capital and human 
resources, aiming at maximising its return. Weber found the spirit of Confucianism 
more amiable, diligent in a soft-mannered way and with the presence of frugality, but 
less intense than in the Western puritanism. He polarised between a selfless gentleness 
in China and a harsh sharp-edged attitude in the Protestant countries. The selflessness 
of Protestantism consisted of the renunciation of hedonistic, earthly pleasures - "except 
perhaps the pleasure of contemplation of possible eternal salvation"11' -, whereas the 
Confucian selflessness consisted more of a consideration for the other person. The self-
gratification in the latter came more from the enhancement of interpersonal relations, 
such as with the community, the family, the friend, the disciple or the master. The 
spirit of Protestantism was more related to (the internalisation of) God; the spirit of 
Confucianism more to other human beings. 
Although prima facie the two ethical systems seemed to have a few similarities, the 
differences in intensity were emphasised. For example, Confucianism was not opposed 
to material well-being, Protestant Puritanism was not in favour of it. They both called 
for self-discipline and had a moderating imperative. But the Puritans were more ascetic 
concerning money and the Confucianists were less self-repressive concerning human 
passions. A clear distinction between the two ethics was formed by the reflection of the 
Protestant rationalisation in its drive towards calculation, quantification. This element 
was apparently absent in the China which Weber studied.119 This quantitative element 
led to calculated relationships; a continuous cost-benefit analysis between expenditure 
and return. Filial piety and the hierarchic, paternalistic attitudes in Confucianism 
prevented this kind of calculation. 
However, the absence of the calculative type of quantification in the Confucian ethic 
did not mean an absence of rationalisation in China. There was in fact an element of 
rational calculation to be found among the Chinese, albeit not so much in the form of 
numeral calculation, but more of a human kind.120 The Chinese took social costs and 
benefits into account in their interpersonal behaviour. For example, not helping out a 
family member could result in loss of face in the community. In a society where social 
acceptance played a crucial role for one's self-esteem, meaning in life and chance of 
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survival, the Chinese tried to strike a kind of social balance in their actions. Likewise, 
calculation of costs and benefits could also take place based on Chinese traditional 
religious beliefs, regarding shen and gut. This way a number of actions bad a function 
in maintaining harmony with the spirit-world. 
Weber claimed that China was characterised by an unbroken and continued existence 
of purely magical religiosity. But Weber's thought showed internal inconsistencies, such 
as the extension of his claim on magic to cover the Confucian ethic. Simultaneously he 
located the Confucian ethic on the level of a cultural religion, which could not 
ultimately be grounded in magic. 
Weber also overlooked the fact that the religious ethic in China did not penetrate the 
masses. It was the ethic of a particular status group. Its bearers never had the goal of 
eradicating magic amongst the masses. 
Weber used four criteria to define the typological location of Confucianism and ascetic 
Protestantism as religions and religious ethics121: 
1) the distinction between the Welt and Hinterwelt 
(whether gradual or fundamental) 
2) the conceptualisation of the Hinterwelt 
(whether cosmocentric, such as in the Indian and Chinese cultural 
religions, or theocentric, such as in the Near-Eastern and Western 
cultural religions) 
3) the "rewards" for life conduct 
(happiness versus this-worldly or other-worldly redemption) 
4) the salvation technique 
(character formation [Bildung] versus mystic and ascetic self-
perfection) 
Weber claimed that in Confucianism prophecy was completely non-existent, that it 
ultimately possessed no metaphysical basis, and that the ethic it advocated was basically 
not a religious ethic. Even though Confucianism distinguished between fundamental 
spheres, largely on the basis of a developed cosmogony, it nevertheless was not able 
to reject the world. Instead, Confucianism represented for Weber "that rational ethic, 
which in intent, reduced the tension with the world to an absolute minimum, both in 
terms of its religious devaluation and its practical rejection"122 of that world. 
But Weber did not distinguish sharply enough between the tension resulting from the 
fundamental distinction between the Welt and the Hinterwelt on the one hand, and the 
resolution of this tension on the other. This tension was at the root of the intellectual 
culture in China. However, in an inner-worldly orientation it was dealt with in a 
defused manner. The key question was whether it was believed if the goals were 
fundamentally attainable with the available means. If this was not the case, one would 
have a sense of predicament. It was this awareness and not unbounded optimism, as 
Weber thought, which helped shape China's intellectual culture.123 
4. no distinction between Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism 
Weber only compared the classical Confucianism of mainland China with the Protestant 
ethic, whereas it was not that static. Confucianism did not just contain many 
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interpretations within it, but it was also a live set of ideas, which has developed and 
changed over time. A Neo-Confucianism had developed in which the Overseas Chinese 
in particular had significantly reinterpreted the role and practice of the merchant class. 
They were merchants, artisans and all those pursuing business concerns, who were 
active in economic life. They were more predisposed to a practical-ethical than to a 
theoretical, intellectual stance. 
Both Confucianism and ascetic Protestantism were primarily representatives not of 
theoretical, but of practical rationalism.124 However, although the practical rationalism 
of Confucianism and ascetic Protestantism demonstrated extrinsic similarities, they were 
ultimately based upon completely different presuppositions and connected to completely 
different consequences.125 The pragmatic adjustments of which the Chinese were 
capable were directly relevant to the development of traditional Chinese capitalism.126 
This was such a typical brand of capitalism, that Redding spoke of the "spirit of 
Chinese capitalism". 
Weber also made too little distinction between the so called high and popular religion, 
nor in China, nor between the Weltanschauung of the Chinese in the mainland of China 
and the Overseas Chinese. A huge gap existed between this high and popular religion. 
Weber did note that: 
"Thus Confucianism permitted such cults, in the form of the Taoist pantheon, 
to continue their existence by its side. Similarly, as popularised Buddhism spread 
to many lands, it allowed the various gods of these lands to live on as recipients 
of the Buddhist cult, subordinated to the Buddha. ... Islam and Catholicism were 
compelled to accept local, functional, and occupational gods as saints, the 
veneration of which constituted the real religion of the masses in everyday 
life."127 
Weber mainly perceived this as the carrier strata not being able to penetrate the masses 
with their religious image of the world and their mode of life conduct, in the face of 
magical and religious traditionalism. But in China the literati rather neglected the 
religious life of the masses.128 Whereas the ethic of the literati merely sought honour 
after death and left the local forms of religion untouched, the religion of the masses 
integrated different forms eclectically to serve more mundane aims. As long as their 
direct needs, such as the provision of material welfare, longevity, aversion of evil 
spirits and good fortune, were met. It was predominantly this popular religion which 
the Overseas Chinese brought along. The traditionalism of the Confucian literati was 
thus no obstacle for social change for them. On the contrary, as Weber himself pointed 
out: "in no other civilised country has material welfare ever been so exalted as the 
supreme good".129 
Giddens pointed at Max Weber's contribution, overlooked by many critics. A crucial 
aspect of Weber's discussion of capitalism in Asia was his distinction between the 
independent development of capitalism and its subsequent diffusion. 
On the one hand, regarding the development of capitalism, Weber predicted that the 
Chinese would quickly "assimilate" capitalism, based on the "calculating mentality and 
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self-sufficient frugality"130. Confucianism encouraged rational calculation, by 
demanding "constant and vigilant self-control in order to maintain dignity"131. It 
contained an affinity for a "worldly-minded utilitarianism" that supported a "belief in 
the value of wealth as a universal means of moral perfection"132. In fact, "in no other 
civilised country had material welfare ever been so exalted as the supreme good"133. 
Weber said repeatedly that Confucianism promoted systematic adjustments to the world. 
Therefore, given the economic opportunities created by world capitalism that spread out 
from Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Confucian heritage could 
facilitate the Chinese to assimilate capitalism quickly.134 
According to Hamilton and Kao, Weber's perception of the rational, calculating 
mentality of Confucians was correct, but he made the mistake to simply typify 
Confucianism as "world-adjustment", because Confucianism did not take the existing 
order for granted.135 On the contrary, Confucianism was founded as a protest against 
the prevailing chaos in Kong Fu Zi's time. Weber was right in as far as Confucianism 
did not provide an ethos promoting institutional change. But he underestimated the 
transformative powers of Confucianism and Buddhism136 and he generally 
misunderstood the nature of Chinese patriarchalism137. 
On the other hand, regarding the diffusion of capitalism, the set of factors decisive in 
the development of European capitalism was absent in China. Weber's causal analysis 
of capitalism included market factors, legal institutions, political conditions, in addition 
to religious beliefs. He thought that material interests and cultural beliefs produce 
historical consequences only in so far as they are embedded in institutionalised 
contexts.13β 
Diffusion of technology and know-how is never a simple, unambiguous process. 
According to Hamilton and Kao, it is an institutional process. The assimilation of 
capitalism by the Chinese that Weber almost certainly had in mind, was to have been 
a family-centred, market-oriented development. The ones most likely to assimilate 
Western capitalist technology and entrepreneurial ideas, were producers and 
distributors, who were largely peasants and small merchants. Such people, Weber 
assumed, would seize the economic opportunities that capitalism created to enrich 
themselves, to care for their families, and to move up the social ladder.139 
What Weber could not have known was the technological realms modern capitalism 
would reach, as he died in 1920. Asian as well as European political and economic 
institutions have changed enormously since then. Confucianism spread through Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore, but the integration there was not uniform and 
the institutions were strikingly different. The diverse political systems in these different 
NICs have had enormous influence on the diffusion of industrialisation, whereas the 
Weberian perspective emphasised the integration and institutionalisation of values. 
Kao, however, concluded that, although Weber's ideal types for a Chinese society must 
be reconstructed, Weber's typological method is still useful today.140 
Religious Perspective 65 
Confucianism as major cultural driving force in East Asian economic growth 
Despite Max Weber's opposite theory, both Western and Eastern scholars singled out 
Confucianism as the major cultural driving force behind the rapid economic 
development in East Asia.141 Intrigued by this economic growth in East Asia, an 
increasing number of development economists have come to see that culture had to be 
included in explanations of why some economies have grown faster than others.142 
The Confucian ethics of thrift, hard work, harmony and cooperation, respect for 
education and reverence for authority, have been acknowledged to play a crucial role 
in the economic development in the NICs. 
In 1979 Kahn's143 study of world economic development was the first to propose that 
some aspects of the Confucian ethic could have facilitated the modernisation and 
industrialisation of East Asian countries which enabled them to achieve higher economic 
growth than other cultures. Jones and Sakong144 found that the homogeneous 
Confucian heritage was a major element in explaining the high level of entrepreneurial 
spirit in South Korean business. Morishima145 suggested that the intellectualism of 
Confucianism had provided Japan with extraordinary fertile ground for the adoption and 
development of Western scientific ideas during the Tokugawa period. In 1983 
Berger146 pointed out that two types of modernisation had emerged in the 
contemporary world. In addition to Western modernisation, East Asian societies had 
developed their own particular type of modernisation. Western modernisation originated 
from the Protestant ethic, while East Asian modernisation seemed to be rooted in 
Confucianism. At the end of the eighties Oshima147 also linked the cultural 
background with economic growth in the Asian NICs and Hofstede and Bond 
discovered the dimension of "Confucian dynamism" in their cross-cultural management 
studies. This cluster of values seemed to be a common denominator of the successful 
East Asian NICs.148 
MacFarquhar149 proposed a concept of "post-Confucian challenge", which considered 
the Confucian ideology as the "inner compass" for most East Asians in the 
contemporary post-Confucian age, and the main cause of the hyper-economic growth 
in this area. He suggested that if Western individualism was appropriate for the 
pioneering period of industrialisation, perhaps post-Confucian collectivism would be 
better suited to the age of mass industrialisation.130 
In 1993 Redding spoke of the "spirit of Chinese capitalism", after he studied the 
economic culture of Overseas Chinese businessmen. He found that they thought 
sufficiently alike, and differently from others, to assume a consistent set of beliefs in 
which Confucianism played the bedrock role.151 Key component was "a class of 
entrepreneurs whose roles overlap extensively with that of the family father-figure, and 
whose power is largely legitimated by the acceptance of paternalism and dependence 
which so typify vertical relations in much of East Asia."152 Filial piety, human-
heartedness, paternalism, reasonableness, compromise and propriety could be viewed 
as religious principles in the Chinese context. Redding regarded an understanding of 
these as essential to an understanding of the emergence of the Chinese class of 
capitalists with its special kind of cooperative system and its special kind of economic 
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efficiency. He claimed that this cultural background deserves recognition for its role in 
economic development, although it is not the sole determinant. How big a part it plays 
in explanation remains open, according to Redding. 
Vogel showed what role the shared Confucian heritage by Japan and the East Asian 
NICs played in the explanation of the rapid spread of industrialisation in East Asia.153 
First of all, he emphasised the importance of situational factors in East Asia after the 
Second World War, such as 
1. aid from the U.S. and international organisations (Singapore and Hong Kong 
formed exceptions in the sense that they received less direct aid) 
2. Japan's colonial expansion undermined the social and economic basis of the old 
Confucian order, which made land reforms and urbanisation possible. In Hong 
Kong and Singapore the defeat of the British forces by the Japanese in 1941 
destroyed the seemingly invincible aura of Westerners. 
3. a sense of political and economic urgency 
4. an eager and plentiful labour force, anxious to find a new basis of 
economic livelihood 
5. the Japanese model. The four dragons shared with Japan that they were all 
densely populated and had scarce natural resources and Japan showed that 
industrialisation was still possible. The governments of Singapore and South 
Korea consciously studied the Japanese experience. 
But, Vogel argued, industrialisation could not have been achieved by these situational 
factors alone. He observed four clusters of institutional practices and underlying 
attitudes in East Asia, which were rooted in the Confucian tradition, but adapted to the 
needs of an industrial society: meritocratic elite, entrance exam system, importance of 
the group and self-cultivation. Vogel saw self-cultivation in Confucian culture as the 
closest analogue to the Protestant work ethic in strengthening the personal drive for 
achievement. In Confucianism this was driven by a desire for more perfect control over 
one's emotions and required study and reflection more than activism. Yet the drive for 
self-improvement can also take an active purposive form, manifested in the effort to 
advance work-related skills. 
Vogel believed that these cultural factors helped East Asia make use of their special 
situational advantages and new worldwide opportunities. On top of these two streams 
of influence, the drive for achievement was further strengthened by three factors, found 
in non-Confucian societies as well: consumerism, export orientation and the success 
cycle. By the latter was meant that their economic success has given East Asians 
confidence, which further fuelled their determination to continue their efforts. In each 
round of success, they acquired new skills and new technology that often have broader 
applicability, and the added excitement helps propel them forward to another round.155 
The role of Confucianism in Singapore 
The historical evolution of Confucianism showed that it was all but static. Likewise, the 
Confucian ideas Chinese Singaporeans brought along underwent changes through time 
and were likely to continue doing so.156 
Chan suggested that it was mostly "vulgar Confucianism" that pushed towards 
industrialisation in Singapore.157 It generally was the common man who emigrated 
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into the Nanyang. He emigrated to change the course of his life, to become more 
prosperous and send money home to his family. The individual Confucian 
characteristics of hard work, thrift and family-centricity (as derived from filial piety) 
were conducive to the goals of these emigrants. Therefore these three Confucian 
elements probably selected themselves during Singapore's initial development. To 
Singapore's immigrant population hard work, thrift and family-centricity were a matter 
of survival. Simultaneously, the Singaporean migrants from China benefitted from the 
opportunity to "get out of the dead hand of the institutional Confucianism on top of the 
legalist state."15" This way they were able to create their own community. 
"Back home" in agrarian China most people used to be illiterate and the Confucian 
ethics and values were passed on to next generations through oral tradition, usually in 
dialects, also called Chinese "little traditions"159. These included the tales of 
grandmothers and street-side story-tellers, folklore and religious rituals during festivals 
such as the Chinese New Year and the month of the Hungry Ghosts. In this oral 
cultural heritage Confucianism was mixed with other elements, such as Chinese 
traditional religions. After migration to Singapore, the little traditions suffered from 
lack of nourishment from the Great Tradition (as Confucianism was referred to) due to 
the great distance from the cultural centre and simply from the lack of mothers and 
grandmothers around. The resulting trimmed-down "folk Confucianism" was tolerated 
by the colonial government in Singapore, but was not supported or encouraged. Until 
as late as the 1970's it was not supported by the state nor the upper strata of society. 
The English-educated saw Confucianism, and still see it to a great extent, as backward 
and old-fashioned.160 The Chinese-educated, under the influence of the May Fourth 
Movement of anti-Confucianism in the mainland of China, saw folk Confucianism as 
reactionary, feudalistic and repressive of individuality. It was something to be 
eradicated. 
Confucianism in Singapore thus could not be regarded as a single, homogeneous set of 
beliefs and practices. If there was any confusion about Confucianism itself, the 
Singaporean syncretism was likely to add on to it, as Beh and Clammer described. 
"In fact the label covers a wide range of attitudes - from Confucianism as a 
philosophical basis of Chinese culture (often espoused by highly educated and 
well informed individuals) to Confucianism as a set of practices closely 
connected with the other traditions of folk activities. Others fall somewhere in 
between... " 
"... it is clear in Singapore that Confucianism does not only function as a 
philosophico-moral system, but spills over in folk religion where Confucius joins 
the pantheon of heaven as a specialist in education which justifies his appearance 
on most temple altars throughout the Republic [of Singapore]."161 
Confucianism in Singapore was a "folk religion", a pluralistic amalgam of beliefs and 
activities often drawn from several traditions. The term "folk" was referred to "exactly 
in the sense that it is used in ordinary everyday usage in Singapore and Malaysia - that 
is to say with reference to those religious practices and their accompanying beliefs 
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which are utilised on a regular basis by members of the general public, usually in 
relation to day to day problems of living."162 
Regarding the link between Confucianism and the rapid economic development of 
Singapore there were protagonists and antagonists. 
arguments in favour 
Lee Kuan Yew was the most prominent of the protagonists. He perceived the Confucian 
way of life and of organising the society as correlated to Singapore's success.163 He 
perceived it as a way of keeping families together and as a mutual help system.164 In 
the nineties Lee became more and more explicit about his concern over the loss of 
Confucian values. He feared that if that would happen "we would become just another 
society, another Western society."165 
Although Confucianism's post-emigration history transformed the forms, symbolism and 
even meaning attached to its ethics and practices, Singapore still clearly showed traces 
of a Confucian background in the nineties. 
1. Compared with the intellectual Confucianism as known to and practised by the 
gentry-class in China or even compared with the other NICs which were predominantly 
Chinese, Singapore was less Confucian. However, on the one hand "vulgar 
Confucianism" was widespread among the Chinese Singaporeans166 and on the other, 
compared with other countries in the world, Singapore did belong to the most 
"Confucian" ones. Pertaining to the latter, in Hofstede and Bond's cross-cultural study 
Singapore scored relatively high on the dimension "Confucian dynamism", although not 
at the top with the other Dragons167. 
Besides "Confucian dynamism" as facilitating economic growth. Hofstede and Bond 
identified "cultural individualism" as impeding economic growth. Following the 
Confucian theory, a Confucian country should score low on this factor. Singapore did 
score low on this dimension168. Individualism thus seemed not to have been standing 
in the way of Singapore's economic development. 
In conclusion, Singapore could cross-culturally be labelled Confucian, albeit not 
entirely. 
2. The Singapore government selected three core values to stimulate in 
Singaporeans. These values had also been effective in economic development in the 
past. They were not only closely related to social and cultural values169, mainly 
Confucianism, but also compatible with economic progress. Hard work would lead to 
high productivity, frugality and thrift to high savings and family cohesiveness to mutual 
help and survival in hard times (see chapter seven). 
3. The fact that Singaporean scholars emphasised the role of the state and the 
institutions in Singapore's development much more than Western scholars, seemed to 
reflect the Confucian ideology of "state above individual interests". Moreover, there 
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were a number of features from the politico-ideological Confucianism to be found in 
the state of Singapore. In chapter four (4.1.2.) the issue of Confucianism in Singapore 
politics is addressed. 
4. From the start of independence, education for the total population had top 
priority. Kong Fu Zi was mostly worshipped as an educational shen by the population 
and the Confucian Analects emphasised the importance of learning and education170. 
Its translation into a massive educational programme was considered to be the 
contribution of Confucianism to the industrialisation of East Asia (see chapter eight). 
In China the ideal to achieve a system of universal schooling, which the Neo-
Confucians had insisted was a sine qua non of winning the hearts and minds of the 
people, failed in the vast country with a lack of rapid communication and an effective 
coordination of efforts. But in the small island of Singapore the education system was 
much easier to implement, monitor and control. 
5. The government showed itself to be flexible to keep up with the economic 
situation. Gradually Singaporeans had been able to get higher-level jobs. As their 
salaries rose accordingly and Singapore was becoming less attractive to multinationals 
looking for cheap mass-production, the government changed its economic strategy a few 
times (see chapter four). This pragmatism was typical for the Confucian Chinese. 
6. Singaporeans preferred a harmony over a confrontation model in the tripartite 
relationship between the government, employers and employees. 
7. The benefits of the economic growth were returned to the Singaporean 
population to fulfil their basic needs. This "delivery of the goods" by the government 
in tum helped the population to accept the leadership and its policies. This mutual 
relation was a distinguishing feature of Confucian political ideology. 
8. The Singaporean development strategy was to improve the overall economic 
development, so every individual would share in the nation's wealth (see chapter four). 
Latif traced the Singapore government's aim to use the opportunities of a higher 
standard of living to produce "a new kind of citizen who is more than just economically 
interested in its fellow-citizens" back to Singapore's Confucian roots.171 According 
to chapter eight of Confucius' Analects: "It is embarrassing if one is poor and humble 
and the Way reigns in the state. Likewise it is embarrassing if one is rich and noble 
when the Way is no longer being used in the state. " In this statement Confucius related 
the individual success or failure in society to the level of justice which governed that 
society. The quality of someone's life was perceived as undetachable from that of the 
people around him. 
9. Singaporeans showed no shame over accumulation of wealth as Confucianism 
did not provide an ideology such as a "Mammon of consumerism". Confucius 
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considered material well-being of the people one of the first priorities of the 
government. He also said that if money could be made in honest ways, it was not to be 
despised, as long as it was not an end in itself.m 
Although these aspects did not prove any causal relation between Singapore's cultural 
background and its economic development, there seem to be enough similarities 
between characteristics of importance in Singapore's development process and 
Confucianism to assume essential influence. One could also turn the question around: 
if the people and the decisionmakers in Singapore would not have been predominantly 
Chinese with a Confucian background, would the course of development have been the 
same? 
arguments against 
Interestingly, it was mainly Western research which emphasised the Confucian cultural 
traits as crucially correlated to rapid economic development. In a conference on 
Confucian ethics and the modernisation of industrial East Asia held in Singapore in 
1987173, Singaporean scholars mainly tempered the enthusiasm about the stimulating 
role of this cultural factor. 
1. Lim174 stressed that the cultural factor was only one amongst many - political, 
social, economic and institutional - which played a role in Singapore's economic 
development. 
2. Wong and Wong stated that 
"economic development is a highly complex, multidimensional process involving 
changes and interactions of the value system, social structure and institutional 
mechanisms ... People's attitudes, beliefs and motivation, the patterns of social 
relations and the power structure operating on them, must have strongly affected 
the working of those primary economic forces."1" 
However, they argued that it was a question of whether the relevant socio-cultural 
values were exclusively Confucian or whether they were structural factors in an 
immigrant society happening to coincide with Confucianism.176 They claimed that the 
"Confucianism-stimulating-economy"- theories were tautological in nature and formed 
a trap of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Values, which prima facie seemed Confucian, such 
as thrift and hard work, could just as well be attributed to the fact that Singaporeans 
consisted mostly of immigrants who needed to be thrifty and work hard to achieve their 
personal aims. Survival instincts on the small island of Singapore without natural 
resources, could also be a plausible explanation for these characteristics. 
3. Wong emphasised the importance of the leadership and institutions in 
Singapore's economic development. He pointed out that these institutions were adopted 
from the British.177 The Singapore government - which played an essential part in 
Singapore's development - was more British oriented than Confucian. The government 
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was technocratic and legalistic and the principal policy-makers and top civil servants 
were mostly English-educated. Moreover, Singapore's bureaucratic system was uniquely 
free from the so called Confucian vices, such as corruption, nepotism, political 
patronage and cronyism. All these made Singapore stand out as the least Confucian 
society among the NICs.17S 
4. The Singaporean culture itself was too complex to simply be called "Confucian". 
Singapore was the least Chinese and thereby also the least Confucian influenced country 
of all the NICs, whereas it did not lag behind the others. 
5. Wong and Wong pointed at the danger of cultural determinism in explaining 
Singapore's economic growth.179 Chan argued that other cultural resources, which had 
nothing to do with Confucian values, had also been useful in unleashing the process of 
modernisation. For instance, Indian Singaporeans, although small in number, had also 
made important contributions to a growing Singaporean economy by their outstanding 
entrepreneurship and high educational achievements. Furthermore, Confucian values 
such as thrift, hard work and love could be found in other major world religions as 
well. The emphasis on education could also be found in a country such as India, yet 
"one has not pointed to education there as a supportive aspect of the 
industrialisation". 18° Likewise, the Confucian paternalistic style of government in the 
NICs could also be found in Asian Muslim countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia. 
6. Wu argued that, although some Confucian characteristics appeared to be 
conducive to Singapore's economic growth, they could have led to different 
consequences in different circumstances. These characteristics alone were no guarantee 
for economic growth. For instance, the family cohesiveness could easily have led to 
familism, which again could have had nepotism and mismanagement of resources as a 
consequence. '81 
7. In the conference the question was raised why China did not modernise sooner 
if Confucianism was positively related to economic progress. But Confucianism in 
China was not the same as the Confucianism the Overseas Chinese developed. Perhaps 
the NICs made such economic progress, because of their own version of Confucianism, 
pragmatically altering it away from the Great Tradition. Moreover, in China historical 
factors, such as China's problematic confrontation with the West and communism, 
inhibited economic growth. 
Thus Singapore's economic growth could not be simply explained by Confucianism. 
From an internal perspective Singapore was not explicitly Confucian and Confucianism 
was generally not deemed to be such an important factor in its economic growth 
process. For example, Chan argued that Singaporeans grew up more with political, 
economic rhetoric such as "We are a rugged society. Nobody owes us a living." than 
with any of the Confucian sayings. However, although the impact of Confucianism may 
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sometimes have been over-emphasised, from an external perspective certain values 
present in Singapore which played an enhancing role in the rapid development, were 
consistent with Confucianism. Although the government propaganda may not have been 
directly derived from Confucianism, it did find echoes in the Great Tradition, especially 
understandable to the Chinese-educated Singaporeans. But the PAP's vision of society 
and its kind of rhetoric also appealed to the English-educated, because its ideas radiated 
a certain rational logic. The PAP's political genius lay exactly in this ability to appeal 
to all sectors of the population. 
Two factors could have reduced the general awareness of and esteem attributed to 
Confucianism in Singapore. Firstly, the pejorative attitude of the upper strata of the 
Singaporean society towards traditions such as Confucianism. Secondly, the ethnic 
pluriformity of the Singaporean population prompted cautiousness regarding cultural 
issues. 
3.4. Chinese Traditional Religion 
Despite the current embrace of Western technology and the secular world view of the 
Singaporean scholars and politicians, Singaporean culture was still pulsating with 
symptoms of Chinese traditional beliefs. In 1983 Parkin noted that 
"What is usually called Chinese Traditional Religion is still an important factor 
in the life of the contemporary community." ... "It is not possible to arrive at 
any accurate understanding of the dynamics of the Chinese community in these 
two nations [Singapore and Malaysia] without serious investigation and 
consideration of this particular expression of religion."182 
The traditional beliefs of the Singaporean Chinese had been variously described as 
"Traditional Religion"183, "popular religion"184, "anonymous religion"185, "folk 
religion"186, "religion of the masses"187 or "Shenism"188. In this study the term 
Chinese Traditional Religion was used. 
This Chinese Traditional Religion was syncretic and the traditional customs, festivals 
and rituals were so numerous that they were sometimes confused with the religious 
practices'89. It was difficult to distinguish between religion proper and tradition. Many 
Chinese traditional practices were similar for people from different religions. Chinese 
were first and for all pragmatic and had contrived many ingenious methods to placate 
their spirits and gods.190 This way traditional folk practices were often used for 
religious purposes. Although regional and dialect-group differences were continued after 
the migration to Singapore, the underlying logic was distinctly Chinese. Meaning 
amongst others that the customs, rituals and festivals all were formulated and practised 
in an agrarian society where often the need for survival dictated the lives of the people. 
Chinese Traditional Religion was deeply entrenched in folk beliefs regarding the 
avoidance of "difficulties, sufferings and misfortunes..., understandable in view of the 
expected crises in life and numerous hardships arising from poverty and sickness."191 
The aim of most activities within the Chinese Traditional Religion therefore was to 
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acquire wealth, health and honour. Basic virtues were loyalty, filial piety, humanism 
and righteousness, reflected in the traditional practices.192 
After their migration, the significance of this Chinese Traditional Religion for the 
Overseas Chinese193 more or less remained the same. It even became intensified due 
to the increased insecurities and uncertainties of the migration. The safe environment 
and assurance of their families and communities had to be left behind. 
The Singaporean immigrants were predominantly lower class and their family loyalty 
and responsibilities made the need for financial success paramount. The migration 
increased their psycho-social need to influence their luck or success. Therefore they 
selected elements from the vast background of religious ideas and beliefs of China 
suitable for institutionalisation in their new country.194 Certain religious activities 
"openfed] up new avenues of hope and restore[d] confidence for the individual who has 
to face a new world away from home."195 Moreover, the performance of Chinese 
traditional religious practices provided a sense of newfound community and identity. 
ancestor worship 
In general, the traditional Chinese religious beliefs were characterised by ancestor 
worship. The Chinese believed that all parts of the entire cosmos belong to one organic 
whole. Death is just a process of transition, not the end of the participation in the lives 
and activities of the family. There is a continued relationship and a mutual 
interdependence between the living and the dead. The family is not an individual unit, 
but belongs to a long continuum of descent. Xiao or filial piety is the reason why 
Chinese performed their rituals of ancestral worship.196 
After a person had passed away, he or she was (literally) installed as an ancestor by 
putting his or her photograph on the house altar. Ancestors were provided with the 
necessary food and other things for the afterlife and in turn they provided the living 
descendants with emotional and social security. Rituals were performed to maintain the 
balance and order of the individual psyche, in every aspect of social life and in the 
entire cosmos. To the Chinese it was not one's obedience to commandments of an 
omnipresent, omniscient God which would influence the course of one life's or one's 
fate after death, but the "spirits" and luck. 
It was difficult to estimate the quantity of spirit-medium activities, due to its highly 
syncretic, individualistic, pragmatic and unorganised nature. Shenism was a "loosely 
bounded religion".197 But there seemed to be a certain consistency in the nature of 
spirit-mediumship. 
Within the traditional Chinese religious activities Wee distinguished two categories: 
those which developed a canonical tradition of their own and those which followed an 
existing canonical tradition198. An example of the former were 
"the rituals where the pantheon of gods belonging to both Malay folk beliefs and 
folk Buddhism are worshipped together... A reason for syncreticism of such 
practices may be due to the fact that all folk belief has a pronouncedly 
eudemonistic character where happiness and prosperity, personal success of 
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every kind are the aims served by the folk belief. These aims are more or less 
synonymous with the needs of the people."199 
shenism 
Of the religious activities with a canonical tradition Shenism was the most prevalent 
form. According to Elliott, this was the most typical, although rather extreme, 
manifestation of the major spiritual orientation of the overseas Chinese.200 He 
described this orientation as neither monistic nor coherent. 
"It is highly differentiated, and, at the best, dualistic. Belief in the reality cf « 
manifestation of religious phenomena need not necessarily be related to belief 
in the reality of other manifestations. Nor need the degree of belief which it 
elicits remain constant. " 
"...Faith, in the Chinese sense, is best summed up in the negative statement that 
it would be very unwise not to believe upon occasion. Some of the participants 
may, thus, believe wholeheartedly, while others, in Western eyes, are only 
believing 'a little bit'. This 'little bit' is still enough to justify their actions in 
their own minds and to observers."201 
The "little bit-faith" was applied with a pragmatic "nothing gained, nothing lost" 
attitude. 
Shenism was literally translated as the "doctrine of the gods"202. It referred to spirit-
mediumship, forming the basis of Chinese spirit-medium activities. Although shén could 
not be translated literally, it was generally referred to as "spirit". Shenism or spirit-
mediumship was an example of the phenomenon of shamanism, found on a world-wide 
scale. This phenomenon was usually not associated with contemporary Chinese religious 
practices.203 But already during the Han Dynasty ideas of prognostication and 
apocrypha were popular in China. Prognostication referred to hidden statements and 
prophecies which originated from shamans and necromancers. The apocrypha had more 
complicated contents and contained mainly false and heterodox sayings.204 
In the context of Chinese Traditional Religion, shén usually referred to objects of 
worship by the practitioners of Chinese Traditional Religion and could be any spirit, 
deified hero or emperor embodied in the form of images for worship, i.e. deities205. 
The practice of Shenism was based on the animistic belief that 
"there is an extremely influential spiritual world with a limitless number of 
powerful and fearsome inhabitants who are apart from the human world, but in 
close relation to it. Those inhabitants of the otherworld of spirits are strongly 
anthropomorphic and their modes of behaviour are firmly patterned on human 
activities ... The fortunes of men are largely controlled by the working of shén 
and by the right propitiation of the more powerful among them.n206 
Contrary to the positive spiritual force of shén stood the negative spiritual force of gui 
(ghosts or spirits of the dead). This was a disembodied spirit which had to be placated 
in order to avoid any harm that it could cause. A shén was appealed to for help in times 
of trouble and its protection sought against evil spirits. 
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Seeking advice or a solution to a problem was done through a spirit-medium. Certain 
living men or women could be temporarily possessed by a shén, who spoke through this 
medium, often called a dang-ki. High ranking shén such as Yuhuangshangdi (The Jade 
Emperor) and Sakyamuni Buddha, as well as sages such as Confucius and Lao Zi were 
considered too dignified to possess dang-ki.2'" 
The possession usually took place in temples, but also residential houses were converted 
into "temples". A dang-ki did not require any special religious knowledge. He or she 
merely lent his or her body to a spirit in a sort of trance. The problems posed to a shén 
through this dang-ki were all private and mainly about illness and health. Other 
problems which were observed were trouble with colleagues or employers, advice on 
a business venture and help with possession by evil spirits.208 
A dang-ki required assistance from an interpreter who also helped in the performance 
of the rituals. A temple committee took care of the practical and economic aspects of 
the cult. Most cults had an individual character and there was no inter-cult 
organisation209. 
The spirit-medium possession was a common religious phenomenon among the Chinese 
in Singapore in the fifties, particularly among the Hokkien dialect group.210 Orthodox 
Buddhism and Christianity posed no alternative to the overall acceptance of some form 
of Shenism. Nevertheless, there were a few other serious rivals to Shenism. According 
to Elliott, these were modernism and the inherent trait of occultism in Shenism which 
appealed less to modern people, the unwillingness of masters to reveal their knowledge 
to their pupils, and the cessation of new immigrants from China who could transfer this 
oral religious tradition.211 Moreover, most Shenist worshippers were older, Straits-
born Chinese women from the poorer socio-economic class. They were illiterate, 
conservative and extremely suspicious of strangers.212 Men were often ashamed to be 
seen in a temple themselves and sent their wives to ask advice on their behalf. This 
Chinese gender role division was not only typical of spirit-mediumship, but also of the 
greater part of Chinese Traditional Religion.ш 
automatic writing 
A special form of spirit-mediumship was "automatic writing", an important means to 
receive direct answers from the world of spirits. It was used for similar purposes as 
other forms of spirit-mediumship. Heinze reported that the Chinese in Singapore 
resorted to automatic writing by a spirit-medium for three reasons.2'4 
1. to get in touch with the spirits of dead relatives or friends. 
2. because they believed that only spirits from higher realms could answer their 
questions. 
3. it were mainly artists, especially writers, who sought divine inspiration through 
this form of spirit-mediumship. 
76 Singapore, a modem Asian city-state 
divination 
Traditional Chinese Religionists also called the aid of the spirits to get to know the pre-
ordained path of their lives. This was done by the practice of divination, the act or 
practice of trying to foretell future events and the unknown. This form was inherited 
from an ancient peasant past, but it also contained both folk Buddhist and Malay 
animistic elements.215 Divination was commonly known as fortune-telling, resting on 
the belief in fate (ming), which is fixed, and luck (yun), which is variable and can be 
influenced. In order to manipulate one's luck in everyday life, Traditional Chinese 
Religionists tried to both appease the gui and propitiate the shén. Some techniques 
available to provide insight into one's future, were: horoscope computation, 
physiognomy (inspection of the face), palmistry (inspection of the palm of the hand), 
weighing the bones of a person, the use of tortoise shells and three ancient coins, the 
use of a bird and slips of paper and the use of eight trigrams216. According to 
Choong, these divination techniques not only provided practical advice, but also tension 
management for people to deal with their fears and anxieties. Again it were 
predominantly women and uneducated, lower class people who patronised the mostly 
itinerant fortune-tellers. 
feng shut 
A special group of so called diviners were the geomancers, oifeng-shui practitioners. 
They chose sites for buildings or burial grounds or provided interior designing, based 
on the five elements of water, earth, air, fire and wood in relation to the spirits. The 
services of these geomancers were usually quite complicated and expensive and could 
therefore only be afforded by the rich. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE 
4.1 Modern political history 
Singapore's modern development started with the prelude to independence after the 
Second World War. 
In the first two years following the British return after the Japanese surrender in 1945, 
the British Governor ruled Singapore with the assistance of an advisory council 
consisting totally of officials and nominated non-officials. The British did not intend to 
remain in power, but planned to sow the seeds of self-government and democracy by 
transferring power to Singapore in stages. Singapore became a crown colony, separated 
from Malaya, on 1 April 1946, with its own Legislative and Executive Council.1 
Nevertheless, as the anti-colonial movement in Asia and Africa gained momentum after 
the Second World War, several formerly colonised countries became independent and 
Mao Zedong defeated the Kuomintang in China, the Chinese in Singapore became 
restless. The social and economic conditions fed their dissatisfaction. Strong population 
growth, unemployment, housing shortage, lack of electricity and clean water fuelled a 
longing for change.2 The Chinese in particular were dissatisfied, because the education 
system offered them few job opportunities. English was the only official language, 
whereas nearly half the school population was enroled in Chinese stream schools. These 
non-English schools did not enjoy much government recognition nor support. Those 
Chinese who went to China to study in a Chinese university, were not allowed to return 
to Singapore. Thus, when freedom (Merdeka) from colonisation became the parole 
during the fifties, the Chinese were in the front lines. 
The political scene was dominated by this strive for self-government and the following 
delaying factors. Firstly, the British had an interest in Singapore as a strategic base 
which made them hesitant to give up this colony. Secondly, Singapore initially did not 
have a strong and stable party system to take over the government.3 The third delaying 
factor was the perceived threat of communism from the Chinese by the British as well 
as the Malays. On par with their loyalty to their motherland, the Chinese adhered rather 
to leftist ideologies than to the ideas based on ethnic groups, called communalism, 
which most Malays preferred. In Malaya communists had stepped up activities against 
the colonial government. Though this communist insurgency was concentrated more in 
the peninsula, from the beginning of 1950 Singapore experienced a series of violent acts 
as well4. Chinese middle schools were used as a basis for so-called secret cells. The 
local British government campaigned against communists and alleged pro-communists. 
It detained oyer 1,200 people under the Emergency Regulations between 1948 and 
1953. The declaration of Emergency in Malaya and Singapore drove the Malayan 
Communist Party (MCP) underground. As armed rebellion had little success, the MCP 
changed strategy. Supporters in trade unions, Chinese schools and other organisations 
were urged to further the anti-colonial cause in an indirect way. Any issue of 
dissatisfaction could be used to stimulate anti-colonial sentiments. In 1954 the 
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requirement of National Service (NS)5 duties offered an opportunity to openly defy the 
colonial government. The MCP presented National Service as a plot by the colonial 
authorities to use local people to fight for the preservation of colonial rule. This led to 
clashes between students and the government. 
The British decided that the best political strategy against the communists6 in Malaya 
was to grant national independence to a moderate and broadly based local leadership. 
Hereby the communists, who claimed that they were anti-colonial freedom fighters, 
would be deprived of their justification of insurrection. After Malaya became 
independent in 1954, as a consequence Singapore was granted internal self-government 
in 1955. The British retained control over not only external affairs and defence, but also 
internal security, civil service, finance and law. The British governor retained his veto-
power. Local elections were called for as a token representation without affecting 
British power in any way.7 
The two political parties of any real impact were the Singapore Labour Front (SLF) and 
the People's Action Party (PAP). Under the leadership of David Marshall the SLF was 
formed in July 1954, while the PAP was established in November 1954 under the 
leadership of Lee Kuan Yew. Unlike the SLF, which was generally united, the PAP 
was not a cohesive group, being nothing more than a so-called united front of social 
democrats and pro-communists.8 The SLF formed the first Singapore government under 
chief minister Marshall. It was strongly committed to socialism, but the united 
communist front gave the fresh Labour Front government little opportunity to deal with 
domestic problems such as housing shortage and unemployment. Singapore was 
dominated by student unrest and strike after strike. In 1955 only, there were 275 
worker strikes. Criminality increased, especially by secret society activities. Marshall 
chose committees to study the problems over stem action, partly because he believed 
the outrage to be genuine, partly to prevent political damage. This soft approach turned 
out to be inadequate in the prevailing circumstances. 
The People's Action Party (PAP) was a group of young men who just returned to 
Singapore after studying in British universities. They were committed to remove the 
British colonial government and establish an independent non-communist Malaya, 
including Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Keng Swee, Toh Chin Chye and S. 
Rajaratnam, all middle-class, English educated men with little or no political 
experience, figured that they needed the support of the Chinese-educated population and 
the communist-controlled trade unions to end colonialism. They therefore adopted a 
pragmatic attitude. As legal adviser to a number of trade unions, Lee Kuan Yew had 
acquired a reputation as defender of workers' interests. The PAP also initially 
collaborated with the MCP, although the PAP declared itself to be non-communist, 
neither for nor against communism9. This way the PAP managed to gain support from 
Singapore's Chinese working class majority, in particular Chinese-speaking students and 
the Trade Union Congress. By this strategy, however, pro-communists joined the PAP 
too, expecting to use the moderate front to their own advantage. The moderate leaders 
were in the majority, but the more radical pro-communists had more power as they 
controlled many mass organisations. Altogether, the PAP was much more left-oriented 
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than the Labour Front10, although Lee, accused of being a communist, stated his aim 
clearly as "an independent, democratic, non-communist socialist Malaya."11 
It was under the PAP's pressure, supported by strikes and demonstrations, that in 1956 
Marshall went to the London Conference, popularly referred to as the Merdeka Talks, 
to demand full self-government for Singapore. The British were prepared to grant full 
internal self-government, but held on to the control over foreign affairs, defence and 
foremost internal security, as they considered Marshall's handling of pro-communists 
as weak. Marshall took this semi-solution as a personal failure and resigned. 
The next Singapore government under Lim Yew Hock dealt firmly with the 
communists. Thirty five pro-communists were arrested, amongst which five out of six 
pro-communist PAP-leaders. As the British had more confidence in this line of 
maintaining internal security12, they made concessions to the next Singapore delegation 
to London in 1957. Singapore acquired a full self-governing status in 1959. 
While Lim suffered politically from his firm actions against the communists in 
Singapore, Lee and his moderate colleagues regained control of the PAP since the 
arrests of 1957. In those years the PAP was known for its anti-corruption campaigns. 
In the election campaign for the first independent government of Singapore, the PAP 
stressed its non-communist stand. During the first general election with a ninety percent 
turnout, the PAP won 53 percent of the votes, which meant the majority of 43 seats in 
parliament. Only eight seats went to the opposition. Some attributed this PAP election 
victory to its stand for anti-colonialism and self-government in combination with its 
willingness to integrate with the Federation of Malaya13. Others held the confidence 
of the party leadership, its effective campaign strategy and the realistic and credible 
party programme mainly responsible for this PAP landslide victory.14 
Before accepting his new post, Lee had the radical pro-communist PAP-detainees freed 
on the condition that they would strive for a "united, independent, democratic, non-
communist and socialist Malaya by peaceful means" and renounce revolutionary 
violence.15 
But the tension between the moderates and pro-communists in the PAP due to their 
ideological differences grew and led to open conflict in March 1960. The following 
period was characterised by a political struggle between the pro-communists and the 
moderate leaders. David Marshall had re-entered politics as a candidate for the 
Worker's Party and drew many of the left wing of the PAP. This created a substantial 
dip in support for the PAP. In two by-elections, in Hong Lim and Anson in 1961, the 
PAP was defeated by the pro-communists. 
This was experienced as a communist threat by the Malayan government. Beforehand 
it had rejected the idea of including Singapore in the Federation of Malaya, because the 
addition of some million Chinese from Singapore would upset the delicate ethnic 
balance. Now fearing an Asian Cuba, Malaya suddenly changed its point of view in 
favour of a Federation of Malaya including Singapore as well as the surrounding areas 
of British North Borneo (Sabah), Sarawak and Brunei16. The latter Malay inhabited 
areas would serve as a quantitative racial balance in the Federation. The PAP, all along 
in favour of a merger with Malaya, agreed to this new strategy. Not only for economic 
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and security reasons, but also because it did not expect the British to grant Singapore 
independence on its own. The pro-communists, however, framed the merger as an 
"imperialist plot"17 between the British, Malayan government and the PAP. They 
feared that the anti-communist government in Kuala Lumpur would detain them.18 
Lee forced the issue of merger by calling a vote of confidence in the Legislative 
Assembly and won by a narrow margin of 27 over 24 votes after long debates. Five 
days later, the PAP Central Executive Committee expelled the thirteen PAP dissidents, 
who in tum started a new political party, the Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front). Thus 
began the PAP's battle for survival. 
In 1962 the PAP lost a considerable amount of seats and was defeated in two by-
elections due to cooperation between several opposition parties. These political 
dynamics led Lee to emphasise the merger with mainland Malaya.19 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, had indicated 
before the possibility to "join" Singapore into the Federation as a "subordinate unit". 
Singapore seemed to need Malaya more than the other way around.20 Due to its lack 
of natural resources, Singapore saw the benefits of an economic trade-off. Malaya could 
provide the raw materials, while Singapore could serve as the centre for entrepot trade. 
The need for military cooperation was also deeply felt, especially since the Japanese 
conquered the region during the Second World War. At the time Singapore was not able 
to defend itself against foreign aggressors at all, when the British forces would 
withdraw. Moreover, the PAP leaders hoped that a security community with Malaya 
could prevent the communist-minded from aligning with a communist bloc. Officially 
the PAP stressed the economic advantages in the merger with Malaya. 
However, there were some major obstacles. The first obstacle was the ethnical balance. 
The Chinese, who formed a majority in Singapore, would become an ethnic minority 
if they submerged in the Federation of Malaya. This gave rise to communal sentiments 
on both sides. The PAP again adopted a pragmatic approach. Internally it tried to 
generate "sentiments of kinship, common destiny and a sense of belonging" among the 
Singaporeans and externally it tried to demonstrate that Singaporeans were "ready, 
willing and able to be absorbed as one Malayan people, all able to speak Malay..."21. 
The second obstacle to merger was formed by the political and economic ideologies of 
Malaya and Singapore, which stood in sharp contrast, the Malayan one being much 
more conservative than the one in Singapore. Malaya was a traditional society with a 
political system of Sultans and Agung and took a gradual and Malay-oriented 
conservative approach, largely aimed at the rural Malays. Singapore, on the other hand, 
was an immigrant state with little political foundation except the coloniser's, urging for 
social development and rapid industrialisation.22 Not only were the Malays resentful 
of the Chinese dominance in the economy, but they were also worried by the sympathy 
and support a substantial number of Chinese gave to left-wing political parties. 
Singapore was largely Chinese with a dominantly ethnic Chinese government with 
proclaimed socialist goals and a commitment to rapid social change23, whereas the 
Malays were not. The PAP professed to be democratic socialist, which came across as 
too leftist to the Malayan government. The PAP countered this allegation as follows: 
Political Influence 81 
"...any group of men who are not only anti-Communist, but also anti-socialist 
and anti any change toward a more egalitarian society, can easily blur the lines 
between democratic socialism and Communism, and invoke the ready-made 
resistance against democratic socialism by labelling it Communism. "24 
Despite the enormous political tension, Tunku Abdul Rahman finally proposed that 
Singapore would merge with the Federation of Malaya, given "local autonomy with 
powers to determine nearly all matters except defence, external affairs and security."25 
Lee responded immediately in favour of the proposal and the merger became a fact on 
9 July 1963. Singapore was to have a special status within the Federation and exercise 
greater powers of self-rule than the former Borneo territories. In return Singapore 
would have a reduced presentation in the Federal Parliament and Singapore citizens 
would not automatically become Malaysian citizens.26 The British agreed to these 
terms, but the communists, who had pan-Malayan goals, were against this merger with 
an anti-communist government in Kuala Lumpur. 
Indonesia was also against the formation of the Federation of Malaysia, because it 
reduced the chances of a greater Indonesia. The joining of the former Borneo territories 
with Malaya, regarded as pro-British, was particularly painful. When the formation of 
Malaysia was proclaimed without the prior approval of Indonesia, Sukarno initiated a 
policy of confrontation (¡confrontasi) against the Federation of Malaya on 20 January 
1963. Various groups in Indonesia gave support to the "crush Malaysia campaign".27 
Left wing nationalists and the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) considered Malaysia a 
Western-sponsored neo-colonialist plot aimed at subverting Indonesia's independence. 
However, most of the Indonesian leaders regarded Malaysia as an overseas Chinese 
dominated political unit which would in tum be used by China to control the whole 
region. The distrust towards the ethnic Chinese was great.28 At first the confrontation 
took the form of a verbal war and harassments, but after a UN report of 14 September 
stated that the majority of the population of the Borneo territories wanted to join 
Malaya, the ¡confrontasi intensified. Trade with Malaya, including Singapore, was 
suspended, armed raids were made into Sabah and Sarawak (the Borneo territories) and 
sabotage and terrorist actions were launched in Singapore. Malayan armed forces were 
too small to deal with the Indonesians, but the British military presence in Singapore 
prevented more aggression.29 
Not only did the merger give rise to international trouble (the Philippines claimed Sabah 
as well), but also was the merger period internally marked by problems concerning 
citizenship, education, labour and internal security. These internal issues all came down 
to ethnic differences and their respective political and economic preferences. 
First of all, originally Singapore adhered to the "one man, one vote" principle. But if 
this were applied, Singapore would be over-represented in the Federal Parliament as its 
population was larger than any of the eleven states in Malaya and the two territories in 
former Borneo. In the merger Singapore had traded these voting rights for autonomy 
in labour and education policies.30 The Barisan Sosialis (BS) took up these voting 
rights as a point of disagreement with the merger. They claimed the PAP's negotiation 
results were a "sell-out".31 To obtain a fresh mandate from the Singapore population, 
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Lee called for a general election on 21 September 1963. The PAP won a clear majority. 
Despite being hampered by all forms of repressive measures, including the detention 
of its key parliamentary and trade union leaders, the BS still managed to win thirteen 
seats and 33 percent of the votes.32 This 1963 general election (GE) was a major 
watershed in Singapore politics as the defeat of the extreme left- and right-wing parties 
marked the beginning of the PAP's increasing dominance over Singapore. 
The second internal problem during the merger period was formed by the language 
medium in education. In Malaya the Malay language was the mandatory medium of 
instruction in the schools. Singapore took a different approach, more in line with its 
real ethnical situation. It professed an equality of treatment of its four main languages 
- English, Chinese, Malay and Tamil - in schools, in order of the number of pupils with 
that particular first language in the school. Simultaneously, Malay was accepted as the 
national language of the state. The school curriculum was revised to emphasise practical 
subjects such as mathematics and science.33 The pro-communists claimed that this way 
the PAP government was killing the Chinese language and culture.34 
The communists' action channels had mainly been the schools and unions. This was a 
thorn in the eye to the PAP government. It therefore decided to tackle organised labour 
as a political interest group. As an argument the PAP mentioned Singapore's "recent 
history". For example, there had been 275 strikes and lockouts in Singapore in 1955, 
as compared to only 27 in Malaya.35 The continued pro-communist activities were also 
perceived as a threat to the internal security by Malaya. Therefore Singapore and 
Malaya decided to join hands in combating the "left-wing die-hards" in Operation Cold 
Storage36. By this firm anti-communist campaign Singapore's autonomy on labour 
became somewhat blurred and invoked a number of questions as to how far the 
Federation's powers would go. The only collaboration between Malaya and Singapore, 
however, was against the communists. Besides that, ideological differences surfaced 
continuously during the merger. Singapore clearly expressed its own points of view. 
The first conflict arose by the end of 1963 when Lee criticised the Malaysian budget. 
He argued that the Federal multi-tax schedule would create a more unequal distribution 
of wealth instead of improving social conditions.37 Lee suggested a progressive 
income-tax system (as would later on, until today, be implemented in Singapore). Lee 
was also in favour of placing high priority on social services. Singapore spent over 46 
percent of its budget on social services, whereas Malay did only 32.5 percent.3" The 
Minister of Finance of the Federation, Tan Siew Sin, however, argued that Malaya had 
to spend much more on defense and police than did the small Singapore. He also argued 
that the comparison was unfair because Singapore still enjoyed military aid from the 
British government. Moreover, Tan pointed at an ideological contradiction in 
Singapore's policies. While the PAP professed a more equal distribution of incomes, 
it was reluctant to give its own income, which was the highest of all Malayan states, 
away to the other Federal states. 
Nevertheless, Lee insisted that only democratic socialist planning would abolish the 
poverty in the states of Malaya. According to Nam, Lee wanted to help uplift the 
present economic standing of the have-nots in the entire nation. He took the view that 
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Malaya's free-enterprise system would not only cause rapid urbanisation at the expense 
of rural planning, but also lead to a widening of the gap of real cash incomes between 
the urban and the rural people. At the same time, Lee believed private industry or 
enterprise would obviously form a "money-making monopoly" at the cost of the have-
nots.3' Lee's socialism was interpreted by some as "levelling down" rather than 
"levelling up" the living standards of the have-nots.40 This perception that everybody 
was to be brought down to a lower common denominator in order that all would share 
a common misery, may probably have led the PAP to emphasise until today that it 
strives for more prosperity instead of a lower standard of living to be shared equally 
among the population regardless of "race", religion or language. 
Whatever the ideology, economic growth was lacking. Singapore's economic motive for 
the merger had been the expectation of more trade and a common market. The Federal 
government, however, turned out to be protective of the economy of the mainland of 
Malaysia. The textile quota dispute in March and April 1965, re-affirmed that 
Singapore could not expand its market into the states of Malaysia. When the British 
government increased its textile quota offer to the Federation of Malaysia, the Federal 
government only left Singapore with a token allotment. Goh Keng Swee, Singapore's. 
Minister of Finance, called this "absurd", as peninsular Malaysia had no factories for 
ready-made goods and its substantial share "would be at the expense of Singapore". 
Together with Singapore's National Trade Congress (SNTC), Goh Keng Swee asked 
the Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman not to discriminate against 
Singapore, not to make Singapore "the largest industrial slum of Southeast Asia" and 
not to "create an army of some 4,500 unemployed".41 Goh understood this dispute as 
being more of an expression of political rivalry than of pure economic jealousy. 
Singapore's trade was also seriously hampered by the Indonesian economic boycott 
against Malaya. Lee was willing to re-open trade business with Indonesia during the 
konfrontasi, for his idea was that economic considerations must be treated separately 
from politics. This attitude gave him the label of "agent of Soekarno". Lee's opposition 
to the war in Vietnam was interpreted as an echo of the voice of Beijing and Moscow. 
This earned him the label of "agent of Communist China". In return Lee labelled the 
extreme Malays "the ultra-Malays" and branded them as "communist collaborators", 
for their "doing President Soekamo's work".42 He said they attempted "to twist our 
arms in Singapore" by using their communal weapon - Malay ethnicity or Muslim 
religion and tried to restrain growth of non-Malay cultures. Lee perceived them to 
"stifle the other man's culture".43 
Both the Singapore and the Malayan government claimed to be non-communalistic, but 
in the process Federal politics turned into a communalistic struggle. The core of the 
conflict between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur (KL) could be summarised as the choice 
between a Malay Malaysia, which the KL Federal government desired, and a Malaysian 
Malaysia, which the Singapore government was striving for. Singapore launched a hard 
campaign for a non-communal approach, which instigated a verbal war between the 
political leaders. Rajaratnam, then Minister of Culture in Singapore, stated that Malay 
culture was not identical to, but only a part of, Malaysian culture. Whereas the Federal 
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government wanted the Malay culture to be dominant in Malaysia. Tunku Abdul 
Rahman often cited the founding fathers of Malaya as the Malays. They were "the 
chosen people". The Federal Minister of Information, Inche Senu, asserted that the term 
"Malaysian Malaysia" was first coined by the Alliance, not by the PAP, and he 
criticised Lee for his being "ungrateful to the Malay hospitality in allowing him to be 
a Malaysian."44 Lee counterpoised: "I am not enjoying anybody's hospitality. I am 
here as of right. And 61 percent of Malaysians have got to stand by that, or it is 
lost. "45 Lee insisted that all Malaysians were in fact foreigners, except the indigenous 
aborigines (the Orang Laut). Dato Albar of UMNO (United Malays National 
Organisation) warned that the Malays would lose patience if Lee continued denying 
their being "sons of the soil".46 Lee stated explicitly that he would never say 
"wherever I am, remember I am a Chinese" or "the Chinese unite".47 But, because the 
PAP did not agree with the Malay Malaysia, it was driven in the corner of being the 
communal champion for the Chinese cause. 
These communal or ethnical tensions led to racial riots in Singapore. The Malays had 
become dissatisfied with their employment opportunities, housing situation, scholarships 
and land reservations. They demanded special privileges, but the PAP insisted that 
Article 89 of its state constitution should be sufficient: "It shall be the responsibility of 
the Government constantly to care for the interests of the racial and religious minorities 
in the State." 
On the anniversary day of the prophet Mohammed, July 21, 1964, a communal riot 
between the Chinese and the Malays erupted, resulting in 33 deaths, some 600 injuries 
and 1,700 arrests according to Nam48, resulting in 23 deaths and 454 injuries 
according to the Ministry of Culture in Singapore49. Singapore UMNO leaders had 
inflamed the Malays in Singapore by statements such as: "If we [Malays] are united, 
not even 1,000 Lee Kuan Yew's can break us." The UMNO secretary-general Albar 
called Lee "Baba Lee" or "step-father" and accused Lee's government of making 
Singapore an "Israel where Muslims are pressed down and suppressed". On the eve of 
the riot, leaflets signed by the Singapore Malay National Action Committee were 
distributed, urging Malays to kill Chinese.50 
Before, Lee had stressed Singaporeans' willingness to learn Malay culture, but these 
events made him place more and more emphasis on cultural pluralism. These shifts 
affected the relationship of Singapore with the Federal Government in a negative sense. 
Integration of or intercultural exchange between Malays and Chinese was virtually 
unknown. The existing level of integration was very superficial.51 To Malay 
extremists, mixing with non-Malays or non-Muslims was frowned upon as committing 
a sin, having contact with "infidels".52 The Malayan Chinese retained their filial piety 
by sending food and money to their relatives in their motherland China. To them it was 
a sacrifice to learn Malay as a common language to contribute to the solidarity of the 
nation. To accept it as a yardstick for measuring and testing their loyalty to the nation, 
as the Federation demanded, was exceeding the limit of their flexibility and willingness 
to adapt. The Chinese required an open discussion on this issue referred to as 
communalism, but Tunku Abdul Rahman thought this would not serve the growing need 
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for communal harmony.53 But ignoring ethnic tensions did not appear the right way 
to the creation of a Malaysian culture. Attitudes polarised and led to a cold war. This 
verbal war, however, reached a zenith when Singapore's Minister of Culture, 
Rajaratnam, was called "another Hitler" due to his claim of being a socialist and a 
nationalist. Lee started calling the UMNO leaders "the feudalists in Kuala Lumpur" and 
the MCA leaders in Malaya "the compradors" for their allegedly bartering of Chinese 
welfare for Malay favour.54 The preference for Malay culture by the Federal 
Government was expressed in for instance the expenditure of 81 percent of the budget 
of religious affairs on mosques in 1965-1966. Political supremacy of Malays over other 
ethnic groups was maintained and promoted by the completion of a five year 
construction work of the Masjid Negara (National Mosque) in Kuala Lumpur in August 
1965. 
Mid 1965, Lee launched a dynamic campaign for a "Malaysian Malaysia or nothing". 
The idea was that in the Malaysian Malaysia the low standard of living of the 
underprivileged class, mainly in the rural areas, would be raised. The nation and the 
state would not be identified with the supremacy, well-being and the interests of one 
particular community or ethnic group. Lee took a stand for equal opportunities for 
everyone. A truly Malaysian Malaysia would mean unity and solidarity for all, where 
the in- and outgroup dynamics would disappear. Lee challenged the "natural rights" of 
the Malays as "indigenous people". He wanted no racial supremacy at all. But Abdul 
Rahman dismissed Lee's denial of the Malays as the indigenous people with more rights 
as "childish". The Senate called for constitutional measures to exclude Singapore from 
Malaysia or to "put Lee Kuan Yew away to sober him up".55 All these developments 
caused serious mutual irritation and it is beyond doubt that the deeply rooted cultural 
dissimilarities played their role in the disintegration of the mainland Malays and the 
Singaporean Chinese. 
Moreover, the PAP had engaged itself in peninsular politics claiming that it would be 
most suitable to draw the support of the Chinese population. The PAP believed the 
Chinese wanted a dynamic, progressive leadership and if they would not turn to the 
moderate progressive PAP they would become more radical left-wing.56 In this way 
the PAP tried to share power with the Alliance Party in the running of Malaysia, but 
this was against the tacit agreement that Singapore would become a kind of New york 
and Kuala Lumpur a kind of Washington. These politics brought about an unbearable 
breach in the communication between the two governments. When secession seemed 
almost inevitable, Tan cautioned the secession movement that it would eventually 
encounter insurmountable problems of being surrounded by 100 million people of the 
Malay "race"57 in Southeast Asia and that the less than 1.5 million Chinese might be 
unable to survive politically by themselves.58 
The ethnic tensions had become dangerously close to explosion and separation of 
Singapore from the Federation seemed unavoidable. About the precise chain of events 
leading up to signing the Separation Agreement, however, there were different 
accounts. According to the version of the Ministry of Culture of Singapore, Tunku 
Abdul Rahman felt that the only way to prevent unnecessary bloodshed was to separate 
86 Singapore, a modem Asian city-state 
Singapore from Malaysia. On 6 August Lee and some of his Ministers were told to 
leave Malaysia immediately. Lee tried to modify this decision into a looser federation, 
but to no avail. On 9 August the Dewan Rakyat, the federal lower house of parliament, 
unanimously approved the Separation Agreement, without any of the Singapore 
representatives present. That same day Lee proclaimed Singapore a sovereign, 
democratic and independent state.59 
The Malaysian version was that by midnight of August 7, the Singapore Cabinet 
unanimously voted for the Separation Agreement. The Federation accepted this decision 
and Abdul Rahman revealed these proceedings on August 9, giving three reasons. 
Firstly, controversy over a Malaysian Malaysia. Secondly, the PAP's competition for 
power at the centre. Thirdly, conflicts over financial arrangements between the two 
governments.60 
The minority parties in Singapore complained about the procedures and the method of 
secession, but not about the fact itself. The PAP presented it as a fait accompli: "what 
has happened has happened". The feelings were mixed. On the one hand one was glad 
to be free from the communalist cold war, on the other hand there was anxiety about 
Singapore's future. 
In retrospect, Nam called the Federation of Malaysia more a "temporary trace" than a 
"permanent peace settlement". It was rather an "artificial creation" than a genuine 
"integration". Almost all political conflicts during the merger period were, in one way 
or another, coloured with ethnical or communal sentiments. 
Mahathir, who later became Prime Minister of Malaysia, pointed at the strongly rooted 
cultural bias. Since the Singaporeans were not accustomed to Malay rule and the 
"Malay monarchy draws no respect from most Singaporean Chinese"61, it should have 
been Singapore, according to Mahathir, which should have built a bridge and cross it. 
Unless the Singaporeans undertook an action to conform their political attitudes along 
the "Malayan way of life", the remerger would be unlikely to occur. Singapore did not 
think of ways then to remerge with Malaysia; it sought its own development path. 
However, in 1996 Lee Kuan Yew raised much consternation with his reply to a 
question by a reporter in a press-conference that one day Singapore might rejoin 
Malaysia. People were confused by this unexpected statement, but it was speculated that 
Lee only said this to keep Singaporeans alert and fight complacency.62 
4.1.1 Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP 
Lee Kuan Yew was secretary-general of the People's Action Party (PAP) since 1954 
and Singapore's Prime Minister from 1959 to 1990. His personal influence on 
Singapore's development was so enormous, that he is often viewed as practically 
synonymous with Singapore's modern history. Even after he stepped down as a Prime 
Minister in November 1990, he remained politically active as Senior Minister, a kind 
of advisor to the Singapore cabinet. 
Although he was only one of the moderate originators of the People's Action Party 
(PAP), he soon stood out. When Chan discussed the influence of values on the shaping 
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of political institutions, she mentioned four people of importance: "Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, 
Dr. Goh Keng Swee, Dr. Toh Chin Chye and Mr. Rajaratnam ... probably from 1977-
78 onwards, it was the Prime Minister all the way. He was the centre of the decision-
making process."63 As Lee had proved himself courageous and resolute, both in 
Singapore's struggle against colonialism and the communists and in its confrontation 
with Indonesia, he acquired a stature that gave him enormous leeway in shaping 
Singapore's course.64 Firm and clear in his policies, Lee has been disgusted by his 
adversaries as a manipulative dictator65 and glorified by his fans for his fervour, 
determination and anticipatory policies. Until he was recently overtaken by president 
Soeharto of Indonesia, Lee held the longest autocracy in modem history (1959-1990). 
This enabled him to implement most of his development ideas in a long-term, 
systematic approach, which is unique for a leadership. Although Singapore officially 
is a parliamentary democracy based on the British Westminster model, Lee's People's 
Action Party (PAP) has held the majority of the seats in the unicameral Parliament. 
Therefore it was both Lee and the PAP who shaped the island-state's development. 
About Lee's personal life relatively little is known, probably due to his efforts to 
discourage a cult of personality and a distinctive sense of privacy66. Nevertheless, 
elaborate books have been written about Lee and the PAP, and Lee's speeches were 
documented in several dozen volumes.67 
"Harry" Lee was born into a traditional Hakka family. His father, Chin Koon, worked 
for the Shell Petroleum Company, at first as a shopkeeper, later as superintendent in 
charge of an oil depot. When he retired, he worked as a salesman for a company in 
watches and jewellery. In 1922 Chin Koon married Chua Jim Neo, who was noted for 
her culinary skills. They had four sons and one daughter.68 
Lee Kuan Yew studied at Raffles College at the time of the Japanese invasion. After 
the Second World War he studied at Cambridge University, where he had a brilliant 
academic career with a double first in law. After he returned from England, he married 
Kwa Geok Choo, who had also been a top law student at Cambridge University. During 
his student days in England he had become keenly interested in issues of colonialism 
and freedom. Here he became determined to play a part in freeing Singapore from 
colonial rule.69 When Lee later became Prime Minister of Singapore, he stated that his 
government would not allow itself to be exploited, neither by the British nor the 
communists.70 
Minchin71 emphasised Lee's messianistic reign, as opposed to the charismatic 
leadership some like to attribute him, meaning that it was rather Lee's message, his 
dreams, which attracted the people of Singapore than Lee's personality. Therefore it is 
less important to delve into Lee's biography than it is to reflect on his values, his 
vision. According to Devan Nair, former trade union leader and Singapore's third 
president:72 
"There is a world of difference between those who like to be seen on top - their 
motives are egoistic - and those who have the inner capacity to be on top. Lee 
stands out from the run-of-the-mill politician because he can look beyond 
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tomorrow, make projections, develop a vision and ignore or bypass the trivia 
of the present. But in so doing he may give the impression of lacking sensitivity, 
being aloof. " 
Lee and Goh Keng Swee, who formed the core "group" of the People's Action Party, 
were Peranakan Chinese who were English-educated. Lee had to use Chinese tutors and 
journalists to inform him about the limits and the expectations of the Chinese-educated 
constituencies. The Peranakan formed a cultural and ethnic group with a mixture of 
Malay and Chinese values, in which the Confucian tradition was dominant. They 
showed strong family ties and adhered to ancestor worship. Lee and Goh were 
primarily socialised with a Confucian upbringing, but their secondary socialisation was 
heavily influenced by their study period in the West. According to Chan73, Lee and 
Gob's early conscious political thinking was that of Fabian socialists. The Fabian 
Society was founded in London in 1883. It was a critical, but eclectical group with 
Bernard Shaw as its most well-known member. Fabians derived their thought from the 
English Liberal Tradition and socialism, especially Marxism, although influence of 
Marx has been denied.74 Liberty and equality were their principal aim and gradualness 
their cardinal principle. The Fabian socialists were constitutional, orderly and almost, 
if not wholly, respectable. They focused on planning, neatness, efficiency, economy and 
hygiene in immediate and down-to-earth policies.75 
Socialist values were reflected in Singapore's important political institutions, leaving 
aside the legislative and administrative institutions which were inherited from the 
British. Democratic centralist principles were shown in the choosing of the vanguard, 
the core group, the cadre members.76 Lee sometimes mentioned "Western academics' 
innocence before the many faces of communism".77 
There was little doubt about Lee's vision of Singapore. Lee was 
"the enemy of parochial community - its peace about living in the present and 
accepting things the way they are, the languor of folk dance and celebration, the 
oneness with land and with ancestors, and the willingness to work only enough 
to secure basic necessities or to help a neighbour. He has sought to overcome 
what he chooses to call the backwardness of the Malays, the clannishness of the 
Chinese-educated and the Indians, the grubbiness of rural villages or city slums. 
He is more attuned to the incentive mentality and to the acquisition of wealth 
and technique without the personal and social costs involved."78 
Lee projected his own life of orderliness, cleanliness, discipline, intensity and virility 
onto Singapore's development. In line with this ambitious attitude, the PAP set out to 
develop Singapore into a "modern, technically advanced, secular and independent 
republic, multiracial and politically plural so long as communalism or communism are 
not contemplated... The Government has promoted the ethic of hard work, excellence 
and skill deserving rewards set by international demand and supply."79 Strictly 
speaking, Lee was not a dictator. He listened to his cabinet Ministers, was on occasion 
"outvoted" and could be persuaded to change his mind. The PAP style was consistent 
with Lee's guiding principles and values. This style was characterised as morally 
upright, elitist, resolute, tough, truthful and paternalistic. Most PAP leaders led by 
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example: no-nonsense hard working, incorrupt, thrifty with public funds, self-
disciplined and virtuous.80 The PAP leaders not only theorised about their political 
principles, but also acted according to them. They meticulously planned their social and 
economic vision of the Singaporean society, to such an extent that one speaks of "social 
engineering" in Singapore. To implement this vision Lee did not just do his job, but he 
put in a certain fervour which made people either love or hate him. To achieve his 
ideals, Lee set out to mould the population of Singapore. He "channeled their energies 
and suppressed their urges, exhorted them, dragooned them, threatened them, led 
them."81 
Lee knew what he wanted, set an example and expected the same high standards of his 
Ministers and bureaucracy. Nevertheless, Lee never was a sage-king in the Confucian 
sense; he rather was a shrewd politician.82 In line with the mechanical perception of 
the "social engineering" of Singapore was the implication that Lee simply used the 
presence of Confucian traditions, such as hard work and obedience to authorities, to 
push his vision of Singapore through. He used the positive aspects in the society and 
tried to correct aspects he deemed to be negative as well. The PAP leaders used 
traditional Confucian values, while simultaneously trying to introduce new values and 
to reshape society towards what they considered a more modern set of values.83 But 
however mechanical this "social engineeering" of Singapore seemed, Lee would be one 
of the first to recognise that Singapore's politics would remain human, subject to error, 
irrationalities and life's unpredictable ways. Lee mentioned several times that he could 
not predict the future. But he used his intelligence, education and skills to achieve his 
goals. This way he managed to use Singapore's scarce resources in a sophisticated way. 
He established an institutional setting which allowed him an inordinate measure of 
control that was instrumental in many ways. As a law graduate, Lee used all 
instruments of a statesman skilfully to virtually eliminate all contenders of the national 
policies. 
From numerous conversations with people who knew and know him, Milne and 
Mauzy84 collected the following descriptions of Lee: 
"as a Fabian socialist (perhaps lapsed), nationalist, modernizer and 
Confucianist. Few would quarrel with a description of him as an 
intellectual workaholic who is disciplined, determined, noncorrupt and fully 
possessed with the qualities of a ruler. He has also often been said to be 
arrogant, intolerant, argumentative, sarcastic, and sardonic, with little sympathy 
for human failings. He is described as a confident thinker and planner who 
nevertheless worries about the unkind vagaries of fate, an ideas man who 
determinedly and relentlessly oversees policy implementation. He is at once an 
'I'll fix you' campaign speaker and a precisely controlled parliamentary debater 
whose facility of language and use of cold logic and facts intimidate most 
opponents. He can be polite and gracious; he can laugh and appreciates irony. 
He is also reputed to have a fiery temper and can be blunt and rude, even in 
public. He is said to be impervious to flattery and to hate sycophants, although 
his very dominance encourages such. He is vigilant in 'setting the record 
straight' (sometimes through libel suits) when his official conduct or propriety, 
or his government's has been attacked." 
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Asked about Lee's spirituality by Minehin, Nair replied85: 
"...Lee Kuan Yew has an intense inner life, one not defined by any particular 
religion. It is evident from the very high standards he sets himself in both 
private and public domains. 
.. .Whatever the uncertainties or absurdities about him, there is commitment. His 
spirituality is expressed in his concern for people. Why else would he insist on 
such high standards for himself, his family, friends, the Government and the 
people of Singapore? These standards are necessary to the desired quality of life. 
...The new elite emerging in Singapore troubles him. He is striving to create 
a new Jerusalem and it turns out to be a new Babylon! What is intended is very 
different from the result! 
...His worldview owes a great deal to his British education. Since then, he has 
been mainly affected by Gandhi and Nehru and some of the Chinese classics." 
During the decades he governed Singapore, Lee's ideas and personality have evolved 
and developed, but in general his political views remained strikingly consistent. 
As the title of a book on Lee Kuan Yew "No man is an island"86 (which was not 
allowed to be on sale in Singapore) so aptly indicated, Lee could not have achieved 
Singapore's development success without his PAP leadership team. The highly educated 
cabinet worked in a well-balanced and cohesive manner. Most of them had a Confucian 
background with its political and moral traditions, but simultaneously believed in 
moulding the society according to rational calculation and logical planning. They agreed 
on the set of guiding principles and values for Singapore and the political fundamentals 
of pragmatism and policy flexibility."7 Their selection included "a voluntary 
psychological examination to gauge intellectual capacity, emotional stability, integrity, 
honesty, loyalty and overall suitability."88 
It was long believed that the first real test for the PAP would come if the younger 
generation of PAP-leaders would take over from Lee and the first generation would 
retire. On 26 November 1990, Lee Kuan Yew resigned after thirty-one years in power. 
Goh Chok Tong took over the republic's top political post, after six years as first 
Deputy Prime Minister (PM) and fourteen years after becoming a Member of 
Parliament (MP). Goh's succession marked the culmination of the PAP's renewal and 
rejuvenation process which in fact already had started in the early 1970's. Lee had not 
only planned and prepared his succession, but he also did not leave politics. Lee 
became Senior Minister in the PM's office as well as retained the post of secretary-
general of the PAP. He said his task was to build confidence in the new leadership and 
to help them present politics to the public. Many were sceptical about his continued 
hold over the PAP. Lee replied: 
"Goh Chok Tong says he wants me as 'Gurkha guard'. I shall try to stay fit to 
discharge this duty. But what happens when I am not around? Before then, some 
in the team should have learnt how to calm down a rough situation. The second 
reason is that straw polls show that older Singaporeans are more comfortable 
with me around. Foreign investors also feel better about their assets because I 
have been a key player in past crises. In a few years, the team will be able to 
do without me and generate confidence on their own."89 
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What caused concern with the opposition was Lee's strong personality and what he had 
said earlier in 1988: "I don't have to be president to be in control. All I have to do is 
remain as secretary-general of the PAP and I have a very strong last word on 
policy."90 The PAP had always been identified with Lee Kuan Yew, which was now 
difficult to separate for the people: 
"The PAP does not have much of an identity independent of the Prime Minister 
and the government headed by him. Its image, identity and appeal are almost 
entirely derived from the personality of the Prime Minister and the achievements 
of the Government. The credit for virtually all achievements is given to the 
Prime Minister by the Singapore people. Loyalty and responsibility of the Party 
does not mean much. If at all mere is a sense of loyalty to the Party, it is 
through the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is the Party in the eyes of most 
Singaporeans. He is also the embodiment of the Government."91 
There was a lot of speculation in Singapore about Goh's role as alleged "seat-warmer" 
for Lee's son Brigadier General Lee Hsien Loong. Goh made it clear that BG Lee 
would succeed him, but that he was not his "seat-warmer". An unexpected event such 
as the diagnosis of cancer in Deputy Prime Minister Ong Teng Cheong and in BG Lee, 
Minister of trade and industry, in November 1992, made the matter of succession rather 
uncertain. The potential loss of these two prime political leaders meant a severe 
drawback for the PAP's future. Although BG Lee seemed to have recovered well from 
his treatments and returned to work as soon as possible, it left a big question mark. Lee 
Kuan Yew played a crucial role in Singapore's development as long as he could. It was 
beyond doubt that he remained the guardian of the PAP's values and principles. 
4.1.2 Confucianism in Singapore's politics 
Although Singapore basically followed the Anglo-American parliamentary system, a 
Confucian background was reflected in a number of ways. 
moral example 
Firstly, in the Confucian tradition, moral values and political leadership were closely 
related. Leadership was to be based upon morality. Therefore, the Confucian political 
recipe for a good government was that the ruler must first of all set a good moral 
example.92 This Confucian philosophy stemmed from the Mandate of Heaven, the 
famous Chinese doctrine which let human destiny depend on man's own moral efforts, 
and not upon spiritual forces. It was developed by the Zhou people, who overthrew the 
Shang dynasty in 1111 ВС, to justify their right to rule. The Shang people submitted 
almost their total lives to spiritual beings. With this new Mandate a growth of 
humanism in Chinese history was inaugurated.93 From that moment onwards the future 
prospects of a dynasty depended upon the virtue of the ruler rather than any spiritual 
power. If the ruler possessed the virtue, he had the mandate to rule. If not, he would 
lose it. 
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All members of a Confucian society had to fulfil their respective social duties: "Let the 
ruler be a ruler, the Minister be a Minister, the father be a father, and the son be a 
son. '"* But the rulers needed to have their moral qualities the most fully developed. 
They were expected to sacrifice their personal interests to the well-being of the people. 
They were supposed to possess the wisdom to assess problems in the light of everlasting 
values. Therefore, the rulers were to be selected from the best talents in the country.95 
This Confucian view of the importance of morality in political leadership was reflected 
in Singapore politics. Since the PAP was in power, not just anybody could aspire to be 
a prominent politician. The ruling class, consisting of politicians, was carefully selected 
by the government. This selection of political candidates and rulers included moral 
values as well as academic and/or professional achievement. In a document about the 
PAP's government from 1954 to 1979 Lee Kuan Yew explained his criteria for good 
leadership96: 
"1) Give clear signals: don't confuse people 
The idea is never to confuse supporters by needless infighting and open 
dissension within the leadership. The leaders should always resolve their 
differences in private, but never contradict each other in public. So 
whenever they make their points in public, people will consider them more or 
less representing the concerted views of the leadership. 
2) Be consistent: don't chop and change 
The policies must be consistent, but not inflexible, in order to win and keep the 
trust of the people. The next generation of leaders must inherit the trust and not 
betray it. 
3) Stay clean: dismiss the venal 
The PAP government is known for its honesty, fairness, and efficiency, which 
are derived from the leaders' determination not to take advantage of their 
positions. Whenever any official is found to be dishonest or corrupt, he must be 
immediately dismissed to maintain the image and integrity of the government. 
4) Win respect, not popularity: reject soft options 
The leaders should not hesitate to implement policies which may be 
unpopular in the short term, but are actually in the long-term interest of the 
people. 
5) Spread benefits: don't deprive the people 
The PAP government believes that it is not possible to practise strict 
egalitarianism, and that rewards must be distributed in accordance with quality 
of performance. But the workers should not be deprived of their fair share of 
the benefits. This is the way to win the heart and trust of the people while 
maintaining the incentive to work harder and to develop one's talent. 
6) Strive to succeed: never give up 
Leaders ought to make their best efforts. If as a result they still do not succeed, 
history will forgive them. But if their failure is due to their not doing their 
utmost, they will only bring disgrace upon themselves. " 
These six basic principles for the Singapore government reflected the Confucian values 
of harmony, virtuous conduct, long-term planning related to interests of the nation and 
perseverance. These were also qualities one looked for in potential candidates for 
politics. 
When the PAP deemed certain persons to be suitable, they were especially groomed 
before being proposed to an eligible pool of candidates for the ruling People's Action 
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Party (PAP). Singapore's label of democratic republic therefore did not stand for the 
eligibility of the entire population, but it meant that the people could choose from this 
pre-selected pool of candidates. After an electoral setback in 1981, Lee told the PAP 
members of parliament (MP's): 
"We have scoured all sectors of Singapore for talent and integrity and will 
contìnue to do so. For only the most capable, honest and committed can keep 
up the standards we have achieved in clean and effective administration. This 
team (of young leaders) is from among the best of Singaporeans and we shall 
add to it. We cannot afford to have mediocrity in charge. The system will then 
sag."*7 
The opposition could bring forward its own candidates, but if the ruling power obtained 
a mandate from the people to rule, the opposition had little influence. 
This political selection system appeared to be quite vulnerable when the PAP 
government was weakened by the cancer of two of its top leaders within one month. 
When this happened, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong publicly addressed the 
Singaporean population to bring forward capable men and women of integrity. 
Intellectuals in particular were called upon to fulfil their social duties and enter 
politics.98 
excellence 
Secondly, although the British culture was inherited through the continuation of the 
Civil Service and the emphasis on meritocracy, the Confucian tradition was echoed in 
the emphasis on examinations and excellence. Altogether, this led to the emergence of 
a kind of Confucian scholar-gentry class in Singapore." The people in Singapore 
considered this legitimate and respected this high socio-economic class. But the 
Singaporean scholar-bureaucracy differed from the traditional one in China in the sense 
that they were not raised in the humanistic tradition. In Singapore they were 
technocrats. There were more engineers and computer scientists than generalists. 
A typical Singaporean feature was the scholar-officer class, whereas in traditional 
Confucianism soldiers ranked low in the societal hierarchy. With reference to its history 
and geography, however, in Singapore the importance of the military was raised. But 
even within this alternative societal construction, Confucianism still played a role. The 
Confucian view of the scholar as leader was reflected in the Singaporean army with BG 
Lee Hsien Loong and BG George Yeo as examples of the combination scholar-military-
politician. The whole class of scholar-politicians made Singapore both a Plato's republic 
and a Confucian state.100 
elitist 
Related to the first two characteristics was the third Confucian feature of Singapore 
politics: its elitist attitude. According to the Confucian Weltanschauung people were not 
bom equal, but with different capabilities. The most able and virtuous were to rule 
benevolently and the others were supposed to show deference and obedience to those 
who ruled, the authorities. This way the society was neatly organised in a hierarchical 
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manner sustained by the cooperative harmony of all. Lee thought that in every society 
there were about five percent 
"who are more than ordinarily endowed physically and mentally and in whom 
we must expend our limited and slender resources in order that they will provide 
that yeast, that ferment, that catalyst in our society which alone will ensure that 
Singapore shall maintain its preeminent place in South and Southeast Asia."101 
Once political leaders were elected, they considered themselves in a superior position 
as they were given a mandate by the people. In a Confucian fashion Lee and bis PAP 
considered themselves entrusted to lead the state, which gave them a heavy 
responsibility. The political style of the PAP leaders was both one of Platonic elitism 
as well as one which followed the Confucian exemplary model of virtuous rulers. This 
unusual mixture of Eastern and Western cultural ideals resulted from their keen 
awareness of the moral, social and political importance of traditional cultural values in 
a multi-ethnic society such as Singapore.102 
Their style of governing consisted of carefully thinking out its policies and then 
informing the people what was to happen. One Minister said "We decided what is right. 
Never mind what the people think - that's another problem."103 This elitist attitude 
resulted in a paternalistic governing style with a high moral, as for example reflected 
in the PAP's population and education policies. 
paternalism with reciprocity 
In many Western eyes Singapore's paternalistic governing style, the fourth feature, was 
an authoritarian autocracy. Critics said that the PAP enforced their authoritarian rule 
and used "Asian values" to legitimise its authoritarianism. The promotion of Confucian 
ethics by the government was "to legitimise a certain essence in state ideology"104. 
But Schluchter warned Westerners for the potential misinterpretation of and 
connotations attached to authoritarianism. Westerners were inclined to interpret 
authoritarianism as it functioned in Latin America, whereas it was different in East 
Asia. Schluchter mentioned for example the distinguishing features of the obligation of 
the government to look after the people, to guide them and the necessity of being 
appreciated by not only the leaders, but also by the people.105 This beneficial side of 
the coin of authoritarian government in Singapore tended to be overlooked in the West. 
Pro-PAP-ers admired the PAP government for its "unique ability...to survive as a 
ruling force in Singapore".106 The term paternalism was not meant as a disguise of 
authoritarianism, but it pointed to a larger vision of society and a genuine concern for 
its welfare. From a Confucian perspective, Lee and the PAP showed good leadership. 
The importance attached to a strong leader in Singapore, the emphasis of the political 
strategy on stability and order and the strict control of dissenters in order to maintain 
harmony in society, were all rooted in the East Asian cultural background. It was based 
on reciprocity, a kind of trade-off between the government and the people. Lee once 
said: "Government does not consist of making speeches. Of course we need 
communication and support between a people and their leaders ... More important of 
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all is the confidence and trust between a people and their government."107 In 
Singapore the loyalty and trust in the leaders led to political stability, which in tum 
enabled the government to implement long term planning and policies. In 1991, a 
survey by Kau and Yang108 showed that 87 percent of the Singaporeans agreed that 
respect for authority is important to a disciplined society in which development is 
promoted. They believed they should place their trust in a selected government of 
intellectuals. 
Chan suggested that the key explanation of the PAP's ability to become the central 
political institution in Singapore and maintain its one-party dominance, could be found 
in the Chinese cultural roots of the majority of the Singaporeans. She noted that "..it 
goes without saying that the orientation of this community towards the political system 
and their attitudes towards authority, power, and social conflict will be the major 
determinants affecting the functioning of the political system."109 Vogel also saw the 
willingness in the population of the East Asian NICs to allow more leeway to leaders 
than is common in Western democracies as rooted in Confucian patterns of relationships 
between subjects unaccustomed to exercising political power and their rulers.110 In the 
case of Singapore, Chan acknowledged that the fact that Singapore was a state in which 
leaders were accepted without being questioned too much, helped in the implementation 
of policies. Furthermore, the close linkage, the alliance between the bureaucrats and the 
politicians facilitated the implementation of goals.111 In fact, in Singapore "politics 
disappeared" and it became an "administrative state".112 
Tu pointed out that one had to make a distinction between the Confucian persuasive 
power from civil roots and the actual exercise of political power. 
In Singapore a political culture was fostered in which one relied on the authoritarian 
power centre. Citizen participation in decision-making in the Western sense was 
neglected. This style of government which was both benevolent and paternalistic 
appealed to the majority of the population in Singapore, which was brought up with 
Confucian values. Traditionally, the Chinese primary socialisation took place with a 
hierarchical conception of authority, a sense of collectivity and and anxiety for 
aggression and conflict. One widely shared anxiety in all social classes in Chinese 
society was lack of harmony in interpersonal relations. This resulted in an avoidance 
of conflict.113 The Confucian concept of citizenship was drawn from the family 
prototype in which filial piety towards parents was transformed into loyalty to the 
sovereign and fraternal duty to the elder brother transformed into civic awareness to 
fellow citizens. 
The other side of the coin of strict obedience to authorities was the duty of the 
leadership to deserve its mandate to rule. According to the Analects (the reference book 
of Confucianists with Kong Fu Zi's sayings): 
"Chi Kang-tzu asked whether there was any form of encouragement by which 
he could induce the common people to be respectful and loyal. The Master 
replied: "Approach them with dignity and they will respect you. Show piety 
towards your parents and kindness towards your children and they will be loyal 
to you. Promote those who are worthy, train those who are incompetent; that 
is the best form of government."114 
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In return for allegiance the sovereign was to work primarily for the greater welfare of 
the people at the greatest economy to the nation.115 
Lee Kuan Yew returned the benefits of Singapore's economic development to the people 
in the form of the fulfilment of basic needs plus luxury in public facilities, e.g. in 
public transport such as the MRT (Mass Rapid Transport, underground train) and bus-
stop facilities. He therefore was popular with many people, not only with the first 
generation of nation builders, but even with young people in the late eighties. In a 
popularity poll amongst youth in Singapore, Lee topped the polls, leaving others far 
behind. For example, Jesus Christ was one of the "idols" one could choose and he 
ranked seventh.116 
institutionalisation 
A fifth Confucian feature was Singapore's all-encompassing set of political institutions. 
Not only had Singapore a one-party dominance and a unicameral legislature, but grass 
roots institutions were included as well. This political strategy could be traced to the 
Analects as well: 
"Tzu Kung asked about government. The Master said sufficient food, sufficient 
weapons and the confidence of the common people. Tzu Kung said, suppose you 
had no choice but to dispense with one of these three, which would you forgo? 
The Master said: Weapons. Tzu Kung said, suppose you were forced to dispense 
with one of the two that were left, which would you forgo? The Master said: 
Food. For from of old death has been the lot of all men; but a people that no 
longer trusts its rulers is lost indeed."117 
The PAP used existing cultural and economic structures, such as powerful clans, 
chambers of commerce and guild associations, to mobilise leaders from for their new 
grass roots institutions: the Citizen's Consultative Committees (CCC's), the Community 
Centres (CC's) and later the Residents' Committees (RC's). In turn these grass roots 
institutions utilised the little tradition of the dominant population, the Chinese, which 
was Confucian.118 This development strategy resulted in two kinds of political leaders: 
the national political leaders and those at the grass roots. By offering the latter status 
within the power hierarchy, cooperation of most potential leaders in the society was 
ensured. This way a certain social cohesion within the country was created. 
pragmatism 
Last but not least, the sixth Confucian feature, was the PAP's pragmatism. Milne and 
Mauzy distinguished two aspects to this pragmatism: tactics and commitment to 
practical results.119 
In Confucian political thought a policy had value if it worked or succeeded, provided 
it was in accordance with moral ends. The PAP was tactical in the sense that it used a 
prudent political style, such as not introducing controversial policies in an election year 
and using methods to acquire public support for policies and programmes. Rajaramam 
once explained the PAP approach to sensitive issues as follows: "When you are dealing 
with emotions... you never meet them head on. You work your way around them. 
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People don't keep on pushing a door that is open."120 Two strategies were used. The 
ground was always carefully prepared. Often an idea was launched, public discussion 
was elicited and directed, a logical explanation in the media by a PAP leader containing 
the pro's and con's was shown, soon after followed up by a decision in parliament 
apparently based on consensus, but according to the government's ideas all along. The 
other strategy, increasingly prevalent, was to make an extreme proposition, gauge 
public reaction, modify the final policy somewhat so that it was widely acceptable and 
end up with a policy close to the original government's idea. 
The second aspect of the PAP's pragmatism was that it did not want to become trapped 
in dogma: efficiency and practical results were more important than ideological 
consistency. The PAP used a practical rationality: if something works, use it. If it 
doesn't, discard it and try one of the alternatives. 
These Confucian features of politics in Singapore rather form a post-hoc analysis than 
a description of the PAP's political strategy. Due to the cultural sensitivity of the issue, 
the PAP never openly and consciously professed a Confucian style. In its education 
policies for example, Confucianism was only one among several Weltanschauungen 
which was optional. However, Lee's emphasis on certain Confucian values in the late 
eighties and nineties - after research had shown a correlation between these values in 
the NICs and the rapid economic growth in these countries - prompted the speculation 
that this was a self-serving attempt to perpetuate a political culture in accordance with 
PAP authoritarianism. Kuo also warned against the danger of the transformation of 
Confucianism from being an end in life into a means for the generation of wealth. '21 
Others thought that the revival attempt of traditional Asian values tried to strike an 
appropriate balance between modernisation and continued prosperity without incurring 
a loss of cultural identity.122 
4.2 Development strategy 
Singapore's recent history and the political and cultural inclinations of the PAP 
leadership, in particular of Lee Kuan Yew, were to be of crucial importance to the 
development strategy of the small island-state. 
When Singapore became fully independent on 9 August 1965, the social and economic 
problems the new PAP government faced, were enormous. Not only was economic 
activity stifled by numerous work interruptions and had the industrialisation not made 
any significant progress, was the unemployment rate high and the housing shortage 
choking, but also was the population under the divide et impera rule of the British 
ethnically and culturally cocooned and psychologically dependent on the coloniser. 
Singapore's development strategy therefore was one for survival. Although the PAP 
leadership had to reorientate after the secession from the Federation, it was determined 
to succeed. The total dominance of the political scene allowed the PAP government to 
shape the development of Singapore according to their ideas without distraction. It 
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strove for and succeeded a great deal in winning popular consensus for its ideal of a 
non-communist, multi-racial, multi-lingual, modem society based on principles of self-
reliance and reward for merit.123 
As a development strategy, economic growth was to bring about social progress and the 
elimination of poverty. Both Confucius and Mencius understood that "a person must be 
able to feed and clothe his family before he can be led to appreciate moral values".124 
Confucius stressed that prosperity ought to be the prelude to moral education. 
The PAP set out a five point plan to achieve the desired development125: 
1. a strong leadership and organisation. 
2. the leadership should inculcate in the population values and attitudes, supportive 
of or quickening the pace of modernisation and development. Some of these 
values and attitudes included "future-orientation, achievement-orientation, 
efficiency, social discipline, self-discipline, the willing acceptance of change as 
part of life and an inclination to hard work. " 
3. creeping complacency after initial success must be fought against to maintain 
economic growth. 
4. the spirit of dynamism and political stability must be preserved. 
5. this development should be institutionalised with time. 
From the start the PAP government set out to shape Singapore according to its vision 
on all fronts. Starting as a socialist party, the PAP considered social planning as an 
integral part of national economic planning.126 The initial independent development 
period was taken up by addressing the basic needs of the population: housing, health 
care, education, employment and "food". Simultaneously, the government wanted to 
control population growth and build a new nation by creating a common Singaporean 
identity. 
housing 
To cope with the urgent housing problem, the Housing and Development Board (HDB) 
was set up in 1960. It was supplied with adequate funds to build 51,000 new housing 
units in the next five years. The previous thirty two years only 23,300 units were built, 
which did not meet the growing population's demand. Until the merger with Malaya in 
1963 the HDB managed to build some 32,000 low-cost flats and shop units.127 The 
first five-year plan concentrated on "emergency" and "standard" one- and two-room 
units. The second five-year plan, launched in 1966, aimed at better quality one- to 
three-room low-cost housing. The Home Ownership for the People scheme was 
launched in 1964 to offer public housing units for sale well below market price. Buyers 
were allowed to use their Central Provident Fund (CPF) savings for downpayments and 
monthly mortgage payments as from 1968. The CPF was set up in 1955 to provide 
financial security for workers in their retirement or when they were no longer able to 
work. It had evolved over the years into a comprehensive social security scheme, which 
also catered for home ownership and health needs. Both workers and employers had to 
contribute to the CPF and different contribution rates applied to workers in different age 
groups.128 
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The controversial part of the housing strategy was that the Singapore population had to 
relocate to the new houses according to plan, whether they preferred it or not. This 
massive removal went along with a number of social problems. The government thought 
of it as cleaning up the slums while offering better housing. However, the Malays in 
particular were attached to their rural way of living. Living in HDB-flats meant 
disruption of their social life. Nevertheless, the massive re-housing scheme of Singapore 
was generally accepted. 
health care 
Health services and sanitation were expanded, especially in the outlying areas. The 
mortality rate fell from 31.2 deaths per 1,000 babies in 1962 to 25.8 per 1,000 in 1966. 
This compared favourably to West-Malaysia with 59 deaths per 1,000 in 1962 and 50 
per 1,000 in 1965 and to the United States with 29.1 deaths per 1,000 in 1962 and 30.2 
per 1,000 in 1966.129 
education 
Education was another pillar of the independent government. It remains up to 
speculation whether it was the Confucian respect for education which emphasised this 
part of the development strategy, or the pragmatic economic analysis that the lack of 
natural resources had to tum Singapore to its human resources. Prima facie few people 
with a low education level did not offer the best development opportunities. But the 
determination of the government to survive led it to improve and stimulate education 
for the entire population. In a crash programme new schools were built and hundreds 
of new teachers trained. On a seedbed of positive attitudes towards education, literacy 
levels soon started to increase. 
Along with an increase in government expenditure on education from S$ 60.9 million 
in 1960 to S$107.8 million in 1963, primary school enrolment increased from 284,702 
to 335,656 between 1960 and 1963, secondary school enrolment from 59,244 to 
84,425.13° The PAP provided a programme of free primary education. By 1966 26 
percent of the total population was attending primary school and another 26 percent 
schooling at a secondary level. 
The four main languages, Malay, Chinese, English and Tamil, were made equally 
important, while a common Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE) was 
introduced to control the level of education. Underprivileged groups, such as the 
Malays, received special treatment. 
Not only did the PAP government work hard on the abovementioned pillars of 
development for the population, but it also tried to improve the state bureaucracy itself. 
To show its sincerity in anti-corruption statements in previous election campaigns as 
well as to create finances to implement policies, the PAP reduced salaries and living 
allowances in the civil service, including those for Ministers. However, this pay-cut was 
an unpopular measure and affected the bureaucracy's motivation to work hard 
adversely.131 Therefore, to ensure that new policies would be implemented, the 
government restored allowances in 1961. 
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national defence 
Having experienced the Indonesian aggression during the ¡Confrontasi, the PAP 
government also put an emphasis on Singapore's national defence, which was virtually 
non-existent at the start of independence. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) were 
deemed to be necessary to defend Singapore from potential enemies who would want 
to profit from a small, defenceless, predominantly Chinese inhabited growth-island. The 
PAP decided upon a two-and-a-half year compulsory National Service (NS) for all men 
of eighteen years and more, regardless of their ethnic, cultural and social backgrounds. 
This had the additional advantage of crossing previous barriers which could be helpful 
in nation building. Moreover the defence force would provide jobs for the unemployed 
masses. The British forces which were still present but would withdraw within ten 
years, employed 40,000 Singaporeans directly and thousands more indirectly. The 
population, however, was not exactly enthusiastic about this military service. The 
Chinese traditionally looked down upon soldiers and the Malays were not exactly 
standing in line to defend the Chinese majority. The Barisan Sosialis took up the 
National Service (NS) issue to stir up anti-governmental sentiments. But the PAP was 
successful in propagating the idea (in euphemistic PAP terms "reminding the 
people"132) that the people were from now on the owners of Singapore and were 
therefore obliged to defend the new state. 
By 1984 Singapore had acquired a significant military capability of its own. Due to the 
naturally limited numbers, the defense force specialised in high-tech military 
technology. 
Besides this NS the compulsory civil defence force was introduced. All citizens were 
required to contribute to their country in case of emergency, either as member of the 
citizens' army or the civil defence force, or by helping to keep the economy and social 
services going. Crime was dealt with by arresting "gangsters" and secret society 
members, who made Singapore an unsafe place before independence. 
As a small country situated in a politically turbulent part of the world while it depended 
on trade and commerce for its survival, Singapore adopted a pragmatic foreign policy 
of friendship with as many countries as possible, irrespective of their ideology, as long 
as they were not hostile against Singapore. The PAP government paid special attention 
to its neighbours Malaysia and Indonesia after the Suharto government assumed power 
and ended the konfrontasi on 12 August 1966. Another year later Singapore joined the 
ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) together with Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Thailand to promote regional cooperation. The main external 
security threat was perceived to come from the conquest of South Vietnam, Cambodia 
and Laos by communists in 1975. Partly as a consequence the ASEAN states then drew 
closer together. 
economic growth 
Singapore's main development strategy was aimed at economic growth from the very 
start. To deal with the unemployment problem at the outset of independence, Goh Keng 
Swee, Singapore's economic guru at that time, and Lee decided to change Singapore's 
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economy structurally. Traditionally Singapore had been a trade entrepot, but trade and 
commerce did not offer sufficient jobs for the rapidly increasing population. Left to its 
own devices, Lee felt Singapore's only viable option was to take advantage of the 
favourable factors in the world economy by promoting Singapore's strategic location. 
In the sixties multinational industries were looking for off-shore sites for their 
manufacturing bases. Large-scale industrialisation seemed the solution for Singapore, 
but there were several obstacles. Technical skills were lacking and the people held a 
strong prejudice against blue-collar jobs. The local market was too small and the 
neighbouring countries, Malaya and Indonesia, started to develop their own industries 
and protected their domestic markets. Still the PAP chose to attract foreign multi-
national corporations (MNCs), which would bring along foreign capital and 
technological know-how as well as would open up a global market to Singapore 
unknown before. To attract the foreign investments three factors were deemed to be 
crucial: political stability, industrial peace and development of human resources. These 
aims were to be achieved by sound policies and firm direction: unity, discipline, hard 
work and acquisition of technical skills, while at the same time creating a Singaporean 
identity.133 Lee assessed the immigrant population of Singapore as hard-working, 
adaptive and keen to leam. 
At the invitation of the PAP government, a UN Industrial Survey Mission visited 
Singapore in late 1960 and in 1961. The Dutch economist Albeit Winsemius was the 
chairman. The UN commission reported that Singapore had the basic requirements for 
industrialisation, including a resourceful people. With suitable promotion by the 
government and close cooperation between employers and labour, Singapore had the 
potential of economic expansion. Singapore was to become a manufacturing base for 
the industrialised countries in the West.134 
Singapore's initial economic plans after independence drew heavily on the report by the 
United Nations Study Group. But the strategy for and the implementation of Singapore's 
industrial development was firmly in the hands of the Economic Development Board 
(EDB), established in 1961. In the eighties a UNDP-report showed that the international 
world had had little idea of the exact development strategy of the Singapore 
government. The government had nodded to the UNDP-plans, meaning that they 
understood, not that they complied. Veiling their internal agenda, they merely gave 
their financiers face to maintain harmony.135 Abandoning those aspects of socialist 
policies which were deemed to be not fitting an isolated, dependent society, the PAP 
government adopted a strategy of a mixed economy, combining private enterprise with 
state participation and offering incentives to private capital. 
The initial industrialisation phase entailed clearing Jurong, a large swampy area in the 
western part of the island, for industrial development. It was to become a model 
industrial city. Already 197 pioneer and non-pioneer industries had applied for 
manufacturing sites in an area of 9,000 acres. The government granted 100 million 
Malaysian dollars (M$) with an additional grant of M$45 million within the first four 
years. As of 1963, the pioneer firms had established industries with a total authorised 
capital of M$650.7 million.136 Further promotion by the government consisted of a 
102 Singapore, a modem Asian city-state 
number of financial incentives to attract investors: tax holidays for pioneer industries, 
low tax rates for export-oriented manufactures and temporary protective tariffs. The 
first industrial project in Jurong was the National Iron and Steel Mills in 1962, a joint 
venture between the government and the private sector. In 1959 there were only 554 
industrial establishments in Singapore, mainly in processing, in 1968 there were 1,563, 
including a wider range from steel and iron works to ship-building and electronics. 
However, unemployment initially rose from 4.9 percent in 1957 to over 10 percent in 
the late sixties. The expansion in industrialisation could not absorb the post-war baby-
boomers. 
To ensure a stable investors' climate, employer-labour relations were controlled by the 
Industrial Relations Ordinance with an Industrial Arbitration Court. Decisions of this 
court were to be binding to both employers and employees. As part of a harmonious 
tripartite (govemment-employers-labour) relationship strategy, the PAP also started to 
reorganise the labour movement to prevent strikes for political purposes. However, the 
left-wing within the PAP and in the unions resisted these actions strongly. This political 
turmoil discouraged investors. In reaction the PAP dealt with activists firmly. The 
PAP's industrialisation policies were criticised "by some sections of the population as 
weighted in favour of a re-distribution of income for the entrepreneurial class whilst the 
labour policy is one of wage restraint."137 This imbalance built up to grave 
dissatisfaction within labour. The PAP and its economists defended its strict labour 
policies with four arguments.138 They claimed that 
1. to ensure economic growth, rapid industrialisation is necessary. Unrestrained 
wage demands discourage investment and work against the interests of the 
workers in the long run. 
2. when full employment is attained, the automatic forces of supply and demand 
will ensure rising wages. 
3. demands for equity are met in a more meaningful way through the government's 
elaborate social welfare services. 
4. in the long term as national income grows, there will be more for the public 
sector to re-distribute. 
The achievement of industrial stability, a cheap and disciplined labour force, sound 
communications and financial infrastructure, in combination with an open economic 
strategy with government investment promotion by the Economic Expansion Incentives 
Act (a package of fiscal incentives from 1967), attracted an influx of foreign investors. 
The Development Bank of Singapore, set up in 1968, took over development financing 
from the Economic Development Board (EDB) which could now concentrate on 
investments. Singapore also decided to have its own currency. The Singapore dollar was 
issued in June 1967 and policies were developed to make Singapore a financial and 
banking centre in 1968. 
Britain's decision in 1968 to close its military bases within three years not only posed 
an immediate threat to Singapore's security, but also to its economy, since the bases 
were the biggest single employer and accounted for twenty percent of the economy. But 
the government used the evolving crisis to rally the population with a renewed sense of 
urgency. When the PAP gained every seat in parliament in the 1968 elections, this was 
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perceived as acquiring a new mandate from the people. This mandate was subsequently 
used to push through tough labour legislation, to enforce discipline, restrict trade union 
activity and provide arbitration to avoid strikes. 
In 1968 industrialisation was given new impetus by extending the large Jurong 
Industrial Estate and creating more smaller industrial estates, building new 
infrastructure, expanding technical education, expanding exports and increasing tourism. 
Taking advantage of the booming international economy in the late sixties139, 
Singapore was able to acquire a head start in its economic development. Previously 
mainly being an entrepot trade-port, Singapore created its own industrial basis of 
harbour-activities, chemical and electronic industries within ten years after 
independence. In 1965 the manufacturing industry had accounted for 15 percent of a 
relatively small GDP. In 1970 it accounted for 20 percent of a much larger GDP. By 
1969 Singapore claimed to be the busiest port in the Commonwealth. 
Singapore entered the seventies as a politically stable state with a high rate of economic 
growth. By 1970/1971 the PAP considered the basic problems of survival overcome and 
went ahead to make Singapore a more modern and prosperous nation. 14° 
The PAP had earned its governing mandate by being able to deliver the national 
development it had promised. Between 1960 and 1968 the national income had grown 
at a rate of 7.7 percent annually. Singapore enjoyed price stability as well as economic 
growth, while simultaneously reducing the population growth rate. In this initial 
development period the PAP had spent about 40 percent of its budget on social services, 
12 percent on economic service, 13 percent on statutory expenditure and 13 percent on 
defense. As the British forces withdrew earlier than expected, however, the PAP felt 
compelled to double its defense budget in 1969 and reduce its allocation to the social 
sector since the infrastructure for the latter was considered to be laid.141 
In the early seventies foreign capital poured into Singapore, mostly into the newly 
developed regional oil industry, but also into precision engineering, electrical and other 
industries. This way Singapore became a base for large MNCs as well as an important 
regional financial and communications centre. Despite Singapore's dependence on the 
international economic system and the oil crisis in the West in the mid seventies, 
Singapore's economy grew rapidly. By this time foreign investment accounted for the 
bulk of employment and more than ninety percent of direct exports. In 1975 Singapore 
claimed to be the third largest port in the world. 
The major source of economic growth came from productivity growth, which made 
Singapore's economy heavily dependent on exports. Therefore the government 
promoted that, to retain competitiveness, the wage increases should not exceed 
productivity. The line of thought was as follows: the Singapore economy is small and 
open and therefore highly vulnerable to the ups and downs of the international 
economy. Given the fact that Singapore has no natural resources, the population has no 
choice but to accept the conditions given to them. Meaning that in times of world 
recession people must be prepared to accept sacrifices and accept reduced wages. 
However, employers are also expected to keep faith in their economy and increase 
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wages when times are good. Smooth cooperation was preferred over an energy-
consuming struggle. This kind of industrial discipline was controlled by the unions and 
thus indirectly by the government. 
In the seventies Singapore was regularly referred to as a "model-state"142: a rapidly 
risen income and one of the world's highest financial reserves, a stable government, a 
well-disciplined labour force, social services and the best housed, best clothed, best fed 
and best schooled population in South-East Asia. 
In spite of its enormous economic achievements, the Singapore government did not 
become complacent. It realised that a small country such as Singapore needed a niche -
an area of concentration that was just right for its stage of industrial development and 
capabilities and in which competition from other countries would be relatively 
weak.143 The PAP government appeared to be good at spotting niches for Singapore's 
economic growth. It chose winning economic strategies by being analytic, anticipatory, 
flexible, pragmatic and fast in implementation due to its overall control in the tripartite 
relationship of employers, employees and government. Therefore, when competition 
from cheap labour in other Third World countries increased, after Singapore's initial 
successful policy of diversification a switch to a second industrialisation phase was 
made. 
The struggle for economic success remained unrelenting. An economic restructuring 
was introduced in the service sector, finance and communication in 1979. In contrast 
to the previous diversified labour-intensive economy, Singapore's economy was to shift 
towards capital-intensive, high technology, high value-added industries. Although this 
second industrial revolution in Singapore received a lot of criticism, the PAP pushed 
ahead its new strategy in its unrelentless struggle for economic survival by both a soft 
and a hard method. 
The soft method consisted of providing facilities for high tech companies. Fiscal 
incentives were offered to enterprises, a Productivity Campaign was launched and 
education policies were modified, expanding technical and computer education. The 
hard method consisted of an enforced pay rise of twenty percent per year, during three 
years. This way the salaries doubled and made it unattractive for labour-intensive 
industries to stay in Singapore. The government bought laboratories and development 
centres from abroad and insisted that companies set up their own training centres.144 
With its rare combination of belief in a free market economy coupled with high 
government intervention, the PAP government achieved full employment and a 
relatively low inflation. 
In 1985, however, Singapore suffered a substantial economic drawback. Investments 
plunged and only in the first half of 1985 36,200 jobs disappeared, while the labour 
market had still grown with 10,400 jobs in the same period the year before.145 Many 
were pessimistic about Singapore's economic future. Van Slageren even concluded that 
its economic growth had come to a standstill.146 But the close tripartite relationship 
between the government, employers and employees appeared to be beneficial to the 
overall economic development. On the one hand salaries were frozen and even reduced, 
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on the other hand the Central Provident Fund (CPF) contribution was reduced. More 
than ten thousand foreign workers were fired and sent back tot their home 
countries.147 In spite of all these economic measures the government continued the 
economic restructuring and replaced outdated companies with a modern economic sector 
of high tech and bio-technology industry. BG Lee expressed the government's line of 
thought as follows: 
"Do you think that the newly industrialising countries are not strenuously 
upgrading education; upgrading their infrastructure; raising their technical 
competence level; developing into substantial economic entities in their own 
right? Do you think that other countries, equally desperate for such investments, 
are not going all out to get them to come, offering all kinds of 
inducements?""* 
Not only economic growth recovered relatively rapidly, but also the rate of employment 
was restored. 
In the early nineties Singaporeans enjoyed the highest standard of living in Asia after 
Japan. On par with Singapore's non-ideological, pragmatic identity, the major qualities 
sought after had become effectiveness and efficiency. The most visible of the 
modernisation efforts were the symbols of "the Singapore way": the Housing 
Development Board (HDB) flats and the infrastructural re-development projects in the 
city. Secondary symbols were formed by industrial estates such as Jurong, the 
Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and government campaigns such as "Keep Singapore 
clean and pollution free". 
In 1992 the European Community upgraded Singapore from"'middle-income country" 
to the status of an "industrialised country"- equivalent to a developed country. Until 
recently, Singapore belonged to the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs), who with 
a combined population of 1.4 percent of the world total were responsible for about sixty 
percent of all the manufactured exports from the developing world.149 Referring to 
Japan and the Asian NICs, the Worldbank stated in its Development report of 1991 that 
"the modernisation of Asia should be welcomed as the biggest development success ever 
achieved".150 For example, Singapore had outnumbered the global economic growth 
by about 4.3 times since its independence in 1965. 
The Singapore government, however, remained cautious. It warned that Singapore's 
level of development was only at the bottom of the "top league" of industrialised 
countries. It was speculated that Singapore's new status was motivated rather by internal 
European political and economic problems than by objective measurement of 
Singapore's level of development. Therefore, again the PAP warned for complacency 
and headed for the status of thé IT (information technology) city of the next century. 
Culturally, Singaporeans now had to become truly "civilised".151 (see chapter seven, 
future values). The population was to be made aware of the reality that they should 
leam to live with lower expectations for economic progress than in the previous period 
of rapid growth. 
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Post-hoc a number of explanations were offered for Singapore's rapid economic growth. 
In the seventies, Hassan152 supplied a myriad of variables as major contributing 
factors to Singapore's economic success: ecological location, excellent harbour, political 
structure, the supply of foreign capital, a development-oriented bureaucracy, planned 
industrial and urban development, a good physical infrastructure and positive attitudes 
and value-orientation of the population. 
At the end of the eighties, Wong and Wong153 pinpointed a multitude of "right" 
economic factors interacting with the "right" government policies, emphasising the latter 
as the most crucial in the initial stage. According to them, although the policies were 
not exceptional for a developing country, it was the standard of integrity and the lack 
of corruption in the government which paved the way for effective development. 
Singapore's economic progress could be easily explained within a conventional neo-
classical economic framework. It could be largely attributed to a similar basic 
development strategy as in all the NICs: an open, outward-looking orientation aimed 
at export in combination with domestic investment in capital formation and 
technological progress. Together these two factors worked as a vicious circle: high 
investment induced high export and GDP growth, high savings and thereby high 
investments again. But the specific contribution of the Singapore government were the 
following policies: special tax incentives for pioneer firms and exports, liberal laws 
regarding capital movement, tariff protection for selected industries, industrial peace 
(which meant low labour union impact), wage stability, stable and dynamic 
leadership154. 
The PAP government considered the following four factors as critical in Singapore's 
development success155: 
1. The political stability and racial harmony. 
If the violence and tensions of the sixties would have persisted, investors would 
never have chosen Singapore. 
2. The political leadership and its administration provided firm direction and sound 
policies. 
3. The determination of the Singaporeans to survive and the efforts they made to 
overcome their problems. In the words of the Ministry of Culture: "... and they 
placed their trust in a government which had taken them through turbulent times, 
responding to its lead with courage and energy" and "trade unions learned to 
sacrifice short-term sectional interests for the sake of long-term benefits ... it 
was through cooperation with responsible management that unions could secure 
their true interests." 
4. The regional and international developments were in Singapore's favour, 
referring to the new anti-communist regime in Indonesia in 1965, the economic 
spin-off from the Vietnam war, the considerable foreign investments in the 
sixties and the high economic growth rates in the ASEAN region. 
nation building 
As Lee and his PAP initially strove to make Singapore a part of the Federation of 
Malaya, which it became for almost two years (1963-1965), Singapore's identity was 
to be absorbed in the total Malay culture. But it was Singapore's very "Chineseness" 
which instigated Singapore's final independence. Lee's views on life contradicted the 
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Malay style of living frontally (see § 2.4). After realising the secession from Malaysia 
and the perceived improbability of a reunion with Malaysia, the question about national 
identity became evident for Singapore's leaders. 
According to Chan and Evers, originally the concepts of a nation state and of national 
identity were intimately connected with European 19th century history. They were 
exported to the colonial territories of the Western powers as part of the process of 
cultural expansion and westernisation. The research done by Western political scientists 
often evolved around these concepts; to a number of Asians they came across as 
constructed rather than real life questions.156 Chan and Evers stated that "national 
identity...is only a problem of Westernised elites that are alienated from their own 
cultural tradition."157 Nevertheless, the search for national identity and the attempt to 
use it as an instrument of nation building became necessary in those multi-cultural 
countries where a coloniser left a westernised elite behind, which was faced with the 
task of building an independent nation state, such as in Malaysia, Indonesia or 
Singapore. Nation building through identity formation was a problem of leaders in any 
plural society, as pluralism was associated with political instability. 
The lack of a deeply rooted Singaporean identity at first seemed a major obstacle in 
Singapore's nation-building process. Moreover, Lee expressed another concern: "How 
did a group of English-educated nationalists - graduates of British universities - with no 
experience of either the hurly burly of politics or the conspiracies of revolution, move 
people whose many languages they did not speak, and whose problems and hardships 
they shared only intellectually?"158 
From the very beginning of independence, the PAP leaders were sincerely wondering 
how to bridge the cultural gap between themselves and the people. 
Singapore's nationalism had been largely based upon the labour movement by creating 
militant anti-colonial unions. After independence, the PAP wanted to tame these unions 
and left-wing extremists in order to mollify investors and start up the economy. 
Different options were contemplated. As a small island-state, surrounded by Malay, 
Muslim countries, Singapore "had to plan its nation building policies cautiously".159 
In most countries a choice was made between a regressive and a progressive identity. 
The former focused on the past and revival of traditions, while the latter ascribed lack 
of development to a feudal or colonial past and focused on a completely new identity, 
where socialism and communism were viewed as the two major options.160 A 
regressive identity for Singapore in the form of the creation of a "third China" would 
be totally unacceptable in its geographical context. Emphasis on cultural tradition on the 
island itself could create a polarisation between its inhabitants. Singapore's population 
was culturally diverse and most Singaporeans initially derived their identity from the 
link to their home-countries or even, more specifically, to their dialect-regions in 
China. At the start of independence, the society was still completely segregated. Ethnic 
groups attended different schools, practised different religions, lived in different areas, 
had different types of jobs. When political awareness rose after the Second World War, 
these socio-cultural differences came to the forefront resulting in the "racial" riots of 
1964. 
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Moreover, the largely immigrant population of predominantly traders and coolies did 
not exactly consist of the Culture-bearers, so there was little traditional Culture161 to 
transfer onto the next generation. Pride in Singapore's history was not a conscious 
phenomenon within this immigrant population. Moreover, Singapore's history was 
perceived as relatively short and uneventful.162 
Thus the PAP leadership originally opted for a progressive identity. However, there 
were two major obstacles. Firstly, the British armed forces still present on the island, 
associated progressiveness with communism and they would never allow any pro-
communist take-over. Secondly, international business would interpret a progressive 
identity likewise, whereas Singapore was thought to depend on its attractiveness to 
foreign capital and the maintenance of its entrepot-trade for its economic survival.163 
The PAP therefore sought a third solution in a non-ideological identity or an identity 
through an "ideology of pragmatism". The common goal for the Singaporeans was to 
be readily found in economic progress for all. 
By the end of the seventies Singapore's development had come to a point where an 
economic foundation had been built and the government could start looking at the social 
and cultural aspects of nation-building. Before devising a new identity campaign as part 
of an all-encompassing "social engineering" programme164, the subject of nation-
building was thoroughly studied. According to Chan165, nation-building was the 
process by which people transfer their commitment and loyalty from smaller tribes and 
villages to the larger central political system or the process by which people shift their 
loyalty from a larger and wider political unit to focus on a new and smaller one. In 
Singapore both processes played a role in becoming entirely independent. The former 
in shifting acceptability from the smaller communities in Singapore to the new central 
government and the latter from the larger Malaysian government to the Singapore PAP 
government. Moreover, the different ethnic groups had to shift their loyalties from their 
respective original home-countries to their new home-country of Singapore. A new 
political leadership had to obtain a legitimate status, which depended on the 
government's ability to respond to existing values as well as creating new ones.166 
Suryadinata167 discussed the "unity in diversity"-approach such as the ones in 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Sri Lanka. He stated that most Third World countries were 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious in nature. Nearly all Asian countries had substantial 
minorities within their borders. To create a unifying identity and to keep Pandora's box 
of ethnic separatism closed was the pre-occupation of most of these countries after 
independence. They all developed their own strategies and policies according to their 
own historical situation. Suryadinata concluded that "although national ideology is 
insufficient to bind ethnic groups together, an inappropriate national ideology has a 
tendency to destroy a new nation."168 The PAP government paid heed to Suryadinata's 
three recommendations. 
"1. To be most effective a national ideology should be liberal, but the core values 
should be shared by all ethnic groups. Suryadinata warned Singapore not to 
privilege the Chinese only or to grant Confucianism a special position, because 
Political Influence 109 
such a policy would alienate the non-Chinese population in Singapore and could 
also invite external intervention. 
2. A newly independent country should avoid religious issues in its search for 
national values. National values would only be accepted by the population at 
large after a long gestation period. 
3. The national ideology would be most effective when a "strong government" 
would implement it. 
Chiew169 distinguished four categories of development in culturally heterogeneous 
societies: 
" 1. cultural assimilation, e.g. U.S.A. 
2. preservation of pluralism by coercion, e.g. South-Africa 
3. fragmented multi-tribal society or disintegration, e.g. Nigeria 
4. cultural integration, e.g. Brazil" 
The only viable solution to Singapore was considered the latter example of cultural 
integration or a gradual fusion into a new, homogeneous culture and society. 
Janowitz made a conceptual distinction between acculturation and assimilation, 
perceived as relevant to Singapore.170 
"Assimilation implies abandoning or rejecting one's cultural traditions and 
communal resources to accept completely a new set of values and norms. The 
assimilated Jew, for example, is no longer a Jew. Acculturation is much more 
gradual and less drastic. It implies continuity with one's background but involves 
learning and internalizing key elements of the new society into which the 
migrant has moved. Acculturation can be extensive without assimilation."171 
The PAP government chose to create a set of shared ideals as opposed to suppressing 
cultural differences. Singapore was to accommodate all ethnic groups under one 
Singaporean umbrella instead of trying to assimilate the minority into the majority. The 
minority in Singapore was Malay, but just across the boundaries it was the other way 
around. By the promotion of a uniting national identity it was hoped that the more 
ethnic boundaries and ethnic exclusiveness were broken down, the more cohesive the 
Singaporean nation would become172. 
In considering the new national identity and values for Singapore, Lee not only took 
Singapore's geographical context and ethnic composition into account, but also the 
PAP's analysis and understanding of how other small nations in the world survived, 
such as Israel, Switzerland and Finland.173 Singapore leaders preferred Switzerland 
as the model for their country. Multi-lingual, multi-ethnic, internationally minded, 
small, secure, smug and rich. Taking Western countries as an example, however, 
brought along a dilemma. Singapore's leaders valued Western science and technology 
and the values needed to obtain this modernisation, but rejected many socio-cultural 
Western values of especially the late sixties and seventies. To them many Western 
governments were associated with the "soft state". A number of traditional Asian values 
were thought to counter this perceived negative influence. After deliberation of the 
pro's and con's of the model to emulate, the PAP chose the conservative Switzerland 
as the example for Singapore. 
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The main pillare of the new nation of Singapore were to be the values of: 
1. multi-racialism 
2. multi-lingualism 
3. meritocracy. 
ad 1. 
After the decolonisation of Singapore and as a lesson from the merger period, one of 
the PAP's main concerns at independence was how to retain a balance between a 
communal identity with as much of its past heritage as possible on the one hand, and 
on the other hand a new common culture striving towards economic development.174 
That this was necessary, was shown by Sidek's statement: "If there is ever going to be 
trouble in this country it is not because of the enemy without with its military might and 
territorial ambition, but the enemy within, first, race, second, religion."175 Racial 
harmony and religious tolerance therefore had to be and did become the main pillars 
of Singapore's development. 
"Multi-racialism" was interpreted as: 
" 1) the practice of cultural tolerance towards the various communities, 
2) the acceptance of differences in religious practices and customs and 
traditions of the different communities without discrimination for any 
particular community and 
3) to accord each community equality before the law and the equal 
opportunity for advancement."1 
The country's first President Yusuf Ishak opened the first parliament of the independent 
Republic in 1965 with these words: 
".. .the best guarantee of our future as a distinct and separate people in Southeast 
Asia is the creation of a tolerant multiracial society comprising the various 
indigenous and migrant groups who have come to settle here...Needless to say, 
the more extreme any community is about one race, one language and one 
religion, the more likely it is to arouse counter-chauvinism against the other 
communities at the detriment of all."177 
The PAP encouraged communities to take pride in their own cultural roots and 
language, but simultaneously to conform to a common national character. 
Singapore became a secular state, in other words multi-religious without a dominant 
religion. Singapore's recent history led the PAP to emphasise that there would be no 
discrimination against any minority. A Constitutional Commission on Minority Rights 
and a Presidential Council were to safeguard their rights. 
In dealing with the problems of the different ethnic groups in the new multiracial 
society, community problems were perceived in the wider context of the building of the 
entire nation. In an attempt to avoid social unrest, the government's initial strategy was 
to rely on a general feeling of charity and solidarity, particularly of the better educated. 
In the nineties, it appeared to be more realistic to rely on a model of "mental concentric 
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circles emanating from the self, progressively lending support to and sharing 
identification with the larger circles as the context dictates... Put simply: one's charity 
extends from the family to the social grouping and then to society at large in a 
prioritised fashion"1'8. This new community approach was more effective in helping 
Singaporean underachievers, as it recognised and capitalised on this kind of "bounded 
neighbourliness". 
The financial support of the government for the self-help groups was enormous. 
According to the government, the result now only depended on the quality of the 
leadership, the effectiveness of the self-help programmes and the commitment of the 
volunteers. While each ethnic community was assisting its own members, cooperation 
between groups was stimulated. 
Singapore thus did not strive for a certain cultural homogeneity, but aimed at 
convergence through divergence. In August 1992 the government made a public 
statement, subscribed by the different ethnic groups, "that cultural and religious 
diversity should be used to overcome class differences, because solidarity between 
people of the same race and religion is natural. One should take advantage in this sense 
of the strength of Singapore." Minister for National Development Dhanabalan 
confirmed that people were found to respond better to groups which they could identify 
with. He said the government was aware that such groups might accentuate differences 
within the various ethnic groups and therefore emphasised that the majority of the 
community had a greater responsibility to limit this. Dhanabalan expressed the hope 
that, as the Chinese were better off in terms of talent and economic power as he saw 
it, the Chinese Development Assistance Council (CDAC) would show a certain large-
heartedness to work with other groups.179 
ad 2. 
In consistence with the principle of multi-racialism, was the principle of multi-
lingualism. Now that Singapore was no longer a colony, in which English was the 
primary language, and it was separated from Malaysia which considered Malay the 
most important language, the PAP made English, Malay, Chinese and Tamil the official 
languages of the new nation, paying respect to the four major population groups. In 
practice this meant bilingualism for most people; not meaning any choice of the four 
official languages, but the mother tongue and English. The mother tongue served to 
retain the original cultural identity; English served as a tool of intercultural 
communication, a common Singaporean identity and as access to the international 
economy, which in turn was considered a prerequisite for economic growth. In a lecture 
at the East-West Centre in Hawaii in 1970, Lee underlined the need for developing 
countries to acquire access to new knowledge, science and technology: 
"The deliberate stifling of a language which gives access to superior technology 
can be damaging beyond repair. Sometimes this is done not to elevate the status 
of the indigenous language, as much as to take away a supposed advantage a 
minority in the society is deemed to have, because that minority has already 
formed a greater competence in the foreign language. This can be most 
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damaging. It is tantamount to blinding the next generation to the knowledge of 
the advanced countries."180 
Lee showed no sign of a traditional cultural identity crisis. Instead he had a clear vision 
of the processes involved in the development of countries. Although the PAP leadership 
insisted on borrowing from Western experience and technology, it was also much aware 
of the need to retain part of the traditional cultural identities, especially in the seventies, 
after the initial economic take-off in the late sixties. Singapore was going to import the 
technology, but not the culture in order to prevent the "infection" of Singapore by the 
"promiscuous" and "permissive" ideas of Western society.181 Multi-lingualism thus 
formed a basis for a double cultural identity. 
Just after the Second World War, the Chinese population in Singapore was divided in 
about sixty percent Chinese educated and forty percent English educated. By the mid-
50's the distribution was about fifty-fifty. Just after independence in 1966, the 
previously segregated schools became ethnically mixed and bilingualism was to be 
practised. Primary and secondary school students had to learn English as a first, 
national language and their mother-tongue as a second language. Textbooks were 
revised to reflect the local, Singaporean context. End seventies the Learn Mandarin 
Campaign was introduced to give all Chinese in Singapore a common medium of 
communication as well as to facilitate communication with China. In the nineties all 
Singaporeans attended an English-medium school and the Chinese took Mandarin as a 
second language. 
ad3. 
Related to the previous two values, the cultural integration-approach was reflected in 
Singapore's emphasis on a meritocratic society. Merit and performance rather than 
ethnic identification or ascribed status were to be the criteria for authority and upward 
social mobility. Educational and occupational discrimination were no longer allowed. 
Singaporeans were to be motivated by the idea that they would advance in their society 
by their own achievements, by hard work and determination instead of status or skin 
colour. The policy was to provide all Singaporeans with equal opportunities. The idea 
behind it was that if the different ethnic groups would all be geared towards the 
individual and collective enhancing of the standard of living and all would progress, 
social stability would grow. 
The cultural integration-approach was reflected in all major government policies such 
as public housing, education, bilingualism, national service and the mass-media.182 
For instance, the compulsory National Service not only served to defend the country 
against outside enemies, but also to unite the internal population. This strategy appeared 
to be very effective. 
To avoid chaos, public discussion on basic questions of political philosophy and 
ideology was severely curbed. The Singapore population in general showed little 
protest, although initially questions were raised about the viability of this political 
strategy183. The PAP won the confidence and the trust of most Singaporeans by being 
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realistic, dynamic (also described as action-oriented) and self-conscious, dedicated to 
create a modern, industrial and multi-racial nation. 
As opposed to the American perception of Singapore's development strategy as a kind 
of affirmative action programme in terms of cultural, social and economic integration, 
Nam criticised the PAP's politics as "very negative 'racial arithmetic' politics of fear 
which has been either openly or covertly carried out by a predominant race over 
others."184 However, Nam did not so much study the Singapore politics after 
independence as he did the merger period with Malaysia. What his study revealed was 
that the addition of the Singapore state to the Malaysian peninsula intensified the 
feelings of communalism and racism already present among the Malays, Chinese, 
Indians and Eurasians, which contributed to the failure of this political experiment of 
nation-building. 
The independent Singapore republic came a long way in nation building due to 
economic success and energetic leadership, but in the eyes of some at the cost of 
authoritarianism185. Wong186 concluded: "The day where nation building has 
succeeded to the fullest extent will be the day where there are no drawbacks and where 
nothing has to be paid in exchange for it. " 
The PAP saw the challenge of the future social and cultural development in finding a 
balance between liberty and responsibility.187 Lee wanted the government to control 
Singapore's development as long as possible, because in Singapore with its relatively 
small population and land area 
"the permissible margin of error would remain very small. Singapore's survival 
and progress rest on certain fundamentals which the people and the political 
parties could not afford to undermine - multi-racialism and racial harmony, equal 
opportunities, a sound work ethic, a clean and efficient administration, national 
service and commitment to defence, and a meritocracy tempered by the spread 
to all of the benefits of economic growth. " 
The new Singapore identity design was based on economic development ideas. The 
immigrant population needed a sense of belonging and commitment to Singapore in 
order to be motivated to work hard to develop the new nation. Social and ethnic-cultural 
stability were considered a prerequisite for economic growth. Thus a common identity 
became one of the highest priorities in the development strategy. So in fact a perceived 
interrelatedness between the economic and cultural development formed the core 
background of many government campaigns. 
The uniqueness of Singapore's development strategy lay not only in this recognition of 
both economy and culture, but also in the integrated approach of the development 
policies and the return of a great deal of the growth benefits to the people. 
family-planning 
To contain population growth the National Family Planning and Population Programme 
was launched. This entailed a series of "social policies" (a combination of incentives 
and disincentives) coupled with professional advice on family planning and 
contraception in order to discourage large families and to encourage the acceptance of 
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nuclear families. In chapter eight the relation between these population policies and the 
population as human resources for economic growth is described. 
4.2.1. The role of grassroots institutions 
As Seah observed, unlike the more established political systems in the West where the 
political leadership was more concerned with system maintenance and adaptation, the 
leadership in Singapore was concerned with establishing and strengthening the political 
system. The leadership also had to provide "political goods" to the people to consolidate 
its own position. The task of remaining in power was difficult. Apart from normative 
dissensus, many of the political measures initiated by the leadership required adjustment 
and reconciliation of existing values on the part of the masses.188 
The government's response to the question of nation-building and political socialisation 
was to use mass-based institutions.189 Since it acquired state power in 1959, the PAP 
built and shaped an extensive bureaucracy. Not only state institutions were deemed to 
be important, but also organisations at grassroots level. 
The PAP first took hold of the slightly over twenty existing community centres (CC's), 
which it inherited from the previous governments, then established many new ones. 
This way it was able to establish and consolidate a relationship with the population, 
mobilise popular support and strengthen its ties with the lower social economic classes. 
First established after the Second World War, the CC's were used for recreational 
purposes and were not given much emphasis by the colonial authorities, nor by the 
early political parties. The PAP leadership changed all that in 1959. It placed all CC's 
directly under the control of the Department of Social Welfare. The head of the 
Community Recreation Division, an American officer sponsored by the Asian 
Foundation, had his services terminated prematurely.190 
The PAP leadership gave three reasons.191 
1. The previous CC-management was dominated by members of other political 
parties. The PAP wanted to prevent them from using the CC's as "cheap 
political machines". 
2. The PAP government believed that the CC's, which were built at public cost, 
should be under the control of the government, especially since a few centres 
had become "gambling saloons and hives for socially undesirable elements". The 
PAP, which had made "anti-yellow culture" and the banning of "socially 
undesirable" activities a major electoral plank, was in no mood to tolerate 
"deviations" from this policy. 
3. The PAP government wanted to expand the facilities of the CC's to serve the 
bulk of the population. 
Later the People's Association (PA) took over the control of the CC's from the 
Department of Social Welfare. The objectives of the PA were192: 
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"1) The organisation and promotion of group participation in social, cultural, 
educational and athletic activities for the people of Singapore in order that they 
realise that they belong to a multi-racial community, the interests of which 
transcend sectional loyalties. 
2) The establishments of such institutions as may be necessary for the purpose of 
leadership training in order to instil a sense of multi-racial community. 
3) The carrying out of any other activities as are incidental or ancillary to these 
objectives. " 
In 1965, the formation of Citizen's Consultative Committee's (CCC's) in every electoral 
constituency, usually filled with local community leaders, enhanced, at least 
theoretically, the contact between the government and the people. Complaints and 
demands from the people were channelled through this grassroots institution to the 
decision-makers. The CCC's seemed the nucleus of local government, with the 
difference that its members were nominated by and were responsible to the higher levels 
of the PAP government.193 Local grassroots leaders were selected who could identify 
with the activities of the CC's. 
Between 1959 and 1966 the civil service almost doubled, new functions and activities 
were created and old systems were reorganised. 
The mushrooming of the community centres (CC's) with their management committees 
in 1962 and the rapid formation of the CCC's in 1965 firmly established the 
government's presence amongst the people.194 In 1971 there were 184 CC's scattered 
over the island, easily accessible to the people.195 
Modem development created an uprooting of the population and a lack of sense of 
community identity. In 1978 the government therefore established residence committees 
(RC's) to meet the need to nurture a community spirit. These RC's could only cater to 
this need to a certain extent, however, as they were artificial institutions, installed by 
the government. They functioned better as means to improve communication between 
the people and the government. Not only had the residence committees (RC's), CC's 
and CCC's become the foci of civic participation, but they had also cultivated a 
consciousness of the national political system.196 
The PAP leadership used the grassroots institutions as socialisation agencies to facilitate 
the emergence of a modern, multi-racial Singapore. The CC's played a crucial role in 
raising the level of national consciousness in Singapore. They also mobilised the 
communities in more meaningful activities than before. Not only recreational, but also 
vocational, cultural and educational activities were designed to support the government's 
nation-building programmes. 
The CC's were able to involve the "grassroots" due to considerable institutional 
adaptability, such as the creation of voluntary people's management committees and 
subcommittees.197 Besides CC's and CCC's, the PAP also established or refurbished 
other mass organisations such as the Vigilante Corps, the People's Defence Force, the 
Works' Brigade and the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) to increase the channels of 
participation. The SAF provided opportunities for men of different ethnic groups to 
mingle and feel united, which promoted the ideal of multi-racialism. However, it should 
be noted that this only really took place since the second half of the eighties, when the 
116 Singapore, a modem Asian city-state 
Malays were recruited on similar terms as the other ethnic groups, (see also chapter 
two) 
Less explicit, but nevertheless present was the CC's function of combating political 
opposition.198 The government desired to curb communism by promoting grassroots 
democracy and by providing structured channels of upward mobility for the "more 
participatory-inclined citizens". In one of his constituency tours Lee said: "The 
Singapore Government is to intensify its struggle against communism by forming 
grassroots committees throughout the state to tell the people the truth."199 S. 
Rajaratnam, then the Minister of Culture, elaborated on this: 
"When the government introduced community centres, its main aim was to use 
them as training grounds for democracy. Democracy does not mean only elected 
leaders running the country or relying on the government to do 
everything.. .Democracy means people also learning to do things for themselves; 
people willing to do service voluntarily for the community."*" 
Sean concluded from these statements that the fundamental objective of the people's 
management committees was "to promote desired values and implement policies that 
would contribute to the upholding of the present constitutional political framework.n201 
On the one hand, the PAP could monitor and control potential recruitment sources for 
the opposition, on the other hand the PAP could propagate its own views to the people 
through the CC's. The CC's also formed a communication channel for the grassroots 
demands. Feedback found its way through the CC's to the political leadership. By 
providing this opportunity for political participation of the people, the government could 
avoid direct suppression of demands for participation.202 
In the period of the split in the PAP with the Barisan Sosialis, the CC's appeared to be 
crucial in the survival of the ruling political party. Opposition members were excluded 
from the activities of the CC's. In contrast to other political organisations such as 
Pekemas (the former UMNO) which adopted a basically communal stand using 
sectional, religious and racial sentiments in attempts to mobilise mass support, the PAP 
tried to inculcate the so called "national values" trough the CC's. These values 
transcended the "cultural parochialism of the different communal groups in the state." 
As community services and leadership were highly valued among Singaporeans, those 
who wanted to be politically active, found it desirable to become a member of a CCC 
or of a management committee of a community centre. Even local community leaders 
who were reluctant to support PAP activities, found participation in the CC's and 
CCC's acceptable. This way these institutions served a mediating function between the 
government and the people. However, only to a certain extent, because the membership 
was dominated by Chinese and the language used often was a Chinese dialect. In 
theory, membership of the people's management committees was open to all citizens. 
In practice, however, those people wishing to serve had to do so through the 
recommendation of a Member of Parliament (MP). A second check devised by the 
leadership was to have all applications and nominations screened by governmental 
agencies such as the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau for their political reliability 
and social integrity.203 
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The organising secretaries of the CC's were sent to a three-year training course 
conducted by the National Youth Leadership Training Institute (NYLTI). They were to 
be the vanguard in leading the masses at the grassroots level in any sphere of activity, 
be it recreational, social or political. They were taught physical activities, technical 
know-how, social philosophy and languages. Character building was the core of all 
these activities. For instance, social philosophy was aimed at making the secretaries-to-
be more loyal and socially and politically aware. The standards were high and 
sometimes less than half of the trainees passed the final examinations.204 
Over the years, the CC's came to be closely identified with the PAP government by the 
public. The CC's were perceived as a para-party institution. This image hampered the 
functioning of the CC's. A sizeable sector of the population had not, for various reasons 
such as apathy, scepticism and ideological differences, been receptive to governmental 
influence. To get more people involved, many keynote speeches by government leaders 
were given in the community centres.205 The PAP leadership placed great emphasis 
on "meet-the-people" sessions and they tended to use these as a method of identifying 
with the masses. Lee used this public platform amongst others to "expose his enemies' 
unreasonableness". He was a master at building verbal bridges to span the extremes of 
debates. This non-violent verbal weapon of Lee had its effects on the people and thus 
appeared to be an effective strategy. 
The government claimed that improvement of a two-way information flow was 
necessary, because it was afraid the people could not understand the complexities of the 
issues at stake. The leadership estimated that forty percent of the people would usually 
not be bothered to read serious articles in newspapers or watch features on t.v.206 
Thus, for example, the CC's played an important supportive role in persuading people 
to accept the idea of compulsory military conscription after separation from Malaysia. 
The CC's gave information on the purpose of the new National Service (NS) and the 
importance of the citizen-soldier was disseminated to the public by the CC-staff. The 
government leaders also used the CC's to clarify policy issues pertaining to military 
conscription. NS-men were sent off into the army from the CC's, in order to instill in 
the boys and their parents a sense of civic responsibility and pride, as well as to 
impress upon the general community the fact that the nation and the society held such 
duty in high esteem.207 
Ethnic and cultural loyalties were a sensitive issue in Singapore. On the one hand, the 
CC's provided the English-educated government to capture the loyalty of the Chinese 
speaking and Chinese educated people, as well as to make them less susceptible to the 
appeals of Chinese chauvinism and Chinese communism. On the other hand, a 
predominantly Chinese educated centre staff would have given the impression that the 
CC's were being used to cater specifically to Chinese needs. The non-Chinese educated 
in ethnically mixed neighbourhoods were known to avoid CC's for this reason. For 
example, because the television, one of the main facilities in a CC, was predominantly 
watched by Chinese speaking people.208 
Moreover, the Chinese and Malay communities showed a difference in attitude towards 
the community centres. The Malay community seemed to be more inclined to 
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participate in social or group activities than the Chinese. Participation by the Malay 
community was only high in areas where it was dominant. In Chinese areas the 
frequency of Malay attendance dropped significantly. Ninety percent of the Malay 
households in the rural resettlement areas did not use or participate in activities of the 
CC's.209 
Another example of the informative function of the CC's was the role the women's 
subcommittees played. They were formed to correct the male domination in the people's 
management committees. In 1970, 98 per cent of all committee members were male. 
The members of the women's subcommittees were all nominated by the people's 
management committees and their tenure of office was tied to that of the main 
committee. The subcommittees were responsible for the organisation of "suitable 
activities for women such as cookery, embroidery, beauty care and sewing."210 They 
thus played an important role in changing the dietary habits of the population from a 
one-sided dependence on rice to the acceptance of wheat as an alternative source of 
staple food to vary the daily diet. 
Over the years, the membership of these women's subcommittees changed. The 
percentage of those with no formal education shrank from nearly four to one percent 
from 1967 to 1970. The number of housewives decreased from 67 to 38 percent in the 
same period. In 1967 the professionals formed only 13 percent; by 1970 they 
outnumbered the housewives. The members also became younger: 56 percent were 
younger than 30 years in 1967, in 1970 the percentage of young female members had 
risen to 71. In short, the trend in the recruitment of subcommittee members was 
towards younger, more educated and economically active women. This trend was a 
reflection of wider societal changes which increased opportunities for women to acquire 
better educational and occupational attainments. This contrasted with the people's 
management committees, which were dominated by middle-aged Chinese-educated 
Chinese businessmen of forty years and older with elementary education. These men 
enjoyed a high social status in Singapore. As pointed out by Wang Gungwu211, 
although the merchant in traditional China occupied an inferior position in the ideal 
social hierarchy, his wealth elevated him to the second top position in the actual social 
hierarchy. This was particularly so among the Overseas Chinese, because wealth was 
accepted as an indicator of social success. The Nanyang merchant class often assumed 
the role of custodians of Chinese interests, culture and learning. In Singapore, the 
Chinese-educated Chinese business group had for a long time been active in promoting 
the welfare of the Chinese. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce, for example, not only 
restricted its activities to the promotion of the Chinese trading class. It was a zealous 
exponent of the importance of Chinese learning, culture and interests. This Chinese-
educated business group usually lacked political power. The attempt by a section of this 
group to capture power in 1955 through the Democratic Party ended in dismal failure. 
Consequently, this group welcomed the opportunity to acquire some vestiges of political 
authority or social eminence by serving the people's management committees.212 This 
reinforced their role as the custodians of the predominantly Chinese Singaporean 
society. Furthermore, they were most able to solicit funds for the activities of the CC's. 
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As they were thus in control of the financial expenditure of the subcommittees, there 
were many "misunderstandings'' between them and the new generation of well-educated, 
professional young women in the subcommittees. Both groups differed greatly in 
socialisation experience and role perceptions.213 This intergenerational conflict was 
typical of the short transition period between the traditional and the modem society in 
Singapore. 
4.3 One-party dominance and the lack of opposition 
Singapore officially was a democratic republic with general elections every five years. 
The constitution did not proscribe the existence of political parties other than the ruling 
one as was done in some African new states.214 
Striking in Singapore politics was the lack of opposition. Singapore's political history 
showed no serious competitive political struggle in which the opposition had an 
institutionalised role and status. Opposition parties were few, activity was low, 
members were scattered over the nation or had left the country. 
The one-party dominance of the People's Action Party (PAP) was not established 
overnight.215 In the early fifties the political scene was dominated by the English-
educated local elite, but was soon overtaken by a new political spirit. In the first major 
elections in Singapore held in April 1955, "no party secured a clear majority and the 
colony's Governor invited David Marshall, leader of the Labour Front (LF), to form 
a working coalition government. " The ten LF elected members formed a team with 
three Alliance members, consisting of the United Malays National Organization 
(UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), and the Singapore Malay Union 
(SMU). In the opposition were four Progressive Party members, three independents, 
two from the Democratic Party (which later merged with the Progressive Party) and 
three PAP-members. By 1959, when Singapore ceased to be a British colony, the LF 
government had seriously weakened and the PAP made a bid for the full powers of 
internal self-government. It won the elections and since then the PAP never lost an 
election. Soon the PAP instituted a number of restrictive measures to check political 
mobilisation on the grounds of security and political stability. Although that did not stop 
political parties from being formed, they were not able to put a real challenge to the 
PAP, due to the dynamics of the institutionalisation and maintenance of the one-party 
dominance. But it was a continuous battle of survival for the PAP. 
The most difficult opposition for the PAP came from within its own party. The 
pragmatic strategy of the moderate leaders to cooperate with the communists to get into 
power had become its own trap. Merger with the Federation of Malaya became the 
breaking point for the PAP between the moderate leaders and the more left-wing 
faction. The newly founded Barisan Sosialis created a serious problem to the PAP. Till 
then, the PAP leaders had dismissed their political opponents as "clowns" in the Labour 
Party and "feeble leaders" in the Progressive Party, but now the PAP's own main 
supportive network went along with the Barisan Sosialis (BS). The PAP quickly 
120 Singapore, a modem Asian city-state 
resorted to their most powerful alternative instrument, being the government 
bureaucracy. Popular support was fought over by extensive "political campaigning, 
information barrage, mobilisation efforts, doctrinal arguments and at most times 
confusion". Moreover, the PAP cast its new opponents as the "communist front". After 
the PAP won the 1963 elections, it dealt immediately with the opposition by launching 
Operation Cold Storage in February 1963 under the Internal Security Act (ISA): 107 
prominent left wing politicians and trade unionists were arrested. The opponents on the 
right of the PAP were unable to adjust to the rapidly changing political environment and 
were troubled by their own past political liabilities and poor leadership. The BS 
remained the main opposition on the left. It disagreed with the continued detention of 
certain political detainees, the new amendment to the Citizenship Bill which deprived 
some left wing leaders of their citizenship, the government's failure to unify the labour 
movement, and the attempts to control the Singapore Trade Union Congress, obvious 
signs that "Lee and his associates were determined to contain the leftist elements". 
After Singapore joined the Federation of Malaya, the Federal government held two 
more security round-ups later that year and the BS was left completely beheaded. Three 
of the thirteen BS members in parliament (MP's) were detained and two others fled, 
presumably to Indonesia. The role of the PAP in this remains unclear, but the arrests 
were "certainly not distasteful to the Prime Minister although immediately after the 
arrest he placed the blame on the Federal Government. "216 
In the post-separation period minority parties in Singapore were subject to the 
conditions laid down in the Registrar of Societies. Membership of any party was 
confined to Singapore citizens only, changes of the party's name and symbol were to 
dissociate any connections with the states of Malaya and party's constitutions had to 
have the expressed statement that "control by any group or authority outside Singapore, 
which is not in the national interest, is not overtly or covertly possible"217. Here the 
foundations of the one-party system in Singapore were laid. 
In January 1966 four more BS MP's resigned and in October the remaining seven quit, 
stating that they would carry on their party's "struggle against imperialist aggression 
outside parliament".218 The BS extra-parliamentary struggle consisted of strikes, 
demonstrations and "sit-down"-campaigns. It adopted certain communist slogans and 
symbols and was engaged in united front activities with communists. The PAP 
government took firm action against the oppositional activists. Many were detained. 
This way the BS gradually became less influential in the trade unions. Moreover, 
schisms started to develop within the BS and the BS lost important foreign allies when 
the anti-communist Suharto-government took over in Indonesia and destroyed 
communists and alleged pro-communists. 
In the 1968, the 1970 (by-election) and the 1972 general elections, the PAP captured 
all the seats in Parliament. In 1971 none of the four big opposition parties, the United 
National Front, the Workers' Party, the Barisan Sosialis and the Pekemas (PKMS, the 
former Singapore UMNO), offered any real opposition or serious sound criticisms of 
the PAP. Lee attributed the lack of a multi-party government to the fact that the 
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opposition was not offering credible alternative policies and programmes. S. 
Rajaratnam, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, defended the government as follows: 
"An opposition party consisting of bums, opportunists, and morons can endanger 
democracy and bring about chaos, disorder and violence. This has happened and 
is happening in many countries. The same can happen under a one-party 
parliament of bums and crooks. 
Equally a one-party parliament can safeguard democracy and bring about рягр, 
progress and prosperity. Singapore has had a one-party parliament since 1968. 
If you forget theory and look at the hard facts you will discover that though the 
People's Action Party has been in power for 12 years, its greater achievements 
in promoting the welfare of the people were under a one-party parliament. " 2 " 
In the general elections of 1972 the PAP was confronted with basically two opposition 
groups. One was a combination of the Workers' Party with the People's Front with 
support from PKMS. The other was the Barisan Sosialis and the United National Front 
together. But the PAP managed to win all 65 seats and 69.2 percent of the votes cast. 
The opposition parties won 28.9 percent. Of the opposition, the Workers' Party did best 
with 11.9 percent of the votes. Although, without any effective leadership and plagued 
by subsequent raids and internal differences220, no opposition party ever formed an 
actual threat to the PAP government, the PAP took even firmer steps to safeguard the 
sovereignty of the republic after the 1972 elections. Two opposition candidates were 
prosecuted. One was charged and found guilty of inciting the people at a political rally 
to unlawfully cause the death of the Prime Minister, his wife, the Ministers, members 
of parliament and community leaders221. The other was sentenced to six months in jail 
for calling the Prime Minister "One of the biggest scoundrels in the world, not only 
Singapore.", "No. 1 Gangster of Singapore", "No. 1 Public enemy of Singapore" and 
"Kidnapper No. 1 in Singapore".222 The question of external funding was raised and 
opposition parties were 'invited' to open up their books for inspection. This discouraged 
at least potential donors. Furthermore, measures were taken to protect Singapore from 
merging or incorporating into another state, federation or country. That would require 
at least two thirds of the total number of votes in a national referendum. 
The PAP leadership felt that Singapore progressed most when opposition was least and 
fighting political opponents was a waste of energy which could better be spent on 
administration and development. 
After the 1972 elections, Lee predicted that the opposition would only gain significance 
in case of severe economic setbacks and failure by the government to meet and 
overcome the problems confronting Singapore. Or, on the contrary, the opposition 
could emerge as a desirable alternative as a result of economic success and enhanced 
social stability just for the sake of a need for change. A sort of complacency could then 
cause "a new restlessness [to] bestir the people, a desire for improvement and change, 
or just change for change's sake, [which] would appeal to a younger generation"223, 
although in this scenario the attractiveness of radical and extremist politics would be 
reduced. 
But the opposition did not gain such significance until today. Instead, over the years a 
predominant one-party system emerged. In fact, according to Sartori, it was a situation 
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with "... a more than one-party system in which rotation does not occur...It simply 
happens that the same party manages to win, over time, an absolute majority of seats, 
but not necessary of votes, in parliament.в224 
The PAP used its one-party dominance extensively. An experienced bureaucratic 
infrastructure was left by the British colonial power. The PAP managed to alter their 
hostile attitude into a dynamic and efficient one, which would later facilitate the 
implementation of policies. This bureaucracy earned the PAP the image of efficiency. 
The top politicians, however, were not overshadowed by these bureaucrats. The major 
policy initiative was taken by the cabinet and the bureaucracy was geared to the 
implementation of the decisions made there. 
Since the eighties the PAP's stronghold has been loosened a little. The PAP lost one 
by-election in 1981 and in 1984 and 1988 the opposition parties managed to win two 
and one seat respectively. This, however, merely represented a negligible denting of the 
PAP's stranglehold over Parliament.225 The changing electorate behaviour, as seen 
in the voting pattern (which did not necessarily have to be translated into the seating 
partem in Parliament), indicated that since 1981 the opposition had been gaining 
credibility in Singapore. Many people saw their past support for the PAP as a contract-
relationship: "You deliver, we deliver; you don't deliver, we don't deliver." Several 
unpopular PAP policies eroded some of its appeal among the electorate. 
However, the rise of opposition votes was rather the result of protest votes against the 
PAP than endorsement and votes for the opposition itself. The 1984 general election 
(GE) results signalled a need for change in governing style and substance of the 
government and its policies. Furthermore, according to Singh226, increased 
educational level and greater political awareness, increased the need for political 
participation. This in turn increased the need for greater démocratisation, representation 
and accountability of what appeared to be a largely authoritarian government of the 
PAP. 
In order to win back lost ground, a next generation of leaders was introduced in the 
cabinet in 1984. The new cabinet opted for a more consultative style of government and 
revised some of the government's unpopular policies, such as the Graduate Mother 
Scheme. The more open style became visible in the televising of parliamentary sessions, 
the establishment of an official Feedback Unit on social issues for the general public, 
the establishment of a PAP Youth Wing and the government's attempt to forge a 
national consensus through the National Agenda. 
In May 1991, the new Prime Minister in the PAP government Goh Chok Tong had the 
book "Singapore: The Next Lap" published as its election manifesto and a broad guide 
line to the future plans for Singapore in the next twenty to thirty years. After the release 
of this book and the impression he got from grassroots leaders that the people were 
supportive of his new, open, consultative style, Goh called for an early general election 
(GE) to get the mandate to rule not only from the PAP, but also from the people. The 
largely disorganised opposition had been caught unprepared. In 1988 there was a total 
of 156 candidates with 81 from the PAP and 75 from the opposition. In 1991, there was 
a total of 126 candidates with 81 from the PAP and 45 from the opposition. While there 
Political Influence 123 
were twenty-one political parties registered with the Registry of Societies in 1991, in 
an environment of a dominant political party system, only three parties mattered in the 
General Elections, namely, the PAP, the Worker's Party (WP) and the Singapore 
Democratic Party (SDP).227 The WP was the first opposition party to break the PAP's 
hold on Parliament when its secretary-general Jeyaretnam, a prominent and eloquent 
lawyer, was chosen to Parliament, following his victory in a by-election in the Anson 
constituency. Jeyaretnam became to be equated with the WP although his performance 
in Parliament was overshadowed by PAP backbenchers and he continued to face 
problems as an opposition politician in Singapore. In 1983 he remarked that community 
workers and grassroots leaders were being used more and more by PAP MP's in their 
walkabouts and that RC's in his constituency boycotted him. The WP was also in great 
financial trouble. It was one of the PAP's tactics to drain its political opponents by 
bringing them to court to claim damages for whatever "damaging statements" they made 
during political rallies. Jeyaretnam was ousted from Parliament in 1988 when he was 
charged with a false declaration of party accounts. While it did do discredit to 
Jeyaretnam and the WP, many Singaporeans continued to see both as political victims, 
with the PAP's heavy hand being blamed for the WP's misfortunes.228 
Chiam See Tong, the founder of the SDP in 1980, was another credible opposition 
politician. He too was a professional who appeared serious-minded and presented his 
opposition party as a responsible group of people. The SDP could be viewed as a 
moderate party, and Chiam openly stated that his party did not want to replace the 
PAP. He professed support for the government if he perceived it as the right way, but 
would oppose any government policy that would harm the country as a whole. The 
SDP, however, also suffered from a lack of funds and of being unable to attract 
credible leaders. Chiam represented the Potong Pasir constituency in the Parliament. 
The 1991 GE were characterised by a debate between the PAP and the opposition, 
especially the SDP, about the status of the elections. Caught unprepared, the SDP 
wanted to discard the early GE as merely a by-election. It was one of the rare occasions 
where the PAP was placed in a dilemma as what to do to ensure its dominance in 
Singapore politics. It decided to dismiss the by-election strategy of the SDP fully. The 
results of the general election were not convincing for the PAP; it won 41 seats through 
walk-overs and it was thus confronted with a fait accompli of a by-election. Had it not 
been for one missing proposer for an independent candidate, the PAP would not have 
been returned to power.229 It kept its dominance by the narrowest of margin possible. 
The mood at the PAP headquarters was sombre as they realised that their task ahead 
was an uphill one. Chiam announced the beginning of a strong opposition in Parliament. 
He said it was the only way to make the PAP accountable and prevent the abuse of 
power in the country. Nevertheless, the PAP formed the eighth government of 
Singapore since its independence in 1965. In 1993 the SDP suffered a serious drawback 
because of problems around its second person in charge, Chee, and because of the 
withdrawal of Chiam. 
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There were a number of reasons for the one-party dominance in the democratic republic 
of Singapore. Singapore's opposition parties all suffered from internal weaknesses. 
Shils's decription of opposition in new states certainly applied to Singapore: 
"It is both discouraging to opposition and injurious to its action when one 
heavily dominant party appears to be immovable. People do not like to back a 
certain loser and the opposition parties are therefore bound to become 
discouraged and desperate under these conditions. Discouragement about their 
prospects of growth not only keeps them small, it also makes them smaller by 
stirring up jealousies and disputes which are endemic in failing organisations. 
Despair drives the opposition into wild accusations, 'walk-outs', boycotts of 
parliamentary sessions, obstructive actions, nonsensical charges, triviality, etc. 
Such behaviour dooms the opposition party to ineffectiveness. "™ 
Another inherent weakness of the opposition was its difficulty to recruit effective 
leaders. This was principally caused by the opposition's inability to attract 
professionals, prominent businessmen or academics into their ranks.231 
Lee called Jeyaretnam and Chiam "DC-3's operating in the jet age."232 
Chan was of the opinion that individuals could dissent in Singapore as long as they did 
not have an organisational base.233 The moment they were organised, they became a 
political threat and were considered an adversary. But a random dissenting voice was 
highly acceptable. The occasional dissenting letter to the national newspaper posed no 
direct threat, but a consistent dissenting voice was considered impropriate and even 
without an organisational base, could be dealt with as well. Therefore stepping into the 
limelight as an opponent of the government could very well "jeopardize one's career 
and sometimes even safety prospects".234 This problem occurred in several opposition 
parties. There were fourteen other parties in Singapore besides the PAP, but most were 
either shadow or phantom political parties. Only four could be considered as real 
entities.235 
United National Front 
The United National Front was a combination of the Singapore Chinese Party, Angkatan 
Islam and the Persatuan Melayu Singapura. Chan attributed them "an amateur's air", 
because "two years after the formation of the party, no known public figure had 
identified with the party and there was no evidence that the party had attracted the well-
educated, the professionals, or any creditable political associates. ',236 
PKMS 
The Malays were organised politically in the PKMS or Pekemas. In particular the 
Malays did not agree with many PAP policies. But the Pekemas never flourished due 
to their exclusive membership (Malays only) and support for Malaysia during the years 
that Singapore was a part of it. The Malay community was aware of its numerical 
disadvantage and it knew that the Singapore government was prepared to use its 
coercive powers to deal with any major disruption to maintain law and order in the 
society237. In the seventies the Pekemas had become a "benevolent association and 
social body"238 rather than a political party in the opposition. 
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People's Front 
The People's Front, thirdly, was thought to be a more serious candidate to challenge 
the PAP. At it's inception in 1971 it announced seven planks: 
"1. To establish genuine and fully independent democratic socialist republic of 
Singapore and to strive for a unified Malayan democratic republic including 
Singapore.239 
2. To protect the fundamental rights, liberties and interests of peoples of all races 
of Singapore. 
3. To eliminate all forms of foreign domination and manipulation of the economy 
of Singapore. 
4. To eradicate economic social and all existing injustices. 
5. To repeal or amend acts repugnant to the interest of the people, in 
Earticular, the Industrial Relations Ordinance, the Employment Act, the Internal ecurity Act and Criminal (Temporary Provisions) Ordinance. 
6. To foster closer social and economic ties with all countries irrespective of race 
and creed. 
7. To support the Chinese People's Republic's unconditional admission as a full 
member of the UN and the Security Council. ',24° 
However, the People's Front's growth was retarded by two factors. One was the 
internal party crisis one month after it was established, sparked off by Lee, who 
referred to one of the prominent party members as "one of our agents".241 The other 
factor was the refusal to admit professionals, academics and other public figures into 
the party. A second party crisis led to its negative image of a "crisis-ridden" party in 
the papers. Again Chan saw as the People's Front's basic problem, besides the internal 
party troubles, its "inability to attract men of some public standing, or the English-
educated to its leadership."242 
Workers Party 
The Workers' Party was formed in 1957 when David Marshall, who left the Labour 
Front government, decided to return to politics. The party stood for Merdeka, 
democracy and socialism, but the implementation of these ideals remained unclear and 
its programmes seemed to correspond with the range of interests of organized labour. 
Again there were internal differences in this party concerning the merger with 
Malaysia. Its vice-chairman and secretary-general were detained in Operation Cold 
Storage in February 1963.243 The party remained dormant until 1971 when a new 
group led by lawyer J.B. Jeyaretnam took over the party organisation.244 The infusion 
of professionals and more English educated boosted the party's image. The new 
Workers' Party (WP) wanted to change all that the members thought was wrong with 
the PAP government. Nearly all planks were aimed at correcting existing measures of 
the government to discourage political action.245 Due to the domination of lawyers in 
this party, the emphasis was on legalistic aspects of government, which by itself could 
only appeal to a small and select electorate. 
Besides these internal weaknesses, the (potential) opposition parties suffered from a 
number of structural disadvantages246. 
Firstly, the geographical restrictions of Singapore - a small island-state -enabled the 
dominant party to effectively control most of the unwanted activities in the state. It 
facilitated a centralised and co-ordinated political apparatus247 which permitted 
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penetration into the society on virtually al levels. Making use of these physical 
conditions, the PAP leadership enhanced and utilised its power to achieve its 
modernisation and development goals. Public policies were relatively easy to 
implement, ideas easily communicated, behaviour regulated and goods and services 
redistributed. 
Secondly, potential opposition parties could not capitalise on sub-cultures or primary 
loyalties due to the heterogeneous distribution of the population. 
Thirdly, the electoral system inherited from the British consisted of a single member, 
plurality voting where "the winner takes all". That meant that if the opposition was in 
the minority in a certain constituency, all its votes there were wasted. In a proportional 
representative system opposition parties would stand a much larger chance to get elected 
for seats in Parliament. 
Fourthly, the Internal Security Act (ISA) enabled the government to detain alleged 
opponents of the state without trial. This ISA also did not originate from the PAP. The 
Preservation of Public Security Ordinance (PPSO) was inherited from the colonial and 
the Labour Front governments and the PAP had been one of its early victims itself.248 
But the PAP perfected this political control system. Besides the power to detain 
potential "subversives", the ISA also stated that "the Minister (of Internal Security or 
Home Affairs) is also empowered to prohibit the printing, publication, sale, issue, 
circulation, or possession of a document or publication deemed to be prejudicial to the 
national interest, public order, or security of Singapore. "^9 Politics for opposition 
parties in Singapore thus became "in every sense a zero-sum game".250 Minchin, one 
of Lee's biographers, wrote about Lee Kuan Yew: "Most of those who have challenged 
him or his programmes have capitulated, been absorbed, are in exile, detention, limbo, 
or disgrace - or dead of natural causes."251 
The PAP not only dealt with the opposition in a direct way by sanctions under the 
Internal Security Act, but the PAP virtually incapacitated all its major political 
opponents through a number of indirect methods as well. In dominant party systems 
opposition parties frequently are not given the opportunities to develop. Thus a process 
of a growing ineffectiveness and marginalisation of the opposition was created. This 
way there simply was no credible opposition to present a viable alternative. 
In a Confucian fashion the PAP went into the elections "to seek a fresh mandate from 
the people"252. Once it acquired this mandate, the PAP did everything in its legal 
power to ascertain this power. Through various measures the ground was increasingly 
made inhospitable for the opposition parties to operate. 
Firstly, an important indirect method was to gain control over most of the political and 
non-political organisations. In contrast to most ruling parties in dominant party systems 
and one-party systems, the PAP did not nurture an extensive party bureaucracy, nor did 
it seriously endeavour to develop active participation and education of its membership. 
But over the years the PAP built an extensive organisational network at the grassroots 
level to enable it to mobilise and control the population253. The PAP's own essentially 
dormant and underdeveloped party organisation was more than compensated by the 
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growth of governmental grassroots institutions. The PAP in this way skilfully created 
a certain political order by utilising traditional sources of power. Traditional leaders in 
the respective ethnic communities were confirmed of their authority status and in most 
cases were given a position in the state political structure254, which legitimised the 
new political system. This strategy had several advantages: the contribution of 
influential people was tapped and opposition was forestalled. Prospects for any 
opposition group or party to organise and grow were hereby extremely limited. The 
PAP tolerated the existence but not the effectiveness of political competition. 
Secondly, an indirect way of political repression was to systematically reduce the 
organisational opportunities for the PAP's political opponents.235 The government just 
had to prohibit to use Housing and Development Board (HDB) flats as party premises. 
As the majority of Singaporeans lived in these flats, there were few other places 
opposition parties could meet. 
Thirdly, the PAP established strict rules for the media, to such an extent that the PAP 
could almost use the media as its own mass medium. The Singapore government was 
very clear about its attitude towards freedom of press. Lee, in his capacity of Prime 
Minister, stated in 1971 that: ".. .freedom of the press, freedom of news media must be 
subordinated to the overriding needs of the integrity of Singapore and to the primacy 
of purpose of an elected government ... we want the mass media to reinforce, not to 
undermine the cultural values and social attitudes being inculcated in our schools and 
universities."256 Governments in many newly independent countries used the 
advantage of control over the mass media, but in Singapore it was done in a quite 
sophisticated way. The political leadership considered it in the interest of nation-
building to shape and control the mass media. Lee told the Press Club in Singapore in 
1972: "Every morning my task begins with reading five, four now, newspapers. I note 
the scurrilous and the scandalous. I can live with that. But when any newspaper pours 
a daily dose of language, cultural or religious poison, I put my knuckledusters on.n257 
Newspapers and magazines which were stepping out of line were firmly punished. The 
fact that they had to renew their permit to print annually, made them vulnerable and 
therefore cautious. As a consequence, government critics and opponents looking for a 
channel to express their views, had a hard time finding a publisher or newspaper willing 
to cooperate. Radio and television stations were entirely controlled by the government. 
By favourable media coverage the PAP managed to gain credit for all the progress and 
development of Singapore and thus legitimise its dominance. The PAP even successfully 
socialised the Singapore population into believing that the presence of an opposition in 
parliament would be dangerous for Singapore, as it would bring division into politics, 
contention and perhaps conflict, and on the other hand frighten away foreign investors. 
This kind of socialisation made the PAP not only a political party, but rather a kind of 
national symbol, thereby neutralising the need for competing political parties. 
Moreover, it was not difficult for the government, consisting of the higher educated 
elite and providing well for the mainstream Singaporeans, to maintain its good image. 
The PAP not only denied similar visibility to its opponents, but also cast the opposition 
in its shadow. 
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The Censorship Board controlled the contents of the information1 spread to the 
Singapore general public. If it did not please the government, the sources were 
attacked. The Eastern Sun, charged with being a Hong Kong newspaper financed by 
communist sources, was closed down as a potential advocate of a radical communist 
identity. The Singapore Herald, with its slightly more critical editorials and independent 
thinking and writing on government policy, was perceived by the government as 
"eroding the will and attitudes of the people regarding fundamental national matters 
such as national service, agitation over labour laws, the Internal Security Act, 
advocating "with-it-isms" and permissiveness in sex, drugs and dress styles"258. This 
was considered not in line with the PAP's pragmatic development identity. The PAP 
insinuated that, such as the Eastern Sun, the Herald was financed by foreign capital 
with an intention of undermining the political stability of Singapore. 
The Chinese daily newspaper Nanyang Siang Pau was another source of concern for 
the government. The Chinese educated Chinese accumulated many grievances and 
finally found a means of expression in the Nanyang Siang Pau towards the end of 1970. 
During the merger with Malaysia the Chinese language and identity were major social-
political issues.259 To the Chinese, language and consequently education was the 
expression of their identity and culture. Chinese schools were therefore set up by the 
immigrants. The attempts of the colonial government to "domesticate" the Chinese 
education system led to student unrest in the Chinese middle schools in and after 1954. 
A committee made recommendations for the improvement and strengthening of the 
Chinese education. The report remained the basis for the education system for a long 
time. In post-colonial Singapore Chinese education was not eliminated, but English 
became the language of the greatest economic value. Along with job opportunities the 
enrolment in Chinese schools declined, as parents became more calculating and 
realistic. The Chinese educated Chinese expressed their concerns about this 
development in the Nanyang Siang Pau. The PAP government saw this as promotion 
of a regressive identity and tried to discourage the eastward political orientations of 
these Chinese. 
Four senior executives of the Nanyang Siang Pau were detained for having launched 
"a deliberate campaign to stir up Chinese racial emotions". This was the first of a 
number of strikes against the press in Singapore. 
In the nineties the opposition was still on the defensive instead of asserting a plausible 
alternative. On the one hand, its statements reflected emotional, basic concerns of 
certain minority groups which did not appeal to the mainstream public. On the other 
hand, opposition MP's were mainly shown on tv in "Highlights of Parliament" making 
weak, emotional replies or statements in contrast to calm and well argumented 
appearances by the PAP. The opposition was viewed as having "heart and guts" as 
opposed to the "brains and heart" of the second generation PAP leaders and the "brains 
and guts" of the Lee government.260 To what extent the selection of shots was 
manipulated or biased, was hard to tell as an outsider. But the government did have 
these opportunities as the owner of or stakeholder in the mass media and was known 
to manipulate it in the name of the stability of the country. Even Chan, a prominent 
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Singaporean professor in political science, critically noted that "whilst in certain 
instances these Government measures may be defended in the name of national security, 
stability and economic development, they also very clearly place limits upon the area 
of political issues that are open to discussion. "261 
Although the mass media were privatised in the nineties and the census relaxed 
somewhat, the government remained alert to information considered damaging to the 
leaders' image. For example, in June 1995 the International Herald Tribune was 
summoned for slander of Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, Senior Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew and his son Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. The prosecution stated that 
the article in question suggested that "Lee junior" thanked his position not to his own 
qualities but to his father. The Tribune had to apologise and state that these were false 
accusations. 
Fourthly, the government used legal ways to deal with its opponents and thereby made 
it more acceptable. By long, complicated processes it took the angle out of the 
resistance against the government's actions. The opposition was not punished without 
hearing or discussion, for example in the case of the government against the editor, 
publisher and printer of The Hammer, the opposing Workers' Party paper, in 1987.262 
The complaint concerned a one-sided report about a previous Committee of Privilege 
hearing. At the core of the dispute was the line of questioning of the Prime Minister by 
Jeyaretnam, secretary-general of the WP, editor of the Hammer and lawyer. Jeyaretnam 
had been allowed time to cross-examine Lee, but did this indirectly to avoid the pitfalls 
of encountering denial to direct questions. The Committee had felt that Jeyaretnam did 
not use his time relevantly and did not allow him more time than the allotted 45 
minutes, which was also given to another speaker. This was followed by a 
misunderstanding about a second opportunity to cross-examine. Jeyaretnam did not 
manage to achieve his desired results within the first question period and wrote an 
article in The Hammer with the title "Jeya denied fair hearing", which was perceived 
as a "gross distortion of the truth" by the government. Dhanabalan, then leader of the 
House of Parliament, took offense and brought Jeyaretnam to court. Jeyaretnam was 
found guilty of charge after elaborate hearing. Jeyaretnam was a verbally gifted lawyer 
and already he did not stand much chance against the government. Let alone the 
majority of other opponents. 
The PAP government was cautiously calculative in using its powers, but once someone 
was perceived as acting against the interests of the government, the PAP used its full 
persuasive powers to end a debate in its favour. Another example was the Dr.Chee-case 
in 1993. Chee was vice-president of the WP and worked in the psychology department 
of the University of Singapore. He was accused of using the department's fax machine 
to send his wife's dissertation to her professor in the United States. This was perceived 
as abuse of public funds for personal purposes and thus a lack of integrity. 
Fifthly, the PAP held the civil service and the trade union movement almost entirely 
under control.263 It inhibited the development of opposition by monopolising the 
labour movement in Singapore. Due to the control of the trade unions by the PAP 
through the Trade Unions (Amendment) Ordinance since 1959, any opponent would 
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have found it almost impossible to create a mass base for its opposition party. In 1968 
the Employment Act and the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act were enacted to 
define the rights and obligations of employers and employees. It reduced the number 
of public holidays, restricted overtime and bonus payments and gave employers more 
authority in hiring, promoting, transferring and dismissing employees. Workers were 
provided with avenues to seek redress from unjust employers. As the balance of rights 
was more favourable for the employers, the government emphasised the benefit of 
industrial peace and the long term good for the workers. The prospect of economic 
development made these measures more acceptable. 
Moreover, the government also participated in business. Due to growing governmental 
activities in statutory institutions and private companies, the power and the scope of the 
bureaucrats increased enormously. With this concomitant emergence of an 
"administrative state", the one-party dominance was consolidated. In this way the PAP 
became more or less synonymous with the state.264 For instance, in 1993 in a local 
theatre play a resemblance was made between the way Singapore was governed and a 
puppet theatre.265 
Sixthly, rapid economic progress and an increasing social cohesion among a more 
affluent population defused communist and communal threats.266 Because the majority 
of the population benefitted from the risen welfare, the people had little to complain 
about. As Bloodworm stated, Lee's government "has done more than lock up the left 
wing. It has swept away the slums and given the people towering blocks of low-rental 
flats, new networks of roads, a new port, a new industrial complex, nearly one hundred 
new schools, a new social system, a new face and a new future."267 The PAP 
government felt legitimate in keeping the opposition from interfering with its efforts, 
because it was striving for a "noble cause": the development of Singapore. As long as 
the government "delivered the goods", i.e. improved the material standard of living in 
a safe environment of law and order, the Singapore population gave the PAP its 
mandate to govern as it thought right. The attitude of the Singaporeans was: "If the 
going is good, why rock the boat; you're getting what you want, so why risk it; tolerate 
a bit of authoritarianism."268 In the nineties Chan thought that this was the main 
reason for Singaporeans' compliance and a weak opposition. Even so much so, that she 
started doubting whether the notion that the political tradition was derived from being 
Chinese and thus from Confucianism had anything to do with it.269 Selvan too 
acknowledged the role of the economic security in the lack of opposition in Singapore. 
He brought up Bertrand Russell's question: "If one man offers you democracy and 
another offers you a bag of grain, at what stage of starvation will you prefer the grain 
to the vote?"270 
4.3.1. Criticism of the PAP 
It was not so much the policies of the PAP the opposition rejected. People might 
complain about minor policies, but they could not find any major issue where the risk 
would be worth the venture. The criticism rather focused on the interpretation of 
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democracy in Singapore. There were regular elections, but the pool of eligible people 
was strictly controlled by the PAP and limited. The PAP did not recruit party 
organisers or student or trade union activists. They rather selected well-educated and 
highly qualified technocratic or professional people in their thirties who had already 
successfully made a career. The government could decide when a (by-)election would 
be held. Thus the opposition could be caught by surprise and be unprepared. The PAP 
leaders did attend forums with public debates and went on "constituency 
roundabouts"271, but rather to explain their own points of view than to listen to those 
of the population.272 
In the seventies, Goh Keng Swee remarked that outside observers who criticised the 
orderliness and self-discipline of Singaporeans, often forgot the historical propensity for 
violence in Singapore. "This also explains why the discerning Singaporean is not 
impressed when petit-bourgeois amateur European revolutionaries call, from the 
comfort of their universities, for the violent overthrow of the government in 
Singapore."273 
Nevertheless, relying heavily on their 1988 manifesto, both the SDP and the WP time 
and again brought up two themes: the need to give power to the people and the value 
of having a stronger opposition in parliament. A WP pamphlet stated that its philosophy 
had not changed since 1961, believing that "people should be given the power to 
influence, and to decide their own destiny." The WP saw as its aim "to eliminate the 
fear of political and economic instability in our country as perceived by our voters if 
the PAP does not stay in power. " 
Besides this overall goal, the WP's criticism consisted of274: 
1. "The fact that the PAP government has given beautiful promises before the 
elections but made increases to service charges rendered after the elections. 
2. That is has become difficult to maintain a family and provide a decent education 
in Singapore. 
3. That the PAP's policies have promoted social inequality and widen the gap 
between the rich and the poor. The five policies that widened the gap are 
catalogued as follows: 
• Increases in HDB flats selling price, conservancy charges, and season parking 
fees will only affect the low and middle income majorities who stay in HDB 
estates. Those who stay in private estates are not affected. 
• The establishment of independent schools and revised student enrolment 
practice favours the wealthy and better educated families. 
•• Streaming education policy too favours the rich. Families who can afford 
extra tuition can ensure a better streaming result for their children. Indirectly, 
the streaming education policy is streaming the rich from the poor. 
• The government also introduced policies which will benefit the rich. For 
example, the Weekend Car Policy, where only those families who own more 
than one car will benefit and enjoy considerable savings from road tax. 
• Increases in hospital and other health care charges have further increased the 
burden on the poor. With the introduction of privatised government hospitals, 
choices available for the poor have become more limited. 
4. The PAP does not provide job security for the workers. 
5. The PAP does not always stand by its words. 
6. It is not always being a responsible government. " 
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Jeyaretnam of the WP wrapped his criticism in a cautious manner in the following 
questions275: 
1. "Why in Singapore today our people must still continue to live in fear that the 
Government can arrest them and throw them into prison and the courts cannot 
do anything? 
2. Why in Singapore today our people cannot make their own choices but must 
have all our choices controlled by the government? E.g.: 
• Why can't we marry anyone (whom) we choose even if he or she is from 
outside Singapore but work here on a work permit? 
• Why can't we own our taxis and make an honest living as a taxi driver but 
are forced to rent the taxis from companies which exploit us? 
• Why must we be forced to fit into racial quotas in choosing where we wish 
to live in this country we call home? 
3. Why is it necessary in Singapore today for those of us who are not well-off to 
be denied: 
• equal medical care and treatment as the rich at a cost we can afford and if we 
cannot afford it, free of any cost to ourselves? 
• free education for our children in schools as the children from rich parents? 
• care in our old age and to live in dignity when we are no longer able to work? 
4. Why should the physically and mentally disabled among us be made to feel that 
they are not part of us? 
From the 1991 elections and his roundabouts in the constituencies Goh Chok Tong 
concluded that the main concern of a large group of Singaporeans in the nineties did not 
appear to be the style of government, but bread-and-butter issues. He found that there 
was "a big group of Singaporeans who really only care about daily life - less taxes, less 
levies, cheap hospital charges, cheap educational services. They want firm government. 
All they are interested in is stability, progress and prosperity. That's the signal for us. 
So we've to reach out."276 He promised that over the next few years his attention 
would be focused on the common man's problems whether it would be high costs or 
whether they were unable to keep up with the fast pace of life. 
Deputy Prime Minister Ong Teng Cheong distinguished four groups among the growing 
number of protest voters against the PAP government: the government checkers, the 
Chinese-educated, the lower classes and the protest voters.277 
government checkers 
To the first group belonged the young English-educated professionals from the middle 
income group, who think that a democratic country should have an opposition party in 
parliament. The dominant one-party system was too dictatorial for them, although they 
acknowledged that this system was the will of the majority of the people in the past 
elections. They were very vocal and believed that the new consultative style of the 
government allowed them to participate and influence policies more. As an example of 
the arguments used by these so-called government-checkers, Bilveer Singh thought that 
elections were 
"the most ubiquitous of contemporary institutions with voting perceived as the 
single greatest act of political participation undertaken by adults in a majority 
of nations of the world. While free elections are not all there is to a democracy. 
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a country which calls itself democratic would have to resort to this device to 
enable the people to 'control' the rulers. 
What significance do elections have in the Singapore political system? 
They provide the only legitimate route for achieving political office. They are 
one of the most important means by which people can express their political 
aspirations and disaffection. They provide a mechanism whereby adult citizens 
can choose their leaders from the competing teams. 
Opportunities to make decisions about political succession. Provide the mandate 
for governmental action and provide opportunities for action, leading to popular 
ratification and an aura of legitimacy for governmental policies. Also important 
vehicles for political participation in Singapore."278 
The opposition accused the PAP government of using the label of democracy as not 
much more than maintaining the constitutional system which allowed people to choose 
their government and their leaders, who would be given a mandate to rule as benevolent 
fathers. 
Chinese educated 
The second group consisted of Chinese-educated Singaporeans, who felt that the 
government was too eager to please the vocal English-educated population. The 
Chinese-educated were most unhappy with the relaxation of the censorship. They were 
afraid could lead to a moral degeneration of the society, the lack of government 
attention for Chinese culture and language and the dominant role of the English 
language. This way the English-educated would hold all key appointments, giving the 
Chinese-educated little opportunity to rise in the Singapore society. 
The government had taken the support of this Chinese educated group for granted and 
had neglected their aspirations and interests. In a traditional Chinese fashion they kept 
their grievances to themselves and thereby made themselves the silent majority. To 
accommodate this important part of Singapore society, the government did modify the 
relaxed censorship. On 4 September 1993, Prime Minister Goh announced that R-
rating, pertaining to sex-scenes in films, would be modified and granted only to artistic 
films. He felt that "we have moved too fast for Singapore, which is still an Asian 
society." He told the press that son pomo had entered Singapore, though that was not 
what he had in mind. The government also raised the age limit of viewers from 18 to 
21 years. 
lower classes 
The third group was formed by the lower socio-economic classes who were mainly 
concerned with their daily issues, such as the increase in maintenance fees, carpark 
charges, school fees, medical costs, bus fares and telephone bills. The unemployed in 
particular and those who could not earn their own income suffered from the many 
increases in fees and the yearly inflation. Shop owners, hawkers and small businessmen 
were badly affected by the increase in rental and the СОЕ279 because of the free 
market economy. The government perceived these grievances as an area of tension 
between the population's short-term needs and the PAP's long-term plans. This was 
perceived as part of the development process. 
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protest voters 
Fourthly, there were the protest voters, but Ong argued that in any country, regardless 
of the political or economic system, there were always protest voters who blame the 
government for everything. They mainly wanted more freedom to do things their own 
way according to him. 
To Ong the Chinese-educated people were the most important of all, because they had 
been the key supporters of the PAP. The 1991 general elections showed that the 
"Chinese problem" was not solved yet. Lee Kuan Yew, during his visit to Kazakhstan 
in 1993, therefore emphasised the importance of the reading of Chinese newspapers by 
the cabinet Ministers. Speaking Mandarin and dialects was a definite advantage in 
Singapore, but there were only a few prominent politicians left who were able to read 
Chinese. Lee emphasised the stamina and mobilising capability of the Chinese-educated. 
His interpretation of the 1991 election results was that Singaporeans had still not quite 
moved away from the traditional pull of clans and dialect loyalties. The results in the 
various constituencies showed that even if the Chinese could relate to each other in the 
public area and a unification process had been brought about, the dialect and clan 
affiliations were still clearly present. Lee called it a "deep-seated emotional instinct, 
reinforced by culture and you identify with those closest to you. "28° He estimated that 
the full impact of the Speak Mandarin Campaign would take another twenty to thirty 
years to materialise. Regarding this language issue, the choice for parents had been a 
difficult one. Culturally, they could have wanted to choose for Chinese education, but 
with the economic opportunities in mind most of them opted for English education. 
What the 1991 elections also made clear was the class division in Singapore politics. 
The PAP government had hitherto mainly focused on ethnic problems in the society, 
but now the gap appeared to be more in the socio-economic positions. As a Senior 
Minister, Lee evaluated past policies as the right ones, i.e. to focus on economic 
growth which benefitted all groups.281 But in Singapore's culture of success and 
excellence, the lower income groups also aspired to be on par with the progress of the 
other groups. Special attention had been given to the Malays through MENDAKI, but 
Lee acknowledged that parallel attention should have been given to the larger number 
of lower income Chinese who faced the same kind of problems. Lee endorsed the more 
liberal policies on culture and the arts and freer discussion of public policies, but the 
differences in level of expression should not have distracted the government from all 
the needs present in the Singapore society. 
Books by opposition 
Despite the general political apathy, a few critical books have been published. In 1990 
Selvan's "Singapore: the Ultimate Island (Lee Kuan Yew's untold story)" showed 
anecdotal material presenting Lee as the Big Brother and Singapore as a "Lee-fearing" 
society. It seemed mainly intended as an eye-opener. More seriously aiming at opening 
up the way for political alternatives were "Dare to change; an alternative vision for 
Singapore" and "Singapore, My Home Too"282 by Chee Soon Juan, former vice-
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president of the Social Democratic Party and former lecturer at the Department of 
Social Work and Psychology at the National University of Singapore. Although he did 
no longer represent the SDP and thus did not represent a group of dissidents, but 
mainly voiced his individual standpoint, his books were sold in record time. Chee 
challenged a number of basic principles of the government. His main points of criticism 
concerned the lack of real political participation in Singapore and the welfare 
distribution. The latter will be discussed in chapter six. 
In the preface of his first book "Dare to change"283 Chee excused himself by stating 
that "only the foolish and the partial will not recognise the PAP's achievements in the 
past three decades. " But he also thought that "the present system of paternalistic control 
and overregulation will lead to a regression of our society." Leaving the decision 
making process to an elite few would drain all life and spirit out the Singaporean 
society.284 To support his argument, he quoted the political analyst Jean Baudrillard: 
"The strategy of power has long seem founded on the apathy of the masses. The more 
passive they were, the more secure it was. But...the inertia it has fostered becomes the 
sign of its own death. "28S 
In his second book "Singapore, My Home Too" Chee made clear how fear of voicing 
opinions had become part of Singaporeans' lives due to the Internal Security Act (ISA). 
He noted there was hardly any dissent in Singapore; the majority was apathetic, timid 
and unquestioning. Chee's criticism, on the contrary, gradually became more and more 
outspoken. Chee summarised Singaporeans' mentality as "keeping stomachs full and 
heads empty". 
"We fear telling the government that it has done wrong because we don't want 
to jeopardise our chances of owning a car, buying a house and going on 
expensive vacations. No, morality is not just about sex, drugs and violence. It 
is also about coming to grips with the over-powering materialistic id within us 
that makes kiasu hypocrites of us all and about our courage, responsibility and 
integrity to speak up for what is right. 
Until we are able to do these things, let us not delude ourselves that we are a 
moral society." 
With the PAP in power, Chee likened getting involved with Singapore's opposition to 
making your way through a minefield. He paraphrased an expression of the popular 
film-character Forrest Gump: "Being an opposition member is like a box of chocolates 
- you never know what you're gonna get."286 
Chee questioned the PAP's concept of Asian democracy as he perceived it: "A political 
system consisting of one dominant party and several small fringe parties with no 
turnover of government.n287 He pointed at the differences with other Asian countries 
and found the term "Singaporean democracy" more appropriate. In his view the PAP's 
term was a strange concoction of democratic and totalitarian ideas to legitimise its 
views. He found the PAP's democracy for example wanting in its screening of all 
selection candidates for "suitability" and suggested rethinking of the one-man-one-vote 
system. Chee thought that consensus was not possible in Singapore, because genuine 
debate on any issue was minimal, if not non-existent. He accused the government of 
136 Singapore, a modem Asian city-state 
"staging 'debates' (always on its terms, by its rules, and in its mass media) to give the 
impression that a 'consensus' was finally reached."288 
In essence Chee's alternative came down to a belief that Singaporeans now were an 
educated and intelligent people, able to make the right decisions for the nation, their 
families and themselves, in contrast to the government's lack of confidence in the 
Singaporean people. Chee thought it was time the government would not reign by 
threatening with punitive measures any longer, but instead should appeal to the intrinsic 
goodness of the people. The past reasons for authoritarian government, such as the 
undeveloped economy, the immaturity of the republic and communism, did no longer 
exist, he claimed. Therefore constant reminders of the "realities" of life and the benefits 
of a pragmatic attitude would only work for those who were happy with the status quo. 
It would also create a non-dynamic ambience, which was the precursor of mediocracy, 
he claimed. 
Chee agreed with the PAP's aim of a continuing economically competitive Singapore 
with a stable political structure, but disagreed with the means towards this end. Chee 
wanted to increase the level of involvement of the people by more political 
participation. This way he hoped to decrease the sense of alienation of the man-in-the-
street from societal issues.289 
PART Π 
THE INFLUENCE OF SINGAPORE'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
ON ITS CULTURAL IDENTITY 
CHAPTER 5 
THE MODERNISATION PROCESS 
5.1 Economic development and modernisation 
Economic development is in one way or another related to the modernisation process, 
but, as put in chapter one, does modernisation inevitably entail westernisation? 
According to Hwang, the origin and pattern of modernisation in the West differed from 
those in East Asian countries. The basic elements of modernisation evolved 
autonomously and interrelatedly from different sectors within Western civilisation, while 
none rose out of the East Asian past.1 The elements of modernisation there were 
exogenous; they were transplanted from the West to East Asia.2 In 1966 Eisenstadt 
expected that modernisation would therefore mean to East Asian countries a process of 
change towards such types of social, economic and political systems as had developed 
in Western Europe and the United States since the seventeenth century.3 How the 
pattern of modernisation evolved in Singapore is the subject of this chapter. In the 
earlier developed countries the modernisation process evolved during a long process of 
private entrepreneurship, but in Singapore economic development took place under the 
deliberate planning and supervision of the government. 
When Singapore gained independence, it was not a question of whether or not to 
modernise, but mainly how to modernise. Ho Wing Meng stated the imperative of 
modernisation for Singapore: 
"Increasing the material wealth of a country through economic development does 
not necessarily make a person any more or less happier than before... But apart 
from this, if we dispassionately consider the desperate predicament of many 
developing countries in Asia and elsewhere being worsened each year by 
population explosion and other social and economic ailments and balance this 
picture with the hope which economic development promises, namely, the 
chance of ameliorating the wretchedly low levels of existence which hundreds 
of millions of people now labour under, we cannot help, I think, but conclude 
with the rethorical question: "Do we have any other better alternative but to 
modernise?'"1 
As to what modernisation constituted, there were different opinions and different angles 
of approaching it. Chen published most extensively about this issue in Singapore. In his 
publications the development of the concept was reflected5. Chen acknowledged the 
fact that there was no common definition of modernisation. It was often used 
synonymously with economic development, industrialisation, urbanisation or even 
westernisation. The common factor in the various definitions was the "emphasis on new 
ways of thinking which make possible for men to create modern industry, modern 
government and modern society6". Chen differentiated between the economic approach 
to modernisation as "man's application of technology to the control and utilization of 
nature's resources" and the sociological approach as the "differentiation of social 
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structures and changes in social relations"7. In 1972, he also voiced the deep concern 
of sociologists over the disruptive features of modernisation such as mental illness, 
rising tensions, violence, divorce, social inequality, juvenile delinquency and racial, 
religious and class conflict. In 1976, Chen portrayed modernisation as follows: 
"In most developing countries ... they often view modernisation as a symbol of 
progress, an imperative in modernising societies for achieving certain goals and 
targets, though their concept of modernisation may be totally different.. .To some 
modernisation may mean sports cars, pop music and free love. To others mass 
political participation and a democratic system. To yet others productivity, 
administrative efficiency and technological know-how."8 
Chen showed the importance of the interplay between economic and socio-cultural 
development, by distinguishing four development patterns. "Industrialisation" referred 
to economic development; "modernisation" mainly to socio-cultural development. 
Industrialisation high low 
Modernisation 
high 
highly developed 
Ш 
stagnant 
& declining 
low Π 
developing 
IV 
traditional 
or undeveloped 
Figure 5.1. Typology of development patterns. Source: Chen, 1976.9 
Patterns II and ΠΙ were the modernising societies. Pattern HI was the most common in 
the Third World: "Modern values are instilled in the have-nots, while productive 
resources are insufficient to meet their demands. In addition to economic stagnation are 
the ever present social and political problems of the 'modernized' masses."10 
According to Chen, Singapore was at that moment, in the mid-seventies, in the 
transition of moving from pattern Π to I. However, Chen warned: 
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"However, if individual demands accelerated by modern values are not held in 
check by individual and collective responsibility, and if modern Western values 
and norms are unconditionally adopted by the population, there is a danger of 
shifting to type III... It is therefore crucial for us, especially at this very moment 
of the transition period, to re-evaluate our traditional past, which includes, of 
course, some Asian values."11 
In Japan, the basic rationale for its modernisation was Toyo no dotoku, seiyo no gakugei 
(the moral and spiritual values of the East, with the technical skills of the West). In 
China the modernisation formula tended towards a conservative defense of the 
traditional way along with a progressive adoption of modern Western learning, mostly 
technological at first, but increasingly involving more of the Western culture which 
underlay and informed that technology. "Chinese learning for substance, Western 
learning for function" was the most familiar expression of this approach.12 
In Singapore scholars and politicians were aware of the westernisation processes 
modernisation could imply. They therefore formulated quite specific guidelines for 
modernisation in Singapore. Several thinktanks served as consulting resources for the 
government, each scholar contributing from his own specialisation. In this capacity, 
Ho13 formulated the most essential guiding principles for the modernisation of the 
government in 1977: 
"1) inculcation of rationality and scientific method in the postulation of policies and 
the resolution of social, political and economic problems. 
2) comprehensive state planning for economic development to raise the general 
level of living and amenities for the broad masses of the people. 
3) the institution of policies to equalize economic and social opportunities through 
universal education in order to raise the standard of literacy and to produce an 
increasing number of skilled workers for the various sectors of the developing 
economy. 
4) to reform pernicious attitudes, beliefs and other forms of rigidities and 
inhibitions so as to facilitate the implementation of programmes for national 
development. 
5) nationalism and national consolidation for the purpose of developing a sense of 
solidarity among the people, so that the government's task ensuring political 
stability and the institution of a set of rules for regulating law and order, is made 
easier."14 
In hindsight, these modernisation principles did seem to have been the guide lines for 
the Singaporean government. It was not a blind following of the Western development 
model, but a conscious effort at emulation of the desirable parts only, although not 
everything could be foreseen. Neither were Singapore's economic development plans 
bom out of disrespect for the Asian culture. According to Ho: 
"Asian politicians are .. not unmindful of the fact that in the modem world of 
today it is not enough for a country to boast of a long and respectable history, 
or a system of philosophical and religious values hallowed by tradition and 
prescribed by custom, while the majority of their peoples continue to undergo 
a degree of privation so extreme as to be an insult to human dignity. They are 
aware that unless their countries are rich and influential in international politics, 
The Modernisation Process 141 
their word will not carry weight, their cultures will be despised and their people 
will be treated with contempt."15 
Nor was the Singaporean development strategy aimed at the profit of some privileged 
people only. 
"[We need] planned programmes for economic development, so that the poor 
and dispossessed will not only have the basic necessities to sustain life and limb, 
but also be provided with the opportunities to build a better life, both through 
their own efforts and with the assistance of their government's, for themselves 
and their children. Economic development then, may broadly be construed as 
an attempt to formulate a sustained programme to raise the wealth of a nation 
и 16 
The urge to modernise the economy was great among the Chinese population in 
Singapore. 
"There is every reason for developing countries to want to modernize and 
transform their stagnant and unproductive economies together with the tradition-
bound systems of values, habits and institutions which make for heavy social 
inertia."17 
The urge for this type of development originally was not the same for all population 
groups in Singapore, but the people who became Singaporeans (a term not coined until 
Singapore's independent development) gradually came to accept the modernisation of 
their home country along with the economic benefits. 
5.2 From developing to industrialised country 
In 1991 Singh summarised Lee Kuan Yew's legacy as a "per capita income of about 
S$19,000, a Gross Domestic Product growth rate of 8-9 per cent, healthy national 
reserves, zero foreign debt, full employment, inter-ethnic harmony, high standards of 
public services and living, a clean and green environment as well as a sound 
international image of Singapore."18 
Compared to traditional societies, modern societies are often assumed to be more 
market- than subsistence oriented, have an economy based on industry and services 
rather than on agriculture, show a widespread use of modern technology, have an urban 
development and to emphasise individual economic progress. 
In the nineties Singapore met all these conditions. Singapore progressed roughly from 
economic survival as a Third World country in the sixties, fulfilment of basic needs of 
the population in the seventies, emphasis on retaining the Asian cultural identity from 
the late seventies onwards to the status of industrialised country in the nineties and an 
aspiration to become thé information technology (IT)-city in the world by the year 
2010." Singapore boasted numerous symbols of a modern country: the many high rise 
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buildings, the impressive Central Business District (CBD), the international clothing and 
supermarket chains, the replacement of old-style teahouses by fast-food restaurants such 
as McDonalds, the efficient MRT (Mass Rapid Transport system: underground train), 
and highly advanced communications and financial facilities. The less visible key 
economic and social indicators also indicated a higher standard of living than at the 
outset of independence.20 
material indicators 
More and more Singaporeans were enjoying higher standards of living, measured by 
the following indicators. 
Table 5.1. Indicators of standard of living in Singapore1 
around the year 
number of 
persons per 
television 
persons per 
telephone 
persons per car 
public buses 
persons per bus 
goods vehicles 
motor cycles/ 
scooters 
doctors 
persons per doctor25 
dentists 
persons per dentist 
pharmacists 
midwives 
nurses 
I960 
23 
('66: tv 
1970 
was inaugurated) 
24.7 
24.7 
1,339 
13,612 
18,931 
640 
325 
95 
964 
1,700 
11.1 
('71) 
1982 
5.8 
2.9 
12.724 
7,585 
96,889 
136,899 
2,225 
530 
373 
2,673 
7,534 
1991 
22 
2.8 
('93)23 
11 
291 
731 
4,051 
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Table 5.1. Indicators of standard of living in Singapore (continued) 
1970 1982 1991 around the year 
number of 
percentage living in26: 
bungalow/apartment 
HDB low-cost 
high-rise flats 
shop/rowhouse 
attap or zinc roof houses 
or tenement buildings 
1960 
10 ('66) 
30 
20 
40 
87эт 
C90) 
newspapers sold daily 615,612 877,500 
('80) 
National Library members28 371,153 796,459 
('80) 
literacy (percentage) 75(*66) 90.1 
C90) 
primary education 30 90.129 
secondary education 1530 6931 
tertiary education 4 
With increasing incomes, families focused on the next round of products to which they 
could reasonably aspire.32 In early rounds, families were excited by products such as 
sewing machines, watches, bicycles, radios, cameras and tile roofs. They moved on to 
telephones, televisions, refrigerators, washing machines and electric rice cookers. Then 
to air conditioning, mobile phones, cars and larger flats with more modern fixtures. 
Consumer durables such as furniture, vacuum cleaners, hi-fi equipment and video sets 
have become "necessary possessions" for many households in Singapore. The latest 
addition to these "needs" was the personal computer. Furthermore, the number of 
Singaporeans travelling abroad increased eight times from 1965 to 1976. 
Singapore had increasingly become a consumer society.33 There were several factors 
at play: desire for convenience, avoidance of back-breaking labour, curiosity, 
entertainment, the excitement of a new fad, the constant stimulation from new 
advertisements and the desire to keep up socially with one's friends and neighbours.34 
However, social comparison also kept consumerism in bounds by what was considered 
proper. 
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population growth 
In 1966, the population was growing by 3.25 percent per year. This percentage was 
reduced to 1.0 in 1986 and recovered to 1.7 in 1990. This latter increase correlated 
with governmental efforts to stimulate population growth, based on anticipated ageing 
population problems. The infant mortality rate decreased from 11.7 per thousand births 
in 1980 to 6.7 per thousand in 1990. In 1993 the life expectancy for men was 71.8 
years and for women 77.4 years. 
economic growth 
Singapore's economy was rapidly developed into greater incorporation in the global 
economy. As the end of the colonial rule neared, Singapore was left with a relatively 
sophisticated economic infrastructure and a competent governmental bureaucratic 
apparatus, due to Britain's core position in the world economy since the nineteenth 
century when it replaced The Netherlands. Since 1959 these advantages were used to 
develop the economy from one based on some agriculture and entrepot-trade to more 
direct trade, manufacturing and construction; most recently in the direction of a high 
tech and service industry. Singapore's economic dependence shifted from small (family) 
and medium scale enterprises to large scale and multinational companies. The Singapore 
economy had in common with the other East Asian NICs (Newly Industrialised 
Countries)35 of South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, that they were land-scarce and 
resource-poor. Still, they all enjoyed a high and dynamic growth for a sustained period 
of more than three decades, initially based on the expansion of manufactured exports. 
Singapore, the smallest NIC with some 3.2 million inhabitants, achieved the following 
average economic growth rates: 
Table 5.2. Economic growth rates of Singapore36 
'60's 
8.7 
*70's 
9.4 
'80's 
8.2-1.8-8.3 
'90 
8.3 
'91 
6.7 
'92 
5.2 
'93 
10.4 
'94 
10.2 
'95 
8.9 
The first half of the eighties showed an 8.2 percent growth until the big plunge to a 
"negative growth" of 1.8 percent in 1985 due to a number of external and structural 
problems. Externally, international recession played a role. Structurally, high wages and 
high costs reduced growth. However, partly due to government measures, the Singapore 
economy managed to recover from its drawback rapidly until a growth rate of 9.2 per 
cent in 1989 and 8.3 per cent in 199037. In 1990 the unemployment rate fell to a 
record low of 1.7 per cent. During this period, the economy transformed from one of 
capital shortage to one which is capital rich and from high unemployment to labour 
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shortage, The accompanying rise in per capita income level made economists call 
Singapore's economy today "matured". 
This rapid economic development was a unique historical phenomenon38. According 
to Wong, it could be explained in terms of purely internal endogenous variables. The 
most important explanation was the high level of investment. At the time of industrial 
take-off, the NICs devoted a very high proportion of their GNP to capital formation. 
In 1980, Singapore had the highest level with about 45 percent. Wong called this 
process of high investment, high trade growth, high GNP growth, high income, high 
savings, etc. the "virtuous circle of growth", as opposed to the vicious circle of poverty 
with low income, low growth and savings, low investment and so on. 
The government emphasised the endogenous economic factors, such as Singapore's 
strategic location, its political, economic, social and climatical stability, its good 
government (meaning not corrupt, rational, competent, strong and united), its high level 
of consensus between employers and employees as well as between the government and 
the people and its high development of infrastructure.39 
According to Porter, Singapore still lagged behind in some economic areas, when 
compared with developed countries, or even with some other NICs. Singapore was 
classified by Porter in the "factor driven" category, while e.g. South Korea had already 
crossed into the "investment driven" category. As Singapore aspired to become a full-
fledged developed country, it had to move into the innovation driven category soon to 
keep its competitive advantage.40 
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Figure 5.2. An estimated evolution of national competitive development during the 
postwar period by Porter.41 
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Acknowledging this development gap, the Singapore government emphasised that 
innovative approaches were needed both to achieve a stronger local presence by MNCs 
in Singapore and to accelerate the development of local MNCs abroad. The former was 
not going to be easy due to the natural affiliation of the MNCs to their home-countries, 
but the latter turned out to acquire quite some effort from the government too. 
Altogether the life in Singapore was too comfortable to venture abroad easily. The 
"trickle out" was far below the pool of expatriate jobs available. According to the 1990 
Census of Population, 14,600 Singaporeans were working abroad.42 In 1991 
Singapore's FDI (Foreign Direct Investments) abroad was only $701 million compared 
with $3.6 billion of inward FDI. 
Singapore was heavily involved in the regional "growth triangle": Singapore, the 
province of Johor in South Malaysia and Batam island in Indonesia. Some hundred and 
fifty local and multinational companies had moved there in the early nineties, taking 
low-wage jobs with them. Vietnam was Singapore's leading trading partner. Singapore's 
specialties - infrastructure, telecommunications and industrial development - all relied 
heavily on government planning and support. Yet it were the GLC's such as Keppel 
Corporation which took the lead.43 
In 1992 China stated that Singaporean companies were "involved" in some seven 
hundred projects on the mainland of China, with a total value of close to $1 billion. 
Whereas two rivals, Taiwan and Hong Kong were together thought to have invested $30 
billion in China over the past decade. Singapore's most prestigious project in China was 
the Suzhou project. It was building a city similar to Singapore near Suzhou where one 
could rely on the phones and would not have to bribe officials. During a visit to China, 
Lee Kuan Yew called upon Singaporeans to be more "venturesome", entrepreneurial. 
According to the managing director of a headhunting firm for overseas jobs, seventy 
percent of the Singaporeans would reject such a job immediately. For many well-off 
Singaporeans, life in the so-called "soft" postings in developed countries was still 
considered not comfortable enough. They wanted the security, the "maid" (housekeeper 
and babysit), the good and cheap food and the warm predictable weather of 
Singapore.44 Singaporeans asked for provision of a "home away from home" such as 
Singapore clubs, newsletter for Singaporean expats and help offices for newly-arriving 
Singaporeans. Whereas the real motivation to work abroad had to come from a "spirit 
of adventure" according to a Shell spokesman. Offering good career opportunities were 
a "must" from the employers' side. Shell Eastern Petroleum had twenty one 
Singaporean staff members in its offices worldwide.45 
Singapore succeeded in becoming the infrastructural "hub" of Southeast Asia. In the 
nineties, MNCs preferred to station their headquarters in Singapore over the countries 
where their factories were built, because in Singapore financial and business services 
were well-developed, there were hardly any electricity disruptions, the 
telecommunications network functioned smoothly, the roads and transport were of high 
standard and there were few traffic jams. Singapore was referred to as "Singapore, 
Inc.", meaning that the state was run such as a giant, super-efficient company. 
Excellence was constantly emphasised in Singapore. It prided itself in being the least 
The Modernisation Process 147 
economically risky Asian country after Japan, having the most profitable airline in the 
world, the world's best airport, the busiest port in the world, and having won all kind 
of awards, such as a medal from the World Health Organisation for Singapore's 
contributions towards building a nation of non-smokers.46 
Inflation was kept low (2.2 percent between 1985 and 1990). The average economic 
growth from 1980 to 1990 was 6.4 percent. In 1967 there were some fifty thousand 
unemployed in Singapore; in 1990 this had decreased to 1.3 percent for the population 
of fifteen years and over. The percentage of the workforce in manufacturing and 
services increased. 
commercialisation 
Mostly, an important part of modern economic development is commercialisation: "The 
increasing dependence of all parts of the world on commercial exchange"47. In the 
case of Singapore, it merely expanded its commercial foundations. Commercial 
activities had been the very raison d'être of the city-state, in contrast to many other 
developing countries which started with an agriculture-based economy. (See chapter 7) 
rising incomes 
The national reserves had grown six times to $19,755 million in 1983. 
The annual per capita GNP rose as follows4*: 
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Figure 5.3. Growth of per capita GNP in Singapore. Source: Department of Statistics. 
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The average annual increase in GDP for the period 1966 to 1970 was 12.9 percent; 8.8 
percent from 1971 to 1983. It rose from S$l,615 in 196549 to S$9,589 in 199050 to 
S$ll,160 in 1993, thereby surpassing an industrialised country such as The 
Netherlands. In 1991 Singapore's GNP of US$12,890 (S$21,230) had overtaken that 
of several Western countries, e.g. New Zealand US$12,140. In 1995 the per capita 
GNP was S$ 22,300. 
After independence the Singapore dollar was newly introduced and acquired a strong 
value against the US dollar of 1.8125 in 1990. Purchasing power, measured in GDP per 
head in PPP (purchasing power parity, USA= 100), put Singapore in third place in the 
Asia Pacific in 1993 with 72.5I 
Singapore remarkably achieved the fulfilment of the basic material needs of its 
population. It also easily fulfilled a set of secondary needs. In 1979 the Physical Quality 
of Life Index (PQLI) of Morris52, which included infant mortality, life expectancy at 
age one and literacy at age fifteen, ranked Singapore fourth after Japan, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan with a percentage of 88.9. 
Singapore provided high quality medical facilities. It was the medical service centre for 
the region. The National University Hospital (NUH) was working in the forefront of 
some areas in medical technology. Public transport was efficient and affordable and the 
telecommunications met the highest standards. Singapore offered a safe, clean and 
pleasant environment. The standard of public hygiene was high, with for example heavy 
fines for littering and spitting in public or permitting water to stagnate as a mosquito 
breeding ground. There was a refuse disposal system with a daily service and regular 
environmental inspections. Roads were in good condition and traffic jams were few, 
considering the high traffic density. 
5.2.1. Joining the top of the developed countries 
Singapore had come a long way in its development. However, beyond the fulfilment of 
basic and secondary needs there was no blueprint on how to continue. 
The second generation of independent Singapore leaders was presented with a different 
economic challenge than the first generation. As Lee noted in his PAP Convention 
speech in 1990: 
"... Your generation has to grapple with the problems of relative success, with 
a future no longer primarily concerned with overcoming poverty, ignorance, 
disease, unemployment. " 
Singapore's economic aim for the last decade leading up to the next century was to truly 
join the "top of the rich nation's league" in the world. Economic growth remained first 
priority. All other policies were sub-ranked or in service of economic development, 
such as political and social stability. Lim Chong Yah, a noted local economist, stated 
that Singapore had reached the bottom of the top ladder. From there the climb would 
be even harder to reach the top. So more skills, more endurance, more determination 
and more esprit de corps would be needed. Lim's formula for the climb was as follows53: 
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1) a competitive market and export oriented policy 
2) politico-social environment conducive to private investment 
3) continued investment in the infrastructural and human capital mix 
4) achieving a cruising speed of 4.3 % real capita GNP growth per annum 
5) an achievement oriented work attitude, showing entrepreneurial drive 
and a willingness to leam the best from others. 
This emphasis on achievement drive encountered an inherent obstacle. The second 
generation's standard of living was much higher than their parents', thus their real need 
for economic growth was less. In other words they were more complacent than their 
parents. They did develop other needs, however, such as more freedom. Recognising 
this changed need and attitude of younger Singaporeans, the Singapore government 
gradually, but very cautiously, loosened some ropes of Singapore's forced discipline. 
The PAP leaders likened Singapore's development to that of a human being; in the 
nineties Singapore had outgrown its childhood years. It was meant that the better 
educated population would now be more capable of making the right decisions on its 
own and could therefore enjoy more societal freedom, but only gradually, as Singapore 
was just coming out of its adolescence. For example, younger Singaporeans were used 
to such a high economic growth rate, that their expectations of increasing wealth would 
have to be lowered to remain realistic. 
Although Goh Chok Tong said he would concentrate on domestic politics during his 
first few years in office, his government was active in foreign politics as well. Goh 
embarked on a route of "economic diplomacy".54 In the Sunday Times an Asian 
diplomat was quoted saying that Singapore could pursue its active foreign policy, e.g. 
calling for a Europe-East Asia summit, because of its growing economic clout and 
stature. The guiding philosophy was: a wise nation will make sure its survival and well-
being are in the interests of others.55 The foreign policy drive was given impetus by 
major international changes in the late eighties and early nineties: the Cold War ended, 
the Soviet Union fell apart and Asia was enjoying an economic boom. Singapore's total 
trade was about three times the size of its GNP, which made it vulnerable to changes 
in the international trading climate, such as the growing protectionism of trade blocs, 
trade frictions between major powers such as the USA and China and the use of social 
issues as a condition for trading privileges. In Singapore one wondered if the Western 
responses were aimed at holding back Asia's emergence as an economic superpower. 
Singapore's leaders considered it necessary to make clear that such attempts would 
backfire: "If they (the West) try to stem the flood tide, the challenge would turn into 
economic conflict and fragment the world into economic blocs - the European Union, 
the North American Free Trade Area and, perhaps, a new Asian bloc," warned Goh.56 
Singapore had played a key role in installing the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 
1992. During his trips to the developed world he tried to convey the message that Asia 
was not a threat but an opportunity to the west. 
The Singapore government made strong efforts to create a constructive network of 
cooperative relationships in the Asia-Pacific. In East Asia, notably in China and 
Myanmar, political links provided a framework for economic investors. On the other 
hand, Goh promoted Singaporeans to Europeans as having cultural links in the Asian 
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economies as well as Western ways of doing business. Both Western and Asian 
diplomats saw Singapore increasingly as a conduit between developing nations and 
South East Asia. 
5.3 Socio-cultural modernisation 
Despite the confusion raised by the concepts of development, modernisation, 
industrialisation and westernisation, there appeared to be consensus on the inevitable 
effect of modernisation processes on the socio-cultural environment.57 Ho pointed out 
that the leaders of developing countries were mostly Western educated. One therefore 
had to accept a degree of westernisation in order to decrease the "appalling disparity 
between the high standard of living and comfort enjoyed by the West and the grinding 
poverty which has been the wretched lot of the Third World. "58 According to Ho, in 
the past Asian government leaders had relied on counsels of astrologers, soothsayers, 
shamans, bomohs and eunuchs. Modernisation not only introduced economic, but also 
socio-cultural changes: 
"(1) rationality and scientific method in the postulation of policies (by objectives, not 
by whims of individuals) 
(2) comprehensive state planning for economic development 
(3) universal education 
(4) reform attitudes and beliefs to be geared towards national development 
(5) nationalism and national consolidation would create solidarity among the people, 
which in its turn would create political stability and law and order. "59 
Ho brought up the question to what extent this concept of modernisation was compatible 
with the Weltanschauung of Asian people. He wondered how much Asians would be 
willing and be capable to change in cases where their interpretation differed from the 
Western one, as modernisation could evoke memories of colonialism and imperialism 
"generally associated with economic exploitation and political subjugation of an 
undesirable sort. "m A society "which has inherited a culture stretching back to several 
thousand years [cannot modernise] if the people are not willing to make serious efforts 
to adapt to the new conditions of life, particularly if these require them to repudiate 
some of their most cherished values. "6l 
With regard to modernisation, Levy distinguished between the "indigenous developers" 
(Western developed countries) and the "latecomers" (countries which started to 
modernise later on).62 The "latecomers" borrowed technological, political, economic 
and ideological systems as well as most Western values from the "indigenous 
developers". This way modernisation induced changes in cultures all over the world 
mostly through a process of acculturation. Considering the power relations of the 
cultures between which the contact takes place, acculturation was defined as "a process 
of extensive cultural borrowing in the context of superordinate-subordinate relations 
between societies."63 The less powerful society usually borrows the most; if the 
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borrowing occurs under external pressure, one speaks of acculturation, if it occurs 
voluntary one speaks of diffusion. 
According to Chen, modernisation was characterised by changes "from a 
technologically simple, structurally less differentiated and traditionally oriented pattern 
of beliefs and social action toward a technologically complex, structurally more 
differentiated and rational-utilitarian oriented pattern."64 Many Western societies had 
already been undergoing this complex process of modernisation for several centuries 
before they became industrial societies, but the newly developing countries, such as 
Singapore, were going through this process at an accelerated pace. 
According to Levy's definition, Singapore, which started to modernise after the Second 
World War and at an accelerated pace after 1959, belonged to the group of latecomers. 
It was inevitable that Singaporeans would be directly or indirectly influenced by 
Western values, behaviour patterns and life style. However, that did not necessarily 
mean that acculturation would take place in the sense that the same socio-cultural 
transformation pattern would be followed as in the earlier developed countries. 
In the West modernisation had not only raised the standard of living, but had also 
brought along so many negative effects that, in 1990, Verfielst referred to the West's 
development stage as in a "crisis". The symptoms he noted included "widespread 
unemployment, high rate of crime, violence, drug addiction, psychological problems, 
much distress, high number of suicides, racialism, social alienation and environmental 
pollution.,,й5 
In Singapore, after three decades of rapid modernisation, unemployment, the rate of 
crime and violence as well as drug addiction were still low and had even decreased 
since economic development was taken up. 
Based on two studies of quality of life in a hundred countries - an independent report 
in 1990 of the Population Crisis Committee based in Washington and a report66 by the 
Singaporean EPC (Economic Planning Committee) - Singapore ranked highly. It rated 
among the best in the world in67: 
- public safety (murders per thousand) 
- public health (infant mortality) 
- noise level 
- traffic flow 
- communications (telephones per thousand) 
- public transport. 
On the other hand, Singapore rated poorly by international standards in: 
- private transport (costs) 
- arts 
- recreation 
- total level of education (percentage with secondary education). 
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Altogether, Singapore was seen as having a high quality of life. Both studies showed 
fairly similar results. Housing and cars were perceived as less positive due to high 
costs. The government took this for granted in the land scarce island state, but the 
criticism on arts, recreation, mass media and education was taken to heart. In the 
nineties these areas were given more attention. Arts and recreation in particular were 
fiercely promoted by the government. The expenditure on education was increased. 
Only the freedom of expression by the mass media was still curtailed strongly in 
sensitive areas. In Singapore the press was not government owned, unlike the visual 
mass media. Nevertheless, newspapers could be published only by companies whose 
directors were citizens of Singapore. In these companies there were two classes of 
shares: management shares and ordinary shares. The former entitled the holders to two 
hundred votes each with regard to resolutions relating to the appointment or dismissal 
of a director or any member of the staff of the newspaper company. The newspapers 
were required to issue such management shares to any person who had been approved 
by the government to hold them. Consequently, the Singapore government could exert 
considerable influence in its dealings with Singapore Press Holdings which comprised 
all the English-language newspapers, all Chinese-language newspapers and two Malay-
language newspapers.68 Furthermore, there was an important working relationship 
between the public relations offices (PRO's) of ministries and local journalists. The 
latter depended on the PRO's for information and were therefore more open to co-
operate in playing down issues considered sensitive. 
There was no pre-censorship of the written press, but editors and journalists were 
regularly reminded of their responsibility to society. Articles or reports that were not 
to the liking of the government were often followed by a reminder to the editors. 
The foreign press, which formed the majority of publications, was harder to control. 
It would have been easiest for the Singapore government to ban their publications 
altogether, but it preferred allowing them in Singapore with the right to restrict 
circulation or to sue for libel in case their publications aroused displeasure with the 
authorities. There was no exhaustive list on what was not allowed to write, but during 
debates the following were mentioned: 
errors or distortions in reporting 
attempts to influence people's opinion that a particular ethnic group had been 
discriminated against 
casting doubt on the independence and integrity of the judiciary 
imposing ideas of freedom of press without understanding the nature of 
Singapore society. 
Singapore's stronghold on the press was most criticised by Americans. However, Rieger 
argued that Americans did not even grant their own government the right of rebuttal in 
a privately owned newspaper, however irresponsible its reporting seemed.69 Rieger 
showed that Singapore followed the European continental tradition where the right of 
rebuttal was accepted. However, Germany, for example, restricted this right to 
The Modernisation Process 153 
statements of fact, whereas statements of opinion were not allowed. In Singapore the 
government seemed to take the right to both, officially out of fear of religious and 
racial conflict. 
Environmental pollution in the small island-state was a concern to the government. On 
the one hand the growing wealth caused an enormous increase in cars which ranked 
Singapore second behind Australia in the Asia-Pacific in carbon dioxide emission in 
1993.70 On the other hand the government showed much effort in trying to make and 
keep Singapore a "clean and green" city. The PAP advocated a policy of limiting car 
driving by for example putting heavy taxes of up to 300 percent on imported cars. Tax-
rebates were introduced for weekend driving only. Simultaneously, public transport was 
made among the best in the world. In the small land area of Singapore one could easily 
live without a car. However, there was a discrepancy between the government and the 
people. Singaporeans who could afford it, gave priority to the status-symbol of the car 
over environmental concerns. 
There were several examples where technological advancements did not go hand in 
hand with socio-cultural development. For example, the China-town conservation 
project entailed a architectural facelift, but its social structure was destroyed. The old 
shophouses retained their old facade, but after renovation they became too expensive 
for the original inhabitants to afford. They had to move out and more upmarket retailers 
and restaurants rent the new shophouses. These people mostly did not live there and led 
a completely different lifestyle. A similar process as in Chinatown happened to the 
Kampong Melayu. This proposed conservation area of a Malay community in Geylang 
Serai also underwent a renovation whereby the Malay architecture was preserved, but 
the businesses changed. The visiting customers changed along, from the Malays to a 
variety of people, amongst which tourists. 
5.3.1. Transformation of the bang associations 
Lu described the effect of modernisation on the important Chinese bang associations. 
More than thousand types of Chinese associations were registered in Singapore after the 
first arrival of Chinese in the British trading port, founded mainly on principles of 
dialect, place of origin, kinship and trade. The associations had interlocking 
relationships and showed various overlapping, competitive and exclusive functions. 
British policies of divide et impera, colonial laissez-faire economy and a strong 
xenophobia in the different dialect groups, reinforced the segregated social structures 
in Singapore.71 
When Singapore became independent in 1965, these Chinese associations initially rose 
in number, despite the official policy of cultural pluralism and national consciousness. 
This increasing number of associations, however, did not necessarily indicate more 
division among the people, but could be purely business-related. The Chinese society 
in Singapore basically was a commercial society divided along the lines of bangs fa 
grouping, a gang). These dialect groupings not only formed trade associations, but also 
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fulfilled a wide range of politico-socio-economic and cultural functions. Their main 
concern was to create social commitment to the community. They provided social 
control, employment, mediation, religious worship, welfare services and education. 
Each bang had its own association building, school, hospital, cemetery, temple, 
occupational and spatial concentration72. However, the Chinese could join as many 
associations as they wished. The commercial profitability of the personal contacts - vital 
for business expansion in an Asian context - through participation in an association 
could have contributed to the growth of the number of associations. 
The social roles of the Chinese associations created a strong association-oriented 
personality among the Chinese in Singapore over the years. Being well-established and 
well-developed organisations, social status and prestige could be achieved by doing 
something of value to the bang. As contribution to the community invariably called for 
monetary donations, wealth had become a strong determinant in the advancement of 
one's social status within the association. Public image and prestige were enhanced by 
making generous donations which were widely applauded and publicised in the Chinese 
press. The Hokkien (dialect from Fujian province) bang was by far the most powerful 
in the economic field and thereby played a leading role in the Chinese community. 
Although the various associations provided an instant institutional base for rallying 
grassroots support, they nonetheless perpetuated the parochial orientation of each bang. 
However, the independence of Singapore brought great political, socio-cultural and 
economic changes. Expansion of integrated schools, bilingualism and the swing from 
Chinese to English education with more and more emphasis on vocational and technical 
training, discouraged the younger generation from associating themselves with bang 
associations. Many of the roles performed by the bangs were challenged or taken over 
by the CCs, CCCs and RCs. Young local-born Chinese generally did not feel the need 
to join bang associations which were associated with the elderly people.73 
The significance of the bangs decreased after Singapore became independent, due to 
three factors74. 
Firstly, after the end of the Second World War immigration from China practically 
came to a standstill. The proportion of local-bom Chinese Singaporeans gradually 
increased. Their affiliation with the home villages in China and therefore bang contacts 
was less than that of their parents. Members of different dialect groups entered the 
associations and inter-dialect marriages broke the exclusiveness. The younger generation 
encountered different values through English-medium education and associated bang 
associations with the older generation, from which they wanted to distinguish 
themselves. The leaders of the bangs mainly became successful businessmen with many 
other obligations. This way their commitment to their bang associations became less. 
Gradually, the role of the bangs grew ever the more limited. 
Secondly, the new economic development put different demands on the Singaporean 
population. Traditionally, dialect trade specialisation had been a result of "a process of 
involution, exclusion, competition, regression and succession."75 Most economic 
activities in Singapore took place in the family-community setting. Relationships were 
close and interdependency was great. In the many small family businesses one shared 
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hardship and had a lot of social interaction and personal contacts. People felt personally 
attached to their work and were therefore loyal to their employer or employee 
respectively. 
However, the new Singaporean development strategies introduced a completely different 
economic order. Chen described how, as modernisation in Singapore introduced 
industrialisation and urbanisation, the workplace and the home became segregated. The 
small-scale Chinese family businesses, located in traditional shophouses, were now 
moved to new industrial estates in the outskirts of Singapore or were resited in multi-
storey "commercial-cum-office-cum-residential" buildings, where they had to compete 
with department stores and supermarkets. People had to go to work in factories or 
shipping yards. The group spirit disappeared largely. Relationships became impersonal 
and based on the calculation of monetary remuneration. Loyalty gave way for an 
excessive job mobility of workers. A sense of alienation, frustration and insecurity grew 
and the outlook on life became more materialistic.76 
While in the seventies the traditional ideology of paternalism still prevented a great 
number of retrenchments, in the nineties the economy had essentially become a buyers-
market. Competitiveness ruled most relationships, including those between employer 
and employee. Family businesses now had to compete with government owned and 
controlled enterprises (GCEs)and multinational companies (MNCs). 
With more parents leaving the household to work elsewhere, the relationship between 
parents and children became less close and the generation gap widened. In combination 
with the massive urban resettlement programme of the government, which in itself 
provided the basic need of shelter for all, the existing family and community systems 
were disrupted. This modernisation narrowed the physical distance between the 
population, but at the same time widened the social distance. The great social 
interdependence, mutual assistance and the sense of sharing among neighbours in the 
kampong life decreased due to segregation. Moreover, the forced resettlement by the 
government made people from different backgrounds live next to each other, which 
demanded a lot of the social adjustment of Singaporeans.77 
Initially, clan associations continued to play many of the roles belonging to community 
life. Clan and provincial organisations were active in taking care of the halls, lands and 
graveyards related to ancestor worship, material assistance to clan members, education 
of young clansmen, punishment of misconduct and settlement of disputes, self-defense 
and providing subsidies or relief to the aged and the needy. 
Thirdly, the political factor played a decisive role. Bang-structures did not fit into the 
national policy of creating a common community spirit among Singaporeans. The socio-
geographical base of the bangs was thus uprooted by the government's urbanisation and 
public housing policies. The population was relocated into HDB-flats regardless of their 
previous type of kampong life structures. Because the HDB-flats could not cater for the 
existing social structures, the importance of the bangs gradually faded. Bang 
representatives in the colonial Chinese Advisory Board were replaced by members of 
parliament (MP's). Integrated schools were promoted, education in the English language 
became standard, the emphasis shifted from general, colonial education towards 
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vocational and technical training, and bilingualism gradually replaced dialects by 
Mandarin and English. The new grassroots institutions of the Community Centres 
(CCs), Citizens' Consultative Committees (CCCs) and Residents' Committees (RCs) 
were centred around mutual interests and cut across ethnic and dialect divisional lines. 
Volunteering in these institutions was highly honoured. Furthermore, the National 
Service (army, navy and airforce) united Singaporeans of different background. In fact, 
the PAP with its widespread institutional influence took over the role of the Chinese 
associations. In the new meritocratic Singaporean society bang associations became 
outdated. The PAP had become the prime determinant of change in Singapore.78 
5.3.2. Changes in the family as social institution 
While there was little doubt about the positive effects of the economic modernisation 
in Singapore, the socio-cultural effects were more dubious. 
To the positive consequences of modernisation were reckoned the better education, 
higher incomes, more travel opportunities, more leisure time and therefore gradually 
better recreation facilities, the emancipation from traditional ways of life, a stronger 
achievement-orientation, more materialistic outlook and more optimism. The National 
Family Planning and Population Programme was seen to have improved the quality of 
life within the nuclear family, the status of women, attitudes towards sex and 
childbearing and family mobility.79 
To the negative consequences of modernisation were reckoned certain Western values. 
Time and again, especially in the seventies, the government warned the Singaporean 
public against the "evils" (or "cultural and moral pollution") of "Western" social values. 
The family was called upon to preserve the traditional Eastern cultural values and bear 
the primary responsibility for socialising the children in the virtues of Singapore's 
"rugged" society. This way the family played an important intermediary role between 
the state and the individual in Singapore. It became an important instrument for the 
government to achieve its national economic goals.80 The family in Singapore was 
therefore not a passive recipient of the impact of economic and social development, but 
an active agent in shaping the socio-economic changes. 
Kuo and Wong conducted an urban kinship study of Singapore.81 They stated that 
much had been written in Western countries about the relationship between the 
modernisation process and changes in family structure. Singapore society, however, 
seemed to have followed its own pattern. However, the interaction of economic, 
socioculturel forces and pervasive social planning made any simple theorisation on 
family change in Singapore a very difficult task.82 
One of the deviations from general modernisation theories was that well before 
industrialisation began, the dominant form of the family in Singapore already was the 
nuclear two-generational family rather than the extended three-generational structure of 
the migrants' country of origin.83 Simply due to the non-availability of kin, the 
Singapore migrant society consisted of isolated nuclear families. Families were mainly 
formed after the Second World War since more women were available. When 
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Singaporeans started settling down with their families for one or two generations, a 
local kinship network was built. There was little necessity to live under one roof due 
to the close proximity in the small city-state. 
However, due to the impossibility until 1992 to obtain a Housing Development Board-
flat as a single person, most young Singaporeans lived with their parents until they got 
married and long thereafter. They started their working careers from the family (or in-
law's) home, by whom they were taken care of and supported. Many enjoyed a secure, 
safe and relatively comfortable life, which was reflected in a general satisfaction with 
one's life.84 The majority maintained close contact with a tightly-knit circle of 
relatives, involving mostly the parents and married offspring, followed by siblings and 
in-laws. Most contacted their relatives regularly for recreational and social purposes. 
These activities mostly involved dining at the parental home or eating out and going to 
the cinema together. There was little variation in these habits between the social classes, 
as assumed in many conventional studies. The lack of difference in kinship orientation 
or involvement between respondents from the English-medium educational stream and 
the Chinese educational stream, raised the question what the relationship was between 
modernisation and kinship. Although it was widely assumed that the English-educated 
represented the "Westernised" or "modern" sector of the population, while the Chinese-
educated represented the "traditional" sector, in terms of both value-orientations and 
behaviour, there was no difference between these two groups in kinship interaction. 
Benjamin suggested that no matter what medium of education, certain basic cultural 
values and practices were shared by all Chinese.85 Asian cultures showed a strong 
kinship orientation. Wong and Kuo, on the other hand, suggested that this kinship 
pattern represented the later stages of societal modernisation. They called the Singapore 
society "sufficiently" modern or developed, so that any preceding cultural differences 
between different subpopulations were "levelled off".86 
The Malays were the only community which lived a traditional life style in their rural 
communities. Therefore modernisation in Singapore had the most impact on them. The 
extended family system, in which several generations of children, parents, grandparents 
and other relatives lived together as one family, was disintegrated. 
In the early seventies, Chen called attention to the various repercussions which the 
(increased) nuclearisation of the society carried87. Families became less cohesive, more 
elderly people were left to themselves, divorce rates and juvenile delinquency increased. 
Family stability was a major imperative in Singapore. Tham stated that this was vital 
in an industrial-technological milieu. It was the means considered to be most efficacious 
towards resolving social and psychological problems facing an individual in an urban-
industrial environment.88 This would be even more the case in a continuously fast 
changing environment such as in Singapore. 
Less cohesive families meant a decrease in influence of family members on the 
upbringing of the children. This was deemed to be very important, as Asian societies 
traditionally attributed a more important educational role to parents than Western 
societies. According to Wee89, parents had five intellectual tasks in raising their 
children: 
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" 1) clarification of goals 
2) description of trends 
3) analysis of conditions 
4) projection of future developments 
5) invention, evaluation and selection of alternatives." 
On top of these tasks, she recommended an "unshakable equality of temperament, 
eternal optimism and a modicum of sheer good luck" for a modem parent to survive. 
Traditionally, children used to be closely monitored while they were growing up. This 
parental role was decreasing in the modernising society. However, in a paternalistic 
society such as Singapore this guiding role was partially taken over by the government 
and the formal school education. However, children were also more exposed to other 
extra-familial influences such as peer groups, television and other mass media. 
Another downside of the successful nuclearisation of families in Singapore, was the 
problem of the ageing population, such as in earlier developed countries. Nuclear 
families had become increasingly isolated from their kinship network. Therefore 
solutions in the form of retired people's communities and nursing homes were wrought 
out. Wong argued that assumptions that old people would prefer such kinds of 
arrangements to becoming burdens on their own families, were ill-founded. It did 
certainly not apply to Asian cultures with their traditional respect for the aged, emphasis 
on filial piety and strong kinship ties. Wong acknowledged that "much of these 
traditional values have changed, of course, on account of rapid urbanisation and 
industrialisation. However, what remains of the cultural values makes for some 
significant differences in societal arrangements for taking care of the old people. " ю 
In Singapore the family remained the predominant and preferred living arrangement for 
the old people. The family still was the major support system for the aged in the 
nineties. The government not only built institutions for care of the elderly citizens to 
a great extent, but it also compensated individual families for taking care of elderly 
parents in the same household by income tax reliefs and tax allowances. 
The most serious social problems with aged people concerned the group of foreign-born 
immigrants without any family in Singapore. In 1970, more than eighty percent of the 
population of over 60 years of age was foreign-born. The ones who remained single or 
the ones who were widowed without children had no one to look after them in old age. 
However, this group was gradually dying out. 
A future problem related to the ageing population was the decreasing proportion of the 
population that would be economically productive. While the young dependency ratio 
in the form of education and allowances declined, the old dependency ratio was 
increasing. 
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Figure 5.4. Number of working persons supporting an aged person in Singapore. 
Source: The Next Lap, Government of Singapore, 1990, p. 22. 
In a Survey on Family Life conducted by the Ministry of Community Development in 
April 1987, family values, family life and husband/wife role division in Singapore were 
studied.91 The results showed that tradition still seemed to be entrenched among 
Singaporeans. Of the respondents 68 percent wanted to have children "to carry on the 
family line"; 59 percent wanted to have children "to look after me in my old age"; 59 
percent just wanted "to please the elders." The majority wanted to have children "to 
make a complete family".92 Although the one or two child family was the norm (59 
percent), this did not mean the ultimate desire of family size among the parents 
surveyed. Half of the respondents (51 percent, especially the older generation) preferred 
the 3-tier extended family; the other half (48 percent) the nuclear family.93 
Nearly half of the respondents (46 percent) felt that "care and concern for one another" 
contributed most to a happy family. More than half (55 percent) mentioned busy 
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working parents as a factor preventing family members from doing things together. 
Family activities were: 
celebrating festive occasions together 92 percent 
(perceived as most pleasant family activity) 
Eating at home 87 
watching tv and video together 79 
celebrating other special occasions 
(e.g. birthdays, etc.) 77 
of outdoors activities "shopping" 
was done the most 58 
Singaporeans had the following problems in bringing up children: 
discipline 38 percent 
difficult to cope with school pressures 34 
motivating children to study 32 
physical care 18 
mixing with undesirable friends 18 
teaching moral/religious values 16 
When facing problems with their children, parents claimed that they would*4 
talk or reason with their children 90 percent 
discuss with spouse 80 
warn or threaten their children 57 
punish them 44 
read books/magazines on child upbringing 42 
ask religious help 35 
ask friends/colleagues for help 34 
ask relatives for help 27 
seek professional help 26 
keep problems to themselves 16 
More than half of the parents (58 percent) was very satisfied with the communication 
at home with their spouse. In general, male respondents were more likely to be very 
satisfied than female respondents.95 
The traditional roles of wife and husband were still prevalent in Singapore, especially 
concerning household duties. In contrast to these household duties, husbands and wives 
were more likely to share in child care responsibilities: 66 percent took their children 
out together, 51 percent shared the disciplining of their children and 45 percent shared 
in caring of their sick children.96 However, the interpretation of this sharing in 
Singapore differed from that in modern Western countries. For example, on "father's 
day" the SBC-news showed a special on fathers in Singapore who "combined work with 
home".97 Unlike a Westerner would expect, the two selected cases showed fathers who 
could be proud of their work and "also managed to spend an hour or two on Sunday 
afternoon" to play or check homework with their children. 
Chee pointed out that the transformation of the Singapore society brought along 
The Modernisation Process 161 
differences between values and practices.98 Diligence, thrift, respect and care for 
elders and tolerance, for example, were values often associated with Confucianism. In 
response to alterations in socio-economic, educational and language factors, however, 
the practices associated with these values changed. However, changes in practices may 
not always reflect a corresponding change in values and vice versa. As an example 
Chee mentioned that he grew up addressing his relatives in terms that reflected gender 
and seniority: the maternal uncles were called Tua Koo, Ji Koo and so on (tua meant 
"big" or "first bom",./'/ "second born") and the paternal uncles Tua Peh, Ji Peh, etc. 
In the English language, however, there were no corresponding terms for these titles. 
Thus, when the younger generation Singaporeans grew up speaking English, they 
displayed the tendency to address their relatives simply as "Uncle George" or "Auntie 
Siew". This was obviously a change in practice. However, Chee argued that this did 
not mean that the younger generation respected their elders less because of this. 
Moreover, the change in practice was not due to the "decadent" influence of the West, 
but rather due to a difference in lingual terms. The difference of firm versus permissive 
parenting did not fall neatly into Asian and Western categories of parenting styles." 
5.3.3. Socio-psychologiccd effects 
Hofstede and Bond found strong indications that the higher a country's economy was 
developed, the more individualistic its population became.100 This process partly took 
place in Singapore. In the seventies Chen noted that the role of the individual became 
more specific and less complicated in the sense of family-relations. Individuals gained 
more freedom, independence and self-orientation. The number of elderly who had 
children and lived with them, declined from 82 percent in the seventies to about 75 
percent in the early eighties. The number of children who were prepared to take care 
of their parents in old age seemed to decrease.101 
This tendency was perceived by the government as symptomatic for a general decline 
in traditional Chinese values. Chen explained how important family traditionally was 
to the Chinese: 
"Filial piety and respect for the elders are well imbued in the Chinese culture. 
To live together with one's children, grandchildren and greatgrandchildren is 
always considered the basic quality of life. The Chinese cultural values of filial 
piety and respect for elders have a role to play in the dignity of human beings 
in the modem world. Mr. Lim Kin San, Minister for National Development, 
said: 'The aged have in their time contributed to society. We are the 
beneficiaries of their service, sacrifice and suffering and now it is their tum to 
receive help and kindness.' This reflects the true meaning of human being.102" 
The government hoped that the traditional values of filial responsibility of care for the 
aged and the encouragement of familistic self-sufficiency would compensate for the lack 
of a welfare state. It thereby speculated on the fact that the family, perceived as one of 
the more "autonomous" social institutions (along with culture and religion), changed at 
a much slower rate than the economic institutions.103 The PAP did, however, 
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introduce tax relief for households in which parents were taken care of and tax relief 
for those children who contributed to their parents' CPF accounts. Nevertheless, Kuo 
and Wong noted that this social engineering design fell short of providing sufficiënt 
facilities for childcare and the aged. 
In the seventies Chen foresaw a growing orientation towards European friendship 
patterns, which were more centred around the individual. In the traditional Chinese 
culture friendships were more situation-centred, i.e. friends as part of the family, not 
only for spiritual support, but also for material support. The material support would be 
lost in a westernisation process. Chen saw friendship as "an important part of the 
meaning of life, even to the life of the modern man" and was sincerely concerned this 
would diminish.104 Lasch thought that in the modern Western world a "therapy-
culture" was replacing rugged individualism and religion. He stated that therapists did 
not see why they should encourage their clients to subordinate their needs and interests 
to those of others, to someone or some cause or tradition outside himself. This 
inclination was opposite to the traditional Chinese values and the prospect of the 
replacement of friends by such therapists gave rise to grave concern in Singapore.105 
Another consequence of modernisation was the change in love and courtship patterns. 
Traditionally love was viewed as a threat to the lineage and stratification of the society 
and therefore had to be controlled. However, as the social structures in the society 
developed, Yeh observed a change in these patterns.106 
"For the Chinese in Singapore, we see a certain, though however gradual, shift 
towards higher institutionalisation of love. The consequences of this are seen in 
the changing of control patterns from direct to indirect, from formal to informal, 
and from child marriage, segregation of the sexes and completely arranged 
marriages to supervised and unsupervised courtship patterns." 
Yeh107 noted an incongruence in this transition in cultural emphasis from "familism" 
to individualism. In the initial stages of modernisation there was an incomplete 
socialisation of love and courtship patterns, resulting in the intemalisation of love 
ideologies by many young people who did not have the institutionalised means to fulfil 
such aspirations. The opportunities for premarital interaction were highest for men from 
the higher socio-economic classes who were English-educated. As the majority of 
Singaporeans was still less educated, from a lower class-background and mostly 
tradition-bound at the end of the sixties, courtship patterns tended to converge towards 
the middle. In between the extremes of a "blind" marriage and free choice, they had 
an arranged marriage with their consent or a self-arranged marriage with parental 
consent. 
In Kau and Yang's study of Singaporean values in the early nineties108, Singaporeans 
showed general satisfaction with the fulfilment of their emotional needs. However, they 
showed discontent in the area of love and romance and were least satisfied with their 
sexual life. Despite the rapid rise in standard of living and the pace of social change, 
morals in the personal field remained rather conservative in contrast to the 
contemporary Wirtschaftsethik, business practices and public life. The incongruity 
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experienced by Singaporean adolescents between the open Western approach to love, 
courtship and marriage conveyed by the mass media and their real, more conservative 
environment, caused more disappointment in life in the romantic realm. This was one 
of the symptoms of friction between the technological and socio-cultural development. 
Once married, young newly-wed couples preferred to start their own families. 
However, a survey in the early nineties showed that most respondents still spent their 
weekends with their parents.109 Younger Singaporeans were keeping up the family 
tradition, although they chose to live in their own flats in more comfortable 
circumstances. 
Due to higher expectations in the modernising society of Singapore the pressure on 
individuals rose. Wong and Leong felt that "in our race to modernise and our quest for 
ever higher standards of living, we are beginning to experience the same stresses and 
strains as people in developed industrial societies."110 Individuals were perceived to 
accumulate more mental and emotional disturbances and distress from the rat race in 
the competitive world of their social and working environment, more ulcers and 
strokes, more frustrations engendered by increased uncertainties and insecurities, a 
sense of alienation and social isolation. In the seventies Chen called for new institutional 
arrangements and an important role of the government in preventing Singaporeans from 
becoming a "nervous wreck, a social deviant, an urban stranger or a social 
dropout."111 
In the early nineties, when modern Singaporeans were characterised by individualism, 
materialism, achievement orientation, to some extent impersonality and a receptiveness 
to change112, an estimated twenty percent of the population was suffering from 
psychological problems.113 The national image of a disciplined, progressive, rugged 
and multi-racial tolerant society had "softened". Goh Keng S wee observed drug 
addiction, "loose living", loss of ambition and withdrawal from society. In his view this 
represented a complete reversal of the ethical values on which the West built its 
industrial base. He therefore thought it the government's concern to see that the 
"mindless young in our country are not misled to imitate such aberrations of 
conduct."114 
Singh concluded that after more than thirty years of growth and progress Singapore 
seemed to be experiencing the "fallouts of success - physical and psychological 
dislocations, poverty in affluence and increasing alienation".113 Singaporeans became 
inclined towards complacency and conspicuous consumption. 
The 1991 survey by Kau and Yang showed that for the majority of Singaporeans social 
changes occurred too rapidly. In Singapore 77.7 percent of the Malays felt their society 
was changing too fast, 69.6 percent of the Indians and 49.5 percent of the Chinese.116 
The need for societal change was accordingly low. The fact that the Chinese expressed 
the highest satisfaction with the pace of change could be due to the fact that the Chinese 
predominantly dictated that pace. 
Already in the seventies, Chen observed that modernisation could "bring out changes 
which may be good for society as a whole, but which may also be deleterious to the 
individual who finds it difficult to adjust himself to the ever-changing physical and 
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socio-economic conditions in Singapore today."117 The perfectionist values imbued by 
the government made life in Singapore rather distressful. Lu expressed a related 
concern: "Although we have made tremendous progress in many fields during our time, 
unfortunately the general quality of our human relations does not seem to benefit much 
from all our efforts towards modernisation".11' 
The younger generation had been brought up with a national identity shaped by 
Singapore's rapid economic growth. Based on attitudes already present in the majority 
of the population, Singaporean values and norms were shaped towards an identity 
beneficial to that economic growth. Lee's statement "From each his economic best, and 
to each his economic worth" was more or less accepted as a national motto for 
Singaporeans.119 This contributed to a money-minded attitude in Singapore. No one 
questioned the need for economic growth. The criteria by which Singaporeans evaluated 
themselves and others in society were 
"1) wealth and income 
2) education фу all social classes considered as important means 
to upward social mobility and success in life) 
3) occupation 
4) status in society"120 
Singapore's higher stages of development raised the question if so-called higher needs 
would become important. One of the few Western human scientists regularly referred 
to in Singapore was Abraham Maslow. His human potential theories, based on the 
notion that people are basically good or neutral rather than evil121, did not conflict 
with Confucianism. Maslow distinguished between lower order physiological needs such 
as hunger, thirst and sleep and higher order psychological needs such as self-esteem, 
affection and sense of belonging. The theory was that once basic physiological needs 
would have been fulfilled, one would strive for more non-material, psychological needs. 
According to Maslow's theory, higher needs would become more important to 
Singaporeans after their "lower needs" had been fulfilled. However, Chee wrote in 
1994 that Singaporeans were generally in the stage of "character and esteem needs". He 
stated that: "Most Singaporeans would agree that we have not yet reached the higher 
stages where our needs for intellectual prowess, flair, and creativity have become 
important."122 
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Figure 5.5. Pyramid of needs based on data from Abraham Maslow.' 
Rieger showed concern about the more non-material and spiritual aspects of the quality 
of life in Singapore, acknowledging that "there is no such thing as culture on an empty 
stomach."124 Although Singapore offered virtually all the material and non-material 
necessities of existence125, Rieger wondered about the cultural element in Singapore's 
quality of life. For example, he doubted whether some of the Cultural activities were 
more related to tourist promotion or to authentic cultural expression. Rieger remarked 
that the government sometimes seemed to want to "create" culture by decree. According 
to him, this formed an encroachment on self-fulfilment and thus on the quality of life. 
He thought that the development of different life-styles due to modernisation was an 
expression not only of different preferences with regard to the style of living, but also 
of a need to create alternative spheres for participation, competition and self-expression. 
Singapore was potentially rich in this respect because of the many cultural variants 
available, but poor in other respects. E.g. due to the necessary physical standardisation 
of housing and due to the psychological standardisation of behaviourial responses in 
order to maintain the total social fabric.126 
Rieger thought that the Singapore government paid insufficient attention to the quality 
of economic growth as opposed to statistically measurable economic growth per se.127 
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He argued that this was understandable from a position of necessary economic survival, 
but entering the stage of a developed country, pitfalls in other areas than the purely 
economic ones also had to be expected. To proceed in the development process beyond 
mere material growth, the Singapore government aimed at gearing its intellectual and 
creative potential towards an innovative, modern, cosmopolitan society. In general, in 
Singapore the concept of "quality" was mainly used in relation to material aspects of 
life. The Singaporean man-in-the-street generally seemed less involved with these 
concerns. When asked about their quality of life, they showed no interest. Someone 
interviewed, replied: "We are rather interested in commercial and economic progress 
than human topics. We have been brought up to think that way and that's what our 
whole society is like."128 
5.3.4. The impact of modernisation on women 
In Singapore women's status in society had risen tremendously compared to the 
situation before independence. In 1961 the Singapore government accepted as the first 
country in Asia a Women's Charter to grant women equal status and opportunities in 
the society. Polygamous marriages under Chinese custom were outlawed by this 
Charter. The PAP government wanted to bring order and uniformity in the chaos of 
different marriages in the different ethnic communities, according to their own cultural-
religious traditions.129 
Wong and Leong, commissioned by the Women's Wing of the PAP, assembled 
descriptions of the many changes in the lives of Singapore women since then.130 
There were steady improvements for women in areas of demography and health and 
educational, employment and career opportunities for women increased. Low, Toh, 
Quah and Lee131 noted, however, that these changes happened in the process of 
economic development, not due to sensitivity or to preoccupation with gender issues. 
Since independence, a fundamental change had taken place in the economic activities 
of women in Singapore, with corresponding transformation of their roles in the family. 
In fact, women at all times played an active part in the economic life of Singaporean 
society, either in producing or gathering agricultural products or making handicraft 
items for trade. In the past, however, the dual role of women, running a family and 
doing productive work on behalf of the national economy, was fused into one way of 
life - work at home. However, with the thrust of industrialisation the centre of the 
productive process shifted from the home to the factory. The positive consequences for 
women of working outside the home were that they could make more decisions 
concerning themselves, shared more control over activities previously dominated by 
men, and made more joint decisions with their husbands over important household 
matters. Thus work outside the home led to more equal roles in the family.132 Family 
planning in Singapore not only controlled the population growth, but also raised the 
status of women. The families which practised family planning showed a higher degree 
of joint decision-making as well as a higher degree of husband-wife 
communication.133 However, societal prejudice against married women (especially 
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those with young children) seeking employment persisted for a long time. Nevertheless, 
family planning made a great impact on the female labour force participation and 
alongside attitudes towards their familial and societal roles gradually changed. 
A study in Singapore among daughters of working mothers showed a few positive 
effects, contrary to the traditional stereotype. These daughters were less traditional in 
their sex-role definition. Girls from a higher social class background working mothers 
were associated with a higher achievement motivation and a higher academic 
performance. However, these daughters also showed less affection for their mothers 
than those of non-working mothers. Boey, however, concluded positively in the sense 
that maternal employment helped to liberalise the daughter from the traditional female 
role definition.134 However, the segregation of work and home also brought along 
occupational conflicts for women. In general, full-time employment, added to child care 
and housekeeping responsibilities, resulted in too much a burden for the mother.135 
The Singapore government had not developed an adequate or state-wide system of child 
care. Furthermore, Singaporean women were confronted with conflicting demands: their 
educational level and the labour shortage situation in Singapore demanded their 
contribution to the labour force, while the government's political ideas and 
interpretation of the demographic trends demanded them to have more children and take 
care of their elder relatives. The resistance of the government against a welfare state 
in combination with a longer life expectancy also faced the women with the problem 
of who was to take care of them in their old age. 
Although Singaporean women enjoyed quantitative improvements such as better 
economic opportunities, the quality of their lives was not necessarily improved. The 
risen economic status of the women was related to later marriage, fewer children and 
increased marital breakdown. In Singapore the trend was towards later marriage. As the 
educational level of the population rose, especially that of the female population, the 
average age at first marriage of the population increased. The proportion of Muslim 
Malay marriages decreased and the proportion of Chinese marriages increased relative 
to all marriages.136 Ethnic group, education and religion were not sufficient in 
explaining these transformations. Chang suggested that the economic and employment 
situation was also of influence. However, as he attributed the trend of marriage at a 
later age in the seventies to the rising unemployment of the sixties, the economic 
development in Singapore later on reversed the employment situation while the trend 
continued. The opposite could therefore be said to be just as much true. As women got 
better opportunities to pursue their own careers, they settled down for marriage at a 
later stage in life. 
Numerous studies showed that industrialisation and urbanisation were associated with 
increases in divorce rates in most countries. Interestingly enough, although similar 
processes of social and economic change were experienced in Singapore, it showed 
differential patterns of divorce according to ethnic group. Although non-Muslim divorce 
rates increased in Singapore, the Muslim divorce rates showed a sharp decline. Tai 
pointed out that cultural elements played a crucial role.137 In most European and 
American studies, there was an inverse relation between occupational status and 
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proneness to divorce. In Singapore, there was a positive correlation instead. Therefore, 
Tai warned against overgeneralisation regarding divorce rates, as social norms, cultural 
values and legal rules and procedures were involved in the various divorce patterns.13" 
Despite the progressive development in Singapore, equality of the sexes remained an 
ideal such as in other modern countries, according to Wong. At the tertiary education 
level the men still outnumbered the women and more young, single, educated women 
than men were unemployed. While there was hardly any formal barrier against women's 
entry into all kinds of occupations, "certain forms of unofficial, overt, and covert 
discrimination against women still persist in our society now."139 
In daily life the perception and attitudes towards women were not so easily changed. 
Traditional values concerning women were hard to uproot. In the context of an Asian 
society such as Singapore the preponderance given to sons over daughters in the family 
was well known.140 Sons were preferred over daughters and sons were more likely 
than daughters to be expected to contribute to the financial support of the family. '41 
Certain gynaecologists in Singapore congratulated new parents with their son after they 
had a baby-boy, but said: "I am sorry, you have a daughter" if they delivered a baby-
girl.142 
Singapore never knew a radical feminist movement. The demands of Singaporean 
women were different from those in the West. The whole Singaporean society was 
much more embedded in tradition. The most important issues for women in Singapore 
were equal opportunities for education and jobs and equal pay. 
Childcare facilities at community centres and family members took care of the children. 
Often the mothers or mothers-in-law did the cooking and the household, so the younger 
women could pursue a career. A woman's job was rather referred to, however, as an 
opportunity for an extra income in the household than as use of the woman's talents. 
Women who worked for personal fulfilment reasons were still in the minority.143 It 
was common for the middle and upper classes to take an amah, a foreign live-in "maid" 
(household help and child-caretaker). These amahs were foreign (mostly Filippino, also 
Sri Lankan or Malay) because Singaporean women felt above that level of work. 
An often heard complaint from Singaporean women was that the Singaporean men could 
not keep up with these societal changes. Singaporean men became confused about their 
roles. In a local television talkshow144 the focus was on the confusion of Singaporean 
men regarding the expectations of the women in Singapore. The female speaker 
(journalist and mother) reflected a general view among younger Singaporean women 
that they should be able to expect more contribution of their husbands in the household, 
but that it was natural to have certain gender-specific roles. A local male family-
therapist pointed at the aspect of socialisation. 
It seemed that the socio-cultural transformation of Singaporean women went faster than 
for men. The fact that the higher educated Singaporean women married later and less 
than lower educated women, seemed to have more to do with the problems surrounding 
the finding of a spouse who accepted a high(er) educated wife than with the conscious 
choice for a career or independency. 
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In an international symposium on Confucianism and modernisation in East Asia 
a Singaporean male scholar, Kuo, brought up the question of the status of women in the 
modern society. He attacked the position of women in Japan: "I have heard stories of 
women in Japan rebelling; I have also heard of their suffering. There must be some cost 
- social cost from the point of view of those who are suffering or the loss to society of 
the talent and contributions of 50 percent of the population."145 
5.4 Singapore's political modernisation 
Most modern, Western countries have a rational, secular state with a democratic 
election system and emphasise the interests and progress of the individual. Singapore 
was also a rational, secular state, but did not profess to the latter two characteristics in 
the Western sense. Democracy and human rights were issues of debate between Western 
and Asian countries, in particular Singapore. 
Despite all changes in Singapore in terms of modernisation, the one-party dominance 
and the way the PAP operated remained strikingly constant. Since Goh took over from 
Lee, the PAP was still standing strong, amongst others due to the continued presence 
of Lee as Senior Minister and his consulting function to the cabinet, as well as due to 
the continued economic growth. 
Critics had severe doubts about this continued political structure. Schluchter146 stated 
that the Western liberal imperative had it that there is no government that is good 
enough: 
"A government that lasts for twenty-five years is something which is not healthy 
in the Western context. It is a very Western idea but if you have this kind of 
economic development, westernisation as you have in Singapore, I wonder 
whether you can fare easily in the long run with the idea that there can be a 
really good government." 
The situation in Asia was quite different. Chan pointed out that Asian democracies, 
unlike Western democracies, possessed the following four characteristics: 
" 1. A communitarian sense which teaches that the individual is important as 
part of a group or society rather than the notion that the individual is the 
centrepiece of democracy and society; 
2. A greater acceptance of and respect for authority and hierarchy whether 
it is India, China, Japan or the countries of Southeast Asia; 
3. The dominant party can remain in power for two or three decades or 
more as long as they continue to perform effectively as the ruling party; 
4. Nearly all the Asian democracies have a centralized bureaucracy and a 
strong state."147 
Of the East Asian NICs, in the early nineties Singapore had procedures closest to 
Western democracies, but a strong, determined leadership was unwilling to put its fate 
entirely in the hands of democratic elective procedures.148 
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Koh made clear that these differences from the Western political systems could be 
traced back to cultural roots.149 He referred to a report by Hitchcock in 1994 about 
similarities and differences between Americans and Asians on personal and societal 
values. Hitchcock had found a high degree of congruence in values between Northeast 
and Southeast Asians. On personal values, they agreed on the importance of hard work, 
respect for learning, honesty, self-reliance, self-discipline and the fulfilment of 
obligations. On societal values, the Asians agreed on the importance of an orderly 
society, harmony, respect for authority, official accountability and consensus. Both 
Asians and Americans listed self-reliance and hard work among the top five most 
important personal values. However, the difference regarding personal values lay in the 
emphasis on respect for learning, honesty and self-discipline by the Asians and in the 
emphasis on achieving success in life, personal achievement and helping others by the 
Americans. Regarding societal values, Asians and Americans agreed on the importance 
of accountability of public officials and freedom of expression. However, they differed 
significantly on the importance attached to three issues150: 
" a) orderly society 
(71 per cent of the Asians versus 11 per cent of the Americans) 
b) personal freedom 
(82 per cent of the Americans versus 32 per cent of the Asians) 
c) individual rights 
(78 per cent of the Americans versus 29 per cent of the Asians)" 
According to Koh, given these differences, it was not surprising that East Asia and the 
United States did not hold identical views on the issues of democracy and human rights. 
He quoted Harries in saying that "Western liberals in general tend to work on the 
maxim that 'one size fits all'" and "no country has the capacity to impose democracy 
on another. Democracy is essentially a do-it-yourself enterprise not an export 
commodity or a gift to bestow."151 Chan pointed at the double standard used by the 
West by arguing that "curiously, when we discuss Asian art, literature and architecture, 
we readily look for and appreciate the difference between the West and non-Western 
countries. However, when we come to examine political institutions and political 
development, there is an expectation of parallel developments as well as end 
products."152 Koh observed that issues of freedom and democracy were like a belief 
to Americans in particular, which obstructed the way to real dialogue. He pleaded for 
mutual respect and mutual learning. Backed up by their rapid economic growth, East 
Asians did not accept their subordinate position of the colonial times any longer. Prior 
to the 1993 United Nations Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, the Asian 
governments held their regional meeting in Bangkok. They came to a common stand in 
the Bangkok Declaration. Most agreed that "there is only one set of fundamental human 
rights for whatever part of the world" (condemnation of genocide, murder, torture and 
slavery), but it was only natural that the implementation of those rights should "vary 
because of differences in socio-economic, historical and cultural backgrounds".153 The 
Asian governments asked "the West to acknowledge their right to find their own path 
to Nirvana".154 
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In Singapore, the tension between economic and political modernisation was an issue 
in the nineties. Rieger observed that there were several distinct positions to be 
distinguished in the debate about democracy in Singapore135: 
1. Singapore is a democracy 
2. Singapore is still on the way to becoming a democracy 
3. Singapore is a different kind of democracy, that is, an Asian democracy 
4. Singapore never intended to become a full-fledged democracy.15* 
ad 1. Lee Hsien Loong stated at the Fortieth World Congress of Newspaper Publishers 
in Helsinki in 1987: 
"Singapore is a democracy. We have elections. Whoever wants to form the 
government must win the majority of the seats in parliament and whoever wants 
to be Prime Minister must command the majority of members of parliament in 
his party - no matter who he is, and no matter who his father is."157 
ad 2. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, however, said on the occasion of Singapore's 
twenty fifth anniversary in 1984: 
"If we had got our priorities wrong, if we had placed emphasis on democratic 
forms instead of economic substance, we would never have reached this present 
stage of our development. Because we had our priorities right, we now have a 
fair measure of both economic substance and democratic forms."158 
The point made here was that consequently it would be incorrect to measure 
Singapore's political development against the standards of a mature democracy. 
ad 3. Democratic standards in the West had their roots in Western cultures and would 
therefore never develop in the same way in Asia. S. Rajaratnam, former Senior 
Minister in the Prime Minister's office, told listeners at the National University of 
Singapore: "We must devise a democracy to suit our needs, not to pick up dying 
corpses from elsewhere."15' Similarly, when explaining the special situation of 
Singapore to the Singapore Press Club and to foreign correspondents, Yeo Ning Hong, 
then Minister for Communications and Information, made clear that Singapore rejected 
the notion that it had to accept all Western democratic ways: 
"We are an Asian society with Asian values. Confucianism provides the bedrock 
of our value system. Our values embody filial piety and concern for family, 
community and nation. We are more concerned with respecting our elders and 
those in positions of authority. In turn our elders and those in authority have a 
moral obligation to their charges, to fulfil their responsibilities to us and to be 
concerned over our welfare. It is a relationship of interdependence and mutual 
obligation, different from the Western concept of every man for himself."160 
ad 4. In 1987 local journalist Seah Chiang Nee made clear how purely pragmatic 
Singaporeans were, also in political ideology: 
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"So what is Singapore's ideology today? To begin with, it allows for Western-
type general elections to choose the government. It is non-communist; it is 
capitalist, it is generally Western-orientated. But these make up a facade that 
hides Singapore's mainstay ideology: the picking up for adaptation, in pieces 
or in whole, of those policies that have proved successful in other societies 
under similar circumstances as Singapore's."161 
Lee Kuan Yew and his generation of leaders had the primary task of meeting the basic 
needs and problems of Singaporeans. The fulfilment of these basic needs of food, 
adequate housing, education and employment was successfully accomplished. In 
addition to peace and stability, these accomplishments formed the major fundamentals 
of the first generation's legitimacy. In contrast, Goh and his second generation of PAP 
leaders had the task of meeting the needs of a generation of Singaporeans that had 
grown accustomed to the satisfaction of these basic needs. Their challenge was how to 
meet the higher needs and aspirations which were not only tangible but also intangible, 
such as political self-esteem. The PAP was looking for approaches and strategies that 
were suitable for Singaporeans who belong to the "stomach-full-money-in-the-pocket-
full-employment" generation. To be relevant and responsive to the modem political 
situation the PAP had to adapt itself to meet these Singaporean voters' needs.162 
Even when the Singapore political culture evolved and the younger Chinese 
Singaporeans learned to understand politics in a different way than their parents did, 
the PAP had always discouraged contention and a bargaining ethos. A petitionary 
approach was nurtured as the way to communicate with the paternalistic political 
authorities.163 The changing needs, brought about by modernisation and economic 
development, were perceived by the PAP as luxury problems in fact caused more by 
Singapore's development success than by failure, but nevertheless as needs to be 
reckoned with. Diversity of opinions was bound to happen when people became more 
educated and were capable of thinking independently. The better English-educated in 
particular and most widely informed part of the population demanded higher 
participation in the government. The modem political order was faced with reconciling 
the demands for "démocratisation". By gradually opening channels of public debate the 
Goh government tried to contain a revolutionary process, but as the government 
remained very cautious in letting go of the strings disappointment started to grow. 
However, in general Singaporeans were still too busy increasing their personal wealth 
to speak of any public unrest. 
Some suggested that the Confucian political ideology operating in the NICs and Japan 
during their recent economic development, might have been dependent on the goods 
that were delivered. According to Hamilton and Kao, "in modem East Asia Western 
ideas, both scientific and cultural, are as important, if not more important than 
Confucian values in shaping what is happening in East Asia."164 MacFarquhar 
suggested that if the economic growth would slow down, which was bound to happen 
in a matured state of economic development, the population might not accept an 
"authoritarian" government any more. "When things get rough, people will start to 
have differences of opinion. That is when ... you need to have political options."165 
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When they started their industrialisation process, the Western developed countries did 
not have the same democratic system as they have today. It took decades to gradually 
introduce voting rights for all segments of the population. In the present Western 
consultative democracies the population consists of many highly educated. In the 
nineties Singapore was regarded as an "adolescent" in this respect. It could thus not be 
treated as a small child any longer. Chua stated: 
"... when the children start being recalcitrant, the paternalism may tum into 
naked authoritarianism. But I think as long as we maintain the democratic 
institution of election, the checks are there. As long as there is election, the 
government will have to respond to the people's sentiments. It will be a mistake 
to think this government acts unilaterally without consultation with the people. 
I think it is true that they do listen to the grassroots very closely and that they 
do respond very closely."16* 
In the discussion about more democracy the Maslowian hypothesis was coined.167 
Now that Singaporeans had fulfilled their basic needs of food and shelter, they could 
be searching for the gratification of higher self-actualisation needs which were more 
political and psychological rather than material in nature. Singapore's political culture 
was changing from political convergence to growing divergence. Greater political 
participation and involvement were demanded in the form of being consulted by the 
government before key decisions affecting the population were made. 
When Goh Chok Tong was installed as new Prime Minister in November 1990, the 
population at large was looking forward to his self-pledged consultative and 
participative style of government. Although it was clear that Goh and his government 
tended to think and act like Lee, Goh had also introduced some bold changes in the 
Singapore political scene. He was the one who since 1984 launched the National 
Agenda for Action, established the Feedback Unit for the people, created the 
Government Parliamentary Committees (GPCs), the Advisory Councils on various 
social issues, the Institute of Policy Studies as a forum for educated debate, resorted 
to Public Hearings, introduced Nominated Members of Parliament (NMPs), let 
parliamentary debates be televised, increased constituency work, introduced fortnightly 
walkabouts by Ministers in the constituencies and established the Youth and Women 
Wings.168 Goh introduced the R-rated films (films with direct sex scenes)169 and 
held greater consultation with the people. This marked a major break from the 
dominant and decisive style of Lee Kuan Yew. 
Goh was willing to accept tolerable changes in government policies for the purpose of 
forging national consensus with the increasingly demanding and vocal electorate. These 
changes were experimented with, in part due to the safeguards that had been introduced 
or were in the process of being introduced, to overcome unbridled dissent, breakdown 
in social discipline and the exploitation of communal tendencies.170 Goh presented 
himself as a "people's Prime Minister" and his friendly and accommodating style 
introduced a new humanistic dimension to Singapore politics, contrasting sharply with 
the stem paternalistic, almost impersonal, cold style of Lee.171 Older Singaporeans 
were worried that Goh's softer style of governing was a sign of weakness, but Goh 
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showed himself convinced of its effectiveness for present-day Singaporeans. To show 
that he was no push-over he implemented some tough policies, such as his arrests of 
the "Marxist conspirators" in 1987, the reversal of the two-child policy, the 
amendments to The Newspaper and Printing Press Act, restriction of foreign 
publications which interfered with the country's domestic politics, placing a ceiling on 
the percentages of racial concentrations in HDB's neighbourhood, limiting the number 
of Malay children that could be enroled in a school, deciding on the Vehicle Quota 
Scheme, raising the levy on foreign workers, introducing Group Representation 
Constituencies (GRCs), Town Councils and the Elected President post, encouraging the 
immigration of Chinese Hong Kongers to Singapore, and most important of all, turning 
round the recession-hit economy through belt-tightening policies, including wage 
freezes and reduction of employer's Central Provident Fund (CPF) contributions.172 
Goh stated his goals in his maiden speech as Prime Minister: 
"My mission is clear: To ensure that Singapore thrives and grows after Mr. Lee 
Kuan Yew; to find a new group of men and women to help me carry on where 
he and his colleagues left off; and to build a nation of character and grace 
where people live lives of dignity and fulfilment, and care for one another. I 
will do this by building on what Mr. Lee and the old guards have achieved. I 
have been part of Mr. Lee's team for the last thirteen years. My stress is on 
continuity, not a break with the past. The torch has passed from one generation 
to the next. But the race continues. " 
Goh did not raise any real controversies during his first governing period and he 
showed by deeds his interpretation of a softer and gentler government as well as the 
meaning of a "smaller government". Although a transition in political style had been 
offered under the consideration that change was necessary, the changes were taking 
place gradually, in other words controlled. The political system itself was not going to 
change. This gradual political transformation did not make all political opinions 
manifest. Due to fear because of previous political repression, Singaporeans had 
become cautious. As a participant in a local tv-forum said: "They tell you the weed 
may now grow, so the bugs can come out. But who knows: one day they may use the 
DDT again!".173 
Supporters of a Western style of democracy were disappointed as the PAP with Lee 
in the background continued its grip on Singapore politics. For example, Wu advised 
not to look for informed or concerned leaders in the future, but to educate the people 
for democracy.174 However, some Singaporeans raised the question of whether 
"democratic values" and "political liberalism" ever were really understood by the 
general population in Singapore, beyond a few politicised Western-educated 
intellectuals. On the other hand the relationship between Confucianists and the power 
of state often was a very complicated one. There were many kinds of situations 
comparable to investigative journalism in the Confucian ideology. The Confucian 
scholars saw themselves as the conscience of society and in their time this conscience 
was often expressed as a kind of adversary relationship with the state.175 The debate 
about democracy was closely linked to the restrictions on freedom of the press in 
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Singapore. George Yeo defended the government's position by attacking the Western 
media for corrupting Asian values. He disclaimed the Western mass media as a model 
for Singapore, because "as a community, we may lose the means to preserve and 
promote the values important to us."176 By "us" he meant the government and the 
establishment. Cherian George, a local journalist with The Straits Times, said: 
"The press in Singapore takes on a greater "educational" role than most. There 
is an emphasis on views that the establishment believes reasonable and 
responsible Singaporeans should hold, while views that are regarded as 
irrational and ill-informed are down-played...In sum, communication is 
decidedly top-down... For the press to adhere to the party line at the expense 
of shedding light on that complexity and diversity seems unwise."177 
Chee accused the government of first articulating its views on a certain issue, followed 
by collecting data to substantiate the official view. For example, the government 
opposed sexually explicit publications in Singapore. In a 1992 survey by the Censorship 
Review Committee (CRC), linked to the government, it was found that 90 percent of 
the Singaporeans disapproved of liberal sexual attitudes and behaviours. This result was 
then used to support the conservative view and policies of the government. Whereas, 
for example, simultaneously it was estimated that there were over six thousand card-
carrying members'78 of the association of prostitutes in Singapore. This as well as 
other contradictions in attitudes and behaviour in Singapore raised questions in the 
media. However, without even questioning the soundness of the CRCs survey methods 
and procedure, the media dropped the subject as quickly as it had brought it up. 
Likewise, Chee claimed, especially in the social sciences and arts faculty few openness 
and debate was found. He said that academics kept one eye on their research and the 
other on the government's opinions and reactions.179 
Chee's main point of criticism was that the PAP government acted as if it was the only 
one capable of knowing what was in the nation's best interest. Any call for more 
democracy was dismissed as decadence of the West, not suited for the culture in 
Singapore. "The West" was mainly negatively portrayed in the Singaporean media. 
Publications critical of Western democracies, especially those written by foreign 
journalists, were frequently given full and prominent coverage.180 This way 
information was either distorted or kept from Singaporeans, according to Chee.m He 
took the refusal of the national newspaper The Straits Times to publish a review of his 
first book "Dare To Change" as an example of selective reporting.182 
Wu expressed his concern that he expected authoritarian governments in all the East 
Asian countries for a long time to come. He therefore did not expect any development 
in the idea of citizenship, although in the Confucian tradition it was always stressed 
that the rise and fall of the nation was everybody's business. However, in the nineties 
it was the momentum of tradition.183 
The real test for the Singapore style of democracy was expected when the economy 
would fail to keep on growing and recession would hit the entire Singapore society. 
Discontent, such as expressed by Chee, could fuel the demand for greater participation 
in the government. 
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According to Confucian tradition, the interests of individuals were to be subordinate 
to the interests of the nation, in contrast to the Western notion of individual rights. In 
the eighties Goh's second domestic policy had been the release of the White Paper on 
Shared Values. These values were to encompass the country's national ideology which 
would be able to keep its Asian bearings as the country progressed into the twenty first 
century. The five values finally agreed upon were: 
" 1) nation before community, and society above self 
2) family as the basic unit of society 
3) community support and respect for the individual 
4) consensus, not conflict 
5) racial and religious harmony"184 
These values formulated by the government did not always coincide with those of the 
population, especially the business community. For example, Wong mentioned that the 
Singapore government wanted Singapore businessmen to learn from Japan, but the 
consensus style of decision-making of the Japanese did much less fit the Singaporean 
export economy in which prompt decisions had to be made185. There was this 
constant field of tension between the government and the business community due to 
different interests, although they had a common interest in economic growth for 
Singapore.186 To maintain the integrity of the government, the PAP pragmatically 
paid the bureaucracy and the politicians extremely high salaries. 
The consequences of economic development and modernisation were not only felt in 
domestic politics, but especially in Singapore's international politics. A benefit of 
Goh's younger generation of Singapore leaders was the lack of direct involvement in 
the trauma of the merger period and the separation from Malaysia and the emotional 
baggage it carried for the older leaders. Therefore Goh was able to create new 
openings in bilateral ties with Malaysia by for instance being the first Singapore leader 
to officially visit the neighbouring Malaysian state of Johor. 
Singapore also became actively involved with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Goh 
stated that Singapore shared several of the concerns of Third World Countries, e.g. 
security and access to markets. NAM was to work out common positions in their ties 
with the more developed countries. The Forum was seen as necessary versus the G7 
or Organisation for Economic Cooperation and versus EEA and NAFTA. Furthermore, 
the North was too absorbed with Eastern Europe and the CIS to be concerned about 
the Third World in the early nineties. Singapore played a leading role in the 
strengthening of South-South cooperation. Problems such as market access, debt, the 
environment, development assistance were critical issues facing the South. By adopting 
the right socio-economic policies, developing countries would be able to strengthen 
themselves economically: work within the existing multilateral economic, financial and 
trading systems and adopt proven economic formulae for success such as open markets, 
free trade and the development of human resources through education and training. 
More recently NAM's focus shifted from political to economic and social problems. 
CHAPTER б 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC MOBILITY 
6.1 Socio-economic stratification 
The ultimate aim of much development aid is progress in economic and social 
conditions, inherently implicating a decrease in poverty. Thus development of a society 
should lead to a transformation in the socio-economic make-up of that society. In this 
chapter the effects of Singapore's rapid economic development on its socio-economic 
class structure are shown. 
In the late 1950's and early 1960's it was widely hypothesised that the process of 
industrialisation would reshape the social stratification hierarchy from pyramidal to a 
pentagon or even a diamond, in other words the middle of the social hierarchy would 
become considerably expanded. ' The logic behind this theory was that industrialisation 
would create a need for more complex jobs requiring more specialised training, 
providing higher salaries and the corresponding higher status for more people. 
However, not only industrialised nations, formerly expected to reach an identical or 
similar social class structure as the early industrialised countries, showed variations; 
especially the emergence of NICs provided a different development. This resulted in 
an increasing awareness of national and cultural variations, which in turn gave rise to 
more international research, although conceptual comparisons appeared to be difficult 
due to a vast variation in and importance attached to the everyday meaning of social 
class differences.2 
In the case of Singapore, the information on socio-economic class structure was limited 
and poorly studied until the nineties. Although some case studies had documented the 
pervasive presence of poverty in Singapore in the 1960's and 1970's3, an overview of 
socio-economic stratification and mobility in Singapore was not given until 1991, when 
the first comprehensive body of sociological research on this subject was published by 
Quah, Chiew, Ко and Lee.4 
Before actually implementing the class studies, they made two fundamental choices. 
Firstly, the Singaporean scholars chose from among the main socio-economic theories. 
Karl Marx's work was best known. In consideration for the Singapore study Sharon 
Lee3 summarised the Marxian perspective on social class structure in the following four 
essentials: 
"1) classes are determined by economic factors 
2) classes are also political actors because of common interests shared by 
members of a class 
3) the struggle of classes leads to social change 
4) the proletariat class under capitalism bears the special charge of 
eradicating class through eliminating capitalism as a system of 
production and societal organisation. "6 
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Marx argued that in a capitalist economy, the number of owners of capital would 
decrease as a result of both technological innovation and competition among capitalists 
for an increasing share of the market. Correspondingly, the number of workers would 
increase due to population growth and the downward mobility of failed capitalists. 
However, the rapid economic development in Singapore did not confirm Marx' theory. 
The number of employers increased 3.6 times from 16,904 in 1957 to 60,170 in 1985. 
The number of employees increased only 2.9 times from 335,372 to 974,614 in the 
same period. The self-employed workers - nicknamed the "petty capitalists" - increased 
1.2 times from 79,613 to 96,782.7 Unpaid family workers diminished rapidly. 
In 1970 there were more non-Singaporean than Singaporean employers and more 
Singaporean than non-Singaporean employees. However, by 1980 Singaporean citizens 
had caught up and almost reached parity with the non-Singaporeans. Between 1970 and 
1980, citizen capitalist enterprise rose while foreign capitalist enterprise fell, such that 
the ratios ended almost identical." Chiew and Ko concluded that previous dominance 
by foreign capitalist enterprises had not suppressed local entrepreneurship. The 
Singapore data rejected the hypothesis that "metropolitan" entry and dominance over 
the "peripheral" or local capitalism would cripple indigenous enterprise. Marx's 
predictions of increasing unemployment in an evolving capitalist economy, or in a 
peripheral economy dominated by a metropolitan sector, had not materialised in 
Singapore9 in it's first twenty-five years of modern development. Furthermore, 
contrary to dependency10 and Marxist theories, there had been a decrease in the 
proportion of the low-income group while middle and high income groups had expanded 
rapidly. Marxist theories were thus not deemed to be relevant to the development of 
Singapore in the 1991 study. 
More appealing to Singaporean scholars appeared Max Weber's theories. In contrast to 
Marx, the Weberian concept of class did not assume that classes were political entities. 
Weber proposed a less materialistically determined and more multi-dimensionally 
oriented theory of stratification, which was considered the most influential perspective 
in sociological studies of stratification today. Weber suggested that inequality among 
individuals and groups can exist in three main areas: 
1. in the market place 
2. in life-styles and in consumption patterns 
3. in the arena of power 
Weber's insistence on separating the economic from the social and the political 
underlined his belief that the three hierarchies need not overlap. In Weber's theory 
different classes have different life chances in the labour market and in the market of 
goods and services, such as access to different types or qualities of housing. 
In Singapore there was no categorical distinction in the type of housing between 
employers and employees, due to conformity in HDB-flats in which most Singaporeans 
lived. Nevertheless, employers tended to have more rooms and more luxury within their 
Socio-Economie Mobility 179 
houses than employees. Weber's hypothesis was thereby considered generally 
plausible." 
More up to date than Marx and Weber, Dahrendorf12 analysed class in modern 
industrialised societies. This again provided another perspective on class and equality. 
He suggested that classes would not disappear in modern industrialised countries, 
because broad changes would prevent the Marxian prediction of revolution based on 
class conflict between capitalists and workers. For example institutionalisation of 
contract negotiations between labour unions and employers, the spread of democratic 
values, opportunities for upward social mobility and disengagement of the political state 
from economic relations could also shape the development of socio-economic class 
structure. 
The recent studies on social stratification in Singapore combined parts of Weber's and 
Dahrendorf s theories. They were based on the assumption of a dynamic continuum of 
social class instead of a discrete system of social stratification with clear boundaries. 
Pointing at both the metamorphosis of societies in the twentieth century as well as the 
rapid pace of change in the most recent modem societies - in which universal access 
to education and an inclination towards achievement and meritocracy have led to a 
complex and fluid social stratification -, one agreed that there was "no single generally 
accepted status classification system"13. 
The second choice made in the Singapore class studies, was between the roughly three 
schools of thought, which were identified in social stratification research. 
Firstly, one that uses multiple indicators of social class, such as income, occupation, 
education, type of housing, car ownership and possession of "sophisticated" or "luxury" 
household items. Quah pointed out that these indicators, however, were strongly linked 
to cultural patterns of lifestyle14 and were therefore not a priori applicable to 
Singapore. Three indicators could prove potential snake pits. Firstly, while in Western 
countries living in public housing generally was perceived as a symbol of poverty, in 
Singapore it was considered a widely acceptable national way of life. Secondly, while 
in some countries the number of cars per household could be a clear indicator of one's 
socio-economic class, in Singapore the government's preference for non-polluting 
modes of transportation, the high quality of public transport and the relatively short 
distances within the nation affected Singaporeans' car-ownership. The vehicle quota 
controlled by a limited number of certificates of entitlement (COEs) plus exceptionally 
high import taxes on private cars, made the relationship between the number of cars and 
socio-economic class in Singapore hard to compare to other countries. Thirdly, the 
possession of luxury items was deemed to be another unreliable indicator due to 
differential priorities based on situational and cultural circumstances. 
The second school of thought used three indicators of social class: highest level of 
formal education attained, occupational prestige and income level. 
The third school used only occupational prestige as indicator. In the Singapore studies 
the second school of thought was chosen. 
The main hypothesis tested in these studies was the popular notion that had grown that 
Singapore's widespread economic development had led to a middle class society, a large 
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group "in the middle" which had incorporated other groups. The term "middle class 
society" appeared to be an appealing term to the popular mass media and a convenient 
label people used to convey the feeling that Singapore "was doing well" in social and 
economic development. 
In 1983 and 1984 a random sample survey was held among Singapore citizens. 
Education, income level and occupational prestige were studied in relation to socio-
economic class. 
6.1.1. Education and class 
The universal proposition that someone's educational level contributes significantly to 
his or her occupational prestige and income and, consequently, to his or her social class 
position, was confirmed in Singapore. Although the educational attainment of the 
Singaporean respondents on the whole was still on the lower end of the scale compared 
to other NICs, the younger generation had clearly benefited from Singapore's universal 
education system since independence. Education was positively associated with income 
and persons with better education were more likely to earn higher incomes. 
Educational level was one of the key attributes in Singapore shared by close social 
networks, particularly those involving spouses and close friends. Both men and women 
tended to marry partners and chose friends with similar educational qualifications. 
These trends in educational effects contributed to a certain "social immobility" or 
perpetuation of the existing socio-economic classes.15 
People with different educational levels also showed different attitudes.16 The better 
educated were more inclined to see themselves as the people who contributed to 
community decisions and were more likely to believe that poor people had good chances 
to do the same. It came as somewhat of a surprise to the Singaporean scholars that in 
the meritocratical society of Singapore all agreed that the lower class had less power 
than other classes in matters affecting the community.17 
A large majority (79.6 percent) of the respondents in Singapore believed that success 
can only be attained by hard work, agreeing that "luck has little or nothing to do with 
it". The researchers remarked that this result dispelled some Western notions of Asians 
as strong believers in fate. Although people with high prestige occupations were more 
inclined than others to acknowledge that hard work is not all and that luck had 
something to do with their success, they regarded planning for the future as most 
important. The better educated disagreed more than the less educated that rich people 
"can get away with almost anything because of their money". Chiew suggested that 
people at the top might have learned from experience that luck was part of their success 
and that people in the lower prestige jobs probably still centred their hopes in the 
Singaporean meritocratical system of rewards which promised success for hard work.18 
Family and school appeared to be important determinants of socio-economic status 
attainment. There was a significant relation between the highest educational attainment 
of both male and female respondents and their fathers'. The mother's achievement was 
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mostly related to the daughters' educational achievement. Parents tended to exert greater 
control over daughters than over sons and parents with little formal education held on 
to the traditional belief that daughters did not need much education. 
However, in spite of this strong initial influence on social stratification by one's family 
background, formal schooling appeared to exert an even more pervasive influence 
during people's entire occupational careers.19 This result was deemed to be especially 
important in Singapore, because it showed that in societies where educational 
meritocracy prevails - such as Singapore -, the influence of the family background 
would gradually weaken. Formal educational credentials would serve as a criterion of 
allocating people to differentially rewarded jobs. This in turn would open new ways for 
socio-economic mobility. 
On the other hand, in the early nineties the concern increased in Singapore that this way 
a socio-economic gap might not so much grow between the 'haves' and the 'have nots', 
but between the English and Chinese educated, respectively the modern Western and 
the traditionally Eastern oriented. 
Quah placed another question mark with the popular notion in Singapore that education 
was the key to social advancement. If this were true, she argued, one would expect the 
respondents to perceive education as an important symbol of class such as in traditional 
Confucianism, where the shi or scholar official was placed on top of the four-status 
hierarchy of shi, nong (fanner), gong (labourer, craftsman) and shang (merchant). 
However, Singaporeans ranked education as fifth class symbol, money as first. 
Nevertheless, Quah did not think this score reflected a general disregard for education, 
because Singaporeans had shown interest in education by consistently increasing their 
general level over the years. The survey results rather indicated a widespread realisation 
of the importance of education and the perceived need to attain at least secondary school 
education to be able to compete in Singapore's job market in the eighties. Forty percent 
of the respondents felt that the minimum amount of formal education a young man 
should receive was secondary education (O-levels); 30 percent Α-level and 20 percent 
post-graduate. Female respondents were slightly more inclined to see a need for higher 
levels of education for young men. The gender differences disappeared in the feelings 
about minimum level of education for young women. Fifty percent thought at least O-
level, 30 percent at least Α-level. Thus Singaporeans did value education, but less 
intrinsically than in an instrumental way, whereby 
"... education is seen primarily (if not exclusively) as a means to obtain power 
and wealth rather than as an end in itself. The marketability of a diploma or 
degree and not the wisdom of the acquired knowledge is what makes education 
an instrument of social mobility in this modem society where meritocracy 
dictates that your job depends on your paper qualifications. "2 0 
This pragmatic attitude of Singaporeans was shown in the fact that the overwhelming 
majority (93.6 percent) of all levels of education agreed to the opinion that "education 
enables us to make the best possible use of our lives". Simultaneously, however, a 
majority of 56.3 percent felt that "people can leam more through working than going 
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to school". The intrinsic value of education was mostly acknowledged by people with 
post-secondary education. 
In the nineties the high value - whether extrinsically or intrinsically motivated -
attributed to educational qualifications had not diminished (yet), either at the national 
level or in the private realm of family priorities in Singapore. Whereas in earlier 
developed countries the market of good academic jobs often had become tight and the 
number of jobless graduates had increased, which had decreased the relative value of 
higher education. 
6.1.2. Income and class 
In the 1950's and 1960's Singapore was still a poor country with low per capita 
incomes and low rates of literacy21. Buchanan22 characterised Singapore in the 1960's 
as a working class society; over three-quarters of the employed persons held blue-collar 
jobs with low pay. 
However, Singapore's rapid industrialisation process resulted in an overall enhancement 
of the occupational structure and of the income level. The unemployment rate was 9.1 
percent in 1966, 10.4 percent in 1970, but dropped to 3.5 percent in 1980 and a "full 
employment" situation in the nineties. The per capita GNP rose from S$l,340 in I960 
to over S$21,000 in 1996. (see also chapter 5) 
In the seventies Chen spoke of a dramatic growth of the "middle class".23 However, 
in spite of the general improvement in income level and the popular notion of a growing 
majority in the middle of the socio-economic stratification structure, there were great 
disparities regarding income found in Singapore in the eighties. 
The social class hierarchy showed small groups at the extremes regarding income (4.8 
percent in the lowest category and 1.2 percent in the highest category). Men at the 
lowest extreme of the income scale in Singapore had a mean monthly income of 
S$160.20 and an average of 1.7 years of schooling, while men at the top of the social 
class ladder had a mean monthly income of S$2,900 with 16.1 years of formal 
education. 
The five intervals in between were rather evenly divided over the range from high to 
low. The mean monthly incomes of the major occupational groups ranked as follows.24 
Administrators, executives and managers ranked top in income in major surveys in 
1966, 1975 and 1980. Professionals and technicians ranked second during those years. 
Clerical workers ranked third in 1966 and 1975, but fourth in 1980. They exchanged 
positions with the sales workers who ranked fourth in the first two surveys, but third 
in 1980. Production, transport and communications workers and labourers remained in 
fifth position. The rank of service workers dropped from sixth to seventh position, 
whereas agricultural workers climbed the income ladder from seventh to sixth position. 
When the respondents were asked to indicate the social class to which they thought they 
belonged, most people (81.3 percent) placed themselves in the middle class, regardless 
of their actual position in income, educational and occupational structures: lower middle 
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(32 percent), middle middle (44.3 percent) and 5 percent upper middle. About 17 
percent placed themselves in the lower class (upper lower and lower lower) and just 1 
percent saw themselves as upper class.23 There was a certain matching between the 
perceived and actual social class, but the link was quite weak. 
The subjective class identity was primarily based on the criteria of money and wealth 
for most classes. Only people in the upper middle and middle class considered 
personality, education and values and beliefs more important in assigning social class. 
Lee suggested that this variation in criteria for class attribution would have to do with 
the pre-occupation with money and wealth by people who have less of it, while 
individuals whose material needs axe satisfied would be able to look for other 
characteristics such as values when thinking about social class. She also considered it 
possible that the upper classes were more aware of the negative image presented by a 
concern with money. 
Whatever the respondents' subjective perception, the researchers concluded that the 
people in the five middle class intervals could hardly be clotted together, because they 
differed from each other in all three components of social class studied. Therefore one 
could not speak of a concentration of people in one homogenous "middle" interval, 
which would have to be the case if Singapore were a middle class society.26 Despite 
the tendency to cover up great differences by common usage of the term middle class, 
there was "no doubt that political, economic, ethnic and psychological divides exist in 
the country".27 
The Singapore social class results showed consistency with research in other 
societies.28 
6.1.3. Occupation and class 
The most complex indicator of socio-economic class to be studied was occupation, 
because occupation per se was not a hard category such as educational level or income. 
The statistics showed that the bulk of the Singapore workers was consistently found in 
the cluster of production, transport and communications (39.6 percent in 1957, 39.2 
percent in 1970 and 40.4 percent in 1980). The proportion of service workers29 also 
remained stable at 9.3 percent in 1970 and 9.7 percent in 1980. The percentage of 
agricultural workers declined from 7.9 percent in 1957 to 1.9 percent in 1980. The top 
two categories increased considerably in size; from 1.7 percent administrators, 
executives and managers in 1970 to 5.1 percent in 1980 and from 4.8 percent 
professionals and technicians in 1957 to 9.7 percent in 1980. With economic 
development the proportion of white collar workers increased and blue collar workers 
decreased. 
The prestige attributed to the different occupations in the Singapore society was another 
matter. To study occupational prestige the Singaporean scholars adapted a scale by the 
American National Opinion Research Center (NORC) to the local situation, resulting 
in the Singapore NORC (SNORC). A number of typical Singaporean occupations - such 
as Buddhist monk, Chinese physician, coffee shop proprietor, Hindu priest, Taoist 
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priest, Imam, ladies' dressmaker and men's tailor - were added. Moral concerns were 
studied by adding illegal occupations such as smuggler, prostitute, illegal lottery agent, 
narcotics peddler, beggar and those with low standing such as bar girl, social escort and 
masseuse. This way a Singapore Occupational Prestige Score (SOPS) was derived. 
There was a strong correlation between the indicators of education, income and this 
Singapore version of occupational prestige scores. Applying the locally adapted method, 
four trends were discovered in Singapore.30 
Firstly, the highest rated occupations were those of professionals, followed by 
businessmen and administrative officers. 
Secondly, the lowest rated occupations were related to illegal or morally unacceptable 
activities, followed by the service sector. 
Thirdly, the least consensus was found in jobs relating to religion, farming, night-clubs 
and the Armed Forces. 
Fourthly, people tended to agree most on the extremes of the social prestige continuum, 
representing the most negative and the most positive values prevailing in the Singapore 
society. As the most undesirable and deviant occupations were seen the smuggler and 
the prostitute (both scoring 3 out of 100). As the top occupations were perceived the 
medical doctor and the university lecturer (respectively scoring 97 and 96).31 
Respondents used a multiplicity of evaluation criteria to get to these ratings. Income, 
wealth, education and conditions of work were seen as the most important criteria in 
ranking excellent and average occupations. The interrelationship between income, 
education and occupation was shown here, although they were not the only criteria. As 
criterion for the rating as "excellent" one used someone's "contribution to society". If 
a person had a high education and income, but earned his or her money in a socially 
less desirable way, the status attributed would drop tremendously. 
The people with a lower occupational prestige were most realistic in their subjective 
class identification and people with average occupational prestige least.32 
In Singapore one's occupation was assumed to affect aspects of one's life well beyond 
income. For example half of the number of respondents who were workers (lower 
prestige occupations) usually stayed at home during weekends, spending their leisure 
time sleeping, relaxing, reading, watching television or doing some household chores. 
If they went out, they would visit relatives and friends, go to hawker centres or go 
window-shopping. Whereas people in higher prestige occupations were more inclined 
to go for drives, short trips and other outings during weekends and chose from a variety 
of activities every weekend. 
People in upper classes tended to be more involved in different social organisations than 
those of lower status. In Singapore, club memberships in particular - such as those of 
golf clubs, country clubs or the Tanglin club - were status symbols which offered 
members tangible proof of one's upper class position. Membership in labour unions, 
clan associations and religious groups, however, cut across occupational prestige 
boundaries. 
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However, in status-minded Singapore even the National Trade Union Congress (NTUC) 
owned a beach resort at Pasir Ris, comparable to a Club Méditerranée. Here members 
could rent apartments at very affordable prices. The Pasir Ris resort offered the same 
facilities as a private club in Singapore. One of the main guidelines of the NTUC was 
to reduce the wealth gap in Singapore. By providing its own perks, one believed that 
social unrest could be prevented. However, in the status-conscious island-state the size 
of the trade unions remained limited in the nineties: less than 12 percent of the 
Singapore workforce (217,000 members).33 
Occupational prestige also had an impact on how one perceived the ideal job. All 
respondents tended to agree on two attributes of the ideal job: foremost an attractive 
salary and secondly, but far behind, cordial social relations with bosses and colleagues 
were deemed to be important. People with low prestige jobs were most interested in the 
pay role and idealised jobs which were easy to perform by perceiving them as relaxing. 
People holding average prestige jobs were particularly interested in good physical 
working conditions, convenient working hours and an opportunity to contribute to 
society. People in high-prestige occupations sought jobs which offered self-fulfilment. 
Singapore's socio-economic class system, as indexed by occupational categories or 
prestige, was flexible.34 Occupational vertical mobility rates were very high. 
Nevertheless, intergenerationally the patterns of downward mobility exceeded the 
upward mobility slightly. Chiew speculated that this could be due to the fact that as 
education had become more universal during Singapore's development process, the 
same occupation was filled by men and women with higher educational attainment than 
their fathers'.35 
6.1.4. Ethnic stratification 
The popular notion in Singapore was that Malays formed the lowest socio-economic 
class and Chinese the highest. Although this was largely confirmed, this stereotype 
appeared to be an oversimplication. 
Singapore did not have any one ethnic minority fully concentrated at the bottom of the 
social ladder. Malays were mostly found in the intermediate score intervals 20 to 40 
(29.2 percent) and 41 to 60 (24.2 percent), which coincided with the lower middle and 
middle class respectively. Of the three main ethnic groups, Indians presented the most 
even distribution across the five social class intervals, with the highest representation 
among the middle and upper middle class. The Chinese showed the most variation, with 
the highest percentages in the respectively upper, upper middle and lower classes. 
As each ethnic group historically specialised in certain economic functions, there was 
a division of labour among the ethnic groups. Because some sectors tended to pay high 
wages (e.g. finance, public administration, professional service) and some low (e.g. 
fishing, mining, quarrying and transport), this division of labour gave rise to differential 
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status attainment accompanied by differential incomes and wealth among the ethnic 
groups. 
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Figure 6.1. Ethnic stratification in Singapore6 
In educational terms, the category "others" stood head and shoulders above the rest, 
followed by the Chinese and Indians as poor second, and the Malays as third at a 
further distance. In terms of occupations and occupational prestige, the ethnic 
stratification followed a similar pattern. Until 1980 the Malays saw the least 
improvement in their socio-economic attainment for reasons described in section 2.4. 
With only 0.4 percent employers, 3.4 percent self-employed workers and 95.7 percent 
employees, they largely belonged to the working class. It was thus concluded that the 
Malays had almost no presence in the so-called capitalist class in 1970 and 1980." 
The percentage of employers increased mostly among the Chinese. The Chinese and 
Indians had the highest percentages and ratios of "capitalists". It was thus not surprising 
that the level of income also followed a similar ethnic pattern as with education and 
occupation: the Chinese ranked top, closely followed by the Indians and at some 
distance the Malays ranked lowest. 
With regard to subjective class identity, ethnicity seemed less important than educational 
attainment, although there was a weak tendency for Indians to claim a higher class 
position than Chinese and Malays while being in the same occupation.38 
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Middle Class 
Lower Class 
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Social networks were clearly influenced by ethnic stratification. In choosing best friends 
Chiew claimed there was a factor of ethnocentrism at work; 97.4 percent of the Chinese 
had Chinese as best friends, 91.4 percent of the Malays had Malay best friends and 
83.7 percent of the Indians had Indian best friends. Educational achievement also played 
an important role in choosing best friends (acculturation processes were mostly 
manifested in higher educated people), but not as strongly as ethnicity.39 
Pertaining to the belief that luck influences success to a great extent, the Malays, 
regardless of their educational attainment, believed most in the role of luck.40 
Malays, less educated Chinese and less educated Indians believed more than the better 
educated that "the rich can get away with almost anything because of their money". 
Education seemed a more important factor in this attitude, however, than ethnicity. 
While money was the principal symbol of social class for people at all levels of 
education, the Chinese were most inclined to perceive wealth in this way.41 This 
tendency was confirmed by other data as well. When Singaporeans were surveyed about 
what was most important in their lives, health scored highest, family second, work/job 
third. However, when the figures were broken down for the three main ethnic groups, 
a few significant differences appeared. The Chinese valued wealth more than the 
Malays (5.9 versus 3.7 percent)42 and the Malays valued religion more than the 
Chinese (14.9 versus 3.4 percent). This result was even more significant, because 
higher levels of education generally acted as "equalizers" by weakening the attachment 
to some traditional perceptions of "class" in one's own ethnic community (such as the 
importance of smooth personal manners and correct behaviour). Furthermore, the better 
educated generally showed a more rational calculation of what gives peoples advantage 
over others when climbing the social ladder. Considering the fact that wealth gradually 
became less important to those with higher education43 and to those with a higher 
personal income44 and that the Chinese generally had a higher education level and 
more income than the Malays, this result was a rather important ethnic difference in 
relative value system. 
In conclusion: ethnic stratification was clearly linked to socio-economic stratification 
in Singapore, but did not entirely overlap. It could only be appropriately valued in 
combination with the other major indicators of class, especially education. 
6.2 Socio-economic mobility 
Part of the confusion about socio-economic status and mobility comes from the often 
neglected distinction between ascribed and achieved status.45 Ascribed status refers to 
status that comes with birth and can therefore in principle not be changed, such as 
status based on caste or gender in traditional societies. Achieved status refers to status 
attained through some personal effort. When subscribing more to the importance of 
ascribed status, there is not much mobility to be expected. Societies can be theoretically 
scaled in terms of their degree of openness or rate of social mobility. Singapore scored 
high on this scale. 
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Therefore it was not surprising to find a significant upward socio-economic mobility 
during Singapore's modem development, which appeared to be structural. 
The number of tax payers increased eighteen times between 1959 and 1980.46 From 
1967 to 1982 there was a great reduction in the numbers and percentages of the wage 
earners with the lowest monthly income (below S$500). Workers from the lower-paid 
commercial sector, which had more income inequality, had shifted to the higher-paid 
manufacturing sector, with less income inequality. Thus Singapore's industrialisation 
process had reduced poverty by reducing unemployment as well as "disguised 
unemployment". However, the top income group had increased their total share of 
income much faster than other income groups, meaning that the rich became richer by 
benefitting most from the economic growth47. 
Despite this unequal improvement in income, the trickle-down theory of development 
made some sense in Singapore. More and more Singaporeans became employers and 
own account workers as they grew older. This was perceived as evidence of intra-
generational improvement. Age appeared a crucial factor in personal mobility. 
Intergenerational changes were shown in the fact that the oldest generation cohort 
studied (bom between 1937 and 1946) showed more upward educational mobility than 
the somewhat younger generation (bom between 1947 and 1956). This difference was 
attributed to the bigger leeway the older generation had to catch up with.4* 
Ko studied the intergenerational transmission of socio-economic advantages and 
disadvantages and the role of schooling. He concluded that social origins were 
important factors in determining one's educational attainment. Interestingly though, this 
influence was less strong with Singaporeans than in other industrialised countries.49 
He attributed this phenomenon to the rapid expansion of the educational system in 
Singapore after independence. All of a sudden the broad population had opportunities 
to improve their educational status, which diluted the effect of social origin. In 
Singapore, as in other countries, the major influence on one's first job attainment was 
the respondents' education, the indirect effect of social origin being larger than the 
direct effect. Meaning that whatever effect the family background had on the first job 
attainment, it was mostly mediated by one's education. 
Ko found that males and females in Singapore differed in at least three different aspects 
regarding socio-economic attainment. First, men on average were able to get slightly 
more prestigious first jobs than women. Second, education had a greater effect on first 
job attainment for women than for men. The third difference was the way the social 
background of the parents worked for men and women. The background variables 
influenced the first job attainment for women mainly indirectly through educational 
attainment, whereas for men there was a greater direct effect of family background. 
In short, upward socio-economic mobility among women was high - especially among 
working women -, but even higher among men. Chiew, who had found the same trend 
in 1977, suggested that this could be due to discrimination against women.50 Ko 
additionally suggested that it could also be partly due to the different emphasis on 
educational qualifications made by different industrial sectors where men and women 
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concentrated their job-seeking efforts. Men were found more in production and sales 
jobs and women more in clerical and service sectors.51 
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Figure 6.2. Average weekly earnings per employee by occupational group, 
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There was no doubt about Singapore's structural socio-economic improvement. Still 
Chiew53 warned that it was the rapid economic development since independence which 
accounted for most of the upward personal and intergenerational mobility in Singapore. 
Without an aristocracy or ascribed status of power, prestige and wealth, much of this 
mobility was achieved through merit in education and industry at work. However, as 
some social class system would become entrenched or established, the advantages or 
disadvantages in family background would be passed on to the next generation, leading 
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eventually to some structural rigidity or status inheritance. Already the relation between 
parents' and childrens' educational attainment was clear. One would thus realistically 
have to expect limits to the socio-economic mobility. 
6.2.1. Welfare distribution 
The political change of guard in 1990 amongst others raised the question whether the 
rapid economic development had widened the income inequality in Singapore, or in 
other words if the welfare distribution had taken place fairly. 
Singaporean scholars tended to agree that Singapore's rapid economic growth generally 
had not increased the income gap, although they were aware that the conclusion would 
depend on the data source and the measures of income inequality used. Figures on 
Singapore were predominantly provided by the Department of Statistics of the Singapore 
government.54 
In 1976 Pang55 argued that in the economic development process of countries there 
was a stabilisation point after which the income inequality would decline with further 
growth. The five countries which successfully combined rapid economic growth with 
more equitable income distribution were: Israel, Taiwan, South-Korea, Japan and 
Singapore. They all invested heavily in human capital formation and created substantial 
employment opportunities in the industrial sector, which enabled the population to 
advance financially. In Singapore this economic strategy was perceived as to lead to an 
enormous increase in middle-income earners. 
Well aware of the attention paid by observers to the income distribution and the 
importance to the electorate, the Singapore government regularly showed income 
distribution statistics to the public. According to these figures income disparities 
alongside inter-ethnic differences narrowed down since independence. In line with the 
increasing income levelling out during the sixties and seventies, recent Census figures 
showed that the average earnings of Singaporean households out of work only, 
increased by about 250 percent: from S$l,228 in 1980 to S$3,076 in 1990.56 
Discounting inflation, this meant a doubling of real average monthly income. 
Where 74 percent of the households earned less than S$l,500 a month in 1980, it was 
only 29.6 percent in 1990. The lowest income group below S$500 constituted 4 percent 
of the households, Chinese forming the majority with 82 percent, followed by 8 percent 
Malays and 7 percent Indians. Speaking in absolute figures, the Chinese were over-
represented and the Malays under-represented in the lowest income group if compared 
to the national population: Chinese 76 percent and Malays 14,9 percent. Not only 
across socio-economic levels equality rose, but also across ethnic groups the gap 
narrowed. 
This egalitarian trend in Singapore was quite exceptional for a developing country. In 
most other developing countries the small elite got richer and the poor majority became 
poorer. 
However, while the mean individual income of Singaporeans increased by 19.6 percent 
between 1966 and 1973, in the same period the national income doubled, which added 
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up to a decrease in the personal income - GDP ratio from 45 to 40 percent.57 Pang 
suggested that this contradiction was caused by the relatively larger proportion of the 
GDP which was exported in the form of capital outflow and profit repatriation by the 
foreign investors and MNCs. The MNCs catalysed economic growth, but at the same 
time limited it. Singapore's economic dependence on MNCs made its development 
vulnerable.58 
Rao and Ramakrishnan demonstrated a decline in income inequality from 1966 to 1975, 
which could be attributed to the increase in employment rate.59 However, there was 
a slight increase in income inequality from 1975 to 1984. Chiew and Ko suggested that 
this was due to the wage policies introduced by the government.60 In 1983 the National 
Wages Council (NWC) recommended that civil servants and employees of statutory 
boards in superscale grades or equivalents would receive an annual increment 
amounting to 7.7 percent of their monthly salary. Those below these grades but earning 
more than S$604 per month were awarded an increase of 3 percent. Those in the lowest 
category would receive S$10 plus 1.3 percent of their monthly salary or wage. In 1984 
the NWC awards were respectively 12 percent, 8.2 percent and S$27 plus 4.2 percent 
of monthly pay. The private sector was under government and union pressure to 
implement similar unequal treatment. This way growth in income was faster among the 
high income groups than among the low-income groups. This relative deprivation 
among the latter generated some dissatisfaction. However, after the dark skies of the 
economic recession of the mid eighties had cleared sooner than expected, one geared 
one's energy again at economic and personal growth opportunities. Chan61 argued that 
in general 
"Singaporeans have in fact put up with and accepted an authoritarian government 
in exchange for material progress, prosperity and peace. You could say that this 
echoes the Confucian tradition: if your political leaders are able to look after the 
welfare of the people, this is acceptable. Probably Singaporeans today would 
consider free speech less of a natural right than, say, the right to cheap 
housing. " 
The Singapore government had always made it clear that it did not want to become a 
welfare state. The PAP constantly used rhetoric such as "We want to create a tightly 
organised society. Singapore must be a rugged society; nobody owes you a living." 
After the first development period, the number of people receiving public assistance 
dropped dramatically from 22,241 cases in 1966 to 6,640 in 1976. The PAP took a firm 
stand: the development of Singapore should be directed at an economically viable, 
materially prosperous, practically stable and socially cohesive nation. It should never 
become a welfare-state such as some industrialised countries in Western Europe, whose 
economies were perceived to suffer due to their social policies. Profits from the 
economy were taxed to provide benefits in education, housing, public health and urban 
renewal, while a vigorous family-planning programme was implemented to help 
improve standards of living. The PAP government aimed to persuade and, if need be, 
force people out of poverty, but loathed "welfarism". Generous subsidies were thought 
to make the country less competitive and thus finally halt its economic growth. The 
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PAP followed the "trickle-down" development strategy. Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong 
frequently stated that unlike in communism where everyone may share in the country's 
poverty, Singapore's political objective was a nation where everyone would profit from 
the country's growing richness.62 Regularly the government pointed at the inherent 
vulnerability of the small island-state. Economic growth and development was swiftly 
felt by the entire population, but economic depression would be widely experienced 
with equal speed. 
Comments of concerned citizens were published in the national newspaper The Straits 
Times. Some warned against the "give-me-more"-mentality of Singaporeans: "While 
some subsidies are necessary to redistribute wealth, they must be implemented with care 
lest they encourage a dependency culture. "е т In line with Confucianism, it was thought 
that people should be able to depend on their families, not on the government for their 
basic survival. As long as the labour market was tight and the majority of the 
population was still living with and interdepending on their families, financial support 
was possible. In Singapore the inequality in personal and household incomes was 
cushioned by the fact that one would exchange financial support among kin members. 
Whether one received or gave financial support depended to a large extent on one's 
social role in the family and the stage of one's life-cycle. Generally speaking, financial 
assistance among relatives and friends was very common in Singapore. These mutual 
assistance networks were important intervening variables promoting social mobility. 
Relatives would pool their resources to finance young family members through 
university, to fund a fledging enterprise or to support people in times of temporary 
setbacks. While the husband was still conventionally regarded as the breadwinner and 
the wife as the homemaker in Singapore in the nineties64, among the unmarried 
people, females were less dependent upon family support than males. 
Despite its tough attitude, the PAP did support the least privileged by amongst others 
maintaining a progressive income tax system and a certain social safety net. 
progressive tax system 
In Singapore's tax system people earning below S$500 per month did not have to pay 
any income tax at all. The bulk of the residents' income tax was borne by the high 
income groups. Although the income groups of over S$30,000 accounted for 7.4 
percent of the taxpayers only, their total tax assessed amounted to 59.8 percent. Indirect 
taxes were heavy for "luxury items" such as tobacco, liquor, petroleum and cars, while 
duties on basic daily necessities were kept at the lowest possible level." 
social safety net 
Singapore's social safety net consisted of subsidised social services, enjoyed mostly by 
the working class population. 
Firstly, free primary education was available to all children. After that, the government 
granted assistantships, bursaries and scholarships to both the needy and the talented. 
Edusave was an important government fund. 
Secondly, subsidised HDB housing estates were introduced by the government. 
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Thirdly, the PAP government introduced and encouraged company welfarism. 
Employers were stimulated to show concern for their workers by for example the 
Central Provident Fund (CPF). This kind of state pension fund required a contribution 
from employees as well as employers, based on a certain percentage of the employee's 
salary fixed by the government. In principle, an employer was expected to retain 10 
percent of his CPF contribution for each employee to create a trust fund; investment 
returns from this fund were then to be used to introduce new employee welfare benefits 
such as medical assistance, educational incentives, social activities and life-insurance 
premiums. The CPF rate started with 5 percent in 1968 and was progressively raised 
to a maximum in the eighties. After the economic recession of the mid eighties, 
however, the employee's contribution to the CPF was reduced from 25 to 10 percent 
of each employee's salary. This reduction practically incapacitated the company 
welfarism programme at the time. Later the employers' CPF contribution was raised 
again, although it had not reached the high level of the early eighties again by the mid 
nineties6". 
Employees were allowed to withdraw money from their CPF-fund to buy a house. This 
increased the home ownership in Singapore enormously, which was perceived as a 
measure of welfare. 
Fourthly, for a long time public health services were heavily subsidised. The lower 
income groups benefited largely from this. Medisave and Medishield were important 
government funds. In the nineties, however, the government reduced it's contribution 
to the public health sector. Nonetheless, by most conventional socio-economic indicators 
(see chapter five), Singapore still completely outstripped its Asian neighbours.67 
These four main welfare measures had helped to narrow the gap between the rich and 
the poor even more than the tax system.68 Moreover, people under special 
circumstances could get government support, such as the few Sam Sui women or Black 
and White amahs who were left in Singapore and had no-one to take care of them. 
Mostly in the thirties they left China in a rebellion against the traditional marriage and 
took vows of spinsterhood when they came to work in Singapore. Separate institutions 
were responsible for the well-being of the people, for example charitable semi-
government institutions such as the Community Chest and the Community Centres, and 
self-help groups which were financially supported by the government. These were 
founded along ethnic divisional lines. First Mendaki (Council for the Development of 
the (Malay) Muslim Community) was established to give more opportunities to Malay 
underachievers. Later also the CD AC (Chinese Development Assistance Council) and 
Sinda (Singapore Indian Development Association) were founded. Although the Chinese 
had proportionately fewer underachievers, they were more in absolute terms. 
In general the PAP government held the point of view that some subsidies were 
necessary to ensure that the basic needs of all Singaporeans were met and to serve to 
maximise the people's potential. However, beyond the basics, people who wanted more 
social and economic well-being would have to pay for it themselves. 
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In a 1991 survey by Kau and Yang a majority of sixty percent of Singaporeans was 
looking forward to greater achievements in the future. The lower incomes (below 
S$l,500 per month) were the least optimistic about their future. Kau and Yang 
suggested that this could be a reflection of the fear about the future where Singapore 
could become an extremely competitive society.69 However, only a few Singaporeans 
were rebellious against their society, which provided them with opportunities for 
upward social mobility. In general. Singaporeans were looking for change and 
stimulation mainly within safe limits: "adventure with a soft landing"70. Singaporeans 
viewed their society as potentially dynamic and generally were extremely interested in 
technological innovations, as these radiated a certain "snob-appeal" and could help them 
upgrade their positions. 
Despite the statistics produced by the government and widely published in the media 
revealing a smaller income gap, there were some who saw an increase in earning gap 
and class resentment.71 The ones left behind in the rapid upward social mobility as a 
consequence of modernisation, started vocalising needs to level down the society in 
order to level themselves up. Cheung, the chief statistician in the department of 
statistics in the ministry of trade and industry, observed that there was a clear 
narrowing of ethnic differences with the rise of the middle class in the three major 
ethnic groups. However, he argued that 
"social class differences have become more important within each ethnic group 
and for the whole society. Although we now have a large middle to upper class, 
a small portion of each ethnic group still remains in the underclass (sic). About 
7 per cent of Chinese households, 6 per cent of Malay households and 12 per 
cent of Indian households live in HDB one- or two-room flats. Most of the heads 
of these households have lower educational attainment and hold low-skill jobs. 
The profiles of these groups are very similar across ethnic groups, suggesting 
that being in the underclass is more a function of individual circumstances rather 
than of ethnic background. While ethnicity may no longer be an important 
stratifying factor in our society, education may have emerged as the most 
powerful factor in determining one's position in the society. 
Substantial criticism concerning the welfare distribution in Singapore came from Chee 
in the mid-nineties. He attacked the PAP's position on the old and weak that the 
community should take care of them. To support this idea the PAP strongly advocated 
Confucian values, in which respect and care for the elderly was embedded. Chee, 
however, thought it should be more of a government's responsibility as well. He argued 
that no one was really sure about the level of poverty in Singapore, because information 
was not readily available for public consumption. He said that statistics were usually 
given to back up the argument that the government wanted to make. Chee accused the 
PAP government of insensitivity to the needs of the less able due to its business-like 
mentality, most significantly reflected in the four areas of social security, health care, 
housing and transportation policies.73 He criticised these policy areas as follows. 
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social security 
Of the Singaporeans over 55 years of age, 31 percent of the men and 74 percent of the 
women had no personal income. Over 55 percent of them did not have any savings and 
44 percent felt that they would face financial difficulties when they would retire.74 In 
1989 the government reported that 1,300 families in Singapore were living in poverty. 
The report revealed there were 750,000 people, more than half of the working 
population, earning a take-home pay of $600 a month and that 130,000 families earned 
less than $313 per month.75 This report was used to support the government's position 
on the need for setting up the Chinese Development Assistance Council (CDAC), a 
charity group that would collect public donations. Later, to defend its position that the 
poor were already taken care of, however, the government reported that only 28,000 
families earned less than $313 per month.76 Another source showed that 45,6 percent 
of the working population earned less than $1000 per month.77 
The government spent about half of what private charitable organisations spent to help 
the "less fortunate".78 Funds for public welfare amounted to about one percent of total 
government expenditure compared to e.g. almost thirty percent spent on defence 
between 1976 and 1989. The international average was thirty percent.79 
The Public Assistance scheme provided financial help to the old, disabled, chronically 
ill or vagrant who do not have any income. Yet for the poor to qualify for assistance, 
the criteria were harsh and humiliating, Chee claimed.80 Only half of the applications 
were approved each year. When approved, the amounts handed over were lower than 
the minimum household expenditure (МНЕ) required for daily living in Singapore. 
Public assistance rates were approximately 5 percent below the МНЕ for one-person 
households and 25 percent below МНЕ for more than one-person households. 
Meanwhile, the salaries of the Ministers and Prime Minister were extremely high. The 
pay of cabinet Minister was increased to $100,000 a month each in the mid nineties. 
The Singapore political leaders were the highest paid in the world. 
Chee found this distribution of income mind-boggling, especially while health care and 
care for the elderly were shifted more and more to the private sector. This privatisation 
would mean a market-oriented care, whereas the needy really needed a minimum 
subsistence level independent from market forces. Chee thought this relative lack of 
public assistance was unacceptable for a country with an extremely high national 
financial reserve. In 1994, Singapore's budget surplus topped $10 billion. This amount 
was added on to the national reserve which was conservatively estimated at $80 billion, 
a large portion coming from the CPF contributions.81 Thus, Chee claimed, Singapore 
had become a society where the state's resources were not distributed equitably.82 
Simultaneously the government provided a myriad of programmes to help the upper-
income families get richer, according to Chee. Government assistance programmes -
such as the CPF, Medisave, Medishield, Goods and Services Tax (GST), Workmen's 
Compensation, Dependents' Protection, tax incentive schemes for families with children 
and living-in elderly parents - were all based on the principle that the more income one 
makes, the more one benefits from the state.83 However, for example saving through 
the Central Provident Fund scheme was only possible if one had been able to work and 
196 Singapore, a modem Asian city-state 
earn some income. These savings were a function of past earnings, level of 
employment, wage structure and contribution rates.84 The eldest workers had 
accumulated the least savings this way. Elder women in particular had not been able to 
accrue many CPF savings. 
Chee argued that an expanded social security system need not adversely affect 
Singapore's economic performance. As counter-example he mentioned Germany, a long 
time welfare state with continuing high economic performance. 
health care 
The government's share of total health care expenditure fell from 40 percent in 1970 
to 37 percent in 1985 to 5 percent in the 1990's.85 Meanwhile the government's 
constant emphasis on working harder and harder all the time increased the stress level 
in Singapore, which in turn could weaken the immune system which can lead to illness. 
As an example Chee mentioned the fact that Lee Kuan Yew's own son, B.G. Lee, had 
colorectal cancer, which was blamed on stress by many. 
housing 
The government claimed that it subsidised the cost of construction of the HDB flats as 
well as the land costs. Chee contested this claim by arguing that the land hardly cost 
the government anything and that the revenue the government collected from various 
sources involved with HDB construction, such as foreign worker86 levies, made up for 
the seemingly low prices of the flats. Nonetheless, although the government may not 
have had the same costs as the private sector, it did finance public housing indirectly 
which made it cheaper for the population. 
transportation 
In Chee's opinion the high car and road tax rates did not need to be maintained any 
longer simultaneously with a quota-system as well as import control.87 
Chee claimed that trends of uneven distribution of wealth and resources were already 
emerging in Singapore, which would give rise to a new class division. As the nouveau 
riche were carving out their own space and were now dominating the Singapore society, 
it would become increasingly difficult for the elderly and weak to make good through 
their own efforts.88 
6.2.2. Women's socio-economic mobility 
Research on the status of women in the Singapore society started in the mid-
seventies89, but only in the nineties a book was published integrating the different 
aspects of studies on women during the first stage (roughly three decades) of 
Singapore's modem development.90 It showed that women in Singapore both 
contributed to and benefited from the country's progress. The three major factors of 
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socio-economic stratification - education, occupation and income - are discussed here 
with regard to women. 
The level of education of women in Singapore improved significantly over the years. 
The illiteracy rate among Singapore women aged 15 to 24 fell from 15.5 percent in the 
1970's to 3.8 percent in 1990. In 1960, the enrolment of women at institutions of 
higher learning was only about one third of that of men (ratio of 34:100). This ratio 
improved to 59:100 in 1981 and 73:100 in 1991.91 
In the nineties, working women showed higher levels of secondary and upper secondary 
qualifications than men. Their share was higher in disciplines such as arts, social 
sciences and accountancy; women's share among the total number of tertiary graduates 
in the Singapore workforce, however, was only 36 percent.92 
On par with the increasing educational level of Singaporean women, the female labour 
force participation rate (LFPR) increased steadily from 21.6 percent in 1957 to 29.5 
percent in 1970, to 44.3 percent in 1980 and 50.3 percent in 1990.93 In this respect 
as well as regarding the socio-demographic profile94, the level of developed countries 
was more closely approached than that of neighbouring countries. Between 1970 and 
1990 the most significant growth was in the number of female workers in the financial 
and business sectors: an increase from 3.5 percent to 12.9 percent.95 Between 1980 
and 1990 the most remarkable increases in female occupations took place in production 
related jobs (from 1.1 to 42.2 percent) and in administrative and managerial jobs (from 
1.2 to 11.6 percent). The percentage of women in sales and service related jobs 
declined from 81.7 to 37 percent.9* 
Although the female LFPR had been steadily growing towards the level of developed 
countries, the sectors and levels of economic activity also followed global 
developments. Women were more concentrated in lower occupational prestige and 
lower level jobs than in high prestige and high level jobs. The majority of female 
workers in Singapore was still found in clerical, sales and service jobs, followed by 
production, transport and manual labour. Women were overrepresented in archival, 
library and teaching jobs and underrepresented in managerial and engineering jobs.97 
Women were much less than men found in decision making positions. For example, 
after a lapse of 14 years without female representation, three women were elected to 
parliament in 1984, accounting for only 3.8 percent. However, although this was a very 
low number, developed countries did not fare much better.98 
Moreover, married women had difficulties returning to their paid jobs after their child 
care and household activities, due to both little support from husband and other family 
members and to lack of part-time jobs. The Singapore study into the status mobility of 
women remarkably noted that "homemakers" were generally underestimated by amongst 
others being categorised as "economically inactive". Whereas a United Nations report 
stated that, if the unpaid work of women in the areas of household and child care were 
included in national accounts, as much as 25 to 30 percent should be added on to the 
GDP.99 In Singapore, the worth of household work was estimated to be at least 5.38 
percent, if not 16 to 17 percent of the GNP.100 
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However, because household and child care work generally was not acknowledged as 
much as by scholars in women's studies, consequently wages received by male and 
female workers showed a sizeable disparity. From 1983 to 1987 women received only 
69 percent of men's wages. Interrupted work histories due to family commitments along 
with lower levels of education and lack of work experience and training were 
responsible for this inequality.101 
Nevertheless, Singaporean women's income had been growing steadily. For example, 
women aged 60 to 64 saw an increase in their income of 9.1 percent between 1980 and 
1990, women aged 65 to 69 11.5 percent and women aged 70 to 74 13.9 percent.102 
In 1990, working women in Singapore had an average income between S$l,016 and 
S$l,123, depending on age as well as educational level. For example, a tertiary 
educated woman between 60 and 64 years enjoyed an income of S$5,489 per month, 
while a much younger woman without education averaged an income of just below 
S$ 1,000 per month and a secondary educated woman could earn close to S$2,000 to 
S$2,200 per month.103 
With the continuing rising level of educated Singaporean women, the tight labour 
market in Singapore and the government's provision of family planning services, tax 
incentives and family service programmes, the gap between men and women was 
closing over the years. Thus women's status in Singapore was improving, although 
equality still had to be achieved. 
6.2.3. Ethno-cultural mobility 
One could expect that through the opening up of the Singapore society through 
modernisation and economic development as well as through the policy of multi-
racialism104, the different ethnic groups would become more integrated. A related 
question to this process could be to what extent the economic development would either 
have eroded the distinct cultural identities in Singapore or would rather have mixed the 
different cultural norms and values. 
One way of studying the issue of ethnic integration is through counting the number and 
approval of inter-ethnic marriages. However, the situation in Singapore was rather 
complex. It was common to speak of inter-racial marriages, but - as Chew and 
MacDougall argued105 - genetically, there are no pure races and the use of the term 
'race' is therefore a scientific sham. In Singapore the racial labelling of the population 
could be criticised as being used rather as an easy-reference classification system than 
as an ethnic distinction. Moreover, the simple distinction of the Singapore population 
into "three races of Chinese, Indians and Malays" was covering up the distinctions 
within or relations between the groups themselves. Some of these distinctions were 
discussed in chapter two; here we would like to add another distinctively Singaporean 
group of people: the Baba's and Nyonya's. Originally these respectively men and 
women were mixtures of indigenous Malay female and immigrant Chinese male spouses 
who once migrated from the Malacca area to Singapore. Their descendants, usually 
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resident in Singapore for several generations, married increasingly within an enlarging 
Chinese community with progressively more even sex ratios. They report their "race" 
nowadays as "Chinese". As an example of this kind of offspring served Lee Kuan Yew, 
whose mother Chua Jim Neo had a great-grandfather who married a Malay. The 
cultural impact of this ancestry was shown by the fact that Chua became a well-known 
instructor and author on Afyo/iya-cooking. 
The Indian counterpart of these Baba-Chinese were the Malacca Chittys. They were 
Malay in terms of language and customs, but remained faithful to the Hindu religion. 
The major sector of the Indians consisted of the dark-skinned Tamils, but there was also 
an array of lighter skinned Punjabis and Bengalis (some of whom were identified as 
"Pakistanis"), Malayalis, Gujeratis and Sindbis. 
Chew and MacDougall spoke of a "grab-bag category"106 of Malays; in fact this 
group included Javanese, Bugis, Bandjarese and Boyanese alongside the indigenous 
Malays, with Arabs and Indian-Arabs (jawi peranakari) also sometimes included. 
Due to this variety in ethnicity, one also spoke of inter-communal relations in 
Singapore. The concept of "community" was often thought of in terms of collectivities 
with shared self-identifications, generally coinciding with identifications by others107, 
although a strong intra-communal solidarity was not always present. 
In spite of these conceptual complications, Chew and MacDougall concluded from their 
research that approval of inter-communal marriage was inversely related to the 
community's percentage of the population. The Chinese, forming 75 percent of the 
Singapore population, were least approving; the Malays, at IS percent of the 
population, were intermediate in their approval; and Indians, who formed only 7 
percent of the population, were most approving of inter-communal marriage. Approval 
increased with a greater number of years of education. Language medium of education 
also played a role (English educated being more tolerant), albeit small compared to the 
level of education per se. These findings were on par with other research done in other 
countries.108 In a cross-cultural study on attitudes towards inter-ethnic marriage, 
Singaporeans were found to be less tolerant than people in a number of European 
countries around 1970.109 
The fact that it were mostly Chinese Singaporean students who followed English-
medium education was foremost perceived as an indication of their priority to economic 
over cultural motivation. Furthermore, due to the continued existence of Chinese-
medium schools in Singapore, the number of students enroled in English-medium 
schools originally was highest among the Indians and lowest among the Chinese.110 
Measured by attitude towards inter-communal marriages, the PAP assumption of a 
positive correlation between bilingualism and communal tolerance was found to be 
correct111. The more youthful had a more positive attitude, which was assumed to be 
linked to the amount of bilingualism. However, the Chinese age differences were less 
big than those within the other community groups. Chew and MacDougall interpreted 
this as the pervasive effect of the prestigious and powerful community membership in 
the Chinese community which seemed to have more impact than the liberalism of the 
young. Parents appeared to be significant others in choices of marriage partner, given 
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the fact that their attitude was rated on the same rank as the respondents' own 
opinion."2 Despite the confirming result of another study that Chinese students turned 
out to be the most conservative of the several community groups113, the Chinese, 
more than the Malays and the Indians, perceived their own community to be more 
tolerant of inter-communal marriage than actually was the case. Chew and MacDougall 
attributed this to the "insularity" of the more liberal Chinese, leading to an 
overestimation of the total community; they thought the majority was as liberal as they 
were themselves.114 
Approving least of personal inter-communal marriage were the Buddhists, ancestor 
worshippers (Chinese Traditional Religionists) and the ones without a professed 
religion. This coincided with the Chinese community in Singapore. As Buddhism and 
Chinese Traditional Religion were the least solid of the religions in Singapore, one 
would expect these religious followers to be the least rigid in their marriage preference. 
However, the opposite was the case in Singapore. Persons most committed to their 
religious beliefs were least worried about the effect of the inter-communal marriage on 
their personal lives, because they were also the least willing to change their faith in an 
inter-communal marriage. In Islam for instance marriage with non-believers from other 
"races" was not rejected, as long as the non-believer converted to Islam.115 
There seemed to be preference effects in favour of the majority group above the 
minority groups. Non-Chinese students unduly prized Chinese mates for example, 
whereas the reverse was not the case. The communal status, the power hierarchy of the 
communal groups in Singapore and even the lighter colour of the skin appeared to make 
an inter-communal marriage of a non-Chinese with a Chinese to be perceived as 
"marrying up". In a society where upward mobility had become paramount to the 
majority of Singaporeans, this type of inter-communal marriage was most sought after. 
Another explanation was that it originally was harder for the minority communities to 
find marriage partners within their own communities as the choice was less. This was 
especially the case for the early immigrants. Although sex ratios were later levelled, the 
more flexible attitude towards inter-communal marriage by the minorities may have 
been set in the earlier days. 
On the majority side, the Chinese felt that marrying inter-communally was like 
"betraying the trust of their parents, who had clothed, fed, raised and educated 
them. Chinese parental socialisation of children involved a constant reiteration 
of the themes of 'differences' between those who are Chinese and those who 
most definitely are 'not Chinese'."116 
Chinese customs also played a role. Chinese bearing the same surname were 
traditionally considered patrilinearly related. To marry a fellow Chinese with the same 
surname was akin to marrying a sister or brother, or incestuous. For Singapore 
Chinese, albeit in decreasing numbers, adherence to the rule of surname exogamy 
remained an important commitment. As surname exogamy already was considered as 
breaching an honoured Chinese tradition, to even entertain thoughts of marriage with 
a partner who was not even Chinese, seemed ludicrous in the "psycho-logic" of the 
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majority of traditional Chinese. Even among many so-called liberal Westernised 
Chinese families, inter-communal marriage was often seen as a shameful event when 
it occurred in the family and something to be concealed at all costs from kith and 
kin.117 Since most students started following English-medium education, however, 
more community barriers were broken down than in the vernacular streams. 
The approval of inter-communal marriage sofar discussed, however, refers mainly to 
a tolerant attitude; inter-communal marriage is another matter as it refers to actual 
behaviour. Discriminating behaviour is a more common phenomenon than a negative 
attitude towards other ethnic groups.118 
As it appeared, the actual number of inter-communal marriages in Singapore was low. 
A study into inter-communal marriages revealed that the pattern or marriage rate had 
remained relatively stable over the ten years after independence of Singapore.11' Even 
though the approval rate increased with the younger generation and with better 
education, the cultural identification and cultural distance among Singaporean 
communities remained very strong. Even in communally mixed HDB estates, the trend 
was towards forming cliques of the same ethnic group and dialect whenever given the 
choice. Moreover, although the bulk of the younger generation shared English as their 
first language, they were very conscious of each other's ethnic and dialect background. 
Their identity and loyalty was strongly linked to their own community.120 
Indians were the ones to marry the most inter-communally. This framework of 
reference made them overestimate the willingness of the Chinese and the Malays to 
marry across inter-communal lines. However, the development of mestizo groups in 
Singapore was limited. After the sex ratios had evened in Singapore after the Second 
World War, the mestizoisation for the Babas had declined. Their lifestyles had become 
rather modern Chinese than a mixture of Malay and Chinese. 
These results did not support an integration theory for Singapore. It was unlikely that 
Singapore would become a communal melting pot such as Hawaii. Simultaneously it 
also seemed unlikely that any community in Singapore would totally vanish. Where this 
happened, such as with the rural Chinese in Thailand121, uneven sex ratios had a great 
influence. Since the sex ratios in Singapore were balanced, this did not occur in 
Singapore. The lesser perceived danger of erosion of cultural identities also appeared 
to occur mainly superficially, such as in use of language or way of dressing. Basically, 
Singapore had remained a communally plural society of roughly Chinese, Malays, 
Indians, Eurasians, Europeans and "others". Singapore had - contrary to popular beliefs 
- increased its cultural complexity since its independence.122 Nonetheless, ethnic and 
cultural differences had been soothed under the common umbrella of economic 
development, due to the fact that it could be demonstrated that all ethnic groups 
registered significant economic advance.123 
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6.3 Dynamics of needs and expectations 
Modernising societies evoke different needs and expectations in their population. Based 
on the rising expectation theory of Davis124 that fulfilment of needs gives rise to new 
needs and ever higher expectations in life, Chiew and Ko predicted that Singaporeans 
would expect even greater and better socio-economic improvements in the future. 
Although one third of the respondents showed uncertainty about their future, three 
quarters of them thought that their children would be better off than they were 
themselves. The majority of the respondents thought they were better off than their 
fathers and the female respondents thought they were better off than their mothers. 
Surprisingly, however, still more than a quarter of the respondents in the class studies 
evaluated themselves as worse off in the economic sense or the same as their fathers. 
This feeling increased as the personal income decreased; most of these low evaluators 
were from the low income groups and they were doing less well in the economic area 
than their peers. While the economic and technological changes developed faster than 
the social structures in the Singapore society125, they could have become disappointed 
in their personal advancement. Thus, in spite of a majority showing themselves 
optimistic about the future, Chiew and Ko did not deem this result strong enough to 
confirm Davis' hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, despite the negative feeling of some who stayed behind in Singapore's rat 
race, the needs and expectations of especially the younger generation had progressed 
along with the general upward socio-economic mobility, although their quality of life 
already had improved. A survey by Singapore Press Holdings in 1996 found that 60 
percent of the young Singaporeans aspired to own a private condominium or house, as 
opposed to living in the government-built high-rise apartments where they grew up. 
This in spite of the fact that the HDB-flats offered ample space compared to other Asian 
métropoles126 and that, compared to the houses their parents had to live in, most 
young Singaporeans had improved. Furthermore, many Singaporeans desired to own 
cars and if possible a Mercedes. More and more people started desiring more than they 
could afford. This, however, catered more to a social need for status than to a physical 
need for (safe) transport. 
This "Singapore Dream" led to a "grab-it-now" attitude.127 To fulfil their newly 
acquired needs, many were willing to "job-hop" to get ahead. Meanwhile, living costs 
in Singapore increased rapidly, especially house and car prices. 
As a consequence, the "fast-forward" atmosphere in Singapore gave rise to a certain 
social distress. 
Disappointments in life for the second independent generation might be related to the 
"paradox of affluence", as described by Hirsch.128 He referred to the phenomenon 
that as the level of consumption rises, an increasing portion of consumption takes on 
a social as well as an individual aspect. Meaning that the satisfaction which individuals 
derive from goods and services depends in increasing measure not only on their own 
consumption, but on consumption by others as well. For example, an individual may 
regard expenditure on education as a means of access to better job opportunities, but 
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as more people achieve that level of education, the utility of that expenditure declines 
in terms of obtaining the sought-after job. From this follows the concept of social 
scarcity: the good things in life are restricted not only by physical limitations of 
producing more of them, but also by absorptive limits on their use.129 
In Singapore this paradox meant for example that, even if incomes would keep on rising 
each year, not everyone would be able to live in a conveniently central location in a 
park with an unobstructed sea view. Nor could everyone who was highly educated and 
had integrity become Prime Minister. As affluence pervades society, there is 
competition by people for place rather than competition for performance. Thus the 
quality of life is not necessarily improved by creating more of the same. Rieger stated 
that the frustration in affluence results from its very success in satisfying previously 
dominant needs.130 Some of the symptoms of this "paradox of affluence" were already 
present in Singapore in the early nineties. Such as the increasing number of private 
cars, which started to congest the roads and made driving less convenient. 
The government tried to moderate the high expectations of younger Singaporeans rather 
than to accommodate them. It regularly pointed out that Singaporeans needed to keep 
on finding niches and work and save hard to keep up economic growth and reach the 
level of the presently developed countries. Expectations of continued high growth were 
constantly tempered. 
Furthermore, some questioned the relativity of needs in the Singapore society. They 
wondered whether one should strive to follow the Western developments. In an opinion 
article in the national paper The Straits Times Ong131 argued that that would be 
shortsighted. He warned that for example in Western democratic societies people would 
fulfil some "needs" at the expense of others. He tried to put the much discussed 
Westernised needs of his fellow countrymen in perspective: 
"More freedom? Can people in other countries have much actual say in the 
governance of their countries? In Western countries more freedom generally 
means seeing an X-Rated film, watch a strip show and read Playboy and 
Penthouse... I treasure the freedom of having supper with my son at a hawker 
centre at any time of the night without fear of being mugged. I have the freedom 
to vote for my preferred candidate to represent me in Parliament. I appreciate 
the freedom of having this article published. I must have the freedom to walk 
tall with head held high regardless of the colour of my skin. " 
Now the basic and more than basic needs of Singaporeans were fulfilled, the realm of 
the higher needs provided a new arena for discussion. According to Koh, a 26-year-old 
researcher: "The older generation was into survival. We are into self-actualisation."132 
Catering to these rising spiritual needs were Buddhist organisations in Singapore. They 
offered a modern Buddhist perspective on the quality of life. As Lu stated, "physical, 
social, spiritual and intellectual growth must be developed side by side, and they must 
all go along for the ultimate End of liberation from all suffering".133 
CHAPTER 7 
SINGAPOREAN IDENTITY AND VALUES 
7.1 The process of developing a Singaporean identity 
One of the main concerns of the new PAP government was to find a new independent 
identity for Singapore in order to foster unity in striving towards economic 
development. 
Before 1965 large numbers of inhabitants of Singapore already had accepted the island 
as a place of permanent residence and had come to identify their personal fates with it.1 
They were positively predisposed towards a national identification on top of their ethnic 
identification. However, at that time the label "Singaporean" did not exist yet. 
Singapore was a complex, polyglot society. There had been influences of various 
cultures with different values through a long process of acculturation during the 
colonisation period for more than hundred and forty years. In the early days Singapore 
culture consisted of Malay influences from the peninsula, Sumatra and Java; from the 
early nineteenth century onwards colonial British influences were added, Chinese 
influences from different regions in China and different dialect groups, Indian, Pakistani 
and Ceylonese influences. The most important cultural factor since the late nineteenth 
century was the Chinese, due to their numerical dominance. 
After its political separation from Malaysia in August 1965, Singapore stood with its 
back to the wall to formulate a new national ideology. It did not have the luxury of 
letting developments take place by itself, as the racial riots had forewarned a division 
of its population along ethnic lines. The fresh PAP government therefore decided upon 
a new set of generally acceptable values aimed at a common future. Given the multi-
cultural population, the PAP government tried to establish this new identity based on 
universal values not connected to any particular cultural tradition. Aware of the Chinese 
domination of the political and economic scene, the PAP went about it with due 
consideration for all involved, because members of the individual ethnic communities 
suspected the chosen values to be nothing more than a reflection of the Chinese, English 
educated elite. Simultaneously the socialists accused the government of being capitalistic 
with totalitarian political features.2 With regard to these sensitive political and cultural 
circumstances, the PAP set out to ingrain a common national identity with pragmatical 
values into the mainstream of the Singaporeans. The new identification process 
developed in two stages: first, there had to be a notion of a common Singapore apart 
from the different ethnic home countries; second, one had to find a balance between 
westernisation due to modernisation and an Asian identity. 
Initially Singapore academics were sceptical about a singular Singaporean identity. They 
believed that ethnic and national identification comprised incompatible loyalties in 
sovereign multi-ethnic states.3 
The notion of a culturally homogeneous nation-state was historically linked to early 
Western European nationalism.4 The objective of this doctrine was sovereign status for 
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"an identifiable group, a nation, as a social and political unit". By the time that national 
consciousness in the West gave rise to the imposition of cultural homogeneity, it by and 
large displayed internal unity and was marked by the absence of distinctive ethnic 
groups. This distinct history of these culturally homogeneous states posed a problem to 
multi-ethnic states such as Singapore.3 
Chew studied the identification-dilemma in Singapore, primarily based on the only 
national survey in Singapore pertaining to personal identification, cross-communal 
interaction and language loyalty, held in 1969. Chew's starting point was not the 
prevailing either/or approach of national and ethnic identity, but he tried to agnostically, 
empirically study the phenomenon. He was well aware of the individual oscillations in 
identity, with the criterion for choice of identification being situational.6 Nevertheless, 
an analysis of the survey showed a clear identification with their own ethnic group by 
both Chinese, Malays and Indians, whether the dimension was acknowledgement of 
traditional religious markers, loyalty to traditional languages or positive group self-
characterisation.7 The national identity was measured by questions about the 
individual's acceptance of a nationality label, an expressed positive affective 
involvement with national symbols and an expressed preference for own country over 
ancestral or other ones. All three ethnic groups scored high on this type of national 
identification, with the Malays showing relatively the strongest loyalty to their ancestral 
country. Slight shifts in ethnical composition of the Singaporean population had had 
negligible effects on national values and norms. 
Chew found an overwhelming evidence for a dual identity of Singaporeans with both 
a high ethnic and a high national identification.8 
According to Erikson "identity ... is a combination of old and new identifications".9 
Although the concepts of identity and identifications are disputed, this simple definition 
provided a good starting point for the Singapore case, in which the forming of its 
national identity was a process of old and new identifications. The government stated 
its goal as not to go from an old Malay identification to a new Chinese identification, 
because Singaporeans "understand Chinese numerical dominance, [but] the multi-ethnic 
character of Singapore society is as real to them phenomenologically, making logically 
and psychologically possible a national identification distinct from a Chinese 
identification."10 
The new identification process initially was set in motion by the PAP using several 
political tools; the rest developed as spin-off. 
The population was socialised into the direction of Lee's vision of a common national 
identity by three vehicles: political socialisation, interpersonal networks and minority 
status replaced by belonging to mainstream. 
political socialisation 
The PAP thought that people would have a greater chance of national identification if 
they used at least two mass media, had at least some primary education and if the PAP 
leaders visited the community centres. This finding was compatible with Lee's views 
and policies: "We want the mass media to reinforce...the cultural values and social 
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attitudes being inculcated in our schools and our universities."11 In Singapore this 
national inculcation was considerably facilitated by the fact that all radio and television 
stations were owned and operated by the government. The written press, films and 
theatre were closely monitored by the national censorship board. Clammer described 
this total information control as "his master's voice"12. 
Education was also a crucial PAP-tool of nation-building.13 According to Quah, two 
of the main goals of education in Singapore were to: 
1. shape young people into citizens of the nation-state following the 
underlying acculturation premise of a national identity 
2. train them as workers for the labour force. 
The schools were consciously used as "agencies of political socialisation", creating 
among students "loyalty to the Republic" and "appreciation of racial and religious 
tolerance". The daily school activities of flag-raising, flag-lowering and pledge of 
allegiance recitation emotionally reinforced the substance of political socialisation 
contained in the government-designed common content school curriculum.14 Students 
brought home this imprint of political socialisation and were expected to influence their 
families. 
The grassroots institutions (CCs, CCCs and RCs) were another vehicle of PAP-thought 
in Singapore. Through recreational and educational activities initiated by and carried 
out by these organisations, social and political values deemed to be desirable by the 
PAP leadership were diffused to the public. Consequently, those who frequented these 
centres had a higher national identification.13 
interpersonal networks 
Interpersonal networks played their part in ethnic and national identification. A 
progressively broader and less intimate network - "from Malay friends to inter-racial 
friendships to chatting with Chinese neighbours to visiting the local community centre" 
- formed the underlying thought for a higher dual identification.16 To promote an 
increase in inter-ethnic contact the government devised an integrative housing policy 
and instituted national public holidays divided over the various festivals belonging to 
the different religions. For the Chinese there were the Chinese Lunar New Year, Qing 
Ming (a kind of Chinese All Soul's Day), Yu Lan Jie (festival of the Hungry Ghosts) 
and the Mooncake- or Lantern-festival (middle of the Chinese eighth moon/month); for 
the Malays there were Hari Raya Puasa (or Ramadan), Hari Raya Haji (pilgrimage to 
Mecca for Muslims), Maulud (the prophet Mohammed's birthday) and the first day of 
Muharram (first month of the Muslim calendar year); for the Indians there were 
Thaipusam (penance festival of the Tamils) and Deepavali (Festival of Light, celebrated 
by Hindu's and Sikhs); for Christians Christmas and Easter were holidays. 
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mainstream 
The minority position of the Malays and Indians made them more aware of their ethnic 
identity than the Chinese majority group. Although the PAP government abstained from 
consistent, conscious attempts to sinify these minority groups and placated the various 
- mostly cultural - Chinese demands since 1979'7, daily social-psychological dynamics 
made them aware of their outgroup position. In the process of integrating with the 
Singapore identity, which was dominantly shaped by the Chinese, the Malays and 
Indians acculturated with the mainstream. 
Already in the early seventies the government measures began to bear fruit. Singapore 
had founded an industrial base for economic development and socio-cultural changes 
due to industrialisation sparked off new values and norms. Chen noticed a rising 
consciousness of a common Singaporean identity. Initially there was a general 
persistence in ethnic sub-cultures in Singapore, "even as the exclusivism and the 
parochialism of these sub-cultures have been slowly but steadily diminished by the 
impact of the West and by the policies of local Westernised political leaders."18 Tham 
recognised certain social sentiments that tended to draw individuals of similar ethnic-
cultural background together.19 However, not to such an extent that they could 
override growing government concerns about Westernising influences due to the rapid 
modernisation of the society. As Lee Kuan Yew said in a speech in Hawaii in 1970: 
"The question to the leaders of less developed countries is not whether or not 
to modernise, but how rapidly and how much of their traditional past they can 
retain, so that they are not just poor imitations of the West, with all the fads and 
fetishes, disorders and aberrations of contemporary Western societies."20 
Lee spoke of "intense" and "less intense" societies; the former being considered more 
favourable to development than the latter, which Lee associated with the Western 
societies. However, many in the government were educated in the West and were 
therefore familiar with its benefits as well as its drawbacks. The perceived 
disadvantages stimulated the PAP to keep on projecting a new Singapore identity into 
the future. They sought to emulate the achievements of the West, but not to copy its 
adverse effects. Lee Kuan Yew led with self-confidence, as was clear from his 
statement in the Singapore Year Book 196821: 
"We shall have a prosperous, thriving, multiracial Singapore. And nothing is 
more infectious than success. In the long run, Singapore will be the light that 
radiates hope throughout the region for similar successes of the multi-racial 
communities not unlike us. By example and precept our success will influence 
the formulae others are seeking to transform old-fashioned communities into 
modern industrialised and affluent societies." 
At the same time, Goh Keng Swee made clear that: 
"Whereas Singapore is a developing country and a member of the Third World, 
we differ from most of them in economic structure and level of social 
development... For instance, we believe that wealth is acquired by hard work 
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and astuteness sometimes aided by good luck, opposed to peasants who believe 
in spirits ... We do not have benighted peasants to modernize."22 
"Continuation of traditional cultures, however charming when read in the 
accounts of anthropologists, serve as a hindrance to the absorption of new values 
which are necessary in the efficient management of a modern economy. In 
Singapore we are not handicapped by problems of this kind. The impact of 
modernization on us is less painful because many of the values of the traditional 
societies have long been abandoned ... Our ancestors' values, nurtured in 
agrarian societies, have no place in a competitive trading outpost. " и 
According to Liu, the responses of the Chinese in the mainland of China to the West 
had already been through three stages since the nineteenth century: first defensive, then 
unduly adulatory of the West and finally a sober realisation that the West was not really 
all that good.24 Although this was not purely a reaction to the West itself, but also 
reflected the development within Chinese intellectual history and Confucianism25, this 
analysis was used as a framework for understanding Singapore's search for its identity. 
By the nineteenth century Chinese scholarly thought was rather eclectic and many 
compromises had already been made. The Chinese mind was set to find common 
ground with the West and to reconcile different claims. This frame of mind was also 
found in Singapore's quest. Singapore neither rejected its former Western colonisers, 
which is quite unique in a decolonisation process, nor did it unduly replicate the West. 
Singapore's search for a new identity eventually came down to striking a balance 
between Western and various Eastern values. This particular conscious development 
gave Singapore its distinct national identity and culture. According to Benjamin, who 
observed Singapore from an external perspective: 
"Singapore does indeed have a national culture ... in somewhat the same sense 
as an anthropologist might refer to the 'culture' of a standard textbook 'people', 
and that Singaporean culture has existed (but continued to change) for as long 
as Singapore itself has existed. "2 6 
Basing his definition of culture on the Durkheimian notion of a conscience collective, 
Benjamin noted that everyday social behaviour in Singapore as observed 
ethnographically was best understood as emerging from a situation in which cultural 
factors emanating from the national system as a whole weighed just as heavily as factors 
pushing up from the lowest domestic level. It was a two-way process of development. 
While ethnic boundaries persisted, the whole of Singaporean cultural values underwent 
constant and often profound changes. The pace of economic change took place at a 
higher rate than the change in socio-cultural structure as is often the case in rapidly 
developing countries.27 To stimulate economic growth, new values and norms were 
introduced and adopted by the modernising society. These were sometimes compatible 
with the traditional ones, but often they were in conflict with the traditional cultures. 
This way two socio-cultural systems could exist simultaneously.28 Chew29 believed 
that, although westernisation generally was eroding traditional ethnic cultures, it left 
sufficient distinctiveness in Singapore to let ethnic boundaries persist along with 
somewhat diminished ceiling levels of ethnic identification. 
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7.1.1. Asian values and "Confucian renaissance" 
While the younger generation in the West became critical of their own industrialised 
societies and showed a growing interest in Eastern spirituality in the seventies, the 
Singapore government undertook conscious attempts at reconciling Singapore's 
westernisation process due to modernisation with the retention of the Asian cultural 
heritage. Although one realised that it was easier to import Western cars, cola and pop 
music - symbolisations of modernisation to some -, than a participative education 
system, a free press and democracy - symbolisations of modernisation to others -, the 
government felt that Asian values should play a moderating and rectifying role. 
The appeal of an East-Asian development model would have to lie in the combination 
of an improved standard of living by modernisation with the retention of distinctly 
Asian values and social structures. Often the approach was critical. 
Ho, for example, raised the question: 
"Are we not perhaps paying too high a price by trading away the cherished 
cultural, philosophical and religious values for a modicum of material benefits 
and other social amenities which do not make people happier than they have 
always been? ... Indeed if a person becomes mentally depressed and disturbed 
by the rat-race which characterizes the materialism of an acquisitive and affluent 
society, if wealth breeds more envy, hatred and strife in society, then the 
advantage of economic growth and prosperity becomes an unmitigated hindrance 
to at least one of man's eternal quests for salvation from the tribulations of a 
competitive and contentious life. " 
Ho stated that at its best economic development merely increased the range and variety 
of human options, but in itself was not a recipe for a happier life. Drawing lessons 
from other rapidly developing urban areas in the world, he feared the unsettling and 
upsetting of those people "caught up in the maelstrom of social pressures, the frantic 
and savage competition to secure recognition, status and wealth"31 which could lead 
to mental disturbances, social 'dropouts' and criminality such as drugs, rape, sexual 
assaults and armed robberies. 
Wu suggested to "choose from the old and from the West, ideas, knowledge, practices, 
scientific discoveries and technological inventions and adopt or adapt them for modem 
and Chinese use. "32 He derived this attitude from the Confucian scholar Lu Shih-Chien 
during the Ming dynasty, who stated that the study of men's heart was central to 
Confucian learning: 
"Open your heart to accommodate the world's things; 
Humble your heart to receive the world's good; 
Steady your heart to discourse the world's affairs; 
Concentrate your heart to observe the world's happenings; 
Calm your heart to cope with the world's changes."33 
Wu pointed out that self-respect, self-reliance and self-confidence were enhanced by 
reviving traditional values such as these. Some, however, feared that this kind of re-
rooting would inhibit economic growth and could even lead to backwardness. The 
210 Singapore, a modem Asian city-state 
revival of Confucian ethics - also termed "Confucian renaissance" - was considered by 
them as an "emotional nostalgia" and an "impractical and backward move in the 
evolution of culture"34. 
Looking for "new" values which did not clash with the existing traditions, the PAP 
wanted to build on already existing Asian values. The problem for scholars and 
politicians alike was to identify common Asian values. If there would have been one 
distinct indigenous value system as part of an Asian culture it would have been easier 
to resist westernisation, but one could not speak of a uniform Asian culture. In 1975 
Rajaratnam, then Foreign Minister, said: 
"[I] doubt whether Asian values or for that matter anything Asian - Asian unity, 
Asian socialism, Asian way of life and so on - exists. It may exist as an image, 
but it has no reality. It is merely a convenient way of describing the 
heterogeneous, conflicting and complex network of beliefs, prejudices and 
values... Only as a geographical expression does the term 'Asia' have any 
reality."35 
Although Bacon distinguished six main culture areas in Asia36, Singaporean scholars 
mainly based their search for basic Asian values on the Chinese and Japanese culture 
in East Asia. They also sought values which were fundamental and relevant to the 
modernising process in Singapore. Compatible with Singapore's economic system, 
which Lee called "East-Asian, Confucian capitalism", the values the PAP chose in the 
early seventies, were37: 
multi-racialism 
social discipline 
ruggedness 
future-orientation 
achievement-orientation 
self-reliance 
patriotism 
technical development 
economic development 
These values were associated with modernisation, but an element such as social 
discipline for instance referred to the East Asian tradition in contrast to Western 
developments. 
As part of a discussion about modernisation and Asian values in Singapore38, the 
following questions were posed at a seminar at the University of Singapore in 1975: 
" (a) Are there Asian values? 
(b) Are there Asian values functional to the modernisation process? 
(c) Are these values intrinsic or should they be viewed from a purely 
functional perspective? 
(d) What values are worth cultivating? 
(e) What is the relationship between the existing and the projected value-patterns 
and stability?"39 
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These exploratory questions could not be answered yet. What was clear was that, due 
to Singapore's heterogeneous demographic character, multi-racialism was one of the key 
pillars of the government's approach of the people. Even though the Chinese constituted 
a dominant majority, the Malays and Indians were "given a clear place under the 
Singapore sun. "* 
Chen observed as the value orientations of Singaporeans of the mid-seventies41: 
receptiveness to change 
achievement-orientation 
materialism 
individualism 
Singaporeans showed "modem behaviours" such as: 
rationality 
expediency 
efficiency 
flexibility 
to some extent impersonality 
These characteristics on the one hand would accelerate the speed of modernisation in 
Singapore, on the other hand Chen, such as Ho, warned for the accompanying social 
and psychological problems, (see chapter 5) However, Chen trusted the ideology and 
attitudes of Asian intellectuals to rectify the adverse effects of modernisation. He 
suggested as new common values in Singapore42: 
1) group spirit and close employer-employee relationship 
2) mutual assistance and community life 
3) parent-child relationship and family life 
4) certain friendship patterns 
5) normative ideology and value concept 
In these values the growing concern about the negative effects of modernisation was 
reflected. One dreaded the more individualistic type of personality formation in a 
nuclearising society.43 The effect Wong expected of the transformation to smaller 
families in Singapore due to family planning in order to achieve population control, was 
a generation that would be better provided and highly competitive but also self-centred. 
She expected the generational gap to grow wider and intergenerational conflicts to 
become more tense. To balance this effect Wong called upon the government to 
encourage the young to keep on taking care of the old in the society44, which was one 
of the Asian traditions. As the government was repeatedly criticising the undesirable 
cultural trappings of Western technological imports and seeking improvement in the 
reassertion of Asian cultural values, this advice was taken to heart. 
Another trapping of the emphasis on economic development was the priority given to 
material aspects of life. Foreign Minister Rajaratnam criticised his fellow-citizens as 
follows: 
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"If the average Singaporean has a philosophy at all, it has its basis in the pursuit 
of material wealth. Money is the source of his dreams and, I suspect, of his 
nightmares as well." 
"Making money to make more money is sterile materialism. But using money 
to develop the other more important aspects of an individual's personality is to 
move from materialism into civilisation. "45 
Rajaratnam typified many Singaporeans as "barbarians" in the way they used money. 
He criticised the "happy pig philosophy" of many Singaporeans who considered sensual 
pleasures and animal needs as the end in life: 
"Human happiness is of a different order altogether. It has to do with things 
such as mind, spirit, courage, discipline, creativity, justice, law, order, 
achievement and civilisation. It has to do with responsibility to society 
- returning to society as much as, if not more than, it gave you. In fact, those 
who got more should give more, and those who give more than they get are the 
greatest of them all. Happiness is not something which descends like manna 
from heaven but is the fruit of effort, struggle, sacrifice, painful toil and 
relentless curiosity about everything."46 
Lu defended the Singapore citizens by pointing at the dilemma they were in. The first 
generation immigrants came to Singapore for the very purpose of making a living and 
thus money-making. On top of this the government made continuous efforts to promote 
economic growth and resorted to money as an incentive to good performance. This very 
likely reinforced the motive to make money. Given the Singaporean perception that 
money-making was beneficial to their society as a whole, the dilemma rose how to 
strive for economic growth without fostering an overly materialistic outlook of life.47 
Lu argued that "money-making should not be given a dirty name, for otherwise our 
destiny would be like that of some third world countries where human existence is nasty 
and indecent."48 However, Rajaratnam's sharp criticism led to confusion among 
Singaporeans: in the business context the profit principle was taken for granted, 
whereas in other contexts it was now treated as the root of many evils. The growing 
number of Christians learned to look upon excessive money-making unfavourably as the 
Bible advised not to store up riches on earth, because these would not last and could 
be easily destroyed by moths and rust49. Confucius professed a slightly different 
version: "Wealth and honour are what every man desires. But if they have been 
obtained in violation of moral principles, they must not be kept."50 To the orthodox 
Confucianist whether one is rich or poor is determined by his destiny; consequently, 
material comfort should not be his main concern in life. In fact, in traditional Chinese 
social hierarchy merchants were ranked lowest on the social ladder, below scholars, 
peasants and artisans. However, this stood in contrast with the importance of commerce 
and trade to the Overseas Chinese, who depended on it for their livelihood much more 
than their fellow countrymen in the mainland of China. Lu observed that it were 
successful "merchant princes" who were calling the tune in many areas of social 
activities in Singapore. The Singapore government compromised in this respect with the 
aim of survival in mind, because Singapore had no natural resources and it's economy 
depended on commercial activities. Therefore Lu introduced a distinction between 
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"common morality" and "business morality". The latter seemed to be a contradictio in 
terminis, but he argued that in a cut-throat free market economy one has to work with 
double standards in order to promote economic growth and create job opportunities. 
Pertaining to the former, Lu proposed that it was morally acceptable for an individual 
to be concerned with money-making, as long as he regarded it as the means to the end 
of enhancing comprehensive happiness both for himself and others. He noticed that all 
too often Singaporeans were only concerned with the ways and means of obtaining what 
they desired without seriously examining whether what they desired was really 
desirable. He hoped that the more advanced the nation's economy would become and 
gain international recognition, the smaller the gap would grow between common and 
business morality because moral codes of common morality would gain territory in the 
process of money-making.51 Lu argued that "the economic fruits are meant for our 
enjoyment and happiness. And it is our cultural and humanistic values that can guide 
us in how to make use of these fruits and decide for us the kind of happiness that is 
worth having." Confucianism could provide people with the joy of morality amidst the 
anxieties and worries in the modern society in the form of a clear conscience. 
Confucianism could thus be viewed, not as a replacement of the four major religions 
of Singapore, but as a viable alternative for those who did not belong to these 
religions.52 
As part of the government Rajaratnam also proposed two kinds of morality: individual 
and social morality. The latter meant accepting and obeying laws for promoting the 
well-being of the whole society; the former was to be aimed at perfecting the 
individual. Individual morality would most likely come from religious inspirations, as 
most religions would proclaim that a man cannot be perfect if all his efforts were 
simply directed at improving himself. 
At the start of the eighties, Lee realised that Singapore would need all the intelligence, 
adaptability and energy it had to keep up the growing economy. He outspokenly 
expressed his concern that Singaporeans had become too Westernised.53 Modernism 
and personal growth through higher education were perceived to have eroded the much 
desired core Asian values of loyalty, duty, filial piety, thrift, hard work and diligence. 
Nirenberg found it "unfortunate" that, while technological knowledge was so easily 
learned, "in abiding by and building upon social philosophies such as Taoism, 
Buddhism and Confucianism, we have been failures."54 Complacency, decline in work 
ethic and demands for more benefits for lower productivity were perceived to have 
eroded Singapore's competitive edge.55 As Singapore was expected to remain 
dependent on the global economy as well as on foreign investors and foreign 
governments due to its size and the nature of its economy, it could not afford to lose 
this competitiveness. Because this was perceived as the effect of westernisation, Lee 
therefore wanted to re-introduce Asian virtues. He stated that56: 
"Confucianist ethics, Malay traditions and the Hindu ethos must be combined 
with sceptical Western methods of scientific inquiry, the open discursive method 
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in the search for truth. We have to discard obscurantist and superstitious beliefs 
and practices of the East, as we have to reject passing fads of the West. " 
A common Singaporean identity had yet to be consolidated as well as a civic 
consciousness, concern and care for others and a spirit of self-sacrifice. The PAP 
translated its observations into an emphasis on productivity, excellence, intensified 
implementation of moral education in schools, the promotion of a Speak Mandarin 
Campaign as well as bilingualism, and on the encouragement and support of cultural 
activities. Moreover, to create a sense of national identity the PAP leadership 
emphasised Singapore's separateness, sense of achievement and superiority. It did so 
by annually organising a lavish and intimidating National Day Parade, playing national 
songs on radio and tv and inculcating the core values in the schools. On the one hand 
these efforts stimulated a sense of self-confidence in Singaporeans, but on the other 
hand it also bred an abrasive, arrogant attitude which alienated its neighbours, 
particularly Malaysia. By committing itself to the path of competitive, dynamic growth, 
Singapore not only created friction with its neighbours, but also posed strains within its 
own society. 
The language policies in particular formed an issue of discussion, due to the relationship 
between language and culture. 
Western cultural forms were particularly pronounced among third generation 
Singaporeans raised with the English language at home. More and more Singaporeans 
had become bilingual - speaking their mother-tongue and English -, but the growing 
preference for an English education due to its economic benefits and the increasing 
exposure to Western ideas and lifestyles through the mass media and travel, prompted 
fears in Singapore that the younger generation would suffer a loss of cultural ballast and 
a weakening of moral values.57 
Western and Chinese culture show distinct approaches: in the West positive or non-
normative theories dominate the social sciences, whereas the Chinese adhere to a 
normative approach, especially in political science, sociology and philosophy. In other 
words, Western culture is more concerned with knowledge about what IJ and Chinese 
culture about what ought to be. This normative ideology was reinforced by and 
attributed to the paternalistic ideology, the gentry concept and the Confucian tradition 
of the Chinese culture. To counterbalance the Western non-normative influence, 
emphasis was placed on bilingualism whereby the mother-tongue would be retained. 
These bilingual policies were not only intended to bridge the gap between the different 
lingual groups, but also in the hope that the younger generations would retain the 
socialisation with Asian values. 
However, the reality in Singapore rather became a division of the population by 
medium of education: mainly in English educated or mother-tongue educated. Among 
the English educated, whatever their ethnic origin, there was a greater degree of 
similarity and agreement in terms of values and attitudes than among the mother tongue 
educated.58 
According to Chua, the government intentionally let the little traditions in Singapore 
atrophy59. Initially the Chinese schools, neglected by the colonial government, had 
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played an important role in transferring the Great Tradition and its link to the little 
traditions. However, in the process of modernisation the learning of the Chinese 
language declined and a shift towards the English language took place, as this was seen 
as the most effective way towards economic development. This way the Chinese schools 
and the Chinese culture also took a backseat. While having no problem with this loss 
of the little traditions, the government did try to revive the Great Tradition by 
promoting Confucian ethics (as part of moral education in schools) and Mandarin 
instead of the several dialects. Not only would this common Chinese medium of 
communication provide access to the Great Tradition, but Mandarin also proved to be 
an economic aid in the growing business with China. It had a similar function as the 
English language for international business. One complication of this Mandarin 
campaign was that it turned out to alienate the English educated Chinese, because their 
touch with their cultural roots came from their dialects. 
Nevertheless, because a degree of westernisation due to modernisation was deemed to 
be irreversible, the key issue became which values to retain and which to discard. 
Confronting the scepticism about the compatibility of Confucian values with the 
emphasis on science, technology and economic growth, Lu proposed as the ideal 
Singaporean someone who possessed the combined qualities of an educated man as 
emphasised in both Western and Chinese cultures. In the Western culture, an educated 
man is primarily one who is able to do clear and independent thinking and to appreciate 
the joy of knowledge. The stress is upon intellectual goodness. In the Confucian 
tradition of Chinese culture, an educated man is someone with a moral character. The 
emphasis is on moral goodness. Ideally, an educated Singaporean should acquire both 
this intellectual as well as the moral goodness.60 Lu indicated sharply Singapore's 
dilemma in stating that Singapore was in the unique position to achieve the best of both 
cultural worlds, but concurrently ran the risk of falling between both worlds and loose 
identity. He warned that - with all its merits - English education had the one possible 
drawback of producing students who were "culturally uprooted and spiritually 
floating"61: 
"The danger is that [the young Chinese in Singapore] may lose their Asian 
cultural identity without really absorbing the humanistic core values of Western 
culture. They should be Westernized as far as science, technology, economics, 
modern management and the free spirit of inquiry are concerned. An English 
education can facilitate their knowledge and expertise in these areas. However, 
it would be an irreplaceable loss for them to be cut off from most of the 
Confucian moral values, particularly the more universal and lasting ones."62 
This discussion about moral goodness showed two weaknesses. First, in the East Asian 
tradition the discussion was mostly normative and lacked concrete application. For 
example, Lu63 mentioned the Confucian economic utopia where "the citizens hate not 
to exert themselves, so they work but not for their own profit" and a meaningful life 
in the Confucian sense as the wisdom of treasuring man's moral values and not losing 
faith in his potential power for the good, but without relation to the daily life reality in 
Singapore. He only indicated that it would be against the spirit of Confucianism to 
216 Singapore, a modem Asian city-state 
follow the minute details of Confucian moral codes. It would suffice to follow the 
Confucian perspective and to be inspired by the Confucian moral examples. Lu stated 
that "we have our specific ways of practising morality, which is unique to our time"64, 
but did not elaborate on it nor gave concrete examples. 
Second, due to the multi-cultural nature of Singapore, the government tried to place 
emphasis upon the universality of values so as not to offend or exclude any part of the 
population. However, as most scholars who delivered the preliminary thinktank work 
were ethnically Chinese, they were mainly deliberating Western and Chinese values. 
Schluchter observed: "It is not really a multi-racial society as everybody maintains, 
because you have seventy five percent of Chinese and the Malays were never really 
equal in terms of cultural heritage."65 
7.1.2. Development of Malay values 
The Malay self-concept was traditional and different from the Chinese to a considerable 
degree. For example, prejudice in Singapore had it that children in Malay families were 
reared too permissively. While studies substantiated a relative absence of early parental 
pressure on children to internalise the values of competition, status achievement and 
material gain, in matters pertaining to social and religious socialisation Malay parents 
showed great meticulousness and paid much attention.66 They just expected different 
modes of behaviour from their children than the Chinese. In a cross-ethnic study about 
values in Singapore it was found that Chinese and Malays differed the most in their 
priorities: Chinese valued economic advancement much higher than average in contrast 
to Malays who scored well below average on economic values, whereas Malays held 
religious values very highly in contrast to Chinese who gave religion a low priority.67 
These differing values prompted a more relaxed attitude towards economic development 
which did not fit in with the Chinese and the PAP's strive for modernisation. The 
Chinese approach towards the Malays was not on an equal base; it was rather one of 
a concerned father trying to help his unknowing child to grow up like him. Chinese 
scholars did not so much study the inherent value of the Malay view of life but rather 
the Malay life style and attitude as a problem to be overcome. For example, Tham's 
study stated that Malay parents in Singapore did show appreciation of the values of hard 
work, achievement, thrift, long-term planning, and self-reliance. They learned their 
children the importance of being serious in their endeavour. Much of this was done 
through reasoning, advice, and the citing of relevant examples rather than through the 
use of disincentives or punishment. Tham believed that the values associated with 
economic achievement were not fully institutionalised previously with the Malays, 
because they were not yet meaningfully and logically integrated in Malay life. This 
conclusion was based upon Erikson's socialisation theory that systems of child-rearing 
represent unconscious attempts at forming behaviourial-attitudinal configurations in 
human beings and their characteristics must reflect the economic needs and the historic 
milieu of the community in question.68 For the Malay community this meant that if 
economic needs were less important vis-a-vis other needs, socialisation would place less 
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emphasis on the securing of economic needs and more emphasis on social and aesthetic 
needs. For the other communities in Singapore which consisted of immigrants, 
economic needs would naturally be much higher than those of the Malays. 
Nevertheless, for the Malays in Singapore economic needs gained importance during 
the independent development period. This was parallelled by a growing 
institutionalisation of values associated with socio-economic mobility in Singapore 
which increased the cultural pressure exerted on children in Malay families to strive for 
economic security and advancement. However, although wealth gained importance to 
them, Malay parents would not moralize about it or use it to justify their actions and 
activities in work.69 
Tham distinguished two levels in the evolutionary process of inculcation of value-
objectives. First, individuals develop or acquire new value-objectives, adapting to the 
changing social and economic conditions. Second, they try to rationalise these value-
objectives, after having internalised them. Success obtained in the pursuit of value-
objectives would lead to the development of ideological beliefs or rationalisations which 
are moral justifications. In Singapore it was considered crucial to success in education 
and work to arrive at these moralisations associated with fulfilment of economic needs. 
The pace of value change differed for the various communities. As the Malays realised 
that they made relatively slower progress than the other Singaporeans in attaining 
success in education and economic development, they wanted to catch up with the 
mainstream (see chapter two). There were a few obstacles, however. Firstly, the 
Malays were less used to inculcation of values and concerns conducive to achievement 
in education and work than the Chinese. The second problem for the Malays was their 
increasing divorce rate. This appeared to be related to the Malay customary early 
marriages. Thirdly, in the area of education and training Malays encountered a vicious 
circle. There were few Malay role models for the younger generation, therefore there 
were fewer young Malays trained in science, technology and business studies at the 
tertiary level. Because proportionately few Malays completed high levels of education 
there were fewer role models. 
In the acquisition of the new Singaporean values induced by the government Malay 
leaders played an instrumental role. They made an impact on their own communities 
through the media and the Malay associations. For example, as the Malays became 
more urbanised and educated, a growing tendency was shown of young Malays 
marrying later, choosing their own partners and maintaining smaller families. Deviating 
from Malay tradition, Malay leaders propagated the virtues of late marriage and family 
stability. They countered the assumption that traditional Malay values were incompatible 
with the contemporary conditions. The values of science emphasising achievement, 
rationality and adaptability did not have to be relegating the teachings of the Islam to 
the periphery. Malay leaders emphasised that the teachings of Islam also attach 
importance to achievements in work and study and give recognition to hard work, 
success and self-reliance. They stated that it was the Malays' failure to guide their lives 
by Islam that was the cause of the problems facing the Malay community.70 
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Improvements in the Muslim law in the Shariah court regarding marriage and divorce, 
such as the régularisation of polygamy, assisted in the implementation of the new values 
set by the government.71 Section 90(2) of the Marriage Act stated that "no marriage 
shall be solemnized if the man to be wedded is married to any other person other than 
the other party to the intended marriage, except by the Kathi or with his written 
consent. " According to the Registrar of Muslim Marriages in Singapore the number of 
polygamous marriages in independent Singapore decreased72. The new laws of 
marriage and divorce were being enforced systematically with the aim of ensuring 
stability in marriage and family life. 
7.1.3. Selection of core values 
In the mid-eighties, according to the magazine The Economist, which conducted a 
survey of Singapore, "the 'Singaporean' identity has been born, but is not yet 
robust".73 
Cheng noticed that the cultural and institutional influences in Singapore were still 
overwhelmingly Chinese, despite the processes of modernisation and westernisation.74 
The Chinese dedication to work and a simple way of life were two features considered 
to be closely related to Singapore's economic growth. Industry and frugality were two 
sides of the Chinese coin of success. Throughout Chinese civilisation these two values 
have been exalted as virtues to be pursued and emulated. Laziness and extravagance 
were to be ridiculed and despised. The Trimetrical Classic, the first reader in the 
classical education that was learned by rote by children who first attended school, 
strongly extolled the virtue of industry and censured idling time away: 
" Industry is rewarding, 
Playing is not; 
Beware, beware, 
Have to strive, have to strive." 
Thus it was not found surprising that the older generation who migrated from China, 
put these cherished values of industry and frugality into practice. It was a common 
belief among the Chinese that through sheer industry and frugality everyone could 
become wealthy; for the purpose of the family, the younger generation and for the glory 
of the forefathers.73 The Chinese immigrants in Singapore started from scratch and 
showed extreme drive for material advancement. While they were keen to learn and 
adapt to change, culturally or religiously they experienced few obstacles to pursue 
material gain. Their strong concern for the welfare of their families reinforced their 
fluid social and occupational mobility to such an extent that the Chinese became well 
represented in all fields and at all levels of economic activities in Singapore. 
In the technical and economic areas modernisation did entail westernisation, but in the 
more personal areas one remained relatively Asian. 
Although Lee Kuan Yew warned that "an all-permeating Western influence could well 
mean the erosion of the Asian qualities of hard work and thrift - qualities that made 
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Singapore successful"76, he believed that a core Asian value such as strong family ties 
was still present. However, only on the level of the immediate family - father, mother, 
children. On the relationship with authority, he observed that by and large, 
Singaporeans were still law-abiding, but the older generation was "more deferential", 
respectful of Ministers and officials, than the younger generation. Lee thought that hard 
work still abounded, but that thrift had declined. Trust between friends had not 
deteriorated. He feared that "with time, with mobility, what Alvin Toffler once 
described as the disposable society may come about. " He thought that Singapore should 
continue pursuing change and progress in society "provided the core values remain. " 
Although the rapid economic and social changes diminished the role of the traditional 
organisational structures in Singapore, they by no means crippled the Chinese 
community. The rapid rise in standard of living in Singapore had increased the self-
confidence of Singaporeans who initially suffered from an inferiority complex due to 
colonisation. This had the effect of more interest in and respect for their own cultural 
background. When Western scholars paid tribute to the role of Confucianism in the 
economic growth in East Asia in the eighties77, the positive elements in this East Asian 
tradition were revaluated. The government played a crucial role in this and emphasised 
the importance of a selection of Confucian moral values conducive to economic 
development. 
Chan warned against attaching too much importance to this cultural aspect in the 
economic achievements: "...in case we go overboard in emphasising that all this is 
Confucian and the PAP must be reacting upon unconscious Confucian reflexes, it is 
important to remember that Singapore is multi-racial. "78 She thought that meritocracy 
and achievement orientation were merely practical solutions to the modernising process. 
On 11 January 1989, BG Lee, then Minister for Trade and Industry in Singapore, 
presented a speech on the national identity of Singapore79 in which he named four core 
values for the nation's development: 
" 1. community over self 
2. upholding the family as the basic building block of society 
3. resolving major issues through consensus instead of contention 
4. stressing racial and religious tolerance and harmony." 
The idea of the family as basic building block of society was reflected in the Chinese 
saying: 'mei you jia, mei you guo" (if you have no home, you have no country). 
Nevertheless, the core values were formulated in a non-political and non-religious way 
and were therefore acceptable to the various groups in the population. Quah, 
coordinating the study group on national values initiated by the government, proposed 
a modified version of the national values and two additional ones80: 
" 1) enhancing racial and religious understanding, tolerance and harmony 
2) preserving and maintaining the tradition of honest government 
3) harmonising individual interests with the interests of the community at 
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4) upholding the family as a basic institution of society 
5) showing compassion for the less fortunate in society 
6) resolving major issues through consensus as far as possible. " 
The debate about which values to adopt, to retain or to discard remained vivid in the 
nineties. Since independence a diffusion process of values had taken place, but because 
the Singapore society kept on rapidly changing, identity and values remained high on 
the political agenda. Mid-1991 Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong referred to Hofstede and 
Bond's research results81, giving the revived debate about the role of Asian values in 
Singapore's development a more academical inclination. To stay successful in the 
economic field, three core values which had facilitated the growth of the nation, were 
eventually selected to be stimulated and promoted82: 
1) hard work 
2) thrift 
3) group cohesion" 
These values were to be the cultural fuel for future economic development in the 
nineties. They not only linked up to the cultural history as well as the economic 
aspirations of the nation, but also to the continued concern, especially amongst elderly 
Singaporeans, about the cultural uprooting process of their society. The selected values 
were perceived as Asian counterbalance against Westernising influences. 
The first core value of hard work was meant to counter the alleged increased 
complacency under younger Singaporeans. This complacency was often attributed to 
Western influences, but different aspects of the younger generation were assembled 
under the common denominator of westernisation without scrutiny. For example, it 
could also be the more luxurious and safe environment in which the present younger 
generation grew up, which gave rise to a less prominent drive to work hard than the 
survival instinct of their ancestors. Although a trend towards less motivation to work 
hard was noticeable83, Singaporeans on average still worked harder than their peers 
on average in the West. Officially the average number of working hours a week in 
Singapore was 45 (in practice most worked much more, while overtime was not paid 
for84), compared to for example 38.5 hours a week in The Netherlands. Parttime work 
was - despite government recommendations -hardly existent. 
From a very young age Singaporeans were imprinted to strive for excellence and the 
education system was highly competitive. By all kinds of awards the workforce was also 
encouraged to be as productive as possible. Western peers were perceived as lazy by 
Singaporeans and the Western increasing preference of leisure over working time was 
hardly conceivable for Singaporeans. The idea that a society could have developed so 
far that increasing the standard of living could be counterproductive to the survival of 
the planet earth and thereby eventually its own survival, seemed an alien concept. There 
was no doubt about the continuing need for economic growth and hard work was the 
way to achieve that all-overriding goal. 
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The second core value of thrift seemed necessary because younger Singaporeans tended 
to spend more money than the older ones. Not only did they possess more money than 
their parents, but they also saved proportionately less. They were brought up in a 
strongly commercialised city, which on the one hand offered more temptations to spend 
their savings on and on the other hand put higher social demands on its population to 
belong to their nouveau riche environment. In an Asian society, where deviation from 
the norm was heavily frowned upon, this situation could easily drive more people 
towards spending in a cumulative way so as not to be perceived as inferior to their 
peers. 
Regarding the third core value of group cohesion, theologist Choong Chee Pang said: 
"There exists a real danger that younger Singaporeans may loose their feeling of group 
cohesion, because they are becoming more individualistic... People live more and more 
in their own isolated world, become self-centred and develop idiosyncrasies. We must 
strike a balance between these two. n85 
Growing individualism was generally perceived as undermining the stability of the 
society. However, again it is controversial to what extent the erosion of group cohesion 
was caused by westernisation. Singaporean features of meritocracy and commercialism 
probably also had substantial impact on the tendency towards increasing individualism. 
Both Chinese and English educated Singaporeans, roughly comparable to more 
traditional and more cosmopolitically oriented, shared the view that due to the social 
pressure to consume more and therefore earn and achieve more, other values such as 
care for the community and the less privileged86 were neglected. This complex of 
factors reduced the priority of group cohesion in daily life. 
7.1.4. Mainstream values 
In 1991 Kau and Yang published survey results about values and life styles of 
Singaporeans between fifteen and forty years old87. This age group formed the 
economic base of Singapore. As this type of survey was not held in longitudinal 
perspective, most interesting as pertaining to the issue of cultural development of 
Singapore were the differences between the generations and the relation between Asian 
and Western values. 
Kau and Yang's main conclusion was that Singaporeans as a group had fairly 
compatible values and were relatively open to new values88. 
As the most distinguishing factor between Singaporeans a Western/Eastern orientation 
was found. Three clusters of Singaporeans resulted: 37 percent of the Singaporeans 
showed more Eastern values, 14.5 percent more Western values and 44 percent showed 
a combination of both value-systems. 
The largest group, which adhered to an eclectic value-system, was labelled 
"compromisers". They did not have an outspoken opinion about religion, money or 
society. They were looking for life satisfaction in personal relations and especially for 
warmth and happiness. The most active part of the compromisers moderately held up 
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traditional values regarding family, education and morale, and was open to innovation. 
Their aim in life was to be socially and financially successful. 
The Eastern oriented group was strongly influenced by Confucian ethics. Family and 
relatives were the centre of their lives. They were highly motivated to success and 
regarded education as an essential preliminary. A large part of these Eastern oriented 
people had hardly developed their own values; they were being guided by their 
conservative parents. 
The Western oriented group mostly consisted of Christians and 'Free-thinkers'. They 
were individualistic, non-conformistic and found more satisfaction in non-material than 
material aspects of life. They were less success and status sensitive and showed a strong 
social consciousness. 
In the survey the youngest cohort (15-20 years) showed the least Western values and 
the most Eastern values.89 At face value this seemed contradictory to the expectation 
of westernisation due to modernisation in the economic development process. However, 
this Eastern orientation with young Singaporeans could be due to the fact that this age 
group was still influenced most by their parents. 
When Kau and Yang asked what Singaporeans would like most in their lives from a list 
of seventeen options, they chose as their most important needs: 
Table 7.1. Most important needs of Singaporeans in percentages90 
emotional: happiness" 56.4 percent 
success in work/study 35.2 
love 30.8 
freedom 21.7 
physical: health 51.2 
material : security 31.6 
social: friends 23.1" 
Needs for emotional fulfilment were most pronounced. A traditional need such as 
"luck" was wished for by only 3.4 percent of the Singaporeans surveyed, mostly by the 
Chinese and the older part of the surveyed (31-40 years). In general, most Singaporeans 
did not value position, status, reputation and power as highly important. Thus the 
efforts of the government to create a meritocratic society seemed to have had effect. 
While a similar study in Japan in 1984 showed a preference of wealth above material 
security amongst young Japanese92, the Singapore survey showed the opposite 
preference. This may probably be attributed to the much less secure and rugged society 
in Singapore. In the Japanese culture one traditionally was provided for from crib to 
grave, although this was gradually decreasing. Furthermore, the younger generation in 
Singapore tended to be less interested in wealth than the older one. Younger 
Singaporeans were rather looking for fulfilment of their emotional and social needs, 
whereas older Singaporeans attached more importance to material needs. 
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The younger Singaporeans (15-20 years) professed a stronger need for success, love and 
friends and less need for health, security and happiness than the older group surveyed. 
This difference could be partly due to the different life stage of both groups. 
Nevertheless, it was remarkable that the young had a more than double need for success 
than the old (48.17 versus 20.35 mean score). Young Singaporeans also showed 
dissatisfaction with their study-results. This came as no surprise, considering the 
omnipresent drive towards excellence and success in Singapore, which was reflected in 
a strong competition in education and a resulting "paper chase"*3. 
Singaporeans valued the material comforts they enjoyed, but only one third of Kau and 
Yang's sample was satisfied with the amount of money they possessed. The higher 
income groups appeared to long more for richness than the lower income groups, 
whereas the latter wanted more freedom. In general, the higher the income, the more 
the social and material needs grew in relation to the emotional needs. Although 
Singaporeans as a whole showed a strong motivation to get ahead financially (62 
percent, with only 4 percent who were not financially driven), the belief in the power 
of money was less in the younger generation. 
Kau and Yang concluded that individualism had increased in Singapore, but young 
Singaporeans had not become more materialistic. Therefore Singapore was a much less 
materially motivated society than one would expect in its stage of relatively high 
economic development.*4 Kau and Yang remarked, however, that: "We have not yet 
arrived in the post-material stage where one attaches less importance to the emphasis 
on material success. At this moment many still believe that money can solve most of 
their problems. They are rather conservative in their financial management, however, 
compared to the cohorts in other countries who are equally prosperous."95 
Kau and Yang expected a gradual continuation of the Singaporean values in the 
direction of more individualism and motivation to success, the former being perceived 
as more Western - although the causes could be pluriform - and the latter as more 
Eastern in the Singaporean context. In the field of the arts in particular individualism 
was deemed to be important to a creative development. 
As the development of the Singapore society itself seemed to instigate a process towards 
individualism and the high drive towards performance was linked to Confucian ethics, 
these cultural changes did not alienate the majority of Chinese Singaporeans from 
themselves. Interestingly, the Malay and Indian Singaporeans were more satisfied with 
their lives than the Chinese Singaporeans. This was attributed to the higher expectations 
in life by the Chinese. 
With regard to moral and social development, the younger Singaporeans showed more 
Western attitudes than the older ones. The beliefs that "filial piety is very much alive 
in Singapore" and "family is the most important thing in life" gradually decreased with 
the age group: respectively from 45.6 to 29.7 percent and from 82.1 to 59.3 percent. 
More than two third of the older sample population believed that a woman's life was 
fulfilled only if she could provide a happy home, against 50.9 percent of the middle 
group and 47.5 percent of the youngest group. Surprisingly the youngest Singaporeans 
disapproved most of pre-marital sex (59.9 percent). They also preferred a career over 
224 Singapore, a modern Asian city-state 
having more children.96 The older Singaporeans were more inclined to do things 
traditionally than the younger ones and felt more that things were changing too fast. 
However, this could be expected due to age. 
Although Singapore's core values were carefully studied97 and were formulated in a 
universal way reflecting beliefs and attitudes of its plural inhabitants, the selected values 
were often associated with Confucianism and thereby the dominant Chinese culture. 
This stereotype was not substantiated by the results of the value survey, however. Kau 
and Yang's study showed that the majority of all ethnic groups believed in the 
importance of the family, with the Chinese even less than the Malays and Indians; the 
majority of all ethnic groups found it important to feel part of a group; the Chinese 
were the least careful in spending money and were least cautious in buying on credit; 
and the Chinese preferred working smart over working hard more than the other 
groups. Moreover, in the cultural respect the non-Chinese showed certain Confucian 
attitudes more than the Chinese themselves. For example, the Malays were more 
traditionally oriented - such as more respect for authority and a more traditional role 
of the woman - than the other ethnic groups (30.2 percent against 26.8 and 14.2 percent 
of Indians and Chinese respectively). Although the Chinese were most conservative in 
their moral ethics, such as pre-marital sex, they were most willing to tolerate it. Most 
of the Malays felt the society was changing too fast (77.7 percent, Indians 69.6 and 
Chinese 49.5 percent). The greater majority of Singaporeans wanted to be well read and 
well informed (around 80 percent) and was in favour of conforming to social norms in 
combination with a lack of interest in rebellion. 
The 1992 general elections showed that a common Singapore identity had replaced the 
emphasis on former communalism; the population had other, far more pressing 
problems. Communalism had become a non-issue in Singapore in the nineties. In that 
sense the nation-building efforts of the government had been successful. Nevertheless, 
while some form of Singaporean identity had been forged since 1965, Singaporeans still 
rather spoke of a Chinese, Malay and Indian Singaporean than of a Singaporean 
Chinese, Malay and Indian. 
The government therefore retained its dual approach. On the one hand contents of 
nation building messages remained unchanged, such as in the citizens' pledge, 
collectively cited at national events: 
"We, the citizens of Singapore 
pledge ourselves as one united people, 
regardless of race, language or religion, 
to build a democratic society 
based on justice and equality 
so as to achieve happiness, prosperity and progress 
for our nation. " 
Citizens' pledge 
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On the other hand Prime Minister Goh believed that multi-racial tolerance did no longer 
need higher priority than socio-economic upgrading of the whole society. He therefore 
not only asked community-based organisations to reaffirm their commitment to 
multiracialism so they would not work against one another at the expense of the overall 
national interest. Goh also wanted these organisations to focus on uplifting the less 
advantaged in their own communities. He acknowledged there had been unease with the 
establishment of the ethnic self-help groups MEND AKI (Malay), SIND A (Indian) and 
CD AC (Chinese Development Assistance Council), because some felt this was a step 
backwards in nation-building. However, Goh felt that these institutions would primarily 
function as an economic aid. They were supposed to upgrade their own ethnic 
communities by raising standards of education and solving social problems. Goh trusted 
that the nineties were very different from the fifties in this respect.98 
According to Yeo, the nature of being a Singaporean was bound to be a paradox. He 
suggested that: 
"If we only look inwards, Singapore has no meaning. Singapore has meaning 
only if we look outwards. It's very difficult to find anything that is uniquely and 
exclusively Singaporean. It's easier to define what is not Singaporean than what 
is. The search for a Singaporean culture ... requires us to look outwards."99 
Nevertheless, Yeo defined the contemporary Singaporean society by three 
characteristics: 
1. civic life 
2. instinctive sensitivity towards others 
3. an ability to reflect the diversity of the world. 
By civic life he understood "the way its people maintained a sense of unity while 
celebrating diversity. They were tolerant towards others, abhorred extremism of any 
kind, believed in old-fashioned values such as the importance of education, filial piety 
and hard work, and dismissed gimmicks and fast and easy solutions". The sensitivity 
towards others was reflected in the development of "a Chineseness, Indianness and 
Malayness which were uniquely Singaporean, yet never exclusively Singaporean. For 
example a Singaporean Chinese having a party would take care to provide halal food 
for his Malay guests. This is not an instinct of a Chinese from Hongkong or Taiwan. " 
Looking back Yeo called Singapore's early development period "an aberration., a time 
when the young nation, faced with newly gained independence and political uncertainty, 
had to look inwards to discover its own nature. We retreated in order to discover 
ourselves." However, now with the major institutions - including the armed forces, 
judiciary and government - established, "it was time for Singapore to look out and 
resume its former open cosmopolitan nature ... For the old immigrant generation, there 
was never any doubt. Now, having an external dimension will bring us back to where 
we were." 
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These cultural remarks were - as usual for the Singapore government - interwoven with 
economic goals. The new economic policy for the nineties was to become 
internationally active, for which an open attitude was deemed to be necessary. 
7.2 Development of religions and views of life 
Following Malinowski's belief that religions are generally adaptive100, one could 
hypothesise that the rapid economic development and modernisation in East Asia would 
have changed the landscape of religions in Singapore too. 
According to Ho, Asians have often been stereotyped as spiritual in the West, 
irrespective of their cultural, ethnic, historical and religious specific characteristics. 
They have been supposed to be preoccupied by moral and transcendental issues so they 
think little or nothing of wealth and material comfort. Their attitude towards the 
environment was supposed to be without intention of conquering or subjugating it, but 
trying to adapt to and fit in with the given scheme of things. At first this kind of Asian 
values was not deemed to be compatible with modernisation and was perceived as a 
serious obstacle and inhibition to economic development. For instance, work habits and 
attitudes needed for industrialisation, such as punctuality, regularity, difficult manual 
dexterity, efficiency and perseverance in monotonous work, were believed to be 
generally lacking in Asian countries. However, Ho pointed out, these are stereotypic 
generalisations of Asians as a whole by Westerners101. He countered this stereotype 
by emphasising Asia's wars and violence and mentioning the enormous diversity in 
Asian values. Lee Kuan Yew made a distinction between the development of East-Asia 
and of South-Asia not only by politico-economic conditions, but also by view of life. 
He noticed that South-Asians emphasise the spiritual aspects of life more, whereas East-
Asians are more pragmatic and materialistic102. 
Now Japan and the NICs have shown that East-Asian countries are able to modernise, 
some Westerners fear a decrease in spiritualism in these modernised former developing 
countries, projecting their experience of Western industrialised countries that 
modernisation and economic development introduced materialism and consumerism at 
the cost of spirituality. Furthermore many Asians fear that modernisation goes hand in 
hand with westernisation which - in their view - brings along a decrease in moral values 
or at least a moral vacuum. 
With regard to the question to what extent a similar process as in the West took place 
in Singapore, one can detect a transformation in values and identity due to the rapid 
modernisation, but in a different direction than expected. 
In the first place, in contrast to the Western stereotype, Singaporeans had never 
particularly been a spiritual people. As described in chapter two, they were foremost 
an immigrant population trying to improve their standard of living which made them 
materialistically oriented. Thus a perceived lack of spirituality in Singapore was not due 
to the modernisation process. 
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Secondly, major traditional religions, such as Buddhism, Taoism and to a lesser extent 
Hinduism, did give way, but rather in favour of other religions than a spiritual and 
moral vacuum. Lee Kuan Yew expressed himself "in favour of a man believing in 
something rather than believing in nothing."103 More than fifty two percent of the 
Singaporeans considered religion an important part of their lives, especially Muslims 
(90.9 percent) and Christians (76.5 percent). According to 1991 statistics eighty six 
percent of the population of ten years and above professed to some religious faith or 
spiritual belief.10* The largest religious shifts took place from Buddhism and Taoism 
to free-thought and from free-thought to Christianity. Muslims could not change their 
religion. 
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Figure 7.1. Intergenerational shifts in religion 
As Singaporeans saw it, they had not become less spiritually inspired during the 
modernisation process, but in a more compatible way with their modem lifestyles. Most 
Singaporeans had not abandoned spiritual and religious influence, but merely changed 
religion. Moreover, reentry there was a revival in adherence to Buddhism in its adapted 
form. 
more free-thinkers 
The number of people called "free thinkers" had been growing since Singapore's 
independence. In 1969 Tamney studied the reasons for this religious shift. His starting 
point was the already existing large discrepancy between the percentage of the total 
Singaporean population which professed to have no religious affiliation (7 %) and the 
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percentage of Chinese students at the University of Singapore (50 %)106. The students 
without religious affiliation mainly had parents with a Traditional Chinese Religion. 
Chinese Traditional Religion 
The hypothesis that the decline in Chinese Traditional Religion could be part of a 
general decline in religion under impact of urbanisation and industrialisation, was 
rejected. The growth of Christianity and the stability of the number of Muslims served 
as arguments for the invalidity of this hypothesis. The idea that the religious labels were 
empty of meaning was also discarded. Tamney measured this by inquiring into the 
frequency of religious rituals at home. This did not appear to be related to the change 
in religious affiliation of the children. Tamney then wondered how, given the strong 
cultural stress on family loyalty and continuity among the Chinese, he could account 
for the rejection of the parents' religion, as he saw it.107 He concluded that the decline 
in Buddhism and Chinese Traditional Religion was related to the content of these 
specific religions and modernisation.108 The growth of science and transition from a 
rural to an urban life had decreased loyalty to the traditional Chinese religions. Both 
Taoism and Confucianism expressed, in one way or another, the aspirations and 
inspirations of the farmer.109 Therefore, the identification of Chinese university-
students in the urban Singaporean environment with the imported, traditional religion 
of their parents was low. The gap in background alienated them from the religion's 
contents. As an example, Tamney observed: 
"This clash between science and religion is continually present to those educated 
people who participate in traditional rituals. For instance the funeral ceremony 
often involves the preparation of elaborate paper images such as cars, houses, 
aeroplanes to be burnt in order that the deceased may have these objects at his 
disposal in the next life. This only makes sense if you believe that through the 
alchemy of fire these paper objects are not truly destroyed but transmitted to the 
other world. To those who do not so believe what can their reaction be but 
scepticism to this scene - "The paper servants flanking the deceased's 
photograph and the 'chauffeur' of the paper motor car, are taken outside and 
lectured by the priest on their duties to the deceased. The 'servants' are advised 
to be honest and hard working, and the 'chauffeur' is warned to be sure to drive 
carefully. Finally the ceremonies are concluded with a bonfire of all the paper 
images."110 
"Such a scene appears absurd if alchemy is denied, and science directly 
challenges the basis of alchemy."111 
Chan explained the collapse of Taoism in China in a similar fashion. With the 
advancement of science and education in China, the Chinese masses learned that 
fulfilment of human desires did not come from chasing away evil spirits nor from 
praying to benevolent deities.112 
Ancestor worship presumed the existence of an extended family to give meaning to life 
and death. When families were small such as in Singapore, the maintenance of 
ancestral links was likely to be of less importance. In 1964 Elliot113 already noted 
that the state of neglect into which burial grounds had been allowed to fall, indicated 
the decline of kinship organisations directed to ancestor worship. 
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In 1992 the Singaporean government decided to widen the Pan Island Expressway. In 
order to accomplish this project an ancient Chinese cemetery had to be removed. 
Singaporeans were called upon to claim their ancestral graves in order to agree on 
further proceedings. The response was remarkably low.114 
Considering Wertheim's115 observation that all religions seemed to be purifying 
themselves as they attempt to adopt to modem times, one would expect the Chinese 
religious praxis to adapt to its new environment as well. However, a Chinese reform 
movement in Singapore long appeared to be absent. The reason for the lack of 
adaptation of the Chinese religions in Singapore was given by Tamney as: "First, the 
priests and monks are considered corrupt; and second, there is precious little 
organisation."116 Concurrently a system of religious education, crucial in a time of 
needed reform, was absent. Neither did the Buddhist laity undertake any attempts at 
reinvigorating their religion. This was "related to the peripheral role this religion 
played in the lives of Chinese even when it was a dominant influence on the mainland 
... It is probably because of strong family relationships that the Chinese related in such 
limited ways to their gods."117 The priority placed on the family was also reflected 
in Hsu118, who emphasised 
"the very low status (in fact a sort of outcast status) traditionally assigned to 
Buddhist monks. Monks were men who left their families of origin, remained 
celibate, and never for the rest of their lives used the first or last names they 
used before entering the monkhood. Chinese monks, in contrast to their Western 
counterparts, were always treated like the scum of the society." 
The Chinese attitude towards religion was utilitarian. Religion was a source of help, 
not providing a sense of community. Tamney observed that Chinese culture in general 
seemed structured on the paradigm: "family; community; all other relations: 
utility."119 They were socialised into a culture based on the premise that the family 
is a source of meaning. Tamney predicted that, as long as for most Chinese the family 
remained the source of meaning and community, Chinese religions would continue to 
decay. Although the breakdown of the Chinese family meant that something else, and 
for some it could be religion, must give meaning to life.120 
In the nineties, youngsters in Singapore still practised certain traditional customs, but -
especially the English-educated - did not realise the meaning and context, similar to 
the celebration of Christmas in many Western countries. 
Therefore the Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations updated the Chinese 
religions by publishing a book on Chinese customs and festivals in Singapore. Its 
survey among 1,025 households in HDB-flats in 1988 showed a growing apathy for 
Chinese festivals, customs and rites amongst younger Singaporeans.121 Wee Cho 
Yaw, the president of the federation, mentioned three explanations for this tendency: 
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1. Many don't know the significance of these festivals, customs and rites 
and there is a confusion between Chinese traditional practices and 
religious practices. 
2. There is a bewildering mass of customs and rituals by the various dialect 
groups; therefore they discard all of them. 
3. There is a lack of relevance of the practices. The Chinese rituals, 
formulated and practised by a largely agrarian society, seem irrelevant 
in a modern, urban society like Singapore.122" 
The Federation of Chinese Clan Associations did not promote regressive traditionalism, 
as some viewed the reviving interest for Asian cultures as rendered out of date.123 
Wee admitted that blind observation of rites and practices 
"has no place in a highly educated nation like Singapore ... The forms of the 
rituals .. must adapt to the changing social environment if they are not to 
become outdated and extinct. What is more important and should not change is 
the underlying premises and moral values of these rituals. The survey confirmed 
that Western influences and the predominance of the English language is slowly 
but surely eroding Chinese customs and rituals in Singapore... [We] hope that 
younger Singaporeans will at least understand and appreciate their rich cultural 
heritage."124 
Chinese pragmatism was shown in the example given of contemporary and local 
adaptation of funeral rites. The Chinese clan federation proposed amongst others the 
following simplification: 
".. unnecessary wastage can be reduced and the sorrow of the bereaved family 
alleviated. Historically Chinese funerals were viewed as public demonstrations 
of filial piety. We believe that it is more important to show love and respect for 
one's parents when they are alive. Their deaths should evoke a sense of 
personal loss and funeral rituals should be conducted in a dignified manner 
befitting the solemn occasion."125 
Traditionally funerals were intended to show filial piety to the deceased by sending 
paper symbols of their material possessions along to the other world. However, as it 
reflected the person's situation on earth126, it also became a display of the deceased's 
wealth to the society. The more extravagant the funeral, the more honour was thereby 
bestowed upon the family. In the nouveau riche, but still traditional Singapore, one still 
encountered traffic jams due to the passage of buses and trucks loaded with colourful 
banners, floral tributes, musicians and life-size paper houses and cars. The spaces 
under HDB-flats were regularly occupied by instant-made sort of temples set up for a 
funeral. The "unnecessary wastage" referred to this elaborate display of wealth and 
filial piety. 
As the raison d'être for the preservation of the Chinese traditional festivals, the clan 
associations stated that they reinforced the concept of the family as the cornerstone of 
society because the family provided occasions for family gatherings and reunions. 
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Local Buddhist organisations also tried to regain interest among younger Singaporeans. 
They "strived to update and fine-tune their organisational structures and methods of 
worship in response to the need of an increasingly sophisticated population. However, 
the basic tenets and teachings of Buddhism, such as the traditions of free inquiry and 
the practice of tolerance, love, compassion and benevolence towards living beings, 
have largely been retained."127. 
Buddhism revival 
Probably due to the local adjustments of Buddhism to the modem society of Singapore, 
in the late eighties and mid-nineties interest in this religion clearly increased. 
Parkin stated that, contrary to the assumption of "many people ... that modern 
education and the rise of the technological society would substantially reduce, possibly 
eradicate, interest in Chinese Traditional Religion and its practices ... there is still a 
great deal of active interest and it is by no means confined to the elderly."128 
syncretic 
In 1991 Kau and Yang surveyed the remainders of folk-beliefs in Singapore by asking 
amongst others to what extent respondents let their lives be conducted by superstition. 
The specific questions enquired about the use of geomancy in the choice of a house and 
the refusal of the number 4 in a registration or licence number (4 is an "unlucky" 
number to the Chinese). Only few Singaporeans responded positively to these direct 
questions. However, the term "superstition" may have made the respondents reluctant 
to admit a socially less valued behaviour. The questions could have been too specific 
or there could be a gap between attitude (in this case intended behaviour) and 
behaviour. 
Praxis seemed to be more syncretic. In daily life Singaporeans did show a number of 
traditional folk beliefs, but these were considered something private. According to a 
woman who lived in an extended family in a four room HDB-flat: "My parents are 
Buddhists and as a Buddhist you don't want to force your ideas upon others. They just 
live their lives and we live ours. We never argue or discuss anything. If we do things 
differently, it is our business."129 
Customs and rituals could often be observed in daily life in Singapore, not just separate 
places of worship. For example, in the nineties many Chinese taxi drivers still had a 
small statue of Kuan Yin, goddess of mercy, on their dashboard to protect them. 
Chinese funerals in particular remained traditional. Perhaps the biggest transformation 
it had undergone in modem Singapore was that the deceased now mostly was placed 
on the bier in the public, open space underneath his or her flat instead of in his or her 
own house. The bier was surrounded by a colourful sort of tent and many seats for 
mourners and visitors. One still put a photograph of the deceased near the bier and 
burnt incense. Family and friends still came to say goodbye at the house and ate and 
drank like it was a party. The funeral still usually took two to three days. The rituals 
remained the same; the improved wealth just provided the opportunity to send entire 
paper houses and cars along to heaven instead of just paper money and to surround the 
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deceased with numerous flower displays instead of just some flowers. In status-sensitive 
Singapore one could regularly spot an entire bus full of banners and flowers to 
accompany a funeral. 
The first class international Regent hotel in Singapore was said to have bad feng 
shui'30. It had to complete a costly renovation before it attracted more guests. Feng 
sftui refers to using the good cosmic energies of the earth to build or design the interior 
of above-earth constructions. This belief originates in China and is based upon the wish 
to live in harmony with the five natural elements: fire, wood, water, earth, air. 
Many Singaporeans showed a dual attitude towards these kind of belief systems.131 
For example, a Singaporean managing director of an international firm stated he would 
not consult a geomancer in buying a house, but that he would avoid the Regent hotel 
(before the renovation was completed), because "you never know..". Rationally he 
denied the socially low-valued belief, but in his behaviour he followed his emotions 
regarding the issue. 
Often popular beliefs were neither committed to nor rejected. Although people did not 
profess to these kind of beliefs as a religion, they upheld a number of traditional 
customs based on them. For example, the vice-president of an international 
accountancy firm with a particularly rational image used to return to the office building 
during the holidays to open up all office doors on Chinese New Year to "let the good 
spirits enter". 
Luck was a key concept in these traditional folk beliefs. For example, the fourth (an 
"unlucky" number) floor of a new building often was the last one to be occupied; the 
eighth (a "lucky" number) was very popular.132 Sometimes streets skipped house 
number 13.133 When business was slow, some smaller businesses did not alter the 
sales or management strategy, but relocated or re-named the shop after having 
consulted a fortune-teller. 
Young Singaporeans often made some kind of compromise towards these folk beliefs. 
While they were aware of certain customs, they did not believe in it themselves, but 
went along as far as their parents were involved to whom they paid respect. For 
example, when a Singaporean Christian woman gave birth, she was to stay home in 
confinement the first four weeks after delivery according to Chinese custom. 
Traditionally, women were considered unhygienic in this period and were not allowed 
to receive visitors. However, she soon got bored and invited her friends to come over 
when her parents were out. She remarked: "Well, those are the Chinese customs. 
However, we, younger people, are modern and we don't have to stick to them." 
Simultaneously she did not want to confront her parents with her deviant ideas and 
behaviour. To keep the harmony in the family she made this compromise. 
The rebellion against authorities, parental advice and ancestral traditions, as known in 
the West, was subdued under the influence of Confucianism in Singapore. Filial piety, 
however, did not prevent Singaporean youngsters from constructing their own, modern 
life style. They would avoid a direct conflict with their parents or elders, even if they 
would have to lead a double life. For example, a young Chinese Singaporean man 
would keep on dating an American woman in secret although he knew his parents 
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disapproved clearly of Americans. He was not going to tell his parents until after they 
had married, as he expected them to be against divorce and to value the family ties too 
highly to reject him.134 
The Chinese belief in forms of shamanism did not disappear. It survived until the 
nineties (1992) as was shown in a study by Tong, Ho and Lin135. They found that 
77.5 percent of the Singaporeans practised Chinese Traditional Religion. Shenism was 
the most common form of religious praxis (46.3 percent). 
As was also reflected in the re-publication of Elliott's ethnography of 1955 in 1990, 
the basic beliefs in the spirit-world roughly remained the same. However, while the 
structural-symbolic dimensions of Shenism did not change, the socio-cultural 
dimensions were adapted to the modern development of Singapore136. Under the new 
circumstances the xianfa practitioners emerged, a contemporary form of spirit-
mediumship. In comparison to the traditional dang-ki, they appeared to be more secular 
and less mystical. The replacement of dang-ki by xianfa practitioners was a response 
and adaptation to modern urban living conditions'37. In Housing Development Board 
flats (in which the majority of Singaporeans came to live) the elaborate equipment used 
in the dang-ki rituals and rites was not practical. According to Ju, the xianfa 
practitioners fulfilled the needs of the religious laity in a new environment: 
"Despite the influence of modernisation and urbanisation, the religious goal of 
the Chinese is still found to be firmly entrenched in the very practical business 
of avoiding hardship, illness and misfortune by the propitiation of those deities 
which can influence human fate... Kinship ties and group solidarity have also 
suffered much attenuation as a result of modern urban living. New forms of 
religious and social organisations have sprung up to create a new form of group 
solidarity that is so important in the social life of the Chinese. Viewed in this 
light, the Xianfa Zongtan and its branches could also be seen as some form of 
an 'association' where those afflicted with problems could search for an identity 
and at the same time satisfy their religious needs."138 
Ju was reluctant to predict any decline of the dang-ki due to the emergence of xianfa-
practitioners. 
The fact that these Shenists did not show up in the national census as a distinct group, 
could be due to their claim of being Buddhists. Ju explained this phenomenon by the 
high regard held for canonical Buddhism as a religion by the Chinese because of its 
strict doctrines and principles139. Furthermore, many objects of veneration appeared 
to be Buddhist deities and some beliefs overlapped. Ju observed the acceptance of the 
Buddhist concepts of "predestination" and "rebirth", but a focus of these Chinese 
Singaporeans on solutions to their worldly problems, in contrast to the spiritual 
objectives of Buddhists. In 1990 Elliott classified the consultations from shén as 
regarding140: 
" 1. Trouble arising from physical suffering or derangement 
2. Trouble attributed to occult factors 
3. The need for gambling tips 
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4. Family troubles 
5. The desire for communication with the dead 
6. The desire for news of friends and relatives in distant parts 
7. The need for business advice 
8. The need for protection in court cases 
9. The choice of auspicious dates" 
Where divination used to serve this psychological function in times of crisis as well as 
a need for cultural identity and perhaps even as a means of social control141, in 
present-day Singapore these needs were fulfilled in various other ways. As far as 
cultural identity and social control were concerned, these were taken care of by the 
government. According to Chen142: 
"This new national set of values implies the breaking up of the traditional 
ideologies and the traditional ways of life among the three major ethnic groups 
in Singapore. To meet this new challenge, the individual's social and economic 
rewards in today's Singapore are based on the principle of competition and on 
his own ability, motivation and performance." 
As far as the psychological function was concerned, the younger generation of 
Singaporean women was much higher educated than their parents. They generally had 
more control over their own lives than their mothers and they had more options open 
to them to turn to in times of crisis. The number of local people frequenting the 
diviners had shrank due to modernisation processes143. The diviners nowadays were 
regularly observed around tourists and expatriates, but they most probably only used 
their services out of curiosity or as an exotic attraction, not out of shenistic beliefs. 
According to Choong, in Singapore the impact of modernisation and urbanisation on 
the practice of divination was especially evident in the field of geomancy. It was 
becoming increasingly difficult for the Chinese to practise geomancy in Singapore in 
view of the various government policies towards land conservation. Urbanisation had 
also affected the fortune-tellers who operated at stalls along the busy streets.144 
Heinze reported that in the early nineties "the belief in spirits is still the basis for 
automatic writing."145 However, it was most likely that Shenism mainly lived on in 
the secretive atmospheres of life such as Lim told about in her narrations about 
Singapore146. 
Chinese Singaporeans showed an instrumental approach to their traditional religion. 
Like in Hong Kong, Chinese traditions were not being cherished as something 
intrinsically sacred or good, but as a cultural resource to be tapped and utilised 
according to instrumental considerations. King spoke of a "rationalistic 
traditionalism".147 
more Christians 
More and more young Chinese Singaporeans were opting for Christianity. In 1991 
Singapore officially counted 12.6 percent Christians in the population of ten years and 
above.148 Many Christians, however, thought there were at least about twenty 
percent.149 Unlike in Western countries where more and more youngsters had 
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abandoned the Christian faith of their parents in the last few decades, in Singapore the 
process was the reverse. It seemed a status-symbol of modem independence to become 
a Christian. The analogy with the Western younger generation lay in the fact that this 
was a belief different from the previous generation and one was looking for a new type 
of fulfilment. 
Being a Christian in Singapore was not just an official denomination like it was for 
many in the West. It was a way of life for many young Singaporeans. Not only did one 
attend the weekly mass or service, but many Christians were actively involved in the 
extra-clerical activities as well and spent much of their leisure time on activities 
organised by their church committees. Some even spent their holidays abroad with their 
church group. Besides their work and family, often the entire social life of these young 
Singaporean Christians evolved around their church. It was also not unusual for them 
to marry someone from the same church. 
The Christian religion did not only seem to fulfil a spiritual need, but also a social and 
psychological. Belonging to a certain church offered a new identity. One of the first 
questions one asked after meeting someone new, was to which church one belonged. 
In the constantly changing society of Singapore, where traditional social structures were 
rapidly disappearing, social mobility was high and families were disintegrating, a 
church offered a new sense of community. 
Some Western priests were somewhat sceptical about this social and psychological 
function of the churches, as they doubted the authentic spiritual intentions of these 
Singaporean church-members. This form of Christianity, however, was rather an 
inculturated version. The Singaporean food- and communal eating-culture was for 
instance continued in the combination of the weekly mass with an elaborate informal 
joined meal in the Catholic church. Certain mass-prayers also fitted in the Asian culture 
rather than in the Western culture, such as for instance this prayer cited aloud by all 
in church150: "That the leaders of our country may instill values and meaning in life 
to all of us." 
Christians in Singapore distinguished themselves from other denominations by the fact 
that they attached significantly more importance to non-material dimensions in life, 
such as love151. They were also more willing to work in a non-profit organisation 
than non-Christians. Due to their often more Western than Asian attitude, these young 
Singaporeans had easier interaction with Westerners who influenced them with more 
Western ideas. Nevertheless, in the first place they remained Asians. 
A number of values of the Christian churches coincided with those of the Singapore 
government, such as modesty and care for others. To that extent these were willingly 
allowed. However, when the love and care stretched from the family to the lower 
socio-economic classes in society like in liberation theology, Christians passed the 
boundaries set by the more Confucian oriented government. 
In 1986 some Christian groups stepped up their activities to evangelise their form of 
Christianity. In their religious fervour these groups caused some disharmony. Even 
Christians amongst themselves were in competition. There was a distinct divide 
between the Protestants and the Catholics. For instance, the Chick publications were 
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offensive to the Catholic church.152 Khattar, past chairman of the Hindu Advisory 
Board, had heard some of the newer Christian groups say that they did not regard 
Catholicism as a religion. These groups said "not proper things about that religion or 
that belief.n,H 
The Hindu Advisory Board showed concern as a minority community in Singapore over 
the excessive and strong proselytisation in recent years.154 It was referring to posters, 
announcing a Christian seminar, pasted at the entrance of a Hindu temple. A door-to-
door campaign of certain Christian groups, whereby they knocked at households of 
clearly visible Hindu homes with a photograph of a deity or a number of mango leaves 
at the door, also caused irritation. Despite the reply of the inhabitants that they were 
Hindu, the Christians remained persistent. Yet another case was literature produced by 
a Christian group, depicting an Indian in a caricature form.155 
Probably the most sensitive to any attempt to convert them to other faiths, were the 
Muslims. The Malay-Muslim community showed itself upset by "misunderstandings" 
between Muslims and Christians. MUIS (Majlis Ugama Islam Singapore) received 
complaints about pamphlets by Christian bodies in their mailboxes and of being stopped 
in the streets by Christian missionaries. They were also annoyed by Christian 
publications with words like "Allah" and "Alkitab" in them, which Muslims consider 
to be specific to Islam and therefore misleading in the given context, especially to 
children.156 Some Muslims received extracts from an unidentified book, in which it 
was stated that Islam was "cruel" and "devilish" and encouraged "the killing of 
Christians".157 
The IRO had to intervene in organisations where the Christian evangelists offended 
people in their door-to-door-campaigns. The religious knowledge subject in schools was 
even "phased out" in the early nineties, because the government believed that it 
contributed to the revival of Christian evangelicalism.158 
In Singapore it seemed common practice for young Christian Singaporeans to try to 
convert friends and colleagues to their particular belief.159 Johnson, who counselled 
groups who were causing irritation to others, noted that most of them were very young 
and they knew nothing about any other religion than the one they were trying to 
propagate.160 
maintenance of religious harmony 
Despite the acquired harmony in Singapore at face value since the late sixties, on 18 
July 1990 the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill (MRHA) had to be amended. 
By the MRHA the people could be warned by a less severe Prohibition Order of their 
"wrongdoings" rather than by the Penal Code of the Internal Security Act. The 
distinction with the IRO lay in the fact that the latter pro-actively undertook activities 
to promote inter-religious harmony and the MRHA reactively sent warning signals in 
cases of inter-religious disharmony. Besides the opposition party, the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP)161, there was general consensus that it was better to prevent anything 
from happening than to have to cure it. Instances of crossing acceptable boundaries in 
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the process of evangelisation and proselytisation were reported by the Internal Security 
Department.162 
To prevent this type of interreligious problems, amendments to the existing 
Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill were proposed in 1990. Rai pleaded for more 
than tolerance alone. He called for respect of the respective faiths. The amendments 
were tentatively put in the form of the following questions163: 
" 1) whether to provide additional safeguards against abuse in the 
legislation. 
2) whether the language of clause 8 (1) (a) - a person carrying out acts 
which may lead to religious disharmony - can be made less 
subjective. 
3) whether clause 8 (1) (d) - exciting disaffection against the President or 
the Government - should be confined to instances where the person is 
doing while or under the guise of practising or propagating a religious 
belief. 
4) Whether an order could be made against a person who is not member 
of any religious group but commits acts which may cause enmity, hatred, 
illwill, etc. between different religious groups. 
5) whether the term "Prohibition Order" should be altered. This term was 
perceived to be too strong for a preventive order and should be more 
accurately "restraining order". 
6) whether provision should be made for continuity in the membership in 
the PCRH (Presidential Council for Religious Harmony). 
7) whether provision should be made that at least two-thirds of the PCRH 
should be representatives of the major religions of Singapore."164 
The government approached Singapore's multi-religiousness in an economic fashion as 
a healthy pull between several competitors for the "soul-market". However, the rising 
concerns for social unrest at the end of the eighties triggered the amendments to the 
MRHA. The minority religions in a sense asked for protection against the more 
predominant religious groups, which had the means to influence people in a manner 
"that may appear to be unfair to the leaders of that [minority] community."165 This 
could easily lead to negative reactions or more religious fervour from the other religion 
in tum. Khattar indicated the danger of a free market of religions; it could make 
religious groups aggressive and they would have to offer or at least promise advantages 
based on their religion in order to attract people to their religion. Religions such as 
Hinduism, whose underlying religious beliefs were liberal and broad based, would 
easily become underdogs in such a system. Khattar, attached to the Hindu Advisory 
Board: "We say that our religion has its weakness as well as its strength, but is has not 
got a dogmatic religious militancy about it."166 Pillai also indicated the lack of 
evangelical fervour in Hinduism compared to some of the other religions and feared 
that the in itself passive religion might become militant such as in India, due to 
provocation by agressive marketing of others. He considered religion as consisting of 
ritual, mythology and philosophy; the latter basically shared by all religions. Therefore 
the Hindus were not against conversions, only against agressive marketing which 
increased polarisation.167 
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Quek Kiok Chiang, president of the Singapore Council of Christian Churches (SCCC), 
stated that the Christian churches "have never been guilty of, nor will we ever carry 
out activities to promote a political cause of a political party under the guise of 
religion; or excite disaffection against the President or the Government of 
Singapore."168 This a-political stance of the Christians in Singapore seemed an 
adaptation to the Singapore political environment. Quek stated in parliament that "there 
is what is called Liberation Theology, which we strongly oppose, because it seeks to 
overthrow constitutionally elected government by Marxism and Marxist ideology. This 
is now world wide, even in Christian circles. So it would be good if we exclude 
Liberation Theology from Singapore."169 BG Lee Hsien Loong, then Minister for 
Trade and Industry and second Minister for Defence, said that liberation theology was 
a legitimate religious issue in some countries, because of the difficulties of the social 
situation there. However: "In Singapore, we believe it is not."170 
Nevertheless, there was a distinct rejection of leftist inclinations in the government of 
Singapore, as was amongst others shown in the statements of SDP member of 
parliament Chiam See Tong: "...all these cases cited in the White Paper, except of 
course for the Marxists, the so-called Marxists comprising the members of the Catholic 
Church, they had all been dealt with successfully..."171. 
Ling How Doong, chairman of the SDP, argued172: 
"More often than not, you would have discovered that the actual manipulators 
or the instigators were foreigners. Ban them, pack them off, de-register 
whatever organisation they are having here. I suppose that would be the end of 
the whole thing. I think one must again bear in mind this factor in Singapore. 
Pardon me for saying this. The present day religious people are not like the 
days of old, where there was blind faith, blind obeisance. The majority of 
people who believe in this sort of religion think that it is a fashion. It is a 
fashion as well as a peer syndrome. " 
The Christian churches in Singapore ran a number of social projects, such as homes 
for senior citizens, day care for the elderly, medical climes and financial and food 
services for the poorest Singaporeans. Quek felt that these kind of social activities were 
obligatory for Christians.173 
Khattar brought up the difficulties in separating politics from religion. He mentioned 
that poverty could be a just cause for a religion to take up, but poverty has got political 
connotations too. A section of the community could be poor due to lack of privileges 
in the law.174 
Regarding the attempts to separate religion from politics, BG Lee questioned religious 
groups about how they would go about an issue such as abortion. This is an issue in 
which the Singapore government regulations differ from the views of several religions. 
It became clear that open campaigning against abortion, as was done in Western 
countries, was considered to cause a lot of disharmony in Singapore and was therefore 
not deemed to be suitable. Complying with the government, Mufti Syed Isa, 
representing the Muslims in Singapore, brought up the multi-racial, multi-religious, 
multi-lingual and multi-cultural character of Singapore175, which could make open 
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debate of controversial issues very chaotic. He called for a more organised manner of 
finding solutions. This was a remarkable attitude for Muslims, as Islam makes no 
distinction between religion and politics and explicitly states that Islam covers 
everything and is universal.176 In this way MUIS made its position in Singapore 
acceptable and non-threatening to the government. Muslims being a minority in 
Singapore, MUIS took an open attitude. Syed Isa cited a verse from the Quran which 
says: "You have your religion, we have ours. " However, he also emphasised that the 
Muslims in Singapore did not want interference. If that would happen, they would 
denounce it and that could lead to adverse consequences.177 However, the 
circumstances in Singapore generally led the religious groups not to do unto others 
what they did not want others to do unto them. The Muslims in Singapore considered 
the best way to persuade others to follow in their religious footsteps to provide an 
example of the goodness of Islam.178 
An opinion poll by the National University of Singapore Students' Political Association 
showed that 74.1 percent of the students agreed that religion and politics should not 
mix, 15.9 percent disagreed and 10 percent was uncertain.179 Although some 
indicated there was a grey area between religion and politics, they still believed the two 
should not be mixed in order to prevent communal strife. 
The plural circumstances in Singapore combined with the political climate made the 
religious groups cautious in their ways of expression. If not, the MRHA bill would call 
them back to order. The interest of the society as a whole had first priority in 
Singapore. As the Mufti said: "MUIS will always be mindful of the role it has to play 
in the interests of society."180 In order to survive, the religions had to adapt to the 
national policy of inter-religious harmony. That meant not always expressing their 
conscience, even if it considered a non-sensitive issue. BG Lee implied that religious 
leaders should refrain from expressing their economic views.181 
BG Lee suggested that if Buddhists, who constituted the majority in Singapore and 
were generally not concerned with political matters, would take a different approach 
and speak out their Buddhist conscience on social and political matters, it could bring 
many difficulties. 
It was not so much the act of expression per se in Singapore, but rather the process it 
could bring about. If one religious group would express a distinct opinion, other 
religious groups would probably feel compelled to speak out their conscience as well. 
Given the interreligious differences, in this way conflicts could easily arise. Therefore 
it was considered up to both the religious majority as well as the minority groups in 
Singapore to guard the state of harmony in the best interests of the country. All 
leaders, whether religious or national, were expected to "serve the interests of society 
and the nation."182 This was an element which cropped up in every discussion on 
national issues. 
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commercialisation 
One of the most visible effects of modernisation which affected traditional customs was 
the commercialisation. Already months before Christmas Singapore's main shopping 
area was lined with the most extravagant Christmas displays, whereas only 12.6 
percent of Singaporeans was officially Christian. Commerce was the main reason, like 
in China. As an elderly Chinese shopkeeper pragmatically put it: "Christmas is for 
everyone. If you're religious or not religious, you can still enjoy it. It's a happy 
festival."183 
Analogous to the months-long boosting of buying presents for Christmas, the Chinese 
custom to give hong bao's (red packets containing money) at Chinese New Year was 
transforming as well. Was it tradition to give only one hong bao per single family 
member at this occasion, in the nineties businessmen encouraged Singaporeans to win 
as many hong bao 's as they could by consuming as much as they could and then giving 
them to as many people as they could.184 
This type of commercial use of traditions and customs was acceptable to Singaporeans 
judged from the lack of protest against this. They did protest against other kind of 
advertisements; a tv-commercial promoting the start of a family at a younger age was 
withdrawn and rewritten after complaints about potential misunderstandings that women 
should not work any more. This message would be in contradiction with government 
policies. 
7.2.1. Re-rooting 
The rapid economic development and accompanying increased standard of living 
instilled in Singaporeans a national pride, which was amongst others translated into "re-
rooting" attempts in traditional Eastern values. 
In 1994 Senior Minister Lee stated that East Asia had no more need of the West for 
its economic development185 and showed concern about the loss of cultural heritage. 
The Singapore government and a large segment of the Chinese community were said 
to be sincerely and genuinely interested in their Chinese roots and therefore made 
attempts at a conscious "re-rooting" of their society. MacFarquhar pointed out that the 
Singapore government had the unique self-confidence to imbue its citizens with a set 
of values from a tradition and use it to the general benefit of the population. This was 
one of the advantages of the so-called authoritarianism in Singapore, according to 
MacFarquhar.m 
In the re-introduction of Chinese culture, care was taken of the acceptability of the 
Confucian values not only to the total Singaporean population, but also to the evolving 
modern society. International scholars were called upon to interpret amongst others 
the Confucian classics for a larger moral education programme, in a contemporary way 
as to make them suitable for the school textbooks. This was introduced in 1979 and 
1980. Pupils could freely choose from Bible Knowledge, Buddhist Studies, Hindu 
Studies, Islamic Religious Knowledge, Sikh Studies and Confucianism. In a study of 
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1991 Buddhist Studies appeared to be first priority among students, second Bible 
Knowledge and third Confucian ethics187. 
In 1983 the Institute of East Asian Philosophies (IEAP) was established as a centre of 
Confucian studies. In the nineties, however, both the moral curriculum and the IEAP 
were halted. The IEAP more or less continued as institute of political ideologies. 
Besides its educational efforts, the government simultaneously conducted a Speak 
Mandarin Campaign and Courtesy Campaigns to return some Eastern culture to the 
Singaporean society. Kuo found it ironic that all these re-rooting efforts were made in 
a time of weakened "little traditions" due to the changing social conditions. The 
traditional conveyor of folk Confucianism had been the dialects, but instead of 
promoting these dialects to inculcate Confucian values, the government conducted a 
Speak-Mandarin Campaign (a new language to many Singaporeans). So the stimulation 
of the official Chinese Mandarin language seemed paradoxical to the wish to re-
introduce Confucianism. However, in its strive to form a common national identity the 
government had to chose a new medium to reach as many Singaporeans as possible. 
Kuo noted the remarkability of Singapore as the first English-speaking Confucian 
society in the world. What kind of Confucianism, however, was still in the making. 
Kuo doubted the impact of the education system on the cultural values of the younger 
generation of Singaporeans by pointing at the other socialisation agents of family, peer 
group and mass media.m In modem societies the development of mainstream values 
is partly influenced by the mass media. To what extent remains a debate, but certain 
is that they do exert a growing influence in societies where socialisation processes are 
shifting from parents to television. The English channels of the Singapore Broadcasting 
Corporation (SBC) boasted a growing viewer number over the years. In Singapore, the 
fact that English had become the first language of the younger generation, made the 
young Singaporeans most vulnerable or open to Western values by the American and 
British tv-programmes. Chan modified this assumption by noting that many 
Singaporeans were also greatly influenced by the Chinese programmes from Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, which offered a traditional package of values.189 There was also 
a Malay Muslim channel. As Singaporeans could switch between several channels 
according to their needs, they in fact chose their own influences. 
Moreover, television provided the Singapore government with another opportunity to 
try to inculcate desired values. In the early nineties the Singapore Broadcast 
Corporation (SBC), Singapore's single tv-organisation, was privatised, but the mass 
media were not entirely released to the market demand. The addiction to passive 
amusement and the lack of moral direction was to be avoided. The Singapore 
government therefore maintained its impact through the Censorship Board. The 
Censorship Board selected which information was acceptable to be shown to the 
Singaporean public and which not. This information filter attributed to a negative image 
of the Singaporean authorities in the West. The Singaporean censorship of magazines 
and television programmes did not stroke with the fundamental human right of freedom 
of expression, which was based on Western values. The Singaporean selection of 
contents according to "good taste" often revealed different values from the West. For 
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example, the Singaporean Censorship Board used to cut out scenes with sexual 
connotations, whereas Westerners often were astonished by the amount of violence 
shown in the Singaporean media. 
The re-rooting process was not an easy one, as there was still discussion about which 
Confucian values were compatible with modem Singapore and which not. Sometimes 
"Confucianism" was a somewhat easy label for a desired set of new values, because 
there were a number of aspects unacceptable to modern people. Shils thought that a 
Confucian aspect of subservience of individuals to the state, for instance, did not fit 
into a modem society. Shils argued that knowledge, the product of intellectuals, was 
usually growing as a society was modernising. This knowledge, in his opinion, should 
be available to all people. It should not be made exclusively available to one most 
powerful group of people. Furthermore, Shils argued that intellectuals should have the 
opportunity to analyse their fields of specialty in all its aspects. If a society was to 
progress or to make effective use of its traditional past for that matter, one should have 
all the knowledge one could get. At the beginning of modernisation in the West, 
intellectuals became superior to rulers. The idea grew that eventually science could 
replace politics, scientific knowledge could replace morals and moral responsibility. A 
strong tendency among Western intellectuals took root towards derogation of the 
political sphere, alienation from authority, an a-political or anti-political attitude and 
an association with revolutionary tendencies.190 In Confucianism this kind of 
contracting out of politics would be unthinkable. At the same time Confucianism was 
not about putting the scholar at the disposal of the ruler. It left some autonomy to the 
people, but Confucianists just believed they needed guidance and direction.191 
7.3 Influence of MNCs and Western expatriates 
Multinational companies (MNCs) play an important role in the development of Third 
World countries. Their capital, know-how and production capacity are perceived as 
important stimulators to the local economy. However, the relationship is generally 
more beneficial to the MNCs than to the developing country; the average growth of 
turnover of MNCs is double to triple as rapid as the GNP growth of most developing 
countries.192 Often MNCs play off governments of developing countries against each 
other for their investments. These foreign investments are a desirable good, because 
of the expected advantages to the developing countries: first, more employment; 
second, more income; third, transfer of technology. However, van Slageren commented 
that this contribution of MNCs to the economic development of Third World countries 
might be overestimated. With reference to the first advantage, he argued that the direct 
employment contributed by MNCs generally is little, indirect employment is hard to 
measure and MNCs drive local entrepreneurs out of the market. The expected 
advantage of more income is also less when taken into account that tax benefits and 
other facilities to attract MNCs by the government have to be deducted from the higher 
salaries in the MNCs. Last but not least, the transfer of technology is also limited, 
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because most MNC activities in developing countries involve labour-intensive rather 
than capital-intensive industries which require little advanced technology. Moreover, 
patents, spare parts control and service are mostly protected by the mother countries 
of the MNCs. 
Critics often argued that governments who welcomed MNCs sold out their interests and 
therefore created a situation of "dependency". The core of the argument was the 
observation that MNCs were generally more powerful than a local government and 
were therefore able to influence the country's development to their own benefit. In this 
scenario, which could be applied to many Third World countries"3, the powerful ally 
themselves against the workers and small local firms. The corrupted elite deprives the 
masses of necessary social reforms. Economic development is to be viewed as relative 
only, because sophisticated techniques and information are not passed on to the local 
people. This way competition from the country invested in and autonomous 
development is prevented. This development of a new type of economic dependency 
of developing on developed countries is often referred to as neocolonialism.1*4 
The power relationship between Singapore and the MNCs was different. The position 
of Singapore vis-a-vis the MNCs was so strong that it has sometimes even been 
referred to as an example of "dependency reversal".195 
From the start of independence Singapore's economic "game" was a win-win strategy: 
"the more for you, the more for me"196. 
In 1960 an industrialisation programme was launched. In the period 1960-1965 import 
substitution in combination with protection of domestic industries was the main game. 
However, unemployment remained high, the domestic market was too small and a 
common market with Malaysia failed to materialise. Amongst others for these reasons, 
the government switched its strategy towards export-oriented and labour-intensive 
industrialisation following political independence. The Economic Development Board 
(EDB)197 viewed direct foreign investments (DFI) as complementary to domestic 
resources. The advantage of DFI over alternative resource inflows was that it was 
packaged to incorporate funds, management, production and marketing technologies. 
Furthermore the foreign investors would chose their own type of business which they 
expected to be successful and as such took the risk of failure.198 This new economic 
strategy coincided with a rapid expansion in world trade in the sixties and Western 
MNCs looking for export platforms to offset rising domestic costs.199 Singapore 
enjoyed the advantage of starting relatively early in attracting these MNCs. It was 
therefore hard to say who needed whom more: the MNCs a country with lower costs 
or Singapore the foreign investment of MNCs. The Singapore government, "being 
competent, noncorrupt and united"200, was in a position to play MNCs off against 
each other, particularly by ensuring that those admitted were not predominantly drawn 
from a single country. The government also derived power from its political strength 
and the nation's economic attractions. Requests from investors, e.g. that their workers 
not be compelled to join a trade union, were turned down by the government. "There 
has never been any doubt in the minds of the people at both ends of the relationship 
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[the government and the foreign firms] as to who has the sovereign authority."201 The 
Singapore government was able to strike a balance between foreign interests and 
political independence. 
Full employment was created by around 1972 due to buoyant labour-intensive 
industries. However, external factors (rising protectionism in the West and increased 
competition from low-wage countries) as well as internal ones (rising wages, tight 
labour market, slow growth in productivity and difficulties in recruitment and social 
absorption of foreign labour) pressured the government into an economic restructuring 
in 1979.202 Singapore's third economic phase was intended to facilitate a transition 
towards high value-added and high-technology industries. 
To avoid mistakes from other developing countries long term measures for internal 
manpower development were taken: a strong emphasis on education and training, 
increased emphasis on research and development (R&D) and a selective investment-
promotion strategy. The Singapore government wanted to make sure that the economic 
growth was accompanied by a transfer of information and knowledge. Besides that, all 
economic policies, however diverse, were aimed at one objective: to create a 
favourable foreign investment climate based on political and social stability, 
harmonious industrial relations, an efficient infrastructure and attractive investment 
incentives. 
That this economic strategy worked was shown by the enormous industrial growth. An 
United Nations Industrial Survey Mission (1963) estimated the volume of foreign paid-
up capital in the manufacturing sector, which was the core component of the Singapore 
economy, at around S$75 million in 1960, constituting 29.7 percent of the total equity 
capital invested in that sector.203 Most of these investments were oriented at the 
domestic market. 
According to a Ministry of Trade and Industry study in 1984 foreign equity investment 
in manufacturing grew to S$778 million in 1970 and S$8,203 million in 1981. EDB 
data of 1986 showed that foreign investment in gross fixed assets in this sector grew 
from a total of S$157 million in the period 1960-1965 to a cumulative total of 
S$12,180 million in 1984.204 Between 1968 and 1973 rapid growth took place in 
foreign investment, manufacturing production, employment and exports. The new 
industries were mainly branches of foreign MNCs. Singapore became the country with 
the most impact from MNCs.205 Their share in the manufacturing sector increased 
from 31.4 percent of gross output in 1962 to 54.5 percent (plus 15.9 percent of more 
than half foreign-owned companies) in 1985, accounting for 14.1 percent of 
employment in 1962 and 41.6 percent (plus 11.8 percent of majority foreign 
companies) in 1985. In 1982 58 percent of the total industrial employment and 83 
percent of the industrial production in Singapore was in their hands.206 In 1986 each 
of the twelve large foreign MNCs had more than $11 billion207 invested in Singapore, 
more than any local firm's investments. Singapore being a leading centre for petroleum 
refining, ship-repairing, oil-rig construction and an export platform for electronics, the 
foreign firms were much more export-oriented and less labour-intensive than local 
firms. Among the major capital-intensive industries, the foreign-equity share in 1985 
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ranged from a high of 84 percent in petroleum refining and petroleum products to a 
low of 4 percent in beverages preparation. 
Among the labour-intensive industries, the foreign-equity share ranged from a high of 
87 percent in electronic products to a low of 11 percent in printing and publishing.208 
However successful, in the face of the threat of imminent business downturn 
Singapore's MNC-strategy, originating from the mid sixties, became a focal discussion 
issue. The government's standpoint was that Singapore had little economic choice but 
to use foreign investments to develop the economy. Goh Keng Swee, the financial 
master mind behind Singapore's development, preferred economic growth by DFI over 
development aid. "One result of foreign aid received by Third World countries is to 
increase the burden of debt service payments - interest and capital repayments. This 
growth rate far exceeds the rate of GNP or of export earnings. "m Goh thought that 
vanquishing poverty and achieving a better life was largely a matter of applying 
knowledge and techniques already in use in other parts of the world, suitably adjusted 
to the local circumstances.210 Therefore Singapore, like the other NICs, worked hard 
to attract the MNCs. In 1977 he replied to Western critics: "In the last sixteen years, 
Singaporeans overcame seemingly impossible handicaps and obstacles. We are not 
likely to give up these hard-won gains for the nebulous ideas offered by armchair 
pundits in the West."211 
However, not only foreigners placed question marks with the alleged dependency on 
DFI, some Singaporeans also expressed their doubts. In 1983 Hakam warned that an 
overdependence on foreign investment for industrial growth and an increasing degree 
of protectionism in the world market rendered Singapore's economy vulnerable.212 
There was no doubt that Singapore's heavy reliance on foreign firms for export and 
low industrial linkage - typical for the industrialisation pattern in developing countries 
and often criticised for its failure to develop an autonomous, integrated industrial sector 
and to ease foreign exchange constraints213 - made the city-state sensitive to global 
recessions and resulting actions of the MNCs. Modem history showed that the two 
major world recessions of 1974/1975 and 1981/1982 also hit Singapore. The 1985 
recession made an economic recovery package necessary, which marked a fourth phase 
in Singapore's economic development. The other Asian NICs, where the export 
entrepreneurship customarily showed a more indigenous character, were less 
influenced. In 1972 the Singapore government had not foreseen that the world trade 
recession and unresolved currency problems would lead to the erection of antagonistic 
regional trading blocs. It also assumed in its economic policies that the neighbouring 
regional countries would not experience another major political upset in the near 
future.214 
The Singapore government, however, managed to cope with the economic setbacks by 
taking strict measures. A direct reaction in times of economic recession was for 
instance the controversial decision to influence the employees to freeze and even cut 
their wages in order to preserve return on investments for the MNCs and thereby jobs. 
On the other hand, when business was prospering, companies were encouraged to raise 
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wages accordingly215 and government and government related organisations often 
provided proportionately high bonuses which could add up to a half year's extra 
salary.216 This way setbacks were acceptable to Singaporeans in the long run. 
Furthermore the strict policies in times of recession were accepted, because the level 
of living was enhanced not only for a small elite, but for the total population. 
One of the examples of the influence of long term government measures was the 
position of MNC employees in Singapore. Generally, the majority of the employees 
in foreign MNCs in developing countries are young women. Low wages and flexibility 
originally form the main reasons for attracting women for labour-intensive jobs. Lack 
of ambition provides employers with the opportunity not to train and educate them. 
Their working conditions are often among the worst. 
In Singapore the dynamics delivered different results. Although originally the MNCs 
could profit from the ready available local women and did not train them, the 
Singapore government influenced the process. Apparently the economic advantages of 
investing in Singapore outweighed the government's requirements for MNCs in the 
seventies to set up training centres and transfer skills and knowledge. Moreover, due 
to the general improvement in education level and job opportunities since 
independence, the younger local women in Singapore came to aspire labour-extensive 
jobs which provided more status. Van Slageren's observation that the presence of 
MNCs generally has upgraded the position of women in developing countries, by the 
higher salaries than local industries can provide and the social consequence that these 
women become more financially independent and are thus able to postpone marriage 
and children217, also applied to Singapore. In the nineties the most repetitive and low 
status jobs were fulfilled by other Asian women from poorer countries than Singapore. 
In this respect the MNCs had become dependent on the Singapore government's 
policies regarding the foreign workers quota. These quota fluctuated under influence 
of the domestic employment situation. A growing number of firms were amongst others 
for this reason relocating to neighbouring countries for production activities. However, 
due to Singapore's sophisticated transport, telecommunications and financial 
infrastructure, regional head offices remained in Singapore where MNCs were 
influenced to appoint more and more local managers instead of expatriate managers. 
However, although the conditions for Singaporean employees were thus improved by 
the government, the working conditions for foreign workers were much less 
favourable. For example Thai construction workers had to live in humble sheds, were 
not allowed to let their families join them and often worked in dangerous 
conditions.218 In times of economic recession workers could be repatriated. Any 
misconduct in the eyes of the government could be penalized by eviction from 
Singapore. The accompanying problems of low production costs were thus in fact 
shifted to another group. 
In spite of the temporary pay-cuts induced by the government, in total the wages in 
Singapore still increased enormously. However, the government's wage policies were 
acceptable to the foreign investors, because Singapore's wages still "remained a bargain 
compared to those of the advanced countries".219 In 1991 wages for production 
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workers in manufacturing were S$5 (US$3) an hour compared to the equivalent of 
S$24 (US$14) an hour in the US and S$17 (US$10) an hour in the UK. ш Therefore 
Singapore's wage rises appeared no deterrent to the foreign investments, especially in 
activities involving considerable skills and precision. In this respect NICs such as 
Singapore set themselves apart from the LDC's (low developed countries) because of 
the growing availability of skills, technical capacities, engineering and managerial 
manpower. 
Moreover, in 1990 Koh Ai Tee221 brought up that there was no proof that 
Singapore's reliance on MNCs made it more vulnerable in an international recession 
than Korea or Taiwan. In 1985 the USA was by far the largest foreign investor in 
Singapore and all Asian NICs were equally dependent on the U.S. market for disposal 
of their domestically manufactured goods (over 40 percent). In case of U.S. 
protectionism Koh expected a sympathetic treatment by the Americans of imported 
goods from Singapore, because these existed mainly of parts and components serving 
as input in American industries. Thus the Singaporean exports were actually 
contributing to their competitiveness than competing with them. Koh added that big 
MNCs were less likely to suffer from an international downturn than small domestic 
firms, because their risk was spread due to their multi-locations. 
As a second cost-factor of the government's emphasis on FDI by MNCs Chia feared 
the side-effect of "crowding out" of domestic enterprises by policy neglect and unequal 
competition.222 The Chinese family businesses in particular feared competition from 
the MNCs, parallel to the government enterprises. An MNC was perceived as a 
formidable competitor due to its well-staffed sales organisations backed by elaborate 
merchandising and advertising promotions. The influx of MNCs was therefore greeted 
by local entrepreneurs with mixed feelings. On the positive side, the MNCs could have 
demonstration and multiplier effects. However, on the negative side, those who failed 
to respond to the new challenge posed by the competition from MNCs would be wiped 
out. Local businesses called repeatedly on the government for protection. However, the 
government believed that protectionism would only breed inefficiency. This would be 
dangerous to Singapore's continuing development.223 Hon Sui Sen, in his capacity as 
Finance Minister, said in 1973224: 
"Some of the more labour intensive, low skill industries will not be able to keep 
pace with the more productive ones and must expect therefore to lose some or 
most of their labour to more efficient entrepreneurs and industries which can 
make more money with and for them. The effect which increasing labour costs 
will have upon manufacturing industry will also be paralleled by effects on all 
other economic activities. Some of the service industries will also not be in a 
position to increase their productivity, their products or services will become 
dearer, sales will decrease and workers will be liberated for more productive 
work. " 
Still, local entrepreneurs responded slowly. The Chinese family-based business had 
many problems with modernisation. While the Chinese drive for material advancement 
was remarkable, their strong individualistic character set limits to their business 
expansion. Most of the Chinese business set-ups were small-scale family businesses in 
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which paternalism prevailed.225 These were mostly organised as sole proprietorships, 
partnerships and private limited companies. Even most of the Chinese public companies 
were still family-based. The fact that many Chinese enterprises were based on personal 
efforts and relationships had set limits to its growth. Moreover, most of the older 
Chinese merchants had started from scratch with little education. For them money was 
hard to come by and the policy that worked for them was to be self-reliant rather than 
to cooperate with others whom they hardly trusted as far as money was concerned.226 
They were mostly hardliners with a suspicious attitude who did not openly 
communicate, not even with close relatives and business partners. 
Historically, large-scale enterprises in China were owned by the government. Modem 
business enterprises were Western innovations, which were alien to the "self-made" 
Chinese merchants in Singapore. They lacked the long period of evolution in 
organisation and technology of modem Western firms. Moreover, young, talented, 
trained personnel in Singapore generally preferred to work in foreign firms, because 
of better remuneration and prospects of promotion. In the face of competition by the 
MNCs the problems encountered by local entrepreneurs in their drive for export 
promotions were many and complex. They were beyond the means of the individual 
firms to cope with227. 
Among the new Singaporean-owned corporations many still remained family-controlled, 
although they were now professionally run and managed by experts recruited from 
outside the family. This was an improvement on the old-style family-run business. It 
ensured the continuing operation of the concern while also more profit was accrued to 
the family through growth. Cheng thought this situation a "happy medium between the 
old and the new, a situation which seemed to suit well the transitional period of 
Singapore's economy".228 
In hindsight the MNCs in Singapore had few direct effects, because they were mostly 
not in direct competition with local small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which 
produced mainly for the domestic market. Furthermore, MNCs could apply for 
government grants to upgrade the technology and management level of the local 
suppliers. The government also linked up SMEs with MNCs through subcontracting. 
In contrast to other developing countries who at best had mixed feelings about the role 
of MNCs in their development, the Singapore government perceived them as helpful 
to domestic economic growth. However, the choice to develop by using MNCs had 
much indirect influence. For example, the rapidly increased costs of doing business in 
Singapore hit domestic entrepreneurs most. The large-scale urban redevelopment with 
the rise of luxurious office buildings and shopping centres dislocated many small local 
businesses and backyard and household factories. Furthermore the local SME's 
benefitted much less than the foreign MNCs from the government's tax incentives due 
to the strict selection criteria.229 These were all disadvantages to the local 
entrepreneurs, but on the other hand most small businesses which were crowded-out 
did not fit into the government's vision of Singapore's future anyway. 
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The economic "game" in Singapore was not an ideological, but a pragmatical, 
utilitarian one. The end of economic growth justified the means of the MNCs. 
Singapore used the dialectics of progress to its advantage by keen copying of Western 
knowledge and learning of adverse experiences. FDI was used as a positive catalytic 
effect on local enterprise through demonstration effects and by joint ventures. Many 
young Chinese Singaporeans viewed foreign MNCs as a means to acquire working 
experience, but their end goal remained to start their own business as soon as feasible, 
although a preference for a "soft landing" prevailed.230 
In practice it was not so much a matter of who was in control, but rather a situation 
of reciprocal need. This could for example be derived from an advertisement of Mobil 
Oil in Singapore: "Partners with community". 
"From uncertain beginnings in 1965, Singapore has undergone a vast economic 
and social transformation to become a prosperous city state, and a model to 
many developing countries. Mobil has been a partner with the Singapore 
community since the start, participating in the growth of the nation beyond the 
company's role as an employer. Through contributions to charitable, cultural 
and sports programmes, Mobil has consistently demonstrated its commitment 
to the advancement of the Singapore community. ... Mobil is fortunate to have 
shared in that growth and is committed to the Singapore community of 
tomorrow. "231 
The government tried hard to create a harmonious tripartite relationship between the 
MNCs, the government and the labour force. In the nineties this relationship was well 
established as can be seen from the examples of two other large MNC investors in the 
Singapore economy. 
Shell 
Shell, an example of the capital-intensive oil refinery sector, was one of the oldest 
MNCs present in Singapore. In March 1991 it celebrated its centenary anniversary. 
Shell was the market leader in the local oil refinery industry and Singapore represented 
the third largest of Shell groups worldwide. In the nineties Shell even intended to 
expand its activities in Singapore: in chemicals (nearly as big as oil), automation and 
information technology. This was welcomed by the Singapore government as Shell 
would "tap Singapore's strengths in terms of its financial services, commodity trading 
sophistication, and the growth of the Singapore International Monetary Exchange"232. 
Furthermore, it was expected that every major chemical and petro-chemical company 
would be looking at Singapore as a catchment base for its operations. Therefore Shell's 
new investments would increase Singapore's chances of survival as the major oil centre 
of the Asia-Pacific region. Walvis, chairman and CEO of Shell in Singapore, was 
positive about the team-like cooperation with the government and expressed his firm 
belief that Shell could work from the basis that it had the best people in Singapore, 
which he found "heartwarming". Walvis praised Singapore's workers and unions as 
part of the relationship between Shell, the government and the labour force. He said 
that Shell would "continue to work hard at this relationship to create mutual benefits 
in the years ahead."233 He also praised the government, because "without the support, 
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stability and vision of the Government, Singapore would not have been able to make 
such outstanding achievements and attract the investments of MNCs such as Shell.,,И4 
Shell, the presently largest foreign investor in Singapore, was the first recipient of the 
government's newly created Distinguished Partner in Progress Award, which was 
introduced by the Economic Development Board (EDB) to mark its thirtieth 
anniversary. BG Lee said: "Shell has a hundred year history of being a good corporate 
citizen. It is deservedly the first company to receive this award. "235 The government 
especially valued Shell's contribution to economic development in Singapore, because 
it went beyond a company's corporate profitability and encompassed a broader overall 
participation in Singapore's social and community development. Shell received the 
government's first Pioneer Certificate Award and was tributed for its community and 
cultural projects.236 Foreign MNCs in Singapore had to pay their social contribution 
to society if they wanted to earn their position and be accepted. E.g. British Petroleum 
(BP) took up environmental projects as special area of attention and Shell sponsored 
the Singapore Symphony Orchestra (SSO) to provide Western classical music at an 
affordable price to the Singapore public. 
Shell was accepted as it's operations were in line with the government's total 
development strategy. Although Shell provided little direct employment, it probably 
provided more indirect employment, though this is hard to measure. In Singapore there 
were no repercussions or boycotts against Shell for it's business in South-Africa, such 
as in some Western countries, although the Singapore government took a firm 
standpoint against the apartheid system and regime. However, being pragmatic and 
utilitarian, politics and business were not mixed. Affinity with anti-apartheid was rather 
shown by maintaining warm relations with ANC-leaders and stepping up the promotion 
of business ties between Singapore and South-Africa since Mandela was freed and rose 
to political leadership. 
Environmental effects of Shell's activities for Singapore were not discussed, although 
the water pollution and the virtual disappearance of the bio-diversity and colour in the 
coral reefs around Singapore must have been affected by its industrial activities. 
Obviously these effects were considered of minor importance than the economic 
benefits. 
Philips 
An example of a MNC in the labour-intensive sector, was Philips. Not only was this 
Dutch company one of the three MNCs involved in Singapore's early industrial 
development next to the American General Electric and the West German Rollei. It was 
also one of the MNCs which took the government's encouragement to heart to set up 
regional operational headquarters (OHQ's) in Singapore in the early nineties. Many 
other companies who wanted to take advantage of Singapore's hub status in South-East 
Asia were Japanese.237 Many companies relocated from Hong Kong as they had their 
doubts about the economic future of Hong Kong after its transferrai back to China in 
1997. 
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Philips grew and developed with the Singapore economy. On November 21, 1951 the 
Philips Electrical Company of Malaya Ltd and the Philips Singapore Pvt Ltd (Philips 
Singapore) was founded. Philips Singapore remained a sales office only for some 
twenty years. Around 1970 it was allowed by the head office in The Netherlands to 
start production activities. Profits from the initial investments were immediately 
returned to the company to level up with the competition. In 1975 Philips realised a 
turnover of $ 180 million and employed two thousand people. Dutch engineers were 
flown in to assist local entrepreneurs to become Philips' suppliers which were up to 
Philips' quality standards. In 1980 some 440 suppliers had a contract with Philips and 
subcontracted to another hundred local enterprises. Although the local economy was 
stimulated this way, the biggest suppliers were subsidiary companies from other foreign 
MNCs. However, their 2,500 employees were local and their share of the total 
turnover increased to about 25 percent.238 
Philips was awarded the Export Enterprise Certificate, which granted the company tax 
benefits for a period of fifteen years if it met certain government conditions concerning 
turnover, investments and size of labour force. Philips easily satisfied the government's 
requirements and became a welcome MNC, especially since it avoided retrenchments 
in the 1974/1975 recession. Philips attempted to build a good relationship with the local 
authorities. For instance the Philips director became a member of the National Wage 
Council and Philips started the Philips Government Training Center in cooperation with 
the EDB in 1975. Some hundred Dutch engineers were recruited to transfer technology 
to Singaporeans. 
Originally Philips had an almost hundred percent market share in the sale of television 
sets in Singapore, but gradually lost ground to Japanese brands. In 1982 Philips 
suffered a fifteen percent loss of turnover and retrenched three percent of its workforce 
supposedly due to automation. Nevertheless, early nineties Philips had become the 
largest employer in Singapore. It had more than six thousand employees and a turnover 
of S$1.5 billion in 1990.239 Philips Singapore had evolved from an initial role of 
Production Centre to a key Competence Centre. 
It was a mutual beneficial relationship. Philips provided jobs for Singapore and 
Singapore provided high profits for the Philips company.240 In 1995 Singapore 
became the official Asia-Pacific headquarter of Philips after the company had already 
transferred a number of activities from the Netherlands to Singapore. 
The rapidly grown economy which increased the standard of living of Singaporeans 
considerably, by far outweighed the costs of the MNC-strategy. The ministry of trade 
and industry viewed Singapore's relationship with MNCs as highly profitable over the 
first twenty five years of independence.241 Neither did the population object to the 
MNCs, as they had become part of the process which brought them economic progress. 
In 1986, foreign-owned establishments comprised 20 percent of the total establishments 
and employed 55 percent of the workforce in manufacturing. They generated 81 
percent of direct exports and 77 percent of capital expenditure. 
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The share of the resident foreigners and resident foreign companies in the indigenous 
GDP had increased most. The total GDP in Singapore had risen from S$3,331 million 
in 1966 to S$31,348 million in 1982.242 The indigenous component of this GDP rise 
was S$3,021 million in 1966 and S$23,084 million in 1982, showing an increase of 7.6 
times. However, the share of resident foreigners and foreign companies between 1966 
and 1982 increased even 26.7 times from S$310 million to S$8,264 million. This meant 
a steep rise from 9.3 percent in 1966 to 26.4 percent in 1982.243 
In the next decade the foreigners' share of Singapore's GDP rose from 7,537 million 
$ on a total of 25,091 million $ in 1980 to 22,516 million $ on a total of 62,711 
million $ in 1990.244 
On a per capita basis the indigenous GDP in 1980 was $571,000 per citizen employer, 
compared with the non-indigenous GDP of $1,472,000 per non-citizen employer (2,6 
times as much). Although the foreigners' share in the per capita GNP also increased 
most, the local population benefitted enormously too. Combining the indigenous GDP 
and Singaporean citizen's net earnings from abroad, the Singaporean GNP increased 
7.6 times from S$3,272 million to S$24,869 million between 1966 and 1982.245 The 
per capita indigenous GNP (thus excluding the share of foreigners) still increased more 
than five times between 1970 and 1995246. 
After the economic dip in the mid-eighties the Singaporean GNP resumed its growth 
in 1987 and continued growing until the mid-nineties. The data indicated that foreign 
and domestic capital could work to a mutual benefit under the strict "supervision", 
promotion and direct participation (through state enterprises and joint state and private 
enterprises) of a growth-oriented, nationalistic government. 
In 1986 Singapore ranked twenty second in income level in the world.247 In 1991 
Singapore ranked twentieth among OECD countries on per capita GNP and second 
among the NICs. The per capita reserve ratio (linked to savings rate) was the highest 
in the world.248 
The fact that it prospered materially, provided Singapore with more self-confidence and 
feelings of control. Although the cooperation with and the investments of the large 
foreign MNCs were cherished, other developments were also set in motion in 
Singapore. 
In the nineties several global processes stimulated Singapore to adjust its economic 
strategy based upon DFI's. Stagnated development assistance and serious debt problems 
had influenced other developing countries into more agressive policies to attract DFI's 
as well. Simultaneously export platforms were less sought after by MNCs. They would 
rather respond to the global strategies made in their home-countries, for example to 
invest in countries with large markets to circumvent protectionism249. The Singapore 
government was well aware of this potential mobility and became aware that it no 
longer wanted to work solely on continuing investment competitiveness for foreign 
MNCs, or that production, technical and now also managerial jobs were available for 
Singaporeans in these MNCs.250 When Singapore lost its GSP (Generalised 
Preference System) status in 1995, well ahead of its competitors, revision of the 
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economic strategy became an important issue. Several options for diversification had 
already been formulated in the early nineties. Singapore was highly dependent in five 
economic areas: 
1. domestic exports by MNCs 
2. non-oil domestic exports to the US 
3. domestic exports of electronics 
4. re-exports 
5. crude oil imports from the Middle East. 
Copying and adopting developments of the West was much easier than innovation and 
continued economic growth once the economy was mature. Chee foresaw that 
Singapore's economy, just as the other NICs, would stabilise and "plateau", allowing 
later developing countries, such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, to catch up.251 
In the mid-nineties the economic growth percentages in Singapore were less high than 
before. 
In the mid-nineties there were altogether more than 7,000 MNCs in Singapore252, 
which accounted for almost 90 percent of the investments in the manufacturing sector. 
Much of this was in the form of FDI, which meant that a large percentage of the 
commercial sector was controlled by foreign companies. Local investment commitments 
accounted only for 16 percent of the total investment.253 
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Figure 7.2. Net investment commitments in manufacturing. 
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Chee was convinced that Singapore's economy would totally collapse if it lost the 
MNCs. He therefore promoted a stronger local business and entrepreneurial 
community. However, this approach was not new. The government already made 
strong efforts in this direction in the nineties. 
Although it seemed logical to attempt to diversify Singapore's areas of dependency, the 
government foresaw too many economic costs attached to it in the short term.255 
Another option consisted of trying to stimulate MNCs not only to export goods but also 
services to developed countries, as well as to encourage locals to add goods to their 
repertoire of export of services only.256 
The government decided upon a twofold approach to reduce Singapore's economic 
vulnerability. 
stronger local presence MNCs 
First of all Singapore set out to achieve a stronger local presence by MNCs. The 
government wanted to encourage MNCs to treat Singapore as a home base rather than 
just a business location which is convenient and profitable in the short term. However, 
as it was expected that this aim would not be fully on par with the MNCs headquarters' 
objectives, Singapore would simultaneously need a second strategy. 
local MNCs 
This backing-up approach was to accelerate the development of local MNCs to world 
standards. An increased contribution of domestic entrepreneurs would have to build up 
Singapore's economic capability and resilience. A welcome side-effect would be an 
increasingly stronger national identity. Due to Singapore's free market commitment 
continuing subsidies or protection of inefficient operations from international 
competition were frowned upon. The chosen strategy was to provide "meaningful" 
assistance by identifying competent local enterprises and supporting their growth 
opportunities by giving them a fair chance to compete for contracts in government 
agencies and GLCs and supporting developmental activities in the private sector.257 
However, here the government's previous emphasis on the financial input, 
technological know-how and marketing links of foreign MNCs backfired. Small local 
entrepreneurs had felt disadvantaged by the government's efforts to attract and support 
these foreign firms for quite some time. The government had paid disproportionately 
much attention to the MNCs. Only now the government, recognising both the political 
and economic importance of the local SME's, started paying more attention to them. 
B.G. Lee remarked: "Local business men are the pillars of our society. They are 
important supporters in the grassroots organisations... If the Singapore economy 
consists only of MNCs and the Government, and if our domestic structure is not 
strong, then our society will be weakened."258 SME's were therefore assisted more 
and larger local firms were helped to expand their overseas activities so they might 
develop into MNCs themselves. 
However, now the government wanted to develop local MNCs, it ran into the problem 
that the new generation Singaporeans showed much less entrepreneurship than their 
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immigrant ancestors. The economic structure of Overseas Chinese societies had mostly 
consisted of Chinese family businesses. Initially Singapore formed no exception. The 
only difference with other NICs was that in Singapore the government also took a large 
share in the local economy. The state owned enterprises (SOEs) started off in a 
catalytic role in pioneering industrial ventures; in areas where both foreign investors 
and local entrepreneurs lacked either the resources or the inclination to venture. 
However, they became so successful - unlike SOEs in many other countries - that they 
came to play as crucial a role in Singapore's industrialisation process as the foreign 
owned enterprises (FOEs). The spirit of Singapore's enterprises was more like that of 
the mature large modern corporations. 
The big institutions and companies in Singapore were thus either foreign or 
government-related. Although the government started to partially privatise these SOEs 
and the government linked companies (GLCs), it wanted to retain control to provide 
a countervailing power to foreign MNCs in the absence of a strong and dynamic 
domestic private sector.259 One of the ways to guard this balance was to offer high 
incomes to the employees. This way the government hoped to attract and keep the "best 
people" in the Singaporean institutions (the government bureaucracy and SOEs). 
Although the government succeeded in striking a balance, the undesired side-effect was 
a certain complacency in the SOEs and FOEs, because others were bearing the risks 
of their investments. A paternalistic government, a strong regulatory environment, a 
comfortable full-employment economy, an education system emphasizing scholarship 
and a strong social pressure towards conformity diminished local initiative, risk taking 
and entrepreneurship, creativity and inno vati veness. Moreover, the continued emphasis 
on excellence in Singapore had increased the intolerance of failure. 
This observation was supported by Chiang's260 1991 study of business activities of 
Singaporeans, which showed that Singaporean MNCs had only slowly increased their 
overseas investments in the eighties. These mainly entailed transactions with foreign 
operations rather than direct investments. Originally the focus was on the ASEAN 
countries, but early nineties investments shifted to East Asia. Although the income 
contribution of these ventures to the Singapore GNP was still negligible in 1991261, 
the continued economic opening up of the People's Republic of China in the nineties, 
offered Singapore new horizons. The main motives for overseas investments offered 
by Singaporeans, were rising labour and land costs plus a shortage of resources in 
Singapore. On the whole Singapore's overseas investments were, such as in Hong 
Kong and South Korea, encouraged by the economic growth and growing affluence in 
their home country and the desire to expand and diversify export markets. However, 
not only economic motives, which were similar to those of MNCs from other NICs, 
played a role, also cultural similarities with China encouraged investments in China. 
For example, speaking both Mandarin and English provided Singaporeans with a 
distinct advantage as intermediaries in joint ventures. This way Singapore became the 
largest investor in China with some huge projects such as the building of a city near 
Suzhou modelled after Singapore. 
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However, many of these Singapore multinationals were still government related. The 
government intended to provide an exemplary role for local entrepreneurs, but was 
aware that it would still take some time before non-governmental Singaporean MNCs 
could play a similar global role as Western MNCs did in the nineteenth century. 
Hakam envisioned Singapore's economic future as part of a large network of 
internationally integrated joint ventures, subcontracting and multi-country locations, all 
interdependent and technologically linked between advanced countries, NICs and 
LDCs.262 However, while developing its own local brand of MNCs, Singapore would 
still have to rely on foreign MNCs. 
7.3.1. MNCs' influence on local values 
Although the question of control, economic dependency and neocolonial imperialism 
has further-reaching implications for the cultural identity as well, so far we have 
mainly discussed the economic influence of MNCs on Singapore. However, the mere 
presence of foreign companies with its foreign employees could have influenced the 
development of the identity and values of Singaporeans as well. 
Around 1990 the European Community topped the list of foreign investors (8,941.2 
million $), followed by the Americans (8,319.2 million $), the Japanese (6,646.0 
million $), the United Kingdom (5,473.2 million $) and Australia (3,346.3 million $). 
In sum total the Asian countries were the biggest investor with $ 13,258.8 million 
invested in Singapore.263 Both manufacturing and financial/business services were the 
industrial sectors most invested in by foreigners.264 
According to the 1980 Census of Population 11.4 percent of the total labour force in 
Singapore consisted of non-citizens. It could therefore be expected that foreign 
influence on local values would not only come from the mass media and the increased 
travel abroad by Singaporeans, but also more directly from foreign MNCs and 
expatriates in Singapore itself. Even if Singaporeans were raised in a fairly Confucian 
setting, they were now working in Japanese, American, British and other foreign 
companies. According to Chan, this must have affected their value systems.265 
In 1988 Fung studied work values in relation to culture in Singapore.266 Based on 
Hofstede's dimensions, managers in three MNCs in Singapore were surveyed about 
their ideal job and about cultural issues. More than three quarters of the sample 
consisted of locals. However, these formed a selective group. Lower ranked 
employees, which formed the majority of the Singapore workers, as well as local firms 
were excluded from this study. Fung's results therefore were probably mostly 
pertaining to the most foreign influenced part of the workforce in Singapore. 
Nevertheless, his results showed that most cultural attitudes were still Confucian. The 
majority of the respondents emphasised cooperation and harmony within and outside 
the family by compromising with opponents to resolve conflicts. Having good personal 
relationships was crucial. Seventy percent showed altruism in their willingness to help 
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others less successful than they were. Their achievement orientation was derived from 
their belief in a competitive spirit and their positive attitude towards stimulating their 
children to do their best. They also reflected the Confucian emphasis on acquiring 
skills and education. Finally, they did not endorse the view that individual decisions 
were of higher quality than group decisions.267 The managers' most important work 
goal was "contribution to company". The other value factors important to managers in 
Singapore were: comfort, employment security, interpersonal relationships and reward, 
representing both intrinsic and extrinsic work goals.268 Fung concluded that these 
managers did not regard physical working conditions as important as lower rank 
employees, which was on par with Western management studies. The ranking of work 
value goals in Fung's study roughly corresponded with Hofstede's findings as well as 
with two other local studies.269 
Fung found a deviation from the Confucian cultural value that parents should exercise 
parental guidance throughout their children's life. In the eyes of traditional parents, 
their children - no matter how old - are always dependent on them. Furthermore, the 
belief in a paternalistic leadership style seemed to have declined270. Half of the 
managers surveyed preferred a consultative style. The young professionals especially 
increasingly demanded a more open and participative approach. The basic Confucian 
principle of unconditional respect for the senior seemed to have been lost on the group 
of managers surveyed. 
They were thus moving away from the Confucian notion of a hierarchical society based 
on status-ordered, reciprocal relationships, such as manager-employee and teacher-
student. Fung called the result that 68.5 percent of the managers agreed that young 
people should be allowed to be critical of teachers "shocking".271 
He believed the Confucian virtues of acquisition of skills and education, industry, 
thrift, patience, perseverance, harmony, stability of relationships and moderation in all 
things to be still relevant for contemporary societies. 
Business etiquette, norms and values in Singapore were most Westernised. This was 
clear in management training and development, where Singaporeans were basically 
American oriented (see also chapter 8). This was probably influenced by the high 
profile of the American MNCs present, the fact that American management standards 
were generally perceived as the highest272 and the fact that many Singaporeans 
worked in Western MNCs. However, although a number of more efficient ways of 
conduct were imitated and the expertise contribution of Western talent was highly 
valued273, not all Western MNC-values were held in high regard. For example, 
American MNCs were sometimes disliked for their lack of social involvement and 
activities and their one-sided emphasis on individual achievement.274 
On the personal level the influence was minimal, given the limited number of 
interpersonal relationships. The majority of expats stayed in Singapore for at most a 
few years and lived separate lives from the Singaporeans. Most foreigners working in 
Singapore, who stayed on a long-term-basis, were somehow or another businessmen. 
Their social concern mostly did not reach further than approval of the political climate, 
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which was conducive to foreign capital. The way the state Singapore was run, like a 
company, was close to their hearts and to their liking. The contact, especially the 
informal contact, between them and the local population and their local colleagues and 
employees, was minimal. The local values were at best looked upon with suspicion and 
lack of understanding. Sometimes they were dismissed as "stupid" or 
"underdeveloped".275 Mostly, expats and locals led different lives altogether with 
minimal personal contacts only and a reciprocal arrogance. Below the surface there 
were many mutual misunderstandings between the Western expats and the 
Singaporeans. These were mostly not solved, because of the limited stay of the expat, 
the (at least attributed) power distance, the Eastern culture of conflict-avoidance and 
the reciprocal prejudices. 
Wives of male expatriates working in Singapore sometimes took an interest in the local 
Culture, but this predominantly entailed the arts and artifacts. They made group tours 
to a local temple, pottery factory, Chinatown and the like or they joined the 'Friends 
of the National Museum'-club. These activities at most gave them some more 
theoretical cultural and historical understanding, but hardly brought them closer to the 
local people. 
In the early nineties cost reductions and restructuring operations led many companies 
to retrench expatriates in the face of weak economic conditions. This measure 
predominantly hit Caucasians holding fairly senior positions with base salaries ranging 
from US$70,000 to US$80,000 a year, mainly in the banking sector. This led to 
thousands of expats willing to work on local terms, foregoing expat perks such as 
housing allowance, return air fare and education allowance for the children. However, 
meanwhile more local candidates had also acquired the necessary experience and skills 
to fill jobs previously reserved for expatriates. This development led to a continued 
decline of expatriate positions in Singapore and to renumeration packages which were 
more in line with local ones. The Straits Times claimed that the average cost of 
maintaining an expatriate family in Singapore used to be US$ 300,000 a year. Two-
thirds of these costs could be saved by hiring local staff.276 
Since 1991 a new generation of expats, closer to the local population, was starting to 
grow.277 Unemployed Australians, New Zealanders, Americans, Indians and British -
from fresh graduates to applicants with 30 years of experience - came looking for new 
economic opportunities. With the same employment package as their Singaporean 
colleagues, they led a much less comfortable and protected life than the older 
generation expats. Their lifestyle was much more open to adjustments to the local 
culture. They lived in HDB flats instead of chic condominiums. They shopped at wet 
markets and NTUC (trade union) supermarkets instead of at Jason's or Cold Storage 
(luxurious Western) supermarkets. They ate at hawker centres and kopi-tiams instead 
of expensive or fast-food restaurants. They drank local instead of foreign beer. They 
took the bus and MRT instead of having chauffeur-driven cars. They worked out in a 
town-centre gymnasium instead of at the country club.278 
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According to the immigration department, in 1992 there were 35,000 employment pass 
holders (given to those earning S$l,500 or more), a jump of 67 percent from 1988. 
There were no figures on foreigners working in Singapore on local terms. 
There was a slight tendency of more Western men dating Singaporean women279, but 
whatever impact these inter-ethnic relationships could have on the development of 
values, the number of married couples only formed a small minority. Many of these 
men eventually returned to their home countries and the often older men who stayed 
on to start their own business rather had to acculturate to the Singaporean culture than 
the other way around. 
One could hypothesise that MNCs as part of a capitalistic economic system would 
bring along commercialisation, but their direct influence on Singapore was limited. 
First of all, being a trade centre Singapore already was a pre-eminent example of a 
commercial city before MNCs were introduced. A commercial attitude seemed to be 
a second nature of the Overseas Chinese. 
Secondly, most foreign MNCs in Singapore were export oriented due to a lack of 
domestic market and did not produce consumer end products, but industrial half 
products. 
Thirdly, the growing affluence in Singapore increased the demand for luxury goods. 
These were imported mainly from the U.S., partly due to the high demand in the 
consumer society, but also partly as an economic strategy. Due to its lack of natural 
resources and to balance its trade deficit with MNC mother countries, Singapore 
consciously increased its imports enormously. From 1984 onwards Singapore even 
showed a trade surplus with the USA. 
Fourthly, the growing affluence also provided more access to all kinds of information 
sources which in turn increased the use of these information sources by commercial 
operators. However, this process could rather be attributed to economic development 
and modernisation than to the presence of MNCs. The sale of non-basic, luxury goods 
in Singapore, such as in the posh shopping centres on Orchard Road, was more 
dependent on foreign tourists than on local buyers. Although more eminently present 
in Singapore than in most other developing countries, fast food commercialisation did 
not stand a real chance in the food culture of Singapore, with its abundant supply of 
fresh meats, fruits and vegetables from all over the world and the cultural variety and 
excellence in preparing these foods. Although eating out was the national pastime, 
Western fast-food chains such as McDonalds formed just a negligible minority among 
the more than 45,000 restaurants in Singapore.280 Moreover, they were relatively 
expensive and not faster than the local hawker centres, which catered more to the 
variety in local tastes. In the city centre McDonalds had relatively many foreign 
customers such as tourists, whereas locals enjoyed local food more.281 The fact that 
tourists spotted these fast food restaurants easily, rather had to do with their selective 
perception and the fact that wealthier countries simply attract more of these commercial 
enterprises than with a globalising culture eroding traditional culture. 
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Fifthly, the government did not allow just any kind of import; e.g. in 1992 chewing 
gum was banned and the Censorship Board monitored which tv-programmes or 
commercials were deemed to be suitable for the Singaporean public. The government 
tried to form a moral counterweight to the commercial influence and if there was one 
pervasive influence on the mass media, it was the government. For example, in an 
attempt to place censorship on an objective footing, in 1982 the Singapore authorities 
published a list of undesirable items282 to be shown in the visual media: 
Controversial themes. 
Films glorifying/glamorising crime, violence, gangsterism, secret society 
activities, racketeering, unbridled contempt for law and order, hooliganism, 
vandalism, rowdyism, hippism, drug addiction, anti-religion, sadism, 
prostitution, sexual perversion, free love, promiscuity, permissiveness, 
lesbianism, homosexuality, incest and other demoralising themes are not allowed 
for exhibition if the themes or stories cannot be improved or the objectionable 
scenes or sequences cannot be reduced or cut. 
Sex and nudity. 
Portrayal of love-making, close and medium shots of nude women, bare breasts 
and bare buttocks as well as genitals of the two sexes are not allowed in low-
budget sex exploitative films. However nudity presented in a tasteful manner 
is allowed in high class productions like "Barry Lyndon" and those of Peter 
Sellers. We also allow long shots of men and women in the nude that cannot 
be seen clearly in English, Chinese and Indian films, but not the frontal view 
of their private parts. For documentary films, scenes of bare breasted women 
of primitive tribes are not considered objectionable. 
Kissing. 
Kissing is allowed in all films except Malay productions. Suggestive 
prolonged kissing showing the tongues playing with each other are deleted. 
Four-letter words. 
Four-letter words and other words, phrases and expressions which convey 
obscene, lewd or vulgar meanings are not allowed. However, certain 
expressions such as swear words which denote one's anger, impatience or 
frustration are allowed, but we always try to minimize them. 
Violence. 
Excessive violence is reduced. All close and clear shots highlighting 
stabbing, killing, strangling, lethal punching, vomiting of blood by 
men/women being beaten up, facial expression of agony, spurting of blood, 
gory scenes of killing, etc. are taken out. 
Rieger drew attention to the questionability of this censorship. He argued that the 
problem lay in where to draw the line between censored and uncensored information 
or in other words to whom to assign authority to decide what is to be censored and 
what not. Although the government formed a moral counterweight to the commercial 
visual media operators, censorship in the realm of art and entertainment was 
experienced by some as affecting their quality of life. This was not so much 
experienced in terms of deprivation, but rather in the feeling of immaturity engendered 
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by the "dictates of the paternalistic authorities, who decided on the suitability of 
information for their protegees". 
Acknowledging this feeling in a vocal part of the population, the younger generation 
government of Goh started experimenting with the boundaries of censorship. In the 
realm of the arts, for example, certain local plays showed overt and direct sexual 
movements in 1993. It seemed like children who wanted to try out what had been 
forbidden to them for some time. However, these plays crossed the boundaries of the 
acceptable and mainly evoked reactions from the public if this was really necessary. 
In reaction the government became stricter again in the next theatre plays. This kind 
of incident was seen as growing pains of a maturing society. 
Nevertheless, due to the censorship by government controlled organisations the 
commercialisation due to American mass media MNCs was much less present in 
Singapore than in for example Latin-American developing countries. Singapore 
television showed a variety of two Singapore Broadcasting Corporation (SBC) channels 
(in English; one entertainment channel with many Western films and one information 
channel with many documentaries; the evening news showed a balance between 
international and local news), several Chinese channels (many martial art films), 
several Malaysian channels (much Islamic influence) and a CNN (international news 
and financial information) channel. 
In the early nineties Singapore experimented with a Singaporeanisation of programmes. 
Singapore intended to become the second Asian film production centre after Hong 
Kong with local drama and entertainment. Discussion arose about the use of Singlish 
(the Singaporean slang mixture of English, Chinese and Malay) on the national mass 
media. Protagonists wanted to enhance local identification with t.v.-personalities; 
antagonists thought the use of Singlish on national t.v. would decrease the youth's 
proficiency in proper English. Overall, television reflected the multi-ethnicity of 
Singapore. The Western influence most prominent was rather British than American. 
In spite of the risen standard of living in Singapore, there was a group of especially 
English educated, younger Singaporeans who preferred a Western developed country 
over Singapore. The emphasis of the government on the importance of English as the 
international business language and the status of Western MNCs, influenced the 
wealthier Singaporeans to let their children study abroad, mostly in the U.K., U.S. or 
Australia. In the nineties a growing number of these students did not return to 
Singapore after they completed their studies. The concern rose that Singapore would 
thus lose its talent. According to a survey by the Goethe Institute in Singapore thirty 
percent of seventy pupils in Secondary Four, Pre-University One and Pre-university 
Two of the Foreign Language Centre saw their future outside Singapore.283 However, 
this was a selective group not representative of the broader population. It could hardly 
be a coincidence that in this period television documentaries showed interviews with 
Singaporean students abroad who missed the Singaporean food culture and the safe 
environment and wanted to return home after their studies. 
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Nevertheless, the growing self-awareness and self-confidence in Singapore during the 
economic development process not only reversed the economic dependency process to 
a certain extent, but also started reversing the acculturation process. For example, in 
1990 the government was advised to take into account that - although the Singapore 
economy was heavily dependent on foreign investments and employers - foreign 
employers should share a similar philosophy in maintaining and enhancing the status 
of women as in Singapore. It was suggested that employers who had innovative 
schemes to employ more women especially in part-time work or in flexi-work or who 
provided child care centres, could be given some tax concessions. At stake was not 
merely an increase in economic output, but also a more desirable balance in social and 
family matters, for the simple fact that women did fulfil multiple functions.284 
In short: although Singapore depended heavily on foreign MNCs in the economic field, 
it's growing affluence provided the nation-state more and more self-confidence and 
power to set it's own pace and standards politically and socio-culturally. 
7.4 Future values 
In its strategic economic plan of 1991 the government stated that the major challenge 
for Singapore in the nineties was how to successfully channel the motivation of its 
people into non-monetary goals without sacrificing their strong drive.285 Based on 
Hartog's model of the development of European values in three post-war 
generations286, the Singapore government thought that it was inevitable that 
Singaporeans would change their values. The Singapore government preferred a 
partnership model over a purely communitarian one and identified the education 
system, the design of the workplace and reward systems as the most suitable media to 
stimulate this model. 
However, in practice there were several obstacles to overcome. During the election 
period in 1991 again concern rose over the westernisation of Singapore, particularly 
with the Chinese-educated Singaporeans. Chinese educated Chinese Singaporeans had 
most problems with the cultural effects of the economic development in Singapore. One 
woman, interviewed on this subject, said: 
"Singapore has no culture any more! That's what my husband and I say at 
home. Look at me: I am Chinese, I am Chinese educated and still I don't know 
everything any more. I hardly practice our customs any more and when I do I 
often don't recall the exact meaning."287 
The widespread use of the English language in Singapore - despite the Mandarin 
campaign - was deemed to be responsible for this erosion of the Chinese culture. 
Westernisation was seen to have caused a de-rooting process. The importance of the 
traditional Asian cultures was therefore highlighted again. In a government publication 
in 1991, however, Tommy Koh, then Singapore's ambassador at large and director of 
the Institute of Policy Studies288 regularly consulted by the government in socio-
Singaporean Identity and Values 263 
cultural matters, warned against the over-simplification of trying to "retain our Asian 
values against the intrusion of bad Western influence." He warned against a reversal 
of the tendency to value everything Western as good and everything Asian as bad. 
"The truth is that there are good Asian values and there are bad Asian values just as 
there are good Western values and bad Western values. " He identified the following 
positive and negative values for Singaporeans in a stable, multicultural society, which 
were published by the government as an example to the population289: 
"Bad Asian Values 
The following are some examples of bad Asian values which our ancestors 
brought from the old countries: 
(a) the caste system in Hindu culture; 
(b) the inferior status of women; 
(c) the practice of nepotism; 
(d) the tradition of authoritarian rulers; 
(e) the shame which parents feel towards their children with physical or mental 
disabilities and the general lack of sympathy for the disabled; 
(f) the attitude of subservience to those in authority; and 
(g) the deeply-rooted Chinese belief that "good boys should never be 
soldiers". 
Good Asian Values 
What are the good Asian values which our ancestors brought to Singapore? The 
good values include: 
(a) the work ethic; 
(b) thrift; 
(c) strong families, including concern and support for members of one's 
extended family who are in need of help; 
(d) modesty and humility, two values which have largely disappeared from 
Singapore; 
(e) respect for education; 
(f) respect for one's elders, teachers and righteous rulers; 
(g) communitarian values. 
Western contributions to Singapore's success 
Singapore is successful not only because of its Asian values. It is successful 
because it has taken the best from the East and the West. We are extremely 
fortunate to be the confluence of four civilisations, Chinese, Malay, Indian and 
Western. We can therefore pick the best from each of these civilisations and 
incorporate them into our own. If we reflect upon the institutions and values 
which have enabled Singapore to make such spectacular progress during the past 
twenty-five years, some of them are derived from modernisation which was 
brought about by the Western civilisation, for example: 
(a) a political system based upon British parliamentary democracy; 
(b) an independent judiciary; 
(c) the Rule of Law; 
(d) a civil service based upon merit and free of corruption; 
(e) equal rights for women; 
(f) modern science and technology; 
(g) a management culture based upon merit, team-work and the delegation of 
power; 
(h) punctuality and public hygiene; 
(i) empathy with and support for the disabled; and 
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(j) the Western egalitarian belief of affording all persons equality of 
opportunity. 
Bad Western Influences 
We should borrow what is good from Western culture but reject what is 
undesirable. I regard the following as some of the undesirable features of 
contemporary Western culture: 
(a) too much emphasis on the rights and interests of the individual and too little 
emphasis on the rights and interests of the community and the State; 
(b) lack of respect for one's elders, teachers and upright rulers; 
(c) the mistaken belief that competition in education is bad; 
(d) the inability to make sacrifices in the short-term for long-term benefits 
which often leads to failure to plan for the future; 
(e) excessive materialism and hedonism; and 
(f) living beyond one's means.n 
The government publication with Koh's suggested rature values did not mention two 
Western values appraised positively by Singaporeans-in-the-street, interviewed by the 
national paper The Straits Times140: 
- individual freedom 
- human rights 
More individual freedom seemed to be one of the rising values in modern Singapore, 
but was politically sensitive. It was controversial though whether this need was inherent 
to a highly educated and well-informed, modern society or if it was a Western 
influence. 
Other additions to the above list by Singaporeans, interviewed about this subject291, 
were: 
"Good Western influences: 
- independence and self-sufficiency 
- respect for someone who tried, though failed; respect for someone who 
sticks his neck out. 
Bad Western influences: 
- criminality 
- lack of discipline and drive to study 
- too much emphasis on individual achievement instead of teamwork 
Good Asian value: 
- no sexual promiscuity" 
Koh, in his capacity as ambassador-at-large at the ministry of foreign affairs, said that 
in Asia the U.S. was viewed as the most idealistic of the great powers, as they had 
fought three wars in East-Asia over the last fifty years, neither in pursuit of territory 
or natural resources nor to impose its hegemony upon other countries.292 Asians 
therefore felt more comfortable with American military presence in the region, because 
"Asians have long memories. We remember (and fear) Japanese colonialism before and 
during World War II. We also remember imperial China and fear its possible 
revival."293 In both the military and economic field the Asian ties with the U.S. were 
deemed to be important, but this did not mean automatically include the cultural realm. 
Singaporean Identity and Values 265 
In the early nineties the PAP government announced that it would loosen some of the 
ropes, now that most Singaporeans had "become well-bred".294 In areas where 
Singaporeans still showed many flaws in the view of the government, however, not 
only the laws would remain strict, but also campaigns would continue to be conducted. 
For example, in the mid-nineties Singaporeans were confronted with the government's 
Smile Campaign. Singaporeans were not seen as friendly enough in public. This could 
negatively affect tourism. 
The government's reaction to the demand for more individual freedom was the reply 
that this was too diffuse. It could apply to anything. Some wanted more political 
participation, but large parts of the population mainly wanted to taste Singapore's 
restricted or forbidden fruits of alcohol, tobacco295, prostitution and pornography.296 
The government chose to retain control in these areas. Furthermore, the hygiene level 
of the city needed continued attention. Lee Kuan Yew's vision of Singapore was an 
orderly, clean and disciplined nation-state. Compared to other Asian countries, 
Singapore certainly succeeded in this respect, even to the extent that tourists sometimes 
complained it was too sterile.297 Singapore citizens seemed to have less problems with 
the heavy fines on habits such as not flushing a toilet, spitting on the streets (an old 
Chinese habit, stemming from agrarian origins), littering, jay-walking and chewing 
gum (a new habit especially among Singaporean adolescents, modeled after the 
American example). Alternative punishment for minor law-offenders was to clean 
streets and park areas in public. As this activity was looked down upon by 
Singaporeans and left to foreign workers (mostly from Sri Lanka and India), this 
punishment caused a tremendous loss of face with often many social consequences. 
Despite the fact that this type of measure raised many question marks in Singapore, it 
was not defied. Even in the English-medium paper The Straits Times one could read 
warnings against the "natural" course of development during modernisation and pleas 
for government intervention and direction. For example: 
"Misapplying the dictum of cultural anthropology that every culture has to be 
judged on its own terms, therapeutic ideology insists that no one has a right to 
'impose' his own preferences or moral judgements on anyone else. [But] Lasch 
says in his 1984 follow-up book The Minimal Self [that] civilisation is about the 
taming of this heart of darkness, and not letting it want what it wants."298 
In 1992 Dhanabalan, in his capacity of Minister of National Development, still banned 
the American magazine Cosmopolitan, because it was considered detrimental to 
Singaporean lifestyle. He was provoked by an article which gave advice on how to 
conduct an affair in the office and how to lie about it to a spouse. In his last interview 
with the media as Minister, Dhanabalan stated that Singapore should guard against the 
promotion of alternative lifestyles, such as cohabitation. "Cosmo sells a lifestyle where 
there are no clear rights or wrongs, everything is relative, situational. In the long term 
that can really undermine society."299 
A moral standards survey by The Straits Times in 1993 concluded that morals were still 
high in Singapore to Asian standards. This was generally perceived as a sensational 
result, contrary to public bias. However, Dhanabalan was not impressed. He replied 
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that people always have higher standards than what they live up to. He argued that 
Singapore therefore "must have standards in order to motivate us and guide us.n3C0 
Criticism on the government was not entirely shunned, as long as the arguments were 
deemed to be correct. For example, the International Herald Tribune got a lawsuit in 
1995 for suggesting that Lee Hsien Loong thanked his position rather to his father than 
to his capacities. Prime Minister Goh stated that the Tribune article had affected "the 
two pillars, integrity and meritocracy" of Singapore.301 A slightly corrective remark 
by Koh was accepted. Koh pointed out that the values selected by the government as 
core values for Singapore's future were not exclusively Asian; they were universal. In 
his address to Singaporeans for the near future he said:302 
"Some Singaporeans are legitimately concerned about the westernisation of our 
society. The tide of Western civilisation is the strongest tide in the world today. 
As an English-speaking people and an open society, we are particularly 
vulnerable to Western influence. Fortunately, Western culture is only one of the 
four cultural traditions which penetrate our minds. The alternative to 
westernisation is not either to be more Chinese, more Malay, more Indian or 
to have a lowest common denominator bastardized Singaporean culture. 
What we need to do is to promote equally the better understanding of the 
Chinese, Malay and Indian cultures as well as the emerging Singaporean 
culture. We should encourage all Singaporeans to develop a better understanding 
and appreciation of the three Asian civilisations. Each racial group should 
attempt to understand and appreciate the cultures of other racial groups. In time, 
we will create an unique blend of the four great cultural traditions which is 
dynamic and organic. 
... Singapore must therefore be a microcosm of the region and of the world. We 
must have a distinct identity of our own but, at the same time, be international 
in our outlook. " 
It was a continuous search for cultural boundaries. For example, in 1993 Minister for 
information and the arts, BG Yeo, attempted to broaden the horizon of the National 
Museum of Singapore. His argument was that many musea had too strong a sense of 
nationalism without crossing the national boundaries which "are a relatively recent 
creation and change over centuries... We have to stop being a parochial people. If we 
continue to be inward-looking, it is for others to make use of us."303 Yeo stated that 
Southeast Asia had been placed between the two great civilisations of China and India 
over centuries and would remain so. By striving for a cosmopolitan Singapore these 
cultures would naturally have to be included. Remarkably, Yeo did not mention the 
Malay culture here. 
Singapore's move to régionalise it's economy in the late eighties and early nineties, 
such as the emphasis on the Growth Triangle between Singapore, Johore (Malaysia) 
and the Riau islands (Indonesia), was accompanied by political attempts to build a more 
externally oriented cultural environment. Yeo called it "going back to the time when 
Southeast Asia formed an organic whole."304 According to Koh "not everyone will 
be interested in history, but if we are to succeed in this drive, we must get some of 
them involved. " Yeo said he had been trying to persuade school principals and teachers 
to take their students to see exhibitions such as an ongoing series on ancient Chinese 
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artifacts at The Empress Place Museum. "If they don't succeed in instilling this sense 
of the past into their students, they would have failed. Education is not just about 
language, science and mathematics; it's also about culture and values. " and "It takes 
time for Singapore culture to mature. This generation are the children of parents who 
had to eke out an existence and did not pass on much cultural heritage to them. Our 
children will have the opportunity to benefit from our middle-class status. " 
Nevertheless, it was a tough task for the government and scholars to persuade the 
younger generation to spend time on their cultural heritage. Most people-in-the-street 
were hardly aware of the origin of their values. Chee said305: 
"What exactly is Confucianism? Ask Singaporeans and one is likely to get a 
vague answer about traditional values practised by Asians or, more specifically, 
Chinese people, both mainlanders and overseas. Apart from quoting a few 
Confucian adages here and there, few are likely to give a comprehensive view 
of the philosophy. It has come to a point where differences in culture East 
Asians have with Westerners are conveniently relegated to the idea that we 
Asians are Confucianists and they, the Westerners, are not." 
As much as Westerners tended to lump Asians together, so did Singaporeans tend to 
polarise between the Asian Confucian societies and the Western societies. It seemed 
as if they only pictured the excrescences of the post-sexual-revolution period in North-
western Europe and the U.S., whereas a number of Confucian concepts such as filial 
piety, respect for the elderly, parents and authorities and a relation of mutual obligation 
and interdependence were not alien in the West either, certainly not traditionally. As 
the effects of modernisation with its emphasis on science and technology and its 
decreasing religious influence had a longer history in the West, traditional values could 
have eroded more in the West than in Asia. Singaporeans who had studied or worked 
in Western countries noted that the positive values which Singaporeans tended to 
associate with Confucianism were not unique to Asians of Chinese descent.306 The 
socio-cultural problems were not so much due to a difference between the East and the 
West, but had to do more with the difference in stages of industrial development 
between countries which gave rise to these problems.307 
However, for most Singaporeans it was either the dualistic tendency which prevailed, 
or distinctions between cultural backgrounds were blurred. For example, an 
interviewed English-educated Chinese Singaporean woman claimed308: 
"We wouldn't know what is Confucian. Singapore is a hybrid society, a mixture 
of all kinds of cultures. Okay, it is dominantly Chinese, but Confucian? We 
don't make distinctions between what is Western and what is Chinese. It has 
blended so much already... There used to be differences between specific 
cultures, like between the Malay and the Chinese. When we used to visit 
Malaysia, I once saw a truck full of bananas waiting to be unloaded. The people 
were just sleeping next to it! But that attitude is changing; nowadays the Malays 
are working just as hard as we are. They don't want to stay behind. In Asia 
deviation of the norm is frowned upon. There is this drive towards conformity, 
to control everyone... In this respect thrift is just a manifestation of 
practicality." 
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Although one was mostly not conscious of the cultural aspect of one's values, it was 
clear that moral values, mostly centred around family ethics, were of great importance 
to Singaporeans. One interviewee declared: 
"Although we don't practice the same customs as our parents did, we still 
inculcate our values to the next generation. I want to pass on certain values 
which I know will give my children a good life later on. Like having more than 
one child. You need fellow siblings to fall back upon. Family relations are very 
important, because you will always know you will help each other.n309 
The oscillation between Eastern and Western and Eastern values again, was quite 
confusing to a large number of Singaporeans. The majority, mostly unconsciously, 
continued its pragmatic, eclectic middle path. Consequently, the wide spectrum of 
individual options kept most discussions about a Singaporean identity and values rather 
vague. A source of confusion was the status of the West. Because of colonial history 
and the national aim to emulate the standard of living of the Western developed country 
Switzerland, a perception of superiority was attributed to the West.310 However, 
Singaporeans started to travel more and realised that they were not lagging behind any 
longer in technological areas. They started feeling proud of their own accomplishments 
in the technological, medical and scientific field, while in the moral area Chinese 
Singaporeans already felt superior to the West. 
In the book "Towards a developed nation" the PAP government spelled out its future 
vision of Singapore which formed the guideline for its policies.311 
By the year 2020 to 2030 Singapore wanted to have "caught up" with the top developed 
nations (one of the G7 countries or equivalent). Therefore four key areas of attention 
were appointed: 
1. economic dynamism 
2. national identity 
3. quality of life 
4. the configuration of a global city. 
economic dynamism 
Economic dynamism was necessary to achieve Singapore's economic goal. In an 
optimistic scenario Singapore wanted to have the same per capita GNP as the USA by 
2030, in a pessimistic scenario the same per capita GNP as The Netherlands by 2020. 
This long-term goal and the maintenance of the levels of physical comfort and facilities 
of the nineties, could only be achieved by a continued strong economic growth. 
national identity 
A common identity remained important to prevent a brain-drain. A strong sense of 
national pride, strong cultural roots, a positive attitude and determination to overcome 
difficulties would have to be part of this Singaporean identity. "... Singaporeans need 
to believe that their country meets their needs more than any other country. Only then 
will Singapore be a viable nation, built by its people. "312 
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quality of life 
A higher quality of life was assumed to be of utmost importance to all Singaporeans. 
The government acknowledged that the vision of this quality could vary between 
individuals; still it suggested that indicators of a high quality of life would be: 
"* High purchasing power 
Enabling purchase beyond the basic needs to include education and 
investment in future needs, with the opportunity to indulge in leisure and some 
luxury 
* High quality physical environment 
Including quality housing, improved public places and buildings, an 
environment that provides fresh air and space to live healthy and happy lives 
* High quality living environment 
Providing safety, fairness and justice, and a wide choice of recreational, 
educational and cultural facilities 
* a wide scope for individual fulfilment 
Opportunities allowing for educational and occupational, artistic and creative 
pursuits 
* a cultivated society 
Comprising individuals who are well informed, refined, gracious and 
thoughtful and a place where ideas, art, literature and music flourish"313 
global city 
By a global city the report mostly aimed at international competitiveness. 
Values conducive to this vision would be an eagerness to learn, team orientation, 
innovativeness and international orientation. Early nineties the latter had become the 
focus of the government, because the emphasis on Singaporean development and 
national identity had worked so well that relatively few young Singaporeans were 
willing to emigrate for educational and occupational purposes and then return to 
Singapore. 
Chee gave the following criticism of the PAP government's vision of Singapore's 
future. He remarked that the qualitative aspect of life is subjective; therefore a 
collective definition of a quality lifestyle was not possible.314 He thought that 
"contrary to indoctrinated beliefs, individualism is not necessarily a bad thing to have 
in our society. " Chee perceived Singapore as lacking in spontaneity and excitement. 
It failed to provide the depth, diversity and dynamism that Chee deemed to be essential 
ingredients of a truly cosmopolitan society. Chee perceived Singapore's social 
engineering as synthetic. He thought it significant that the Minister of Information and 
the Arts once said: "Fun is a serious business. " Chee, a psychologist, called this an 
"emotional deficiency disease"315. He thought it was a delusion that culture and social 
values of a community could be created in a similar manner as constructing housing 
estates, shopping centres and office buildings or as in controlling crime and regulating 
traffic. In his view conservation programmes by the government had taken away the 
270 Singapore, a modem Asian aty-state 
charm - the smells, sights and sounds - of Singapore. Chee thought that thus Singapore 
lacked the cultural element unique to a society that could forge an identity with the 
people living in it, the result of a long process of historical evolution. Chee believed 
that culture should evolve by itself, not by "a government who tries to mould the 
society for pragmatic and commercialistic purposes".316 All social engineering was 
justified by the government in terms of economic progress. The spirit of Singaporeans 
was thus dampened by an obsession with consumerism and materialism. Thus 
Singaporeans had become more perfunctory than dynamic. According to Chee, with 
the rush to make money Singaporeans ignored the finer qualities of life that make the 
society a mature and thinking one. He thought that when "the economic bubble bursts, 
Singaporeans will need something to fall back on, something that will keep the society 
from fragmenting. That something is cultural identity."317 
Chee claimed that much of Singapore's economic progress had been at the expense of 
its cultural development. He argued that Singaporeans had a low sense of citizenship 
and belonging, related to their detachment from the decision-making process. He saw 
Singaporeans as mainly living for the here and now and preoccupied with achieving the 
levels of material wealth set by the ever increasing standards of living. 
Chee thought that excessive societal regulation undermined the spirit of 
communitarianism where care for the community is performed more out of obligation 
and blind obedience to authority than a genuine sense of caring for the society. For 
example, forty percent of the population in the USA, which was supposedly an 
individualistic society, was involved in volunteer work, compared to only six percent 
in Singapore.318 Where regulations did not control Singaporeans' behaviour, Chee 
claimed it was found wanting: 
"We ruthlessly rush to board buses, stand near bus exits so that we don't have 
to "walk" too far to disembark, enter MRT trains before passengers wishing to 
alight can get out, stampede to obtain free tickets to a movie, become disorderly 
in our frenzy to buy shares, etc. Quite the contrary, ours is very much a society 
of self before community. 
The combination of stifling governmental regulations, emphasis on excellence 
and meritocracy measured in terms of material gains, and the oft-repeated 
notion that "nothing is for free" and that "no one owes us a living" has brought 
about this social disease of every man for himself. 
...it is precisely the overregulation of society that gives rise to kiasuistic 
behaviour. " 
Singaporeans had earned the dubious honour of being the most badly behaved tourists 
in a survey in Europe and Australia.319 Chee likened his fellow-countrymen to just 
escaped prisoners who don't need to observe all the enforced habits and behaviours any 
more. Singapore's "me-first syndrome", kiasuism, was a negative form of 
individualism. Positive individualism, however, would allow individual members of 
society to have their own ways of thinking and goals in life and pursue these. He 
mentioned that many people who made historical contributions to society were 
individualists and that to encourage conformity was to discourage positive 
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individualism. Ultimately, Chee thought that it was this positive individualism that 
would eventually raise the quality of life in a people.320 
He called for time off for Singapore to contemplate matters less materialistic. The 
constant pressure to make the economy grow, inhibited an atmosphere conducive to 
intellectual stimulation and activity. Singaporeans were conditioned to believe that 
"distraction" from hard work and productivity would disintegrate the country and 
anarchy would reign. The Singapore society was almost exclusively fuelled by extrinsic 
motivation, whereas it was intrinsic motivation that would really improve the quality 
of life. 
7.4.1. Future of Confucian values 
In 1983 the Institute of East Asian Philosophies was established321, which organised 
amongst others the 1987 Singapore Conference on Confucian Ethics and the 
Modernisation of Industrial East Asia. An important question raised at this conference 
was how to adapt an ethical system designed for one set of economic assumptions, 
meaning the context of the Western industrialised world, to another set of assumptions, 
meaning the Confucian influenced world. Fu322 thought it time to look at the potential 
contribution of Confucianism in a post-modem world instead of the retrospective 
attribution of Confucianism as contributing to economic development and 
modernisation. 
The PAP government did not strive to make Singapore a Confucian society. It merely 
wanted to draw upon Confucianism as a source of already present cultural values 
compatible with its own vision of Singapore's future. The trouble with this re-rooting 
was that the selection of Confucian values was internally inconsistent and could thus 
be viewed as arbitrary. For example, equality of women, equal opportunities for 
everyone and meritocracy, were not Confucian, but deemed to be crucial to Singapore. 
On the other hand, Confucian political ideology seemed to contradict modern demands 
of democracy and human rights to Western observers and thus to be incompatible with 
the contemporary modem context.323 Still, the Singapore government adhered to the 
Confucian principle of paternalism. 
Different people selected different values, according to their own preferences, both in 
favour of certain Confucian ethics and against. 
Confucianism as a political ideology offered most problems. King emphasised the 
potential of Confucian tradition for the material development of society, but indicated 
its limitations for a full-fledged civil society. In such case, a top-down checking 
system, such as in a Confucian situation where the state is stronger than the society, 
would not be desirable. "Power of course means checks, but checks and balances 
cannot be really achieved by constitutional arrangement. They can only be achieved by 
social mechanism. Only when society becomes politicised can there be developed an 
autonomous kind of resource and power. "324 
Shils remarked that there was some apprehension that Confucianism manipulated people 
into a moral attitude, pretending to be friendly, paternal, filial.325 He thought that if 
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one were to use Confucian ethics during the modernisation process, like was done in 
Singapore, a moral dilemma would pop up. Confucianism emphasises the intrinsic 
value of morality. However, to what extent would it then not be contradictory to try 
to manipulate other people into moral human beings. According to Confucianism, each 
human being should be treated as an intrinsically valuable person, a moral entity, not 
as a means to an end. Thus manipulating people into moral beings is thought to be not 
of high moral standard itself. On the other hand, if one does not do so, one would be 
presented with the dilemma that this would be equal to condoning other influences of 
which one does not approve by the same moral ethics and that would be immoral too. 
Opposition politician Chee claimed: 
"It is extremely suspect for PAP politicians to champion ideas about hierarchy 
and obedience to authority by taking bits and pieces of Confucian philosophy, 
often wholly out of context, to create a system designed to keep themselves at 
a political advantage."326 
For example, Chee perceived the Corrective Work Order (CWO) as punishment for 
litter bugs (publicly having to pick up litter in Singapore's parks and beaches) as a 
variation on the government's Asian-values dogma, a shaming tactic based on the view 
that Asians are afraid to lose face. Although the offenders did hide their faces when 
filmed and photographed by the press, Singapore's littering problem did not seem to 
have improved.327 
Tu pointed at the difference between "political Confucianism" and the "Confucian 
personal ethic". He thought the more important aspect of Confucianism was the notion 
of one's personal ethic code regarding one's family, education and career. Tu said that 
the essence was not the political Confucianism, but rather a concentration on the family 
which served as a prototype for the functioning of the state.328 According to 
Fukuyama, Confucianism by no means mandated an authoritarian political system. 
Other Confucian societies such as Japan and South Korea had been able to 
accommodate a greater degree of political participation and individual liberty than 
Singapore without compromising their own fundamental cultural values, and Taiwan 
was moving rapidly in the same direction.329 
Schluchter warned Singaporeans to be careful of a too pragmatic use of Confucianism. 
"This kind of eclecticism devalues the critical impact a value system can have on the 
behaviour of people in the long run, not in the instrumentalistic sense, but in the sense 
that it provides the source for giving meaning to life."330 He suggested a more 
holistic approach which would transcend the level of the political or economic 
entrepreneur. 
According to MacFarquhar, the strength of Confucianism lay in its emphasis on civil 
order, on the needs of people relating to each other. In a more and more 
commercialising and secularising world on a global scale, the humanistic aspects of 
Confucianism, "the essence of civil conduct between people", could offer more 
identification than what Weber called a salvation religion.331 (see chapter three) 
MacFarquhar thought that, although Confucianism had lost its social foundation and 
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"no longer exists as a wholesome cultural system - it exists as fragments"332, as a 
moral Weltanschauung it could still play a role in Chinese societies. 
Max Weber did not discuss the intrinsically valuable institutions in Confucian ethics 
of family, school and state or the seat of office, for which Confucianism prescribed 
beneficial modes of conduct. However, it was in these that Shils saw the potential of 
curbing the negative consequences of modernisation and rationalisation, 
"namely, the hyper-individualism which has generated the hedonism from the 
increased productivity. These are thought to be destructive of the moral quality 
of the individual himself and that of the institutions, particularly the family, and 
the whole society, undermining respect for the state. "3M 
Shils thought that Confucian values, such as collectivity, respect for others, friendship 
and disciple-ship, diligence and disciplined work, were not only conducive to economic 
and industrial modernisation, but also protective against undesired consequences of 
modernisation, such as too much emphasis on achievement, hyper-rationalisation and 
hyper-individualism. Thus the very aspects which Max Weber thought to be inhibitive 
for a Confucian society to produce industrial capitalism could in fact mitigate the 
negative consequences of this industrial capitalism. 
In reaction to Max Weber's perception that Confucianism was unfavourable to free 
enterprise, Meng mentioned that an important feature of Confucianism is its tendency 
to conform to, instead of transcend, reality.334 
This type of Confucian characteristics on a macro-level could prove to be of more use 
for the future than the selection of Confucian values on a micro-level. 
For example, the values identified positively for economic growth in Hofstede's value-
system called "Confucian dynamism" have stimulate East Asians in the past to produce 
more and thereby enhance economic development. However, in the process of 
modernisation these same values could decrease. For instance, hard work and thrift 
could become less necessary when most of the needs which could be fulfilled by these 
values, would have been achieved. Beyond the level of survival, from which these 
Confucian values sprang, there could be other needs pressing most. A Confucian 
attitude and behaviour may be incompatible with the developed post-modern society, 
where productivity has outpaced economic growth. As long as Singapore is still in a 
transition from secondary to tertiary level of development, the selected productivity-
inducing Confucian values could be relevant. However, these same values could cause 
tremendous stress and frustrations when Singapore would be in a similar economic 
situation as in the Western countries in the nineties. The drive to work hard and the 
pressure to strive for excellence in a society where unemployment is high, could not 
only stimulate the highly valued economic competitiveness in the rat race, but could 
also cause psychological disorders. The Singaporean föam^-mentality took its toll 
in twenty percent of its population having psychological problems.336 As long as jobs 
were abound plenty, the productivity-inducing values could prove relevant. However, 
times may change. 
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According to Meng, it was not only a question of concern about the challenge of 
modernisation for Eastern culture, but also a matter of exploring "a new way for 
troubled mankind through a dialogue between occidental and oriental cultures".337 
Wu mentioned the Confucian concept of keji (one must learn and be ready to move) 
as important to the future of Confucianism in Singapore.338 In the economic area, 
Singapore had applied this principle when its cheap labour, important to initial 
attraction of foreign investments, appeared to be exhaustive. The government then 
stimulated Singaporeans to upgrade in other directions. Singaporeans' high esteem for 
education could make it possible to achieve the government's dream of becoming the 
IT(Information Technology)-city of the next century. The Confucian keji was also 
reflected in the fact that the Singapore government made its plans about thirty years 
ahead. 
Keji was also shown in the scrutiny of even Confucianism itself for its positive and 
negative elements. The Confucian tradition showed many different characteristics, some 
of which appeared to have been conducive to economic development, whereas others 
could undermine it. Singaporeans had shed inhibitive Confucian elements after their 
migration from China in its transformation into the new Singaporean society and had 
to be cautious in their re-rooting attempts. However, some conducive aspects in the 
past could turn out to become a handicap in the adaptation to a post-modem society. 
The relevance of the heritage of Confucianism was quite complex. Lim33' identified 
Kong Fu Zi's progressive teachings as positive and his conservative teachings as 
negative. Progressive were deemed to be Kong Fu Zi's principles of teaching. Many 
dictums were still used as reference, such as the example which Singapore seemed to 
have taken to heart: 
"If a man keeps cherishing his old knowledge, so as continually to be acquiring 
new, he may be a teacher of others" 
Analects, 11/11 
Kong Fu Zi's political thoughts were more complicated with both positive and negative 
elements. Progressive were deemed to be Kong Fu Zi's sayings: 
"Give them enough food, give them enough arms, and the common people will 
have trust in you" 
Analects, XII/7 
"When the people have become rich ... educate them" 
Analects, XIII/9 
"In caring for the common people one should be generous" 
Analects, V/16 
Conservative was labelled Kong Fu Zi's apparent lack of awareness of a change in land 
ownership and a transfer of political power to lower levels during his time. 
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His ethical thoughts also contained both progressive and conservative elements. As Lim 
pointed out, Kong Fu Zi may be regarded as a sage by Confucianists, but he also made 
human mistakes; he was sometimes not clear on an issue or was biased. For example, 
Kong Fu Zi treated and spoke of women and "small men" with scom. Therefore, Lim 
argued, one had to adopt a practical, realistic and scientifically analysing approach. 
However precious cultural heritage could be, an objective attitude, taking historical 
factors into account, should reject certain elements of tradition and retain others. 
Wu also advised Singaporeans to be practical in studying how the Confucian code could 
be modified and adapted to the requirement of modem conditions, of the specific 
Singaporean condition. It should not be cut off from its metaphysical roots to be 
viable.340 As an example King noted that people will always wonder about the 
meaning in life, even if they have become more rational due to a modernised 
society.341 
A few general observations with reference to these keji plans for Confucianism in 
Singapore could be made. 
Firstly, the fact that the Confucian ethics have evolved and nowadays incorporate other 
belief systems, make its analysis an extremely complex matter. 
Secondly, the discussion of the relevance of Confucianism for the Singaporean society 
often crossed the lines between descriptive and prescriptive. Many would start out in 
a Western descriptive fashion, only to end in an Eastern moralising rhetoric.342 
Thirdly, the value-discussion was mainly an intellectual affair. The "man in the street" 
in Singapore could not care less about the analysis of his value system.143 
Fourthly, one could place some question marks with the assumption of the Singaporean 
eagerness to learn. Chan pointed out that especially the older generation suffered from 
the "Man's crab syndrome": on the Isle of Man there were crabs which had a way of 
pulling each other down as they tried to climb out from the crab basket. In this way 
Singaporeans' strive for excellence was mediated by an attitude of "If you have 
knowledge, do not show off."344 The younger generation seemed mainly pragmatical. 
Many wanted to leam only until they could start earning a more comfortable living. 
The status-consciousness in modem Singapore led to a widespread "title-inflation".345 
For instance, in the Singaporean society someone with a Bachelor's degree was 
considered a university graduate. As this label provided access to most higher level 
jobs there was no need, except for university jobs, to continue one's education beyond 
a BA. High educational fees, a limited budget of most people and a strict selection for 
a limited number of scholarships were further restraining factors. On the other hand, 
most career starting Singaporeans continued to live with their families until well into 
their marriage, so they had fewer costs than most students in Western countries. If they 
would have been interested in learning per se, why were there so few to pursue a 
Master's degree? The Singaporean money-mindedness seemed to rate higher than the 
intellectual endeavours. 
In 1992 a discussion about the right value-system for Singapore was organised by the 
Institute of Policy Studies and the Singapore Heritage Society. Kwok noted a field of 
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tension between traditionalists, who emphasised going back to one's Asian roots, and 
"cosmopolitanists", who emphasised that modem people can and should strive at 
becoming citizens of the world, freeing themselves from the yoke of tradition and 
embracing the cognitive possibilities opened up by modernity.346 In Singapore the 
growing international interdependence of states in a new world order was perceived as 
the most realistic perspective for the future. Therefore the Singapore government strove 
to breed independent citizens equipped to function anywhere in the world with 
Singapore as their home base, as opposed to making its citizens self-reliant within the 
confinements of their own nation. This encouraged a cosmopolitan attitude. 
However, neither traditionalism nor cosmopolitanism could offer the ultimate solution. 
Chua suggested that a middle road between the extremes of traditionalism and 
cosmopolitanism could be found if one would treat tradition as an "ongoing source of 
wisdom, knowledge to respond to and that is continuously responding to the modem 
world, to the contemporary conditions".347 
7.5. In cross-cultural perspective 
Singapore's search for its own identity and values has hitherto been viewed from an 
internal Singaporean perspective. Singaporeans were preoccupied with their respective 
Chinese, Malay and Indian ethnical identifications on the one hand and with an East-
West identification on the other. The focus was on intra-cultural changes which did 
happen during the process of rapid economic development. The concern was regarding 
the fact that Singapore was perceived as the most westernised country in Asia. Cross-
culturally, however, Singapore appeared to remain relatively Asian. 
Hofstede compared the ways of thinking and social action in forty countries worldwide. 
He discovered four value areas distinguishing between national cultures psychologically 
and sociologically: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism and 
masculinity. These value areas described basic problems of humanity with which every 
society had to cope.348 In his sample based on data gathered between 1967 to 1973, 
Singapore was categorised within the culture area of less developed Asian 
countries349, together with Hong Kong, Taiwan, India, Pakistan, Philippines and 
Thailand. In Hofstede's research Singapore scored relatively low on the individualism 
index (shared rank 39-41 out of 53 countries, score 20 on scale of 100), well below 
Western countries.350 On the power distance index Singapore scored relatively high 
(rank 13, score 74), well above Western countries.351 On the masculinity index 
Singapore took a middle position (rank 28, score 48), lower than Anglo-Saxon 
countries, higher than Scandinavian countries and The Netherlands352. Finally, on the 
uncertainty avoidance index Singapore ranked lowest (rank 53, score 8).353 The 
combination of a hierarchical (high power distance) and collectivist (low individualist) 
attitude provided Singapore with a distinct East Asian rather than a Western profile. 
The extreme low avoidance of uncertainty was typical of Singapore in its early 
development years. 
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In countries with a high power distance environment. Hofstede expected the superego 
to be personified in the form of a powerful person, such as the father, the leader or the 
boss. People would be able to blame the powerful for their ills. This was the case in 
Singapore. 
With regard to the combination of uncertainty avoidance and masculinity, Singapore 
was - though marginally - clustered with the Anglo "masculine risk-takers". The Asian 
countries in this cluster all appeared to be former UK or US colonies. 
Hofstede attributed culture change (shins in values) to four different kind of causes: 
1. maturation (due only to aging) 
2. seniority (due to experience over the years) 
3. generation (due to age cohort) 
4. Zeitgeist (due to drastic system-wide changes in conditions).354 
The values of Singaporeans did not change significantly between the period 1967-1969 
and 1971-1973. In the eighties, however, Bond discovered a fifth cross-cultural 
dimension in the Asia-Pacific which had not been noticed previously by the Western 
researchers. He devised a Chinese Value Survey which showed the fifth dimension 
could be labelled as "Confucian dynamism".355. The Western surveys had never 
inquired into this realm as its values were not relevant in the Western world. On the 
other hand questions pertaining to "truth" appeared to be not relevant to the sino-
influenced world. 
The same concepts could be interpreted differently in the Eastern and Western contexts. 
The Western questions about power distance, for example, drew mainly attention to the 
aspect of power itself, whereas the Eastern questions showed that power distribution 
depended on the distribution of personal virtues. In cultures with a high power 
distance, such as Singapore, dependency on a person in power made self restriction a 
virtue. 
On the individualism index, the Chinese value-system compelled to include the value 
"serving your country" on the collectivist side of the index. Besides this added value, 
no significant differences in interpretation were found. 
The masculinity index showed a different interpretation for the Chinese. The original 
masculine part represented the assertive, materialistic, achievement-oriented side of the 
masculinity index. However, the Chinese value-system also showed chivalry (which 
reminds of the medieval ideals of the knights in the West), patience and friendliness. 
These latter two values would be expected to be labelled feminine by most Westerners. 
Hofstede explained this phenomenon by noting that Chinese philosophers have always 
emphasised that yin (more feminine) and yang (more masculine) elements in life are 
intertwined.356 Moreover, the Chinese spoke in terms of the "desirable" as an 
abstract virtue, whereas the Western survey meant the "desirable" for one's own 
person. These two desires do not always overlap; often they are in contradiction. 
On the feminine side the Chinese survey emphasised the subordination to higher goals 
such as patriotism and justice. 
278 Singapore, a modem Asian city-state 
None of the factors in the Chinese Value Survey correlated with Hofstede's uncertainty 
avoidance. 
The concept of "Confucian dynamism" covered a continuum with a long term 
orientation and a short term orientation. The long term orientation was considered the 
most future oriented and dynamic as well as the most Confucian. It contained the 
following values357: 
" - concern with respecting the demands of virtue 
- pragmatic 
- acceptance of change, relativity and interrelations 
- potential long term orientation 
- adaptations of traditions to a modern context 
- perseverance towards results which cannot be readily achieved 
- thrift, being sparing with resources, large savings quote, funds available for 
investment 
- tendency to synthesise new information and to look for utility 
- willingness to subordinate oneself for a purpose 
- having a sense of shame is seen as all-important" 
The short term orientation consisted of: 
" - concern with possessing the truth 
- normative 
- concern with personal steadiness 
- orientation to the past, present, or nearby future 
- respect for traditions 
- quick results expected 
- social pressure to 'keep up with your neighbours' even if it means 
overspending 
- hospitality even if it means overspending 
- reciprocation of favours and gifts even if it means overspending 
- tendency to analyse new information and to look for consistency 
- more passive attitude regarding new information 
- concern with self-gratification 
- concern with face 
- having a sense of guilt 
- having a sense of shame is seen as important, but not as overriding other 
social concerns" 
Singapore ranked ninth out of twenty-three countries on the long term orientation with 
a score of 48 on a scale of 10O358. China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan and South-
Korea respectively took up the top five positions. 
The correlation between the long term Confucian dynamism dimension and economic 
growth figures published by the World Bank for 1965 to 1987 was high for the 
countries surveyed, hereby proving some kind of relation between cultural and 
economic development.159 Perseverance, respect for status in a hierarchical society, 
thrift and shame on the long term orientation in particular were perceived as beneficial 
to economic development. Traditional Confucian values such as overall importance of 
shame, personal steadiness and stability on the other hand were perceived as hampering 
entrepreneurial initiative and risk taking. Too much respect for tradition could inhibit 
development. 
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The fact that Singapore scored lowest of the Five Dragons could indicate that cultural 
change was happening most rapidly in Singapore, but there were no longitudinal data 
on "Confucian dynamism" available. Still Singapore scored higher on this Eastern 
dimension than the Western countries. Not only the greater ethnic diversity in 
Singapore, but also the distinction made between the personal and business areas with 
regard to values might account for the relatively low score on Confucian dynamism in 
Singapore compared to other East-Asian countries. In the personal, moral area 
Singaporeans remained traditional, but in the business field the immigrant population 
appeared to be extremely adaptive. This distinction between these two areas could not 
be read from the end score on the Confucian dynamism dimension. 
In 1989-1990 Grace Lee Chau Chin tested the validity of Hofstede's cross-cultural 
observations for Singapore.340 Hofstede's survey items had been derived from factor 
analyses on data from France, Great Britain and Japan. However, the Singapore study 
results showed that the same cultural construct could be interpreted differently in other 
countries. She found, for example, that scores on the power distance and masculinity 
index in Singapore differed significantly from Hofstede's sample. She concluded that 
one could not interpret Hofstede's cultural constructs without modifying or redefining 
the constructs in terms relevant to the specific cultural context. 
In 1993 cross-cultural data of Trompenaars361 showed the following profile for 
Singapore on six dimensions covering how people relate to other people: 
1. individualism 
2. emotionality 
3. relation work - private life 
4. status attribution 
5. locus of control 
6. social order 
individualism 
Singaporeans were still more collectivist than individualist362, even more than 
respondents in other East Asian countries. Belonging to a hierarchical group was part 
of this collectivist attitude. Referring to "quality of life" fifty percent of Singaporeans 
responded with "individual freedom", well below North American, North-European 
and East Asian countries (except South Korea). Trompenaars concluded that these 
results questioned the prejudice that modernisation implies individualism.363 
emotionality 
As to the dimension of emotional affectivity versus emotional neutrality, Singapore 
scored more affective364. There was no general pattern by continent. For example, 
in Singapore and Hong Kong exhibiting emotions was much more acceptable than in 
Japan or Indonesia, also more than in The Netherlands for that matter. Americans and 
South Europeans showed the most emotions. In the emotional neutral countries there 
was a tendency to dismiss emotions in the workplace as "unprofessional". If 
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professionalism would be seen as a feature of modern developed countries, Singapore 
would be seen as more professional than the USA for instance. 
relationship between work and private life 
Singapore also was a slightly more diffuse than specific society365, meaning that work 
and private life were not strictly segregated and that once someone was admitted as a 
friend nearly all private spaces were shared. In diffuse cultures loss of face is of great 
importance, which leads to taking much time to get to the point. In this respect 
Singapore contrasted sharply with the Western countries. 
status attribution 
Singaporeans attributed status only slightly more to achievement than by ascription366. 
Most of the literature on achievement orientation saw this as part of modernisation, the 
key to economic and business success, and labelled societies which ascribe status as 
"economically backward". It came as no surprise that most Western countries accorded 
status to achievement. However, Trompenaars concluded that "there is no evidence that 
either orientation belongs more to a "higher" level of development, as modernisation 
theorists used to claim.367 
locus of control 
Singaporeans believed more in an external than an internal locus of control regarding 
nature.368 In this respect they differed considerably from most the North American 
and North European countries. However, Trompenaars noted that internal versus 
external loci of control did not necessarily distinguish the successful from the less 
successful in non-American cultures. Being externally adaptive proved its economic 
effectiveness for countries such as Japan and Singapore. 
social order 
Singaporeans scored slightly more universalistic than particularistic369, meaning that 
upholding the law was preferred over helping a friend. The most universalistic were 
the North-American and North-European countries, which considered this value as a 
symptom of modernity. However, interestingly, Singaporeans scored more 
particularistic in the business area than in the personal area. This indicated a lack of 
loyalty towards the company or work organisation, which could be related to the high 
presence of multinational companies and the high percentage of job hopping due to a 
tight labour market in Singapore. In contrast, Japan scored extreme universalistic in the 
business area, while it scored in the middle in the personal areas. Identification with 
the corporation was relatively extremely high in Japan. 
Trompenaars' data showed that, cross-culturally speaking, Singapore had not become 
very Westernised, although in some respects it was the most Western of Asian 
countries. Nevertheless, Singapore remained distinctly Asian compared to Western 
countries. 
CHAPTER 8 
HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 
8.1 People as main economic asset 
Due to the lack of natural resources, the Singaporean population necessarily formed the 
key factor in the development of Singapore. It was the only source of capitalisation for 
the government. In the book "Singapore: The Next Lap" Goh Chok Tong presented the 
new government's vision of Singapore to the general public as follows: 
"People are, and will always be, our most precious resource. More than 
anything else, it is the effort of Singaporeans, with their drive and talent, that 
has made the country what it is today. Overcoming great odds as a newly-
independent nation without natural resources, we have turned our city-state into 
a thriving and modern economy. The future will be no different. In the next lap, 
the size of our population and the quality of our people will determine how 
successfully we fare. We must have enough capable and talented people to do 
the job - and to do it well. This is crucial."1 
Pang, Tan and Cheng perceived Singapore's human resources - "the quality of its 
people, their commitment, and their will to succeed" - as the single most important 
contributor to Singapore's economic and political success.2 
In the early nineties Singapore had already achieved the level of developed countries 
going by income level. But in other aspects, unidentified by the OESO, it still lacked 
a developed structure of society. In order to become a full-fledged developed country, 
the Singapore government had the relevant literature and research studied. Based on a 
study of a selection of small industrialised countries, amongst which Japan as only 
Asian developed country, the main finding was that the key competitive advantages that 
Singapore needed to develop were human resources and other aspects of soft 
infrastructure. Singapore already had an excellent physical infrastructure, but this soft 
infrastructure could still use much improvement.3 
This link between human resources and economic growth explained why government 
policies invaded private realms of life to the extent they did. Probably nowhere else in 
the world were the state policies to organise a country's people and to influence its 
values and attitudes so extensive and pervasive, even intrusive in the eyes of many 
Western observers.4 
population size 
Population size was the first human factor perceived to have a direct impact on the 
nation state's economic prosperity. In 1959 the annual population growth rate was 4.7 
percent. The first episode of the National Family Planning and Population Programme 
to contain population size was marked by the slogan "Two is enough" in the sixties. 
The disincentives imposed direct economic penalties on couples who desired more than 
two children. Hospital delivery and accouchement fees in government hospitals were 
raised, maternity leave benefits were withdrawn, income tax allowances were 
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withdrawn, big families were given less priority in public housing and in the choice of 
primary schools. These penalties were not imposed if one of the parents underwent 
sterilisation.5 Abortions were cheap and easily obtained. Priority for entrance 
registration at primary one level was given to children with at least one sterilised 
parent. This way the government succeeded in reducing the crude birth rate from 29.9 
births per 1000 people in 1965 to 22.1 per 1000 by 1970. However, there had been 
other influences besides the policies as well. Wong thought that the indirect socio-
psychological pressure radiating from the family planning programme was more 
significant in deciding the family size than the direct economic penalties.6 Families who 
"planned" their upward economic mobility were more likely to reduce their family size. 
This factor of the perceived opportunities to improve their standard of living along with 
social factors such as higher educated and more working women might have been just 
as important as the direct social policies. Whatever the precise cause of reduction of 
family size, the government's aim of zero growth was surpassed. Statisticians predicted 
a decline in the population in the twenty first century. In 1987 the government changed 
its population policy into "Three is better". The poster slogans were "have three, and 
more if you can afford it". Ong Teng Cheong had argued in a speech as second Deputy 
Prime Minister in 1986: "To a small nation like Singapore, children are the country's 
future resources. They are our economic, defense and social resources. They are the 
potential force that will shape the destiny of Singapore's future."7 Fiscal measures to 
back up this new direction were large tax rebates for children (in 1989 extended to 
fourth children) and tax reductions for the wife's earned income, subsidies for child 
care centres, provisions for priority registration at primary one entrance level for 
children in three-child families as well as priority in obtaining government flats. In the 
civil service mothers were permitted unpaid leave to take care of their children and 
part-time work was facilitated.8 
There were two problems with the government's National Family Planning and 
Population Programme. Firstly, the population policies produced differential effects in 
the social classes. Since the government hospitals, public housing and the state 
educational system catered to the greatest majority of the population, these measures 
did not only have a wide impact on the general population, but also had a stronger 
impact on the lower social classes. Withdrawal of paid maternity leave affected the 
small group of working mothers with large families most. On the other hand, since only 
those people with a higher income had to pay income tax, the measures on income tax 
relief affected the higher income group most. According to Wong, the population 
disincentives were by no means coercive, nor did the government intend them to be so. 
They were devised "for the good of the poor themselves". Still, many believed that the 
disincentives tended to penalise the poor rather than the rich, and were therefore 
perceived as "unjust". 
Secondly, the government's population policies were perceived as interference in 
people's personal lives. Generally, the Confucian background, with its emphasis on 
societal order and good leadership, prevented the majority of the Singaporeans from 
protests against infringements on their personal freedom. But when Lee coupled the 
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social policies with level of education, family planning became the most controversial 
government policy. Lee expressed his concern for a "decline in quality of the 
population", because higher educated women tended to many later and have fewer 
children. Because the government foresaw a declining talent pool in the future, it 
wanted to encourage higher educated women to have more children with the expectation 
of improving the level of human resources. The policies following from this notion 
were very controversial. Although the recognition of this skewed procreation pattern 
was valued as a long-term, inter-generational approach to human resource 
development9, the criticism was that the proposed policies were based on an unfounded 
belief in heredity of intelligence. Due to the resistance against the higher priority for 
graduate and some other educationally qualified women than for less educated women 
in registering their children for school, which was forcefully expressed in the 1984 
election campaign, this priority scheme was abandoned in 1985. Nevertheless, Lee 
continued with other "quality" policies. Families in which both parents had little 
education and low incomes were granted cash benefits if the mother was sterilised. 
Hospital delivery fees in wards used by the poorest patients were raised appreciably, 
whereas the more expensive wards had minor increases. Beginning in October 1987, 
married women with some secondary education and fewer than three children had to 
receive counselling from a doctor before undergoing abortions. 
Furthermore, a social development unit (SDU) was set up, based on a Japanese 
model10. It aimed at stimulating opportunities for higher educated men and women to 
meet and marry. The cruises, called the "love boat", were particularly ridiculed by the 
Singapore population and the nick name for the SDU became "Single, Dumb and 
Ugly". 
Lee's eugenic ideas and policies were especially controversial, because the Malays were 
perceived to be the ones with the lowest education level, lowest incomes and the most 
children. They were the ethnic group which felt most hit by these policies. Moreover, 
the Malays were Muslims and Islamic leaders opposed sterilisation. 
Nevertheless, in general the success of the birth control efforts was so great that the 
government could shift its focus to the related problem of an ageing population in the 
nineties. The government based its policies on the predictions of statisticians that the 
population was not growing fast enough to replace itself in the long term. An increasing 
number of Singaporeans remained unmarried and those who did marry tended to have 
fewer children. As a result, the population was expected to peak in the year 2020 and 
thereafter begin to decline. 
On the one hand respect for the elderly was seen as "a cultivated society's recognition 
of human dignity over the economic utility of its human resources. "" This was often 
regarded as an Asian value in contrast to Western values, reflected in the degree of 
respect and social status of older and more senior people in Asian societies. 
On the other hand some potentially serious consequences were identified. 
Firstly, an important consequence of the ageing problem would be the decrease in the 
size of the defense force. Although the SAF (Singapore Armed Forces) relied on its 
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emphasis on high technology instead of numbers12, in 1993 one started recruiting 
women for NS (national service) too, in spite of fierce debates. 
Secondly, a growing number of elderly employees would be more costly as well as 
more difficult to (re)train. This would reduce Singapore's international competitiveness. 
Thirdly, fewer young people had to support more and more elderly people, which 
would be an increasing financial and physical burden on them. 
Fourthly, the ageing process meant that less income tax could be collected, whereas 
support facilities such as hospitals would be needed much more. The workforce 
generating the income would become too small to support the elderly and needy in the 
society. 
As the government was determined not to make Singapore a welfare state, pro-active 
policies were deemed to be necessary. In The Next Lap, the government stated: 
"Fortunately we have spotted the problem in time. Too small a population will 
hinder our development. It will impose limits on what we can do. We will be 
unable to undertake certain activities for lack of capable people. Our local 
cultural and entertainment scene may be less exciting than elsewhere for lack of 
audience and talent. Our security will be less assured because there will be fewer 
able-bodied Singaporeans to man our armed forces. We need not accept such 
constraints. We can, and we must, make sure our population grows sufficiently. 
We should also supplement our numbers with talent from abroad. How 
successfully we do this will determine the kind of Singapore we will be in the 
next century. We must therefore address these problems today. We need to 
know how many people Singapore can accommodate comfortably, and find ways 
to raise the quality of the population. 
... A sufficiently large population will provide many more opportunities for 
Singapore to grow and develop. It will provide the critical mass of talented 
people needed for our future development."13 
According to studies initiated by the government, Singapore would be able to 
comfortably house four million people and still improve the quality of life - provided 
the land would be used carefully.14 With these expectations in mind, the government 
attempted to increase the total population growth. Previous obstacles to large families 
were lifted and incentives were given: tax rebate for up to S$20,000 for the third child, 
top priority for entry into school for the third child and provision of child care 
facilities. In public service, working mothers could receive up to four years no-pay 
leave to deliver and care for their babies, several unrecorded days leave a year to attend 
to sick children and part-time work arrangements to help them cope with family 
responsibilities.15 
quality of the people 
The second human factor considered important to the economic success, was the 
"quality of the people". In the Singapore context this quality predominantly referred to 
the economic value of the Singaporeans, as the key human resource policies concerned 
wages, productivity and training. 
It started with independence, when the government changed the hands-off policy of the 
colonial administration. The "considerable but unorganised energies" in Singapore were 
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channelled to serve the state-defined objective of economic growth. From then on the 
government showed unrelentless efforts to upgrade the Singapore workers with an 
integrative mix of economic and social policies all aimed at a nation of excellence with 
a cultivated society and a developed economy. In each development period the 
government managed to mobilise the support of the population for its goals. Not all the 
policies and programmes were a success, but enough to affect significantly the quality 
of Singapore's human resources. 
In the sixties the central issue in human resource management was labour discipline. 
Although labour legislation favoured the employers, the government was firm in not 
allowing them to take advantage of the workers. The government's approach to labour 
problems was not legalistic, but it rather relied on its considerable powers to persuade 
the union movement and employers to work together as partners in progress. Over the 
years a mutual trust and goodwill developed. 
Having achieved a peaceful labour situation and full employment in the seventies, the 
focus became to reduce the demand for labour and raise productivity. In its unrelentless 
struggle for economic survival the government devised a soft and a hard method.16 
The son method consisted of providing facilities for high tech companies. Fiscal 
incentives were offered to enterprises, a Productivity Campaign was launched and 
education policies were modified, expanding technical and computer education. The 
hard method consisted of buying laboratories and development centres from abroad and 
insisting that companies set up their own training centres. In 1975 e.g. Philips started 
the Philips Government Training Centre in cooperation with the Economic Development 
Board (EDB). Some hundred Dutch engineers were recruited to transfer technology to 
Singaporeans. It was not compulsory for students of these training centres to work for 
the company in question. This was part of the government's high-tech development 
aims. Philips' training programme for managers and supervisors was not only meant 
to update their skills, knowledge and attitudes, but also to ensure succession of qualified 
and competent managers in the local context.17 
Another "hard method" by the government was the enforced pay rise of twenty percent 
per year, during three years. This way the salaries doubled and made it unattractive for 
labour-intensive industries to stay in Singapore. The National Wages Council (NWC), 
established in 1972, was to achieve the following official objectives18: 
" a) to recommend annual wage increases 
b) to ensure orderly wage determination so as to promote economic and 
social development 
c) to assist in the development of incentive schemes to improve national 
productivity" 
In the late seventies the government began appointing government-bonded scholars to 
leadership and administrative positions in the National Trades Union Congress (NTUC) 
to induce fresh blood and professionalise the union movement according to some, to 
increase it's influence according to others19. In the government's eyes, the union 
movement was an important pillar of support. It's main objective, unlike that of unions 
in many other countries, was not to represent the sectional interests of workers but to 
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rally them behind the government's policies and programmes for economic and social 
development. This way the unions took up a middle man position instead of an 
opposition function. The NTUC was represented in various national tripartite bodies, 
such as the NWC and the National Productivity Board (NPB) and on governing boards 
of educational and training institutions. Because the unions took part in decision-making 
themselves, their role towards the workers became to explain the national policies to 
them. 
Early eighties the wages were no longer lower, but higher than in the other NICs.20 
The evolution of the wage system parallelled developments in the market-economy: 
from low wages in the drive for labour-intensive industrialisation, through high wages 
when the economy was restructured for high value-added industrialisation, to wage 
restraint during the economic recession of the mid-'80's. It was always linked to 
productivity and DFI opportunities as a reward for labour. But it did not always work 
out as intended; wage increases sometimes exceeded productivity growth.21 
In 1981 the National Productivity Council was formed, which almost immediately 
launched the National Productivity Movement. Improved quality of life in Singapore 
was perceived to come from a grown GDP, which was influenced by a higher quality 
of work, as shown in the figure below, used as a starting point by the productivity 
movement. 
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Figure 8.1. Productivity improvement process22, showing direct link between the 
quality of the workforce and the quality of life. 
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Higher worker productivity was to be achieved by skills upgrading, making use of the 
financial support of the Skills Development Fund (SDF) set up by the government in 
1979. When the SDF was placed under jurisdiction of the NPB, emphasis shifted from 
top and middle management to lower level workers (earning S$750 or less a month 
and/or with Α-level education or below). 
Following Lee Kuan Yew's visit to Japan in 1979, the need to emulate the "Japanese 
model" was highlighted. Lee seemed to have been deeply impressed with Japan's 
industrially disciplined labour force, efficient bureaucracy and corporate welfarism. In 
Singapore he thereupon emphasised cooperative organisation, dedication to work ethic 
and joint company effort. Like the Japanese, Lee saw education, in particular technical 
and vocational training, as being the key to future economic growth.23 
The secrets of Japan's success applicable to Singapore were to improve the quality of 
the Singapore workforce. When the Japanese Productivity Center launched its national 
movement to improve productivity in 1955, it defined the productivity concept in a 
somewhat different way than it perceived the West did.24 It considered that 
productivity had to be more than a mere ratio between input and output and decided that 
the human element was the most important in promoting productivity on a sustained, 
long-term basis. The attitude was to treat employees as human beings with brains, not 
as part of lifeless machines or bloodless system. No reference was made to 
"rationalisation", which was considered a rash approach often detrimental to long-term 
productivity. 
This Japanese approach, which emphasised valuing and mobilising employee 
contribution, resulted in a very specific human resource management system. 
Employees were recruited straight from school, not for specific jobs, but as long-term 
human asset. As they enjoyed life-long employment, they were intensively trained and 
developed throughout their working careers. Training costs were considered as 
investment rather than cost by most Japanese corporations. Skills only, were not enough 
for the Japanese, employee motivation was deemed to be as important to be effective. 
Therefore the input from work floor employees was taken seriously and decisions were 
made in consensus. This Japanese HRD system had been successful for a long time, but 
this traditional approach came under pressure due to a number of factors which also 
applied to Singapore. 
First of all, Japan would be facing a structural shortage of labour rather than 
employment due to an ageing population. The Japanese HRD system had its roots in a 
time of labour surplus. 
Secondly, the younger generation was developing a much more diversified value system 
than the older generation. Instead of relying on a "business first" attitude, Japanese 
companies now had to accommodate to aspirations and needs of individuals, also 
outside their working lives. Japanese workers generally had been so devoted to their 
work that they did not mind having little time left for family life and leisure. But in a 
changing environment in which basic necessities such as housing were becoming more 
and more expensive, the lifetime-employment concept with a traditional seniority system 
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was starting to lose appeal. Young, capable employees in particular started wanting to 
be rewarded for merit and achievement. 
Thirdly, the globalisation of the economy confronted Japanese multinationals with other 
HRD systems, often incompatible with the unique Japanese one. When starting a 
daughter company abroad, this intercultural difference often led to problems. 
Fourthly, in a competitive area innovative technological development is often crucial 
to future economic success. But the Japanese emphasis on teamwork and seniority 
inhibited young individuals from creatively using their intellect. 
Moreover, in Japan a new national consensus was emerging to create a new kind of 
society that is not only materially affluent, but also mentally and spiritually fulfilling, 
including recognition of the value of the individual.25 
To adapt to this transforming society Miyai, president of the Japan Productivity Center, 
suggested to keep the positive aspects of the traditional Japanese system, i.e. human 
oriented management systems, equitable distribution of wealth through non-
discrimination between staff and labour and blue- and white-collar workers, mutual trust 
and respect between labour and management, extensive information sharing among all 
members of the organisation and intensive training and development activities. But other 
parts had to be modified. Miyai suggested to gradually and partly replace seniority-
based promotion and remuneration policies by merit-based ones; continue life-time 
employment for core employees, but simultaneously introduce more flexible forms as 
well; create a wider recruitment practice; develop talent at a younger age; expand job 
transfer and rotation practices to other corporations and last but not least the school 
system should not only encourage conformity to promote teamwork, but also individual 
creativity and initiative. 
However, Singapore's human resource situation was entirely different. The dominant 
force in the local business community consisted of the Chinese, who had established 
themselves by sheer hard work and "street smartness". Their trader's mentality never 
vanished, i.e. Singapore businessmen were usually interested in quick profits and 
seizing trading opportunities.26 Long-term commitment seemed alien to them and with 
full employment job-hopping characterised the labour market. 
Nevertheless, certain valuable lessons were drawn from the Japanese HRD system. The 
Japanese team work and company loyalty served as a model to the Singaporeans. 
Quality Control Circles (QCCs), the Just-In-Time (JIT) principle and On-The-Job-
Training (OJT) were found to be useful tools towards productivity growth. The common 
thread linking them up was employee involvement as the foundation for continuous 
improvement. 
OJT in particular caught the interest of HRD personnel in Singapore, just as in other 
countries who attempted to emulate Japan's economic success. A survey of NPB in 
1986 showed that 90 percent of the companies in Singapore had some form of OJT 
programme for their workers.27 However, what was considered OJT varied widely. 
51 percent classified their OJT programme as part of the informal training given to 
workers.; 63 percent indicated that their programmes were not conducted on a 
company-wide basis; 48 percent did not set targets for their workers to achieve under 
Human Resource Development 289 
OJT; 52 percent reported that their OJT instructors were not trained to conduct OJT. 
These results revealed a lack of understanding by companies. In 1987 NPB engaged a 
Japanese expert to prepare materials on OJT and training staff on how to conduct OJT. 
In partnership with Seiko Instruments a self-instructional package was developed, 
financed with 90 percent SDF support. SDF also supported 70 percent of the package 
price charged to companies and $2 per trainee per hour of structured OJT. The NPB 
Consulting Division was marketing the programme. 
The problem in Singapore was that frequent job-hopping undermined the long-term 
activity of manpower development in the company.28. Japanese workers were also less 
afraid to admit mistakes in the learning process, because traditionally their jobs were 
life-long. 
Nevertheless, all kinds of committees were formed in Singapore, such as Work 
Excellence Committee's (WECs), Quality Control Circles (QCCs) and Work 
Improvement Teams (WITs). The aim was to involve the workforce to compete as a 
team. However, the way this could work out contrary to intention in a less company-
oriented environment than in Japan, was shown in a large accounting firm in Singapore. 
Internal business units competed so much with each other to be the best unit within the 
company that it affected overall results29. 
In the late eighties the human resource concern shifted to searching for a model which 
incorporated the best of local and foreign practices in work organisation and values. 
The other local concern was the wage flexibility and its effect on Singapore's 
competitive edge in world markets. 
In the nineties Singapore's economic growth was attributed to employment as well as 
productivity growth. Productivity growth was broadly measured by two factors. First, 
the amount of capital - machinery, equipment and physical facilities - available to each 
worker. Second, the quality of inputs (effectiveness) and the efficiency with which they 
are used, which is measured by total factor productivity (TFP). Singapore's initial 
productivity was largely driven by the first factor, but as the economy matured TFP 
began to replace capital investment. According to the "law of diminishing returns" 
effects of further increases in capital intensity would be limited. Hence, Singapore 
focused on its TFP. In developed countries, TFP accounted for 50 to 60 percent of 
productivity increases. Singapore achieved this level between 1986 and 1991.x As 
strongly related to the TFP, human resource development (HRD) was emerging as a 
very important policy area, not only in Singapore but in all countries in the region.31 
The 1990 Population Census showed that the previous decade more women joined the 
Singapore workforce.32 According to Mah Bow Tan, minister of state, this was not 
only due to the increasing number of better-educated women and more job 
opportunities, but also to the provision of child care centres and the availability of 
foreign maids. Girls stayed in school much longer. The trend, however, that women 
quit working as they got older, married and had children, remained stable. The Census 
also showed that more Singaporean workers had moved up the career ladder, with one 
in four holding professional, technical, administrative or managerial jobs, compared to 
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less than one in five ten years ago. This trend was accompanied by a decline in lower-
skilled jobs. A national emancipation committee advised the Singapore government to 
share its expertise and experience in promoting the economic status of (older) women 
with other countries, especially those in Southeast and East Asia, which had similar 
social and cultural traditions and values33. 
The number of Chinese in the higher skilled and financial jobs increased the most. The 
Malays now held more professional and technical jobs, but did not work more in 
administrative or managerial jobs. The output per worker in manufacturing increased 
significantly from $25,000 in 1980 to $41,000 in 1990, after discounting inflation. In 
the finance and business services sector the output doubled from $68,000 in 1980 to 
$127,000 in 1990.34 
According to the World Executive Digest, in the early nineties Singaporean top 
managers (excluding expatriates) earned the most in Asia (excluding Japan), not only 
in gross annual salary, but also in terms of purchasing power.35 In a number of 
developed countries top managers earned more, but the Singaporeans' purchasing power 
was among the highest in the world (only Swiss, German and Austrian managers were 
better off).36 The released of these figures gave rise to a debate on salaries in 
Singapore. An NTUC (National Trade Union Congress) official commented that if the 
government should call for wage moderation due to slower economic growth, the CEOs 
should set the example. On their part workers had to understand that higher wages 
could only come from productivity growth, thereby urging workers to train and 
retrain.37 
In the national paper The Straits Times a debate was picked up about the CEO wage 
differences between the U.S. and Japan. According to the Economist the pay of 
American CEOs was 85 times that of the average American factory worker. In Japan, 
the estimate was that company presidents earned 17 to 24 times the salary of their 
factory workers. A study by Crystal showed that U.S. CEOs earned 160 times more 
than their factory workers and Japanese CEOs 16 times. A Japanese vice-minister 
warned the Americans that such huge wage differences were detrimental to the morale 
of the employees, who were needed for productivity. In Singapore a SNEF (Singapore 
National Employers' Federation) survey estimated the average gross monthly pay of 
local CEOs eleven times that of the production operator.38 Attempting to draw lessons 
from the American-Japanese discrepancy, it was suggested in Singapore that CEO 
salaries should be related to the company's performance as well as be in reasonable 
proportion to the workers' pay. 
The Business Times raised the question if Singapore managers were being overpaid, 
now even managers from recession-hit developed countries came looking for jobs in 
Singapore and accepted local terms. On the one hand the high level of pay in Singapore 
was related to the strong Singapore currency and some believed it was a proper 
reflection of Singapore's stage of economic development. On the other hand there 
appeared to be a short supply of managers in Singapore which drove up the wages. 
Because of this tight market, people were promoted beyond scope, standards were 
compromised, overpaying was common and the value of managers had become 
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inflated.39 The common overestimation of jobs for instance was reflected in the 
designation-title-inflation. One printer was only able to attract young employees by 
giving them the title of "sales executive" instead of the more relevant "door-to-door 
sales boy".40 As long as the economy was still growing and the pay gap was not too 
big, however, this skewed representation did not raise a discussion per se. 
Only practical consequences did. The recruitment of junior executives by seven unions 
caused consternation in Singapore as there was discussion about the executives' duties. 
Under the Industrial Relations Act (IRA), managers and executives could not join rank-
and-file unions. But there was no proper definition of a manager or an executive. Thus 
there was confusion due to the title-inflation about who could join the unions. In 
reaction the new labour ministry guidelines made it clear that most junior management 
staff were free to sign up as members of existing unions. Only a minority with conflicts 
of interest, such as staff with access to confidential information, would be barred.41 
In some cases staff was reported to have been promoted in order to avoid their union 
membership. But the union filed a complaint with the Labour Ministry and companies 
had to take more care in their promotion policies.42 
The Economic Committee in Singapore found that Singapore had reached a developed 
country's income level, but structurally was not yet a developed country. The common 
use of Western terminology was initially confusing, but campaigns and policies rather 
indicated a prescriptive than a descriptive development. The "culture of success" 
syndrome in Singapore made many young Singaporeans, who did not have international 
experience, arrogant about not only Singapore's achievements but about their own value 
as Singaporeans as well. Still, in spite of all the achievements in improving the well-
being of Singaporeans, a number of the higher educated considered plans to 
emigrate.43 This could be related to the fact that in Singapore "living" was still 
subordinate to "making a living". 
The overall economic importance was reflected in the way HRD was treated in 
Singapore. Human resources were mainly seen as part of the productivity drive. In the 
eighties, the term "quality of work life" (QWL) became the buzz word in international 
HRD. The concept originated in the seventies and has taken root since then. It contains 
a wide variety in interpretations, but can broadly be categorised in a set of 
organisational conditions or practices such as democratic management practices, job 
enrichment and safe working environment on the one hand, and on the other hand the 
impact of working conditions on the employee's well-being such as number of 
accidents, health, satisfaction and development as human being.44 In Japan the QWL 
movement was mainly directed at improving operations, whilst the American QWL 
originated in the social and behaviourial sciences. In Singapore, the QWL movement 
was prompted by the need to improve national productivity and to maintain harmony 
in industrial relations. Initially cooperation between workers, represented by trade 
unions, and management failed. Management feared undermining of its authority and 
both parties were cautious and suspicious of each other's moves. The memories of the 
antagonistic fifties and sixties were too fresh to work jointly towards a common goal. 
Therefore union-management cooperation became one of the objectives of the National 
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Productivity Movement. QCCs were heavily promoted. Most organisations introduced 
it to allow their employees to participate in solving work-related problems. While 
participating, the employees developed more satisfaction from their work, which led to 
better quality products and service, cost reduction and more harmonious labour-
management relations. Because it was a win-win strategy the QCCs met with a 
measurable degree of success. In 1987 there were 3,500 circles involving 26,000 
workers in 143 organisations in the public and private sector.45 According to the NPB, 
since the productivity circles first appeared in Singapore in the early eighties, they had 
helped innumerable Singapore firms save millions of dollars and produce better 
products.4* 
As the government mostly initiated and supported new HRD concepts in Singapore, the 
media offered free publicity to the campaigns and Singaporeans were continuously made 
aware of the need of the new goal. An entire quality and productivity culture was 
created. For instance around the National Productivity Award (launched for companies 
in 1983, extended to include individuals in 1986 and to include teams in 1990) or the 
1992 productivity cruise with the theme "Quality work, quality life". As soon as 
statistics showed a weak spot in Singapore, the government boards attempted to improve 
it. This was undertaken rather by rewards rather than by punishments, led by the notion 
of the effect of a good example. E.g. establishments could be awarded for service 
excellence or polite drivers could be halted by police not to be fined but to be publicly 
awarded for courteous driving. Another example: according to BERI's 1991 Quality of 
Workforce Index, Singaporeans overconsumed their daily caloric requirements the 
previous three years. Consequently, Singapore's rating for the attention span and health 
measure in the index fell from a maximum of 5 points in 1987 to 4.5 points in 1990. 
Because this affected the rating of the quality of Singapore's workforce, health 
programmes in the workplace were taken up by the government. Health promotion as 
preventive measure against declining work performance and absenteeism was also found 
to be financially important. For Singapore the national norm for medical costs averaged 
$316 per employee in 1991. This meant a national bill of $416 million or 1.5 percent 
of the national pay-roll. In 1991, each worker on the average took 7 days of medical 
leave, resulting in 10.4 million man-days lost. Studies showed that as much as 42 
percent of absenteeism in the workplace could be reduced by programmes aimed at 
wellbeing. Therefore a Singapore study mission was sent out to acquire knowledge and 
skills from foreign organisations or companies in order to gradually build its own 
expertise in that area. In the Workplace Healthy Lifestyle Programme the public sector 
took the lead in the promotion, showing senior public servants on an exercise bicycle 
in the media as a model. When implied that Singapore was imitating an American trend 
where 75 percent of the employers had some form of healthy lifestyle or wellbeing 
programme, this was rejected. Health programmes were merely deemed to be important 
as well in Singapore. The Chinese traditionally already had much interest in health; 
therefore this trend just linked up to an existing cultural interest. The Asian joke that 
"If we like it, it's modem. If we do not like it, it's Western"47 seemed to apply here. 
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Great Eastern Life Assurance Company Limited (GE Life), the oldest established life 
assurance company in Singapore and Malaysia and one of the 1992 winners of the 
National Productivity Award, was the first in the private sector to take part in the 
national programme. Its CEO claimed that respect for the individual was the first value 
of its corporate philosophy. He believed in maximising each person's potential by 
providing him or her with proper training. GE Life had an incentive scheme 
encouraging participation among all, rather than rewarding excellence of a few, to 
sustain interest in the long run. To what extent the respect for an individual's input 
went, was shown by a GE Life's brochure in which the group sales manager told his 
personal story. 
Before he joined GE Life he spent more than a decade and a half trying to find his own 
peace of mind. But in his last 18 years with the company he found that he could bring 
peace of mind to others. He had to work hard at it, but the rewards had always been 
there. He said his career as an insurance professional had brought him life-long 
friendships, real job satisfaction and an exceptionally good standard of living.4* In an 
accompanying letter he went on intertwining his morals with his business results: 
"I shared with the crowd a story of a swallow from China. When its due to fly 
south to Fiji, it didn't because it was enjoying the comfort and lifestyle in China. 
So when the snow came it found itself frozen and dropped to the ground. 
Fortunately, a cow came and gave it some dung. 
Because dung was warm from body heat, it defrosted the swallow. It began to 
sing and was happy with its new found life. Unknown to the swallow, a cat was 
' nearby and had it for lunch. The moral of the story is that everything/season has 
its own timing and rhythm. That those that throw shit on us may indeed be our 
friend and that we ought to be sensitive of our surroundings and enemies before 
we open our mouth. 
I have also observed that most of my decisions are not as logical as I thought 
and that emotion plays a greater part than logic. Some of my emotions may have 
been hooked up during my childhood days and I need to work on myself to set 
me free by observation and forgiveness. 
1993 has been delightful with cases of 20 per week when our average was 8. We 
are increasing our number of agents and we expect to have 35 by the end of the 
year. 
Our daughter Tania is learning to get her driving license and boating licenses. 
She is very eager to pass and has been working hard getting tuition in these 
areas. Our son, Thaddeus is now taller than Tania and is in Primary 6. He 
seems quite concerned about his health and God. 
In the Financial Needs Analysis talk, I stressed the importance of going against 
the tide of general expectations... 
God bless you. 
Take time to pray, think, play, read, love, laugh, give, work and to do charity. " 
To Westerners this kind of personal input would seem quite unprofessional and 
irrelevant, but in Singapore it was not uncommon. This letter showed how work and 
private life often were much more interrelated than in the West. 
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The government's drive for excellence was not only applied to areas which were 
lagging behind, but all companies and employees were indoctrinated with the challenge 
of staying on top of the competitive edge. For example, although the Singapore port 
was considered the best in the world by Singaporeans, all staff was reminded to review 
their work constantly and look for ways of improvement. Goh Chee Wee, minister of 
state for communications as well as minister of state for trade and industry, encouraged 
the port workers to broaden their job skills. For example, container equipment 
operators not only needed to know ship operations and documentation, but also basic 
computer and automation skills. Not only should the workers limit their knowledge to 
their immediate work areas, but also be more aware of their effects on other 
departments. The collective effort of all was seen as crucial in eliminating inefficiencies 
and wastage and improving work standards. 
In Singapore one was well aware of the fact that "people make the difference between 
the success or failure of a new system or new technology."49 According to Lim Boon 
Heng, Senior Minister of State for Trade and Industry and chairman of the NPB, 
economists increasingly were coming to the conclusion that comparative advantages can 
be created and a country's true - sustainable - competitive edge rests on quality 
manpower resources. Singapore would focus on this sustainable HRD advantage, which 
other countries could not emulate by merely pouring in more money.50 As most 
important economic opportunities for Singapore's future were amongst others identified 
more sophisticated business activities with a high quality, well educated and productive 
workforce.51 An effective interplay was to be created between the economic hardware 
and the human software, such as human resource and cultural development. 
Despite all this theoretical development in which Singapore showed that it had come a 
long way from bare economic survival, the emphasis stayed on economic survival, i.e. 
consolidating the acquired high standard of economic development, or more if 
Singapore could afford it. One talked of expectations and demands for a balanced life-
style befitting a developed nation. For instance, culture and recreation were seen as an 
integral part of human resource development in a society with a better quality of life. 
Furthermore, in recognition of the desire of the better educated population for fuller 
participation in the political process, the government launched the National Agenda in 
1987 - a broad programme to invite the general public to provide feedback to the 
government on any national issue affecting their lives. But on the whole the economic 
aspects enjoyed higher priorities. The government warned against complacency. 
Although the new generation of Singaporeans was better educated, had a stronger 
national identity, was better able to earn a living for itself, it was at the same time less 
used to hardship than to affluence, less aware of the fragility of prosperity and had 
higher expectations of what life had to offer.52 It was feared that the younger 
generation would sit back and enjoy the fruits of their parents' labour instead of 
sustaining the higher standard of living for the next generation. Lim told the 
Singaporeans: "It is only when we do quality work that we - our families, our friends 
and the entire nation - can enjoy quality life."53 There was no doubt that the physical 
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quality of life had improved: not only did almost every family in Singapore now own 
a refrigerator and a television set, but other consumer durables such as telephones, 
washing machines and video cassette recorder were also part of the Singaporean 
households.54 Higher incomes had brought these material acquirements within reach. 
But, Lim warned, Singaporeans could not start taking it easy; because if they did, their 
standard of living could fall behind the rest of the world. In Singapore real wage 
growth had been faster than productivity growth. To prevent inflation and recession, 
productivity performance had to be increased and wage growth kept moderate. With 
competition from e.g. Hong Kong where wages had been kept much lower than 
productivity growth, Singapore could not afford to relax. Lim emphasised that 
Singaporeans should learn from the Japanese experience the past 35 years. For example 
"quality service" could not just be atarimae hinshitsu, i.e. quality that is taken for 
granted, but should be miryokuteki hinshitsu, i.e. quality that fascinates.55 By pushing 
productivity growth up this way, Lim thought that "we can realise our dreams faster... 
With quality work, we may then enjoy many more years of quality life."56 
Higher productivity was the key factor. Between 1981 and 1991, two thirds of 
Singapore's economic growth came from the average productivity growth of 4.2 percent 
a year. However, empirical evidence shows that as economies mature, their productivity 
growth curve tends to gravitate. But in Singapore the saturation point still seemed far 
off. The feeling that the sky was the limit dominated. HRD activities took place in 
terms of preparing today for tomorrow's changes in which Singaporeans ultimately 
wanted to enjoy a higher standard of living. 
The importance attached to human resources in the form of productivity potential was 
constantly propagated. One article in the national magazine of the NPB said: 
"Imagine that productivity growth froze in 1981 - the year the Productivity 
Movement was launched. What would this have meant for us? On the average, 
each Singaporean today would have been one-third poorer. Or, to put it more 
pointedly, our standards of living today, as measured by per capita income, 
would have remained at the 1983 level! And most of us would probably have 
to wait a little longer before talking about home-entertainment systems. 
This rather dramatic portrayal illustrates the importance of productivity growth 
to the nation's prosperity and to our personal well-being."" 
The productivity movement's mission then was to make Singapore a highly productive 
nation. After the Vision '91 scheme, focusing on reskilling and training of older 
workers, the government's Vision '95, based on the Strategic Economic Plan (SEP) and 
the NPB's Productivity 2000 Report, emphasised economic redevelopment in the form 
of employee involvement, skills upgrading and quality work. SEP mapped out 
Singapore's strategy towards becoming a developed nation, while Productivity 2000 
recommended measures for achieving a target of three to four percent productivity 
growth in the nineties. The employment growth had continued to rise. E.g. in 1990 
60,100 new jobs were created, in 1991 64,000. Construction was the expansion sector, 
in reaction to GDP growth. The quantity of jobs was no problem, but the quality of the 
workforce still could improve. The government therefore urged companies to be as 
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committed to excellence as the government was. Four areas to further increase 
productivity were pointed out. 
Firstly, the productivity of selected domestic industries needed upgrading. 
Domestic Singaporean industries were characterised by the predominance of small 
service-oriented establishments with low productivity. Most of the establishments had 
sole proprietors or were partnerships with less than 50 employees. These small local 
companies (SLCs), such as commonly seen in housing estates: neighbourhood coffee 
shops and hawkers, barbers and beauty parlours, provision shops, Chinese medical 
halls, bakeries, confectioneries and gift shops, had played an important role in the 
economic development of Singapore. Small manufacturing firms and workshops 
producing on a small scale usually for the local market, played their part too. But these 
SLCs now lagged behind the productivity growth in other sectors; although the domestic 
sector employed 39 percent of the workforce58, it contributed only 9 percent to the 
gross domestic product or national output. Its GDP was also lower than their foreign 
counterparts. Therefore the NPB aimed at assisting the domestic commerce sector and 
the community, social and personal services sector to upgrade and improve their 
productivity. Targeted firms included vehicle workshops, gift shops, bookshops and 
Chinese medical shops.59 The NPB proposed to help them form cooperatives, for 
example to share training costs. More training shops were set up in HDB estates close 
to these shops' locations. One example of successful local entrepreneurship was the 
chain called Happy Family Minimarts. The Chinese Singaporean who developed from 
small shopkeeper in a kampong hut to owner of a multi-million retail operation was the 
Singaporean case of the American dream come true. He managed to get hundreds of 
small shopkeepers to agree to work together and collaborate so that they could survive 
the tough competition from the foreign-owned supermarket chains.60 He formed an 
association to modernise and subscribe to the concept of a central purchasing unit to 
reduce costs through economy of scale. 
Special attention was paid to train the employees of the attending SLCs at varying levels 
of change, according to their needs and wishes. But their limited manpower and tight 
work schedules prevented many of them from attending the training. 
Another form of increasing domestic productivity was undertaken by stimulating locals 
to start a franchise. Franchising flourished because the failure rate was much lower than 
with normal business start-ups. When the Trade Development Board (TDB) announced 
it was willing to bear half the cost of mapping out a successful franchising company, 
it generated fresh interest: a promising avenue for local companies to expand their 
business and for individuals to go into business.61 Successful was the way the oil 
companies franchised their service stations. An interviewed franchisee declared in the 
national magazine Productivity Digest: "Everything is put up by Shell or Mobil, but the 
petrol station is run by a franchisee who's willing to work 365 days a year, through 
Chinese New Year, Christmas, and perhaps, for 24 hours. Can you imagine a Shell 
manager running a petrol station? No way he will operate it with the same degree of 
commitment as a franchisee. " Singaporeans believed that such franchises combined the 
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best out of both worlds - the extensive resources of a giant multinational with the 
initiative and drive of the local individual. Very few petrol station franchises failed. 
As second area to increase productivity the government identified the participation of 
private sector employees in the QCC movement. In the civil service 67 percent of the 
employees participated against only 1.7 percent in the private sector. The aim was to 
increase the participation there to 4 percent of the total workers. Positive examples of 
practices in the worker participation programme were shown to the private sector. Some 
sustaining QCC activities already practised in companies were: 
"a) time provided during work hours for circles to meet. 
(e.g. Philips, the Matsushita group of companies, Yokogawa Electric, 
Singapore Automotive Engineering) 
b) incentives, like meal allowances and overtime for QCCs 
(Exxon Chemical not only paid overtime but also gave transport allowance) 
c) monetary gains were shared with circles. 
(at Mobil Oil a portion of the savings contributed by QCCs was paid out to 
employees annually as part of a productivity bonus scheme) 
d) full-time QCC facilitators and managers were assigned to organise, train and 
sustain QCCs."62 
From 1982 to 1992 circles presenting at the National QCC Conventions reported 
productivity improvements and savings in time, materials and manpower totalling more 
than $40 million.63 QCCs were used to solve problems in productivity, safety, quality, 
cost and delivery. But in general, in the ten years of the QCC movement in Singapore 
many QCC activities failed to take root due to lack of interest and support of the top 
management. CEO involvement and commitment appeared to be crucial, but was often 
lacking.64 Regarding the implementation of new HRD concepts the fact that it was the 
government, not the company CEOs who introduced them, created resistance. As 
"Singapore Ine" the government encouraged private sector employers to set up QCCs, 
but showed itself less of an example in empowerment in the political arena. The 
Japanese QCCs formed a bottom-up management programme, a channel to submit 
ideas, to regularly speak out and exchange views on causes contributing to a particular 
problem, suggest solutions and corrective measures and implement these 
recommendations. Management guru's in the quality field such as Deming, Juran, 
Karatsu and Ishikawa all agreed that quality had to start at the top. Successful QCCs 
all had in common what was called management ownership, where the management 
translated its commitment into visible support through actions. A common goal, training 
in QCCs, an environment conducive to participation, teamwork and learning were 
deemed to be necessary. The lack of top-down support in Singapore often led to low 
employee morale and cynicism. 
Thirdly, the costs of these QCC circles had to be halved. 
Fourthly, training investment had to be increased from 2.3 to 4 percent. NPB 
encouraged MNCs to send their employees for upgrading courses to plug any skills gap 
due to changing technology. All training had to be functional to the goal of raising 
productivity and competitiveness. 
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In HRD Singapore took a leading role in Asia. The first "HRD Asia 1992" congress 
in Singapore was a success and established itself as the only trade fair of its kind in 
South East Asia. The "HRD Asia '94" brochure stated that the recognition of HRD as 
essential to technology transfer from industrialised countries by ASEAN governments 
was a vital step towards development of local technology. The HRD trend had been set 
by the governments and was taken up by the private sector, which, according to several 
independent surveys in 1991, considered human resource issues as the most important 
area of concern65, in contrast to environmental issues which had the least priority. The 
interrelatedness of human resources and economic growth was reflected in the "HRD 
Asia '94" theme: "HRD & Business Success: Riding the waves of change together". 
8.2 Education and training 
8.2.1 Education 
Both in Eastern and in Western societies respect for education is widespread. Among 
the Chinese becoming an educated person was traditionally regarded as the highest goal. 
The Chinese practice of bestowing educational degrees and sanctioning educational 
qualifications at the national level can be traced back to the second half of the sixth 
century when the official examination system was first established.66 
Furthermore, the Singapore government stated that "as Asians, we believe that 
education is the key to a better life"67. With human capital as main economic asset in 
Singapore, the government therefore saw education and training as a good investment, 
second to defence. Studies on the interaction between human resource policies and 
economic growth had also shown that the impact of literacy change on output change 
was most apparent.68 Basic education in particular had a significant impact on 
productivity. Albeit indirectly, changes in the socio-economic environment due to 
schooling had proportional impacts on fertility behaviour for all females of reproductive 
age.69 Basic education shifted attention from population to productivity growth. 
In its early years of independence, Singapore emphasised the quantity of educational 
opportunities to meet the needs of the fast-growing population. In 1965 the total 
government expenditure in education dedicated to development expenditure was 25.5 
percent. 
Although population growth was kept at bay, the Singapore workforce was not much 
lifted to a higher educational level in the sixties and seventies. Partly because one had 
to catch up with the leeway due to the colonial neglect and partly because the home 
language of many students was different from that used in the schools, which increased 
learning difficulties and the attrition rate. The other more ethnically homogeneous 
NICs, such as Taiwan or South Korea, achieved much higher educational 
attainments.70 But this lack of formal education did not hamper Singapore's initial 
economic development based on labour-intensive industrialisation. Singaporeans 
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appeared to be able to pick up new skills quickly in their work environment. 
Nevertheless, as the government shifted its strategy to more capital-intensive 
industrialisation, the need for better educated and trained workers increased. By the late 
seventies the government stepped up its investments in human resources considerably. 
The proportion of the national budget spent on developmental expenditure in education 
increased from 11.2 percent of the total educational budget for the financial year 
1977/1978 to 21.71 percent for the financial year 1987/1988.71 There was a 
phenomenal growth in tertiary educational and training institutions. 
The literacy level of the Singapore population increased continuously from 80.5 percent 
of the total population aged ten years and over in 1977 to 86.8 percent in 1987. In 
1977, 78.5 percent of all children aged 6 to 17 was enroled in schools, in 1987 93.8 
percent.72 In 1950 there were only 1.7 males and 1.2 females on every 10,000 males 
and 10,000 females in the population who were college or university graduates. In 1988 
this had increased to 54.7 males and 40.4 females per 10.000.73 
In Singapore female literacy, which was taken as a significant indicator of development, 
increased from 60.1 percent in 1970 to 76.2 percent in 1980. This was a bigger 
increase than in male literacy. The lowest literacy rate was among Chinese women. 
Although the overall literacy rate in Singapore was high, the majority of literate people 
only had primary education in 1980. 
The Skills Development Fund (SDF) was set up in 1979 to upgrade the skills of 
workers with little formal education. The SDF was initially financed by a levy on the 
workers' wages. Instead of provoking much resistance against this levy, the interest in 
courses supported by SDF funds appeared to be insatiable. According to Pang, Tan and 
Cheng this reflected not so much the Singaporeans' love of learning for its own sake, 
but rather the interest in acquiring practical skills that would help them get ahead in 
life.74 
Not only the Chinese and Indians used their educational opportunities, also the Malays 
had been caught up in the drive for development. In 1980 only 14 percent of Malays 
attained secondary or higher qualifications; in 1990 30 percent. Many Malay families 
had moved to bigger homes and had become home-owners.75 Mendaki played an 
important role. In 1989 it was reorganised and took on more social and economic 
projects as part of a total approach to uplift the standing of Malays. But with mixed 
results in its economic projects, Goh reminded Mendaki to focus on educational projects 
in reaction to which Mendaki's leaders made clear that education would stay the most 
important in the nineties. Thè Straits Times editorial76 pointed out that this was the 
wisest decision, as the Malays, despite their impressive academic improvements, still 
lagged behind the other "races": "Ultimately, it is education that will make the 
difference". 
The importance of education and training was expressed in its share in Singapore's 
productivity growth. Until the nineties the end goal still was economic growth; 
education and training being a means to it. On 13 May 1992 the Productivity Statement 
1992 was published, in which it directed the attention of the productivity movement in 
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Singapore to two structural factors: first, development of a quality workforce or in 
other words education and training, second, upgrading of domestic industries. 
Productivity growth averaged 4.2 percent a year for the period 1981-1991. Most of this 
growth was contributed to "capital deepening" (i.e. higher capital-labour ratio). The 
breakdown of the remaining 14 percent of total factor productivity (TFP) was as 
follows77: 
a) education and training 19 % 
b) technical progress 7 % 
c) demand changes -7 % 
d) industrial restructuring -3 % 
e) capital structure or composition -2 % " 
The conclusion was that improvements in TFP and overall productivity were largely 
driven by the rising level of education and skills of the workforce, more so than 
advances in knowledge or innovation. Therefore one wanted to build upon this source 
of long-term productivity growth. 
In industrialised countries with large domestic markets, technical progress and 
economies of scale were the main sources of their TFP growth when they were at 
similar stages of development as Singapore. Shifts in employment from agriculture to 
manufacturing also made significant contribution to TFP growth in industrialised 
countries. It contributed an average of 20 percent to their TFP growth during the 1950's 
and 1960's. The rise in educational level of the workforce in these countries contributed 
a relatively small proportion of TFP improvement, ranging from 3 percent for Germany 
to 21 percent for the U.S., due to their relatively nigh educational profile. 
In the earlier period of 1929 to 1941 the contribution of education in the U.S. had been 
much higher: 36 percent, due to a lower educational profile. In Singapore the 
contribution of education to its TFP growth in the period 1981 to 1991 was a much 
higher 130 percent (discounting the negatively contributing factors)78, as shown on the 
following page. 
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Figure 8.2. International comparison of sources of TFP growth.79 
The educational level of the Singapore workforce had increased steadily. 
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Figure 8.3. Singapore workforce profile by highest qualification attained, 1981-1991' 
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The younger workers were better educated than the older ones. In 1991 the age cohort 
of 20 to 29 years had the largest proportion with tertiary education (17 percent). This 
was perceived as positive for business, because these youngsters were seen to be more 
easily trained. It was thus argued that investment in education assured a quality 
workforce.81 
In 1991 the World Competitiveness Report, published by the World Economic Forum 
and the International Management Development Institute, ranked Singapore top among 
34 countries in terms of the effectiveness of its education system in meeting the 
demands of a competitive economy.82 Singapore's success was attributed to its 
"impactful, effective education system", manifested in the significantly improved 
educational level of the workforce over the years. The government could build on the 
fact that almost eighty percent of the Singaporean population attached importance to 
education and being informed. The rising level of education had contributed to a 
growing drive for success. 
However, despite the rapidly risen level of education and the participation of higher 
educated in the workforce in Singapore, in the early nineties Singapore's level of 
education was still lagging behind other NICs and developed countries. 
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Figure 8.4. Workforce educational profile - an international comparison. 
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The percentage of people with primary education and below had been dramatically 
reduced from 60 in 1979 to 45.4 in 1991, but this was still the highest of the NICs. 
These figures made sustained education and training a key priority in the government's 
Strategic Economic Plan. The amount of the GDP spent on education had only been 3.4 
percent in 1993, but the government promised to raise its contribution to five 
percent.84 
Singapore's HRD policies aimed at joining the ranks of industrialised countries by 
2010. The key five areas in the soft infrastructure were85: 
1. international orientation 
2. national teamwork 
3. innovation 
4. human resource qualities 
5. education and training 
ad 1. international orientation 
The first area could be interpreted in three ways: setting selected foreign countries as 
an example, using foreign resources as input for Singapore's own development and 
finally, becoming an international player itself. 
Singapore was constantly and consciously comparing its own performance as well as 
its overall quality of life against the so called "best countries" in the developed world. 
Due to its small size, multi-cultural population, emphasis on hard work and high 
standard of living, Switzerland was generally taken as the benchmark. To achieve 
Switzerland's standard of living, Singapore - with its finite indigenous resources - chose 
to continue its original economic strategy: to tap into the resources of other countries 
to keep on developing. Thus the new slogan "Singapore Unlimited" was coined.86 
Singapore considered itself fortunate that the international trend in companies was to 
globalise. Once again Singapore could ride on this trend. But this time Singapore's 
aspired a higher goal than in earlier years: with the world as its resource Singapore 
wanted to become an independent player itself. Using global opportunities in accordance 
with the principle of mutual benefit was an important new strategy for Singapore's 
economy in the next lap.87 One saw globalisation as a series of concentric circles. The 
innermost circle Singaporeans needed to work on was formed by their minds. 
Globalisation required a change in mindset. The next circles were formed by the 
institutions needing to acquire a global orientation, then Singapore as a country, the 
region, the outer world and finally the global economy in the outer ring. Globalisation 
did not merely mean doing things overseas. The intermediate circles needed to be 
configured for the inner circle to have a favourable view of the outermost circle (global 
view). 
To successfully internationalise, the spearpoints of Singapore's attention would be to 
create a willingness by Singaporeans to live and work abroad, to strike a balance 
between openness to foreigners and foreign culture without eroding Singapore's values, 
a good infrastructure in air, sea and telecommunications services and a pro-international 
business tax system. The international orientation had to be inculcated on all levels; 
from Chinese schools which promoted ties with Chinese schools in Malaysia88 to the 
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building of a "Harvard of the East" through developing an MBA programme with a 
strong international business orientation.89 Previously the best Singaporean students 
were sent to top universities in the West, returning to take up key positions in the 
public sector, now one wanted a home base. 
ad 2. national teamwork 
In the second "soft" area of national teamwork, it was deemed to be important that the 
three major economic factors - labour, business and the government - should continue 
cooperating towards a common vision of Singapore. The cultivation of personal values 
which were positive towards national teamwork was held in high esteem. Singapore 
held closely on to the consensus principle, thereby attempting not to compromise the 
quality of the leadership process. Certain procedures and systems, such as high level 
negotiating groups, were to facilitate this building of consensus. Class distinctions 
which tended to polarise groups were to be discouraged. 
ad 3. innovation 
The third area of innovation was also considered of utmost importance to economic 
survival. The government's message was that unless Singaporeans could improve 
themselves faster than their competitors, Singapore would not be able to sustain its high 
level of economic growth. Singapore's competitive edge in the future was to be 
improved by enhancing the level of innovation. The type of information useful to 
innovators was to be identified and made available to them. Singapore's education 
system would have to change in order to nurture creativity and innovativeness more. 
Companies would be encouraged to provide attractive financial and non-financial 
rewards for creative and innovative ideas. Innovation soon became a concept that 
pervaded every aspect of the Singapore economy - from education and social traditions, 
to employee reward systems and government bureaucracy. Singaporeans became aware 
of the disadvantages of their law and order state with its rules and regulations, strict 
discipline and conformity. The entrepreneurial spirit and the willingness to take risks 
were gradually replaced by a preference for security and comfort. Despite the fact that 
it was not easy to formulate an effective prescription to stimulate innovation in the 
economy, the government took a number of actions to create a climate which 
encouraged innovation. In education and training systems, room was to be created for 
individuals to exercise initiative. Teachers and trainers at all levels were to move away 
from exclusively following a set way of doing a given assignment, by rewarding 
initiative and resourcefulness. Public commendations were not only to be given for 
diligence and contribution, but also for creativity and innovation. The government was 
also willing to review its own rules which hindered companies or individuals from 
trying or adopting innovative ideas to increase business efficiency.90 
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ad 4. human resource qualities 
The fourth HRD area was the most vague one. Wirtschaftsethik and creativity were both 
deemed to be necessary in a long-term economic development, but one did not have an 
answer yet as to how to combine these important human resource qualities. 
ad 5. education & training 
Last but certainly not least, education and training retained their focal attention. To 
become a structurally developed country, the rating of the general quality of education 
in Singapore had to be raised from a good to an excellent level. Every Singaporean was 
to be provided with the opportunity to enjoy at least ten years of good basic education, 
with the aim of having a high proportion of basically educated. Most of them would 
then go on to junior colleges, polytechnics or vocational institutes. These would have 
to retain a high standard of competence, a high degree of industry relevance, 
constructive attitudes and values, some emphasis on technical education for innovation 
as well as on foreign languages for international orientation. The number of university 
students was to be increased from about 25,000 in 1990 to 30,000 in 1995; the number 
of polytechnic students from about 28,000 to 34,000 in the same period. In both 
institutions the emphasis was on linkage with industries to meet their needs, especially 
in the polytechnics. The increased pool of graduates was important to Singapore to be 
able to focus on high-tech and information technology industrialisation. 
The number of researchers and engineers per 10,000 workers was to be increased from 
28 in 1990 to 40 in 1995. In addition, two hundred researchers and engineers were to 
be invited each year. Furthermore, each year hundred corporate researchers and 
hundred students would receive scholarships. The HRD budget in NTP (national 
technology plan) was S$160 million. 
Singapore planned to double its national expenditure on R&D from 0.9 of its GDP in 
1990 to 2 percent of GDP in 1995. The problem was not the lack of funds, but the lack 
of talent and promising projects. Some feared a brain drain of local as well as foreign 
professionals. BG Lee, Deputy Prime Minister, therefore was in favour of attracting 
more foreign scientists and researchers to make Singapore a centre for scientific 
research and development. Thus an International Manpower Programme was developed 
in order to increase the supply of the top echelon of talented and professional people. 
Availability of suitable job opportunities91 would have to attract preferably South and 
East Asian talent for Singapore's next phase of development: the move beyond 
manufacturing into knowledge-based activities with greater design and innovation 
content. The ideal was a scientific community where a cross fertilization of ideas and 
collaborative research would take place.92 
But not only was this kind of formal education deemed to be important, but also 
continuing and upgrading education for all others. To develop the nation's potential to 
the full, the government wanted to use Singapore's resources to the maximum 
advantage. The maximum opportunity and encouragement had to be given to every one 
in the workforce to upgrade their skills and knowledge during their entire career. The 
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principle of a life cycle perspective for the individual, from cradle to retirement, 
applied to education and training. 
The government therefore made broad-ranging plans for life-long learning opportunities, 
from pre-school to tertiary level and continuing education and training. With the decline 
in illiteracy, the attention for quality in education and training had increased. Streaming 
in schools according to academic achievement had already been introduced; now the 
four main goals in education were93: 
" - To maximise learning potential 
- To develop thinking and creativity 
- To nurture leadership qualities and good work ethics 
- To cultivate civic and moral values" 
From pre-school age onwards the development of Singaporeans was monitored. In pre-
school training not only the important role of the parents was emphasised, but also an 
expansion of preparatory school programmes. The mother tongue and English, good 
work ethics and Asian values and traditions had to be taught. "Schools must, hand in 
glove with the home, produce morally upright, diligent and compassionate citizens."*4 
In primary schools more "remedial and enrichment programmes" and all-week extra-
curricular activities were deemed to be important. Interaction among peers would create 
a strong sense of camaraderie, belonging, responsibility and leadership. An enriching 
and reassuring environment should nurture and stimulate young minds.*5 To achieve 
all this, special attention was paid to serious and updated teacher training. Singapore 
was to be a caring society which would not exclude the disabled from the mainstream. 
Special schools for disabled children would be located close to normal schools to give 
opportunities to meet and play together. Counselling programmes were offered to 
parents of disabled children. All kinds of educational media, e.g. open university 
programmes or self access learning by using Teleview, were welcomed. The 
universities also provided opportunities for second chance students, who did not have 
the opportunity to study previously. The university's mission was "to inspire and 
challenge the nation's finest minds."96 Not only creative abilities, but also an 
entrepreneurial spirit were to be developed to broaden students' minds and extend their 
vision. Talented people from the society were invited to share their experiences with 
students in order to form a bridge between university and workplace. Exceptional 
talents as well as those with learning disabilities would get special attention. Scouting 
for talent in whatever area was stimulated in the schools. In 1995 the Internet facility 
on computers prompted the suggestion of the formation of networks-of-excellence 
instead of centres-of-excellence.97 
The government said it recognised the long-term returns on investment in education 
expenses, it raised its financial commitment from 4 to 5 percent of the GDP in 1991. 
For every Singaporean schoolchild an Edusave account was opened to which the 
government contributed an annual sum. Parents were also encouraged to contribute. 
They could then use the account to pay school-related and school-supported course fees. 
The education subsidy per student increased from about 1,000 S$ in 1980 to about 
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2,500 S$ in 1990. Still Singapore's average growth rate of education-related expenditure 
as a percentage of total government expenditure was among the lowest in the NICs: 
11.4 percent. Again only Malaysia showed less growth (9 percent).98 
It was recommended that the development of the group of human resource developers 
would be undertaken with a sense of mission.99 On the one hand greater flexibility and 
greater diversity were to provide the basis for innovation and progress. On the other 
hand, the government did not believe, as in other areas, in unconstrained free choice 
in education and training. It instituted several controls (e.g. enrolment levels and quota) 
and incentives (e.g. financial support) to balance private choices with the objectives set 
by the government. 
One of the main challenges to the Singapore government was how to develop its human 
resources, but simultaneously not to let it get out of hand. The dilemma was that the 
aspired increasing intellectual development had also increased the intellectual variety 
in the market place, less desirably including politics. The higher educated showed a 
more liberal and individualistic ideology, as they depended less on others for their 
survival. 
Rules of evidence and logic became more complex. Rieger100 described the concept 
of a "vibrant society" as including the participation of individuals in the generation and 
testing of new ideas, the cut and thrust of attacking established prejudices and the 
ability to choose from an unrestricted spectrum of information and opinion sources. He 
stated that this form of societal development would increase in intensity as basic 
material needs were met and the level of literacy rose. However, freedom of expression 
and access to information clashed with the government's need to prevent conflicts of 
ideas from developing into ethnic, religious or other conflicts. This led to the dilemma 
that the government encouraged competition in all areas but the intellectual one, 
whereas this would have to form the basis of a sophisticated society. 
8.2.2 Training 
Realisation of the importance of training was only a recent concept in Asia early 
nineties. The magazine Asian Business questioned the phrase common in chairmen's and 
companies' statements all over the world: "Our people represent our most valuable 
asset". Eighteen listed companies in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea, 
Taiwan and Singapore were asked what they were doing about developing human 
resources. The results showed a gap between the skills which conventional education 
provided and the temporary skills needed by businesses. On top of the list of labour 
problems most pressing in Asia in the early nineties were the shortages of skills and 
poor employee efficiency. Shortage of technical skills occupied fourth place. 
The Asian countries studied lagged behind the industrialised countries in volume and 
level of training undertaken. Compames faced growing difficulties in recruiting and 
retaining staff. The traditional loyalty of Asian employees was giving way to greater 
job mobility and demands for higher pay. But time and money invested in employees 
alone proved no guarantee for success.101 An integrated company approach with 
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strong senior management commitment and involvement proved more successful. In the 
mean time high staff turnover resulted in disruptions in production as well as increased 
recruitment and training costs. Difficulties were particularly great regarding managers 
and professionals. Therefore companies instigated radical incentive and inducement 
packages, such as medical assistance, educational assistance, sports and social facilities. 
The companies handling personnel problems were the exception rather than the norm. 
Thousands of companies in the Asian NICs had yet to address - or even understand -
the human resources problems they faced. But greater world competition, less reliance 
on ever-available supply of cheap labour and influence of Western management 
techniques added to the pressure of taking up the challenge of training the workforce. 
The Singapore government recognised this need as no other. From the 1985-1986 
recession it had learned the importance of dealing with "rigidities" and the need for 
greater education, training and research and development (R&D). As the government 
was searching for ways to become a developed country "with an edge"102, to surpass 
the industrialising and industrialised competitors, one was also constantly looking for 
training programmes which could be converted into productivity gains directly. For 
example, in 1988 the government announced that all clerks and secretaries in Singapore 
were to be taught how to use personal computers and that 25 percent would be qualified 
to do so by 1990.103 In a short time these skills were upgraded on a huge scale. 
Nevertheless, in 1991 Singapore spent almost the least of the NICs on training. Only 
Malaysia spent less.104 Singapore's relatively low spending on training was explained 
by the fact that it had already done the bulk of basic training of the workforce, whereas 
the other countries still were in earlier stages of training development. 
Training just started to be seen as beneficial to a more productive workforce and a more 
cohesive organisation. Therefore the emphasis of Singapore's industrial future was 
shifted to training and retraining of its workforce.105 
Since 1988, the Singapore workforce had been rated top on the U.S. based Business 
Environment Risk Intelligence's (BERI) Quality of Workforce Index (QWI: a composite 
index of eighteen factors). In BERI's 1992 QWI and 1992 Labour Force Evaluation 
Measure (LFEM), Singapore continued to top the overall rankings. 
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The World Competitiveness Report ranked Singapore first among the Asian NIEs, 
excluding Japan. The criteria were compulsory education, vocational training, economic 
literacy, professional women in the workforce, worker motivation, labour flexibiliy, 
industrial relations and organised labour.107 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 β 
Figure 8.6. World Competitiveness Scoreboard (1991)m 
Nevertheless, in spite of its economic top positions, Singapore's general educational 
level was still below that of the other NICs. Lim Boon Heng, Senior Minister of State 
for Trade and Industry and chairman of the National Productivity Board (NPB), 
acknowledged that Singapore had a "burden" of poorly qualified older workers. He 
therefore underscored the importance of training and retraining adult workers. As one 
of the major tasks of managers in Singapore in the nineties, Lim considered helping 
these employees learn fast enough to meet the rapidly changing economic demands.109 
In the long term the overall educational profile was to be upgraded; in the short term 
there was an urgent need to improve the skills of these older workers by training and 
retraining for suitable alternative jobs. 
The government devised two national strategies on training110, a quantitative and a 
qualitative one. 
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quantitative strategy 
The expenditure on training was raised. The Skills Development Fund (SDF) pledged 
S$91 million for training in the year ending March 1991, up from S$71 million in the 
previous year. According to the SDF annual report, this accumulated the government's 
commitment to S$844 million. As at March 1991, reserves for further training stood 
at S$291 million. One training place was created for every three employees, more than 
two-thirds of overall training places being in the service sector.111 
Companies were also encouraged to double their training investment from the 2.3 
percent of the payroll in 1993 (about S$700 million) to four percent in 1995 - a 
proportion that, benchmarking showed, was invested by the best companies in the 
world. On average, private sector companies devoted less of their payroll to training 
than the national target. The government therefore urged employers to treat training as 
a form of investment and to measure annual training budgets against capital investments 
instead of the amount spent on salaries.112 Training was promoted as an investment 
multiplier"3 and Singaporeans were pictured as hungry for training and with the 
capacity to learn to sharpen their company's competitive edge.114 Although the 
government formed an important initiator of training, it was left to the organisations and 
companies themselves to do something about it. However, the government took such 
an interest in the private sector that employers often looked at government bodies for 
solutions to their problems. For example, when Lim visited companies regarding QCCs, 
employers complained that their problems already started before their efforts to upgrade 
the productivity; many of them had trouble finding good workers. Lim then replied that 
the government would be pleased to play the role of facilitator, but companies had to 
find solutions to those kind of problems themselves.115 
qualitative strategy 
The second strategy was to encourage companies to put more effort into structured OJT 
(On-the-Job Training) and supporting QCCs (Quality Control Circles) as an important 
mechanism of worker participation. After studying international management practices, 
Singaporeans were drawn mostly to these Japanese techniques. Just-In-Time (JIT) 
production (using capital more effectively by e.g. low stocks) was another Japanese 
strategy which was valued, but which was less emphasised. Despite cautiousness 
regarding potential overrating of the Japanese productivity, Lim insisted on learning 
from their experience. One found that an open-mindedness towards improvement was 
lacking in many European countries.116 
The most occurring problems in human resources in Singapore were in order of 
importance117: 
managing across cultures 
recruiting managers 
management development training 
retaining managers 
escalation of labour costs 
executive compensation 
implementation of localisation policies. 
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On the factor "management quality" on BERT s Quality of Workforce Index, Singapore 
ranked 9th out of 34 countries. Those ahead of Singapore were all developed countries 
- Germany, Japan, Switzerland, France, Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands and Belgium. 
Although Singaporean managers had good instincts about running a business, their score 
was hampered by lack of formal training and lack of adoption of modern management 
practices. 
Due to high staff turn-over and lack of loyalty, companies often were reluctant to train 
their staff. Participants in training mostly did not show a great eagerness to learn new 
skills and certainly not theoretical knowledge. Although Singaporeans showed more 
respect for their teachers than in Western countries, it was less than in the more 
traditional Malaysia. In training-on-the-job trainees were much less interested in the 
educative aspect than the career-pushing factor. In job applications and in their jobs 
most younger Singaporeans showed themselves more interested in high salaries and a 
fast career than in learning new skills or in self-actualisation opportunities."8 
The quality of management appeared to be a problem not just confined to the smaller 
companies. The MNCs and larger local companies also faced problems in adopting 
effective management practices. In a number of companies middle managers had 
problems with participation, open communication and QCCs. This was aggravated by 
the fact that managing productivity was still viewed by many companies as a function 
of middle management. An NPB survey showed that one in three companies did not 
involve CEOs and two out of five did not involve supervisors in their attempts to raise 
productivity.1" People attending management courses were mostly middle managers, 
sent by their top managers who thought themselves above the need to be trained. These 
middle managers often reacted to trainers with the remark: "You better train my 
boss."120 On the one hand this could indicate that there was much to improve with top 
management, on the other hand this could also be attributed to the Asian belief in 
"strong leadership". The Western norm to take responsibility for one's own behaviour 
was not deeply inculcated in Singaporeans; one easily blamed higher levels for 
mistakes.121 
Realising these weak areas in Singapore's HRD, emphasis on management training was 
increased. Management training still represented only a small percentage of total 
training expenditure. Improving the quality of management was seen as a starting point 
for solving other problems. Studies in the U.S. and Japan showed that quality and 
productivity were linked to good teamwork, effective communication and willingness 
to train workers. Because the quality of work and private life were also perceived to 
be related, managers fulfilled an important function in the society as role models. Thus 
a nation-wide campaign aimed at managers to improve communication, leadership, 
training and teamwork was conducted. The media were full of advertisements showing 
smiling managers who claimed for example: 
"The truth is, you can't begin to talk about breaking the quality barrier. Without 
first breaking the communication barrier."122 
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The policy in Singapore was a system of free market competition. The best training and 
educational institutions were to show their skills and knowledge to potential clients, so 
they could pick and choose from what seemed to fit best. 
In practice the government and government-linked institutions had the most impact by 
offering the bulk of training opportunities. With the completion of their new building 
in 1986, the NPB took the lead in the training of managers, supervisors and workers. 
It offered a wide range of training possibilities at affordable prices with most training 
done in the area of technical skills. The SDF (Skills Development Fund) subsidised 
training provided to upgrade the skills of lower level workers, who at most had A-level 
diploma's from secondary school. This way every year 30,000 workers enroled for the 
Basic Education for Skills Training programme (BEST) of the NPB. In 1993 the 
government initiated the Management Development Grant Scheme (MDGS) for the 
private sector, which subsidised selected basic management skills courses for small 
companies. The government also started preparations for a top management institute, 
but the training providers had to persuade the top managers to enrol in the courses.123 
The Introductory Voucher Scheme (IVS) targeted at reaching out to small companies 
that had never applied for SDF grants before.124 A new assistance scheme was worked 
out to help local firms train their workers at a cost they could afford.125 
A survey commissioned by the NPB (National Productivity Board) showed that one 
third of all management consultancy bureau's depended on small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) for three quarter of their revenue. But 99 percent of the SMEs still 
preferred to work out their problems for themselves. People who ran these companies 
were usually not so highly educated and did not understand what management 
consultants were telling them, as they spoke an academic language. Consultants were 
mostly chosen by,the reasonability of their fees, but this shifted slightly towards a 
relevance in experience, especially in SME consultancy.126 Government agencies tried 
to facilitate greater interaction between SMEs and MNCs to develop a culture of 
information exchange, which was lacking among businesses in Singapore. On the one 
hand SMEs were encouraged to establish strategic alliances with multinational 
customers and on the other hand they were to establish more ties among themselves to 
exchange information which would give them an edge over foreign companies.127 
However, the goals of the government often did not stroke with companies' aims of 
quick profits.128 But not only the SMEs thought mainly about the short term, also 
Singaporean training managers in larger companies often lacked educational knowledge, 
thus their criterium of "cost-effectiveness" usually came down to few costs only. Often 
their main aim was to increase the productivity and thereby enhance the competitiveness 
of their company and to be recognised as having a great stake in this. Their background 
and interest was mostly rather in technical areas, marketing and sales than in the field 
of organisational psychology or human sciences.129 Thus a systematic application of 
expert knowledge in the HRD field was mostly lacking. 
Besides the NPB, there were also other major professional training centres such as the 
Singapore Institute of Management (SIM), Singapore Institute of Personnel Management 
(SIPM), Marketing Development Institute of Singapore (MDIS), Singapore Hotel 
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Association Training and Education Centre (SHATEC), Singapore Manufacturing 
Association - Technical Training Centre (SMA-TTC) and Singapore Retail Merchants 
Association Training Centre (SRMA-TC). 
Private HRD consultancy bureaus and academic institutions also provided training. As 
an indication of the importance placed by the government on people management in 
Singapore, the School of Management of the National University of Singapore set up 
a Human Resource Management (HRM) division in 1983. The institutions of higher 
learning thought themselves in a position not able to afford to ignore the national 
objective of high-tech development which required competent management and a well-
trained workforce.130 The HRM-course was offered to graduating seniors in all 
faculties except the Faculty of Business Administration and Accountancy. One of the 
topics was multi-cultural experiences with a special focus on Japanese and American 
practices. By providing some basic knowledge about the human aspects in the working 
world this way, one intended to give the future Singaporean managers a head start. 
Despite this wide range of training opportunities in Singapore, one found there was a 
shortage of trainers in Singapore. The NPB advisory panel released a report on training 
infrastructure in 1991. It said that in 1989 there were 1,200 full-time trainers resulting 
in a ratio of about 1 fulltime trainer to every 1,000 employees. In the USA this ratio 
was 1:122 and in Germany it was 1:49. There were also 7,900 part-time trainers in 
Singapore. In Japan most managers and supervisors had training responsibilities as part 
of their duties. The shortage of trainers in Singapore was thought to impede the 
government's target to increase training intensity in order to achieve the long-term 
target of four percent of the payroll invested in training. Therefore, especially for 
companies who found it difficult to release staff for off-the-job training, the Trainer-
Manager Programme was developed to increase training and coaching skills of 
managers and supervisors. It was launched by cooperation of the six leading training 
organisations in Singapore at the National Employers' Conference.13' 
Apart from educational and training institutions, there was another powerful influence 
on the development of the human resources in Singapore. On the one hand male 
Singaporeans not only learned basic military skills during national service (NS) - the 
two-year compulsory joining of the military defence force for young men -, but also 
absorbed values and attitudes shaped by the government which influenced their view of 
life and work to a great extent.132 On the other hand these militaristic influences 
showed themselves in a prevalence of male chauvinist thinking, also in HRD.133 
STADA (the Singaporean Training And Development Association) presented itself as 
the national body of HRD professionals promoting and facilitating the acquisition and 
application of HRD knowledge and skills that had an impact on organisational 
effectiveness and in tum the nation's quality of work life.134 
STADA's starting point was that people are Singapore's most valuable resource and 
improving the quality and productivity of this resource was a vital task "which we as 
Human Resource Developers must strive to accomplish". 
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Originally Singaporeans learned about training and development from foreign experts, 
but in the nineties the trend was towards self-sufficiency. The results from off-the-job 
training had been limited.135 STADA's 1993 national "camp"136 on "Best practices 
in Human Resource Development" was opened with the statement that Singaporeans had 
learned a lot from foreigners in HRD-conferences, but that it was now time to apply 
the theory into practice by Singaporeans themselves. There was no better way to 
improve Singapore's HRD than by experiencing, exchanging experiences amongst each 
other and then to apply what they had learned from these exchanges.137 Where the 
trend in Western European companies was to cut down on internal training departments 
and hire external consultancy and training providers, in Singapore there was a 
protectionist tendency to provide as much HRD and training as possible by internal 
training departments. One pointed at the importance of localisation of training practices; 
cultural differences in approach had to be taken into account. Companies with the most 
HRD experience shared their adjustments to the local context with relative 
newcomers.13e The workforce was relatively young (median between 30 and 34 years 
old) and trainers were either young themselves or often trying to act young and modem. 
Many HRD professionals liked to place themselves in an avant-garde position with 
relatively progressive ideas for Singaporean society. This national Singapore culture was 
reflected in its training and development in various ways. For example, the STADA-
camp as well as its adventure learning programmes - STADA's most popular training -
used to start with a few ground rales; first of all one was told to "have fun". The 
second rale was to "be yourself" and finally one was to "share and leam". The first two 
rales would appear as a contradictio in terminis to most outsiders, but to Singaporeans 
this enforced pleasure seemed perfectly normal. They were used to their lives being 
planned for them, even in the most personal realm. Another example of local culture 
was shown in the way training topics were presented, not only in STADA, but also in 
general: in a fast paced manner such as an entertainment show, full of local 
humour.13' Young Singaporeans having grown up in an ever-changing environment, 
their attention-span in general was rather short and they were continuously looking for 
new stimuli to satisfy them. The norm was a "high-energy" or "adrenalin-pumping" 
presentation. On the one hand this led to superficial performances aimed at projecting 
a successful image of oneself. On the other hand this led to an energetic environment 
in which one believed in visions to have the potential to come true. The strong future-
orientation unleashed an upward surge of positive forces for the mainstream 
Singaporeans and a strong motivation towards success. In contrast to the perceived 
prevailing apathy and cocooning trend among peers of the younger working generation 
in Western countries. 
In June 1990 the Service Quality Centre (SQ Centre) was set up by the government to 
achieve excellence in customer service, in which economic sector forty percent of 
Singapore's workforce was working. In line with the government's strategy to seek 
partnerships with the private sector, a partnership was established with Singapore 
Airlines (SIA), the company with the best track record in service. The Singapore 
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formula was to distil the best of SIA's service into easy learning principles and make 
it available to other Singapore companies. Cheong Choon Kong, managing director 
SIA, emphasised the mutual benefit of the partnership: "We humbly accept the 
invitation from NPB to pass on what we have learned. " In the brochure the following 
statement made by Prime Minister Goh was highlighted: "We must be better than 
others, producing better quality goods and providing better quality services. This means 
having a better trained and skilled workforce." 
After launching its programmes in November 1990, the number of companies that took 
part in the courses skyrocketed. The training fees were affordable and because SQ 
Centre was launched by the government, it enjoyed a good reputation. SQ Centre 
emphasised that it took into consideration the unique cultural context. The focus on 
local needs would ensure that participants could easily grasp situations and understand 
the lessons.140 Furthermore, a certain pride was instilled in the companies participants 
worked in, to prevent frequent job hopping. It was not so much the contents of the 
training which induced the success of the SQ Centre, as these were mainly copied from 
other sources141, but it was the Singaporean approach which involved participants. 
The atmosphere was upbeat and full of enthusiasm. Many participants evaluated the 
training as effective, practical and meeting the training needs of the service industry. 
The SQ Centre employees profited too from the high turnover in the form of bonuses. 
It was considered highly attractive to work there. 
Having heard of the success, other countries such as Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Indonesia were interested in training from the SQ Centre. Thus SQ Centre spirits were 
even more aroused and one planned to meet training needs elsewhere around the world 
as well. In Singapore, just as internationally, one became more and more aware of the 
importance of cultural skills besides technical skills of managers. However, in the 
nineties economic benefits still had top priority. 
8.3 Wirtschaftsethik in HRD 
Singaporeans' Wirtschaftsethik rated highly in cross-cultural comparisons. It was mostly 
associated with discipline and hard work. Therefore believers in the Asian "miracle" 
wondered why "Asia's most orderly, efficient, regulated democracy" was worried about 
losing its competitive edge in service.142 
Excellence-driven Singapore was known for its hard work ethic. Although no figures 
were available on the relation between overwork and health in Singapore, a study 
conducted by the National University Hospital found that managers cited work pressure 
as their number one complaint.143 But it was hard to find executives admitting that 
they were overworked.144 Twelve-hour days were normal in the accounting business. 
A C&L director estimated that most professionals worked more than 60 hours a week, 
despite the official statistics. It was common to see people so tired that they were 
sleeping in offices and libraries.145 Japanese figures on deaths related to overwork 
raised some commotion. The Japanese 2,088 working hours a year was much more than 
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the American worker's 1,800 or the West-European 1,500 hours. The Singaporean 
manager's mentality was a hard-driving "I must get a Merc before I'm 40".146 A 
Straits Times Insight survey about Wirtschaftsethik published in December 1994 showed 
that more than half of married workers spent at least 44 hours a week at work. Most 
married workers worked between five and five-and-a-half days a week. Twenty five 
percent worked six to six-and-a-half days a week and ten percent seven days a week. 
Although the five to five-and-a-half days work week was the norm, forty percent of 
working husbands and twenty percent of working wives were working at least six days 
a week. The lower educated, lower income groups worked the most.147 Only few 
Singaporeans valued the extra time they could spend with their families more than the 
money they could earn by working longer hours. Most said that, given the choice, they 
would stick to their present hours or work even longer. The Wirtschaftsethik was as 
strong as ever: to achieve higher standards of living one was prepared to work hard. 
Only eight percent was willing to take a pay-cut in return for shorter hours. Even in the 
high income category less than ten percent opted for more leisure. Fifteen percent of 
school-going children worked during school holidays. Despite the many hours worked 
one was generally positive about the amount of family time. Eighty-four percent of 
families with young children usually had dinner together and seventy-five percent 
usually went on outings together.148 
The Singapore family values promotion team expressed its concern on the effects of the 
hard work on family life. 
One consultant believed that Singapore was far from being a nation of workaholics like 
the Japanese, but there was a social pressure to work hard, work smart and perform. 
In Singapore visibility, to be recognised, was important. Singaporean employees were 
more selfish than the Japanese worker who was company loyal.149 They worked 
towards their first big car, their first landed property; their job was still a means to an 
end. But Singaporeans could switch off work quite successfully because they had a 
broad social life outside work. 
Krugman and Young150 argued that virtually all of Asia's economic growth was due 
to more manpower and capital input, rather than due to more efficient use of resources. 
In other words, rather due to quantitative than to qualitative growth. However, the 
actual development process involved both. 
With full employment and with an increasing educational level, the aversion of local 
workers to menial work151 had increased. To meet the growing shortage of menial 
employees, the government allowed unskilled foreign workers to complement the 
Singapore workforce, first from Malaysia, later from Thailand and Sri Lanka. This, 
however, had certain undesirable consequences according to the government. Social 
problems of the foreign workers included adjustment problems, overtaxing of housing, 
medical, recreational and other services and a less disciplined and less competitive 
Wirtschaftsethik than the Singaporeans. The economic problem related to the presence 
of foreign workers was that the availability of cheap low-skilled workers allowed many 
employers to continue inefficient operations and labour-intensive industries. The 
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government therefore initially intended to "phase out" this lower skilled foreign 
workforce by 1991.152 A foreign-worker levy was introduced to deter employers from 
employing them. But as long as the full employment situation persisted in Singapore, 
Singaporeans kept on rejecting menial work and the local economy had to keep on 
depending on foreign labour for manufacturing, hotels, construction and domestic 
services. 
On the other hand, the government relaxed the immigration rules for highly educated 
and skilled professionals so they could serve as a "powerful magnet to attract [labour 
extensive] investments. " The potential displacement of local expertise by foreign talent 
and the inequalities in income, housing and fringe benefits between these expatriates and 
locals had not become an issue of contention yet. Another process was countering this 
effect: because the costs in Singapore rose so much for foreign companies, they 
gradually started hiring locals from the increasing Singaporean talent pool rather than 
expensive expats. Moreover, as the government's aim was merely to improve the talent 
pool in Singapore, immigration also used selection criteria for foreign professionals 
based on domestic supply. If the skill or knowledge of the applying foreign professional 
was already abundantly present in the Singapore workforce, he or she would not be 
granted an employment pass. 
As shown in paragraph 8.1 Singapore's productivity had increasingly grown due to 
more effectiveness and efficiency of indigenous human resources. But there was an 
attitudinal problem. The ministry of education had productivity concepts reinforced in 
the moral education programmes in schools. Formal curricula about teamwork, human 
relations and productivity were offered, essay competitions and exhibitions were 
organised. Students in the vocational and industrial field received tuition and handbooks 
in desirable work attitudes.153 Nevertheless, the prevailing work attitudes were not up 
to the standard required by the government to achieve the vision of Singapore's future 
development. According to Sim Kay Wee, chairman of the boot camp where the SQ 
Centre training was conducted and director human resources of SIA, young 
Singaporeans working in service had grown up in relative prosperity, so their attitude 
to serving others was often casual and haphazard. Reinjecting discipline was necessary 
for economic survival. Sim: "Most companies in Singapore know how to survive, but 
how committed are they to the long term? Some just like to make a fast buck... We are 
in the business of changing attitudes."154 Both expatriates and concerned Singaporeans 
agreed that Singaporeans in general were polite and punctual as long as they thought 
they could earn money from or through you, but as soon as this was not the case they 
would not even see you if you were right in front of them.155 In business persons 
often seemed not to be perceived primarily as humans, but as human resources, i.e. 
means for economic advancement. 
What the generations in Singapore seemed to have in common was this short term 
economic attitude which overruled the long term ethical attitude, not only in business, 
but even in HRD. 
Each organisation or company in Singapore was given free hand in developing its 
management systems. According to Wong156, this had led to a fine collection of 
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advanced management systems developed and tested in different parts of the world. 
Both American systems and Japanese corporate philosophies were implemented in 
Singapore companies. Wong made a comparison between the three major factors in 
Singapore's work environment besides the government: the American MNCs, the 
Japanese manufacturers and local Singaporean firms. 
Table 8.1. 
Profile of management practices in three typical firms in Singapore by Wong.157 
Planning 
Pobcy Making 
Other Control 
Devices 
Grouping of 
Activities 
Use of 
Specialized Staff 
Authority 
Definition 
Degree of 
Decentralization 
Leadership Style 
Trust and 
Confidence in 
Subordinates 
Manpower 
Policies 
Job Evaluation 
Development and 
SeledKHi ol 
Promotran Cntena 
Training 
Programs 
Motivation 
Employee Morale 
Absenteeism 
Turnover 
Productivity 
Ability to Attract 
Trained Personnel 
Utilization of High 
Level Manpower 
Growth in Sales 
American Subsidiary 
Long range (5 years) 
Formally stated. 
Used as guidelines and 
control measures 
Quality control, cost 
and budgetory control, 
setting of standards 
On functional area basis 
Some 
Clear 
High 
Consultative 
High 
Formally stated 
Done 
Done 
Many 
Monetary 
High 
Low 
High 
High 
High 
Effectively utilized 
High 
Japanese Subsidiary 
Medium range (1-Э years) 
Formally staled, 
Used as guidelines and 
control measures 
Quality control, cost 
and budgetory control, 
setting of standards 
On functional area basis 
Some 
Unclear 
Medium 
Autocratic Participative 
Medium 
Not staled 
Done 
Done 
Some, mostly 
on the job training 
Monetary and 
psychological 
High 
Low 
High 
High 
Medium 
Moderate utilization 
High 
Local Firm 
Short range (1-2 years) 
Not formally stated 
Some cost control, 
some quality control 
On lunctjonal-area basis 
None 
Unclear 
Low 
Paternalistic Autocratic 
Low 
Not stated 
Done by some 
Done by some 
Few 
Monetary and 
psychological 
High 
Low 
High 
Medium 
Low 
Moderate to poor 
ulihzalion 
Modest 
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In American MNCs HRD policies were usually planned and fairly well-structured, local 
employees were paid good wages and were given sufficient training and business 
exposure to assume senior management positions. For example, the CEOs of Hewlett-
Packard and National Semi-Conductor were local employees promoted from within the 
organisation. Personnel techniques such as job evaluation, promotion criteria and 
training programmes were frequently employed and high-level manpower was used 
effectively. American MNCs generally had high employee morale and high 
productivity. 
The Japanese subsidiaries, with major areas in textiles and electronics, had much more 
expatriate (Japanese) staff than in American subsidiaries. Approximately fifteen percent 
of the entire Japanese subsidiaries operating in the ASEAN region was located in 
Singapore. Local staff was generally expected to execute plans laid down by their 
Japanese bosses. Trust and confidence in subordinates was low. In contrast to the 
American MNCs, the Japanese companies found it difficult to attract and retain trained 
managerial and technical personnel. The Japanese companies tried to transfer some 
Japanese management principles to Singapore, e.g. in manufacturing emphasis on 
quality in workmanship and product performance. Where QCCs were effectively 
implemented, morale and efficiency increased. The aspect of lifetime employment, 
traditional in Japan, was not feasible in Singapore. 
Local Singaporean firms were dominated by the "trader's mentality", i.e. preference 
for short term measures and quick profits. Leadership style was paternalistic-autocratic 
with authority definition usually unclear and diffused. 
Although wages were low compared to the foreign MNCs, employee morale remained 
high. However, these firms found it difficult to attract and retain high-level manpower. 
Although each of these three groups had a different emphasis, they all depended on 
Singaporean human resources. The research conducted in the area of values and their 
relationship to human behaviour in organisational settings has been limited and since 
most of these studies were done outside Singapore, the conclusions were not deemed 
to be applicable to the cultural setting of Singapore. Wimalasiri highlighted the gap 
between the fact that human beings tend to develop and nurture a system of core values 
over a whole life which has a direct impact on behaviourial patterns on the one hand 
and that training aims to change behaviour in only a short amount of time on the other 
hand.158 Therefore one needed to study the impact of cultural values on HRD and 
training in Singapore. 
Traditional management in Singapore was characteristically paternalistic. It was derived 
from the Chinese culture and the Chinese family institution in which lineal relations -
line of descent - played an important role. This family system was extended to the 
management of traditional and non-traditional businesses. But with the influence of 
foreign business and management practices the Singaporean style changed. 
In 1978 Casey found that managers in Singapore displayed a leadership style in between 
autocracy like managers in other Asian countries and a participative style like 
Westerners and Japanese.159 Fukuda160 emphasised that, despite similarities in 
cultural heritage, there was a wide cultural gap between oriental countries. This 
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observation, however, could be due to the fact that especially Japan stood apart 
culturally from the other Asian countries. Within ASEAN countries Loo161 found that 
work-related values generally were quite similar. Although on a micro-level one could 
distinguish between groups again. For instance Ismail162 had found that the work 
value systems of managers in Malaysia differed across educational level, age, length of 
service and ethnic origin. 
Wimalasiri163 and Loo stated that higher order needs had priority for Singaporean 
employees. A 1970 survey about work values showed that Singaporean employees 
preferred intrinsic work values over extrinsic ones. The most desired were pride in job, 
job involvement and a preference for activity. The least desired were social status and 
earnings. However, there was a discrepancy in attribution of values. One attributed the 
positive - higher order - values to one's own person, while the others were perceived 
as more money-minded, status-seeking and possessing negative work values. Students 
who were interviewed, expected jobs providing intrinsic fulfilment to be hardly 
available and thought they would eventually have to succumb to prevailing norms in 
which money and status played an important role. 
The different pace in the economic development on the one hand and the social 
development on the other hand, created several value dilemmas in Singapore. Mid 
eighties, Vasoo1*4 saw a shift away from the Confucian ideal, but not entirely. 
Paternalistic values and orientation based on status and the perception of eldership and 
authority were less tolerated and accepted by the younger generation in the workforce, 
while egalitarian values became more acceptable. Vasoo attributed this shift to the 
increasing educational attainment of the population, the improvement in income levels, 
an increase in leisure time and longer careers. The implication for organisations was 
that participative management and a less paternalistic political leadership with more 
freedom of choice were called for. This would also have consequences for reward and 
promotion systems and the building of individual commitment to organisations. Thrift 
was expected to give way to more consumption expenditure, which would be more 
varied and personal. Organisations would therefore have to be more involved in meeting 
social and recreational needs of employees. Finally, Vasoo believed that in spite of the 
rise in Western individualism, the future Singaporean would still have high regard for 
the maintenance of harmony rather than confrontation in resolving personal and 
interpersonal problems. 
In 1987 Wimalasiri published results of a study on relational values of the Chinese in 
Singapore. She found that most respondents (48 percent) preferred collaterality, 
meaning that e.g. in organisations consensus was sought and in community work 
collective effort was deemed to be important. Individualism was preferred next by 29 
percent. Thus the lineal relationship, the traditional Chinese way, gradually lost 
importance among the Chinese Singaporeans, especially among the young. The Chinese-
educated, who were inculcated with values such as filial piety and respect for elders and 
authority, were more lineally oriented than their English-educated counterparts. 
However, one's preference depended on the situation; in community work and family 
work relations lineality generally was endorsed as the next best approach to collaterality 
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and in the field of paid work individualism was ranked first.165 Although emphasis on 
lineality declined, the collectivistic attitude in Singapore still reflected the Confucian 
background. This in contrast to the Western individualism which in economic and 
management theories is considered the driving force behind success in industry and 
business. HRD tools such as recruitment and pay systems, selection procedures, job 
designs, training and placement were mostly based on this Western value system. 
Chong described Singapore society as culturally very fluid: 
"Vagueness in cultural norms and values such that the boundaries of the cultural 
universe are often ill-defined and are characterised by the existence of 
overlapping and even possibly conflicting norms and values which are tolerated 
and can be considered acceptable so long as the resulting causes of action 
achieve socially desirable results."166 
Chong thought it was a result of lack of confidence in one's original culture and due 
to the pragmatic nature of the Singaporeans, that they were willing to adapt their own 
cultural norms and values to the environment in order to survive and prosper. This 
would explain the often unreluctant and pragmatic absorption and integration of new 
and foreign values and practices into the existing cultures of Singapore.167 
In July 1985 the NPB commissioned a study into the feasibility of the development of 
a single Singaporean management style.168 When the Times Organization conducted 
the survey on productivity attitudes, the results showed four styles present in Singapore: 
"(a) Authoritarian Manager - makes decisions promptly, informs his 
subordinates and expects them to comply even if they do not 
understand. 
(b) Communicative Manager - makes decisions promptly, but tries to 
explain them to his subordinates before implementation. 
(c) Consultative Manager - asks and considers the opinions of his 
subordinates before making decisions. 
(d) Populist manager - discusses an impending major decision with his 
subordinates and accepts the popular viewpoint as the decision even 
if its not in the long-term interest of the organisation."169 
The first three styles occurred most in Singapore and were evenly divided (29, 27, 28 
percent respectively). The majority of the workers, however, preferred the consultative 
form (40 percent). They found that the most important qualities for managers were 
"understanding and sensitivity" and "ability to persuade and motivate". It appeared that 
the success of managers in Singapore depended not only on the techniques and 
efficiency, but more importantly on their ability to manage the human resources, "the 
man behind the machine"170. 
In 1984 Everett, Krishnan and Stening showed in their study about auto-stereotypes and 
hetero-stereotypes that there was a perception gap between Japanese and Singaporean 
managers in Singapore which could affect the morale of the local workforce.171 The 
Japanese regarded the Singaporeans as much less ambitious, cautious, logical, decisive 
and flexible than the Singaporeans regarded themselves. Whereas the Singaporeans rated 
the Japanese as considerably less methodical, predictable, patient, extroverted, flexible 
322 Singapore, a modern Asian city-state 
and frank than the Japanese rated themselves and as much more ambitious and assertive 
than the Japanese believed themselves to be.172 
In 1988 Fung studied work values in relation to culture in Singapore.173 Based on 
Hofstede's dimensions, managers in three MNCs in Singapore were surveyed about 
their ideal job and about cultural issues. More than three quarters of the sample 
consisted of locals. However, these formed a selective group. Lower ranked employees, 
which formed the majority of the Singapore workers, and local firms were excluded 
from this study. Fung's results therefore were probably mostly pertaining to the most 
foreign influenced part of the workforce in Singapore. Nevertheless, his results showed 
that most cultural attitudes were still Confucian. The majority emphasised cooperation 
and harmony within and outside the family by compromising with opponents to resolve 
conflicts. Having good personal relationships was crucial. Seventy percent showed 
altruism in their willingness to help others less successful than they were. Their 
achievement orientation was derived from their belief in a competitive spirit and their 
positive attitude towards stimulating their children to do their best. They also reflected 
the Confucian emphasis on acquiring skills and education. Finally, they did not endorse 
the view that individual decisions are of higher quality than group decisions.174 The 
managers' most important work goal was "contribution to company". The other value 
factors important to managers in Singapore were: comfort, employment security, 
interpersonal relationships and reward, representing both intrinsic and extrinsic work 
goals.173 Fung concluded that these managers did not regard physical working 
conditions as important as lower rank employees, which was on par with Western 
management studies. The ranking of work value goals in Fung's study roughly 
corresponded with Hofstede's findings as well as with two other local studies.176 
Fung found a departure from the Confucian cultural value that parents should exercise 
parental guidance throughout their children's life; in the eyes of traditional parents, 
their children - no matter how old - are always dependent on them. Furthermore, the 
belief in a paternalistic leadership style seemed to have declined177. Half of the 
managers surveyed preferred a consultative style. The young professionals especially 
increasingly demanded a more open and participative approach. The basic Confucian 
principle of unconditional respect for the senior seemed to have been lost on the group 
of managers surveyed. 
They were thus moving away from the Confucian notion of a hierarchical society based 
on status-ordered, reciprocal relationships, such as manager-employee and teacher-
student. Fung called the result that 68.3 percent of the managers agreed that young 
people should be allowed to be critical of teachers "shocking".178 
In 1988 Loke compared American, Singaporean and Japanese management practices in 
Singapore179. A resume of the results is shown on the following pages. 
Singaporean management had its own distinct style, mostly traditional Confucian (except 
for the meritocratic promotion system): authoritarian and hierarchical. However, with 
the adoption of foreign business practices a multinational mix of values and practices 
was created.180 The resulting Singaporean management style was authoritarian as well 
as an adoption of both Western and Japanese concepts. 
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Table 8.2. Cross-cultural management practices in Singapore by Loke.m 
American Singaporean Japanese 
Organizational 
form 
Decentralized (2) Authoritarian (2) Autocratic (7) 
Number of 
hierarchical 
layers 
Managers* 
aulliontv 
Degree of 
control 
Recruitment 
philosophy 
About five 
layers (2) 
Authority and 
responsibility 
is delegated and 
clearly spelt out 
in each level 
Believes the 
decision should be 
made closest to 
the problem (2,4) 
Tight-loose, down 
to the lowest 
possible level 
Formal feedback 
system (4) 
Strictly on 'hire 
and fire" basis. 
retrenchment 
exercised if deemed 
unavoidable (4) 
About f i \ e layers 
or more (2) 
Authority 
resided more at 
the top management 
level (4) 
No formal feedback 
and appraisal 
sjstem (2) 
No clear 
patterns on 
hiring practices 
(1) 
Less than five 
lasers (4) 
Authority 
concentrated 
more with the 
department 
managers who 
are the 
Japanese (4) 
Very tight, 
daily review of 
operations on 
the floor (4) 
Do not believe 
in "hire and 
f i re 'pohcy 
W 
Promotion 
criteria 
Strictly on perfor-
mance, experience, 
education and future 
potential (4) 
Based on merit, 
performance, 
experience and 
education (2,4) 
Generally 
based on merit 
W 
Selection Promotions from 
within or from 
outside (2) 
Promotions from 
within as far as 
possible (I) 
Promotions from 
within as far as 
possible but 
advancement 
opportunities 
to the top are 
limited for 
local managers 
(3,4) 
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Table 8.2. (continued) Cross-cultural management practices in Singapore by Loke 
Training 
practices 
Planning 
Participation 
in planning 
Evaluation οΓ 
plans 
Job rotation 
not widely 
practised (2) 
Longer term 
plans (2) 
Participation is 
encouraged for all 
levels of manage­
ment Local managers 
are sent to the US 
divisional headqua­
rters to participate 
in global strategic 
planning (2,4) 
Frequent (4) 
No practice of job 
rotation. Emphasize 
on-the-job training 
as well as informal 
training. (1) 
Shorter range 
plans (2) 
Planning rest­
ricted to top 
management and 
subordinates will 
just implement 
the policies. (2) 
Frequent (2) 
Job rotation 
not widely 
practiced. 
Emphasize on-the 
-job training 
(1) 
Shorter range 
and detailed 
plans (4) 
Mainly Japanese 
departmental 
managers are 
involved and 
plans have to 
be approved by 
the headquarters 
in Japan (4) 
Quarterly (4) 
What Singaporean top managers valued highly was good working conditions, security 
of employment and cooperation among colleagues. Important were also deemed to be 
job variety and opportunity for high earnings. Americans showed more belief in 
success, 'getting ahead' and trust in employees than Singaporeans. They also scored 
lower than Singaporeans on uncertainty avoidance, which contradicted Hofstede's 
results182. The most significant similarity between American, Japanese and 
Singaporean managers was the high achievement orientation, which included challenging 
tasks, contribution to the company, high earnings and job advancement.183 There was 
a significant difference in work values between expatriate top managers and 
Singaporean middle managers. 
Redding and Richardson found that Singaporean middle managers seemed to acculturate 
more to their American superiors than to their Japanese superiors. They observed a 
tendency in Singapore to uphold Western management values and the successful 
implementation of American management practices.184 
The majority of the Singaporean middle managers preferred to work under a 
consultative superior, whereas the majority was working under a sales type. 
Singaporean managers differed from their Japanese counterparts in the sense that they 
were more willing to break company rules, had less desire to work in a prestigious or 
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large company and that they feared disagreement with their superior less. There was 
a difference between Singaporean top and middle management and the assimilation of 
foreign values between individuals, but the cultural variable clearly dominated in the 
end.185 
Loke concluded that in order to prevent ill implementation of policies and inefficiency 
American top managers in MNCs were to realise more that Singaporeans wanted a good 
relationship with their superiors. The American top managers should have more 
interaction with and concern for their subordinates. Singaporean middle managers also 
wanted a more specific and better defined job situation and work requirements as well 
as lower job stress. In terms of human resource management it was expected that 
following up these suggestions would lead to more employment commitment.ш 
In 1989 Lee Chau Chin made a comparison between the work values of indigenous 
Chinese and Japanese expatriate managers in Singapore to test the validity of Hofstede's 
cross-cultural observations.167 Hofstede's items had been derived from factor analyses 
on data from France, Great Britain and Japan. But the Singapore study results showed 
that the same cultural construct could be interpreted differently in other countries. 
Lee found a different view of collectivism between Chinese and Japanese managers, 
although both national culture groups were considered collectivistic in comparison to 
the West. The collectivistic attitude of the Chinese was reflected in loyalty towards the 
family, whereas the Japanese showed much higher allegiance to the workplace.188 The 
Chinese managers in Singapore showed high concern for interpersonal relationships and 
a strong need for affiliation. They generally emphasised the total welfare of their staff. 
Talking was the preferred mode of communication and business ties with customers, 
suppliers and government agencies were often carefully maintained. The Chinese valued 
collectivism and group cohesiveness highly. 
The Chinese managers in Singapore scored low on individualism. This was reflected 
in a congenial atmosphere in the workplace where managers liked to see each other as 
members of a team. 
Lee observed a relatively small power distance with the Singaporean Chinese managers, 
as they maintained much personal contact with their staff. One interviewee said: "Going 
to a guy's house if his wife is ill and seeing if you can help out" was as important as 
meeting task goals.189 The preferred leadership style was the consultative one. 
Subordinates liked to be informed of decisions. 
The Chinese Singaporean managers scored high on masculinity. Lee interpreted this 
result as an indication that Singaporeans were advancing to higher-order needs in 
Maslowian terms. She saw this high masculinity score as an orientation towards 
intrinsic work goals, a need to perform and assert oneself. To accommodate the 
symbolic meaning of a career in the more masculine than feminine culture in Singapore, 
intrinsic rewards such as opportunity for advancement and job autonomy were in order. 
The Chinese Singaporean managers scored low on uncertainty avoidance, in contrast 
to the Japanese. This risk-taking of the Singaporeans was reflected in the high 
employment instability. The Task Force on Job-hopping in Singapore190 found that 
90.7 percent of companies with high labour turnover attributed it to job-hopping. The 
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average annual resignation in Singapore was 23.3 percent, with the highest percentage 
in restaurants and hotels with 43.9 percent, followed by 39.5 percent in 
manufacturing.191 A survey on the job-hopping trend reported that 50,000 Singaporean 
workers, or 4.2 percent of the total workforce of 1.2 million, had more than three jobs 
the past year. The lack of commitment to the employing company presented Singapore 
with a problem of high job mobility, which was correlated with loss in productivity and 
high costs in recruitment, even at the top management level. Lee suggested that 
Singaporean companies should therefore adopt a more people-oriented style of 
management. 
Although a more localised HRD was regularly emphasised, it remained hard to build 
company loyalty in Singapore. In 1992 Chew and Chew192 pointed out that seven in 
ten directors and managers had held one or more previous jobs. Sixty-five percent of 
clerical staff and sixty percent of production and services workers had held more than 
one job. Chew and Chew partly attributed the lack of company loyalty to the fact that 
much employment in Singapore was offered by MNCs, perceived to be "footloose" and 
unlikely to be really committed to local workers in return. Therefore, Chew and Chew 
said, it was no use to strive for an employee commitment similar to a national loyalty; 
one should rather strive for better job dedication. 
The general Good Boss contest during the 1992 Productivity Campaign, which 
challenged management of companies and organisations to take the lead in the drive for 
higher productivity and quality, showed that the Confucian type of manager was still 
very much alive in the Singapore society. The winner, Loh, was shown to others as an 
example of a good manager."3 He was characterised by a saying of the Chinese 
philosopher Lao Zi: "A leader is best when people hardly know he exists." He was 
known by his employees as caring, understanding and approachable. A firm believer 
in Confucian ethics, he managed his company in the traditional Chinese way, meaning 
he treated his employees as part of his family. Whenever his employees had personal 
or work-related problems, he would try to help them. "He's like a father to us. He's 
always there to help when we need him."194 Loh would even take money from his 
own pocket to get employees out of financial difficulties. Besides helping his own 
workers, he would also contribute to charities. His attitude was that money was not 
everything in life. Loh was encouraging his staff to go for training externally and 
trained them on-the-job. Loh himself was not an educated man, but had acquired some 
two decades of hands-on experience. His knowledge and skill made him much 
respected. He believed in responsible workers; those who worked hard, received cash 
rewards; those who were lazy, were counselled and warned. As a model for his 
workers to emulate, Loh worked hard (six days a week without fail) and showed 
responsibility himself. 
The general criteria which employees appeared to apply when evaluating their bosses 
for the Good Boss nomination were communication (listening, advising and sharing 
policy changes/keeping employees informed), patience and not loose temper, efforts to 
understand staff in work and welfare. 
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Jurong Engineering in Singapore confirmed the value of communications in staff 
development. A company spokesman said more dialogue with staff, combined with 
prompt responses to requests for help, led to greater effectiveness in settling human 
problems.195 
It seemed a complex task to create a truly Singaporean management style with on the 
one hand the constant integration of foreign values and practices and on the other hand 
a government campaigning to remind the people of the Confucian obligations to family 
and the community and the attendant concern about the rise in individualism. 
Nevertheless, an ever more distinctively Singaporean Wirtschafisethik was emerging. 
For example, STADA's 1993 national conference196 was about "quality in training". 
Quality, however, was not primarily viewed as the level of one's ability to transfer 
learning or as the level of learning by participants, but the focus was rather on how to 
enhance the commercial success of one's own company and how to advance one's own 
HRD-career. Training was primarily seen as yet another type of business. Although 
trainers and HRD-people perceived themselves as more socially oriented than the 
average Singaporean, they saw a need for "economising" their jobs. The senior "guru" 
present at the conference, advised the younger HRD-people to "be like a Chinese 
businessman: anything also can, lah!"197. This meant that one should never say "no" 
if there is a commercial opportunity. 
In a discussion about the training product or service as a three-tier package (the inner 
ring being the core product/service, the middle ring the support and the outer ring the 
enhanced service), it became clear that in Singapore the focus was on the outer 
packaging of the training, such as the venue being a five-star resort or hotel, the best 
free food, a free t-shirt, etc. As this was what the customers valued, this was what the 
providers often focused on. Although the older, more experienced participants warned 
for the danger of this detraction of the real training service, a young trainer publicly 
concluded the discussion at the end: "So if I want to be successful as a trainer in my 
company, I make sure that I offer them a good resort"198, without redress. 
When transparencies were shown with data from a cross-cultural value study by 
Moneim199 comparing Singaporean to Malaysian managers, in which Singaporeans 
scored very high on economic values and low on social and religious values and 
Malaysians the other way around, participants showed clear recognition. One did not 
mind this value gap, however; one rather joked about it that it was "no wonder that the 
Malaysians lag[ged] behind"200. 
During teambuilding courses Singaporeans generally were more concerned with winning 
than with integrity.201 To achieve quality work one was trained in teamwork. To 
motivate attendants several teams were formed; group dynamics created a competitive 
spirit. The aim was to be able to cooperate as a team to achieve the highest results, to 
deliver the best quality. But in order to end up as the winning team, often rules which 
would affect the quality were offended. The 'fever' of winning, however, seemed to 
override any objections of conscience. One seemed caught up in the Singaporean 
"excellence-complex", i.e. quantitatively speaking. 
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One example was the execution of an outdoor exercise called "Spider's Web" by some 
forty Singaporean employees of an oil MNC. The objective was to move the whole 
team through a 'web' without touching its 'threads'. The rules were that each time 
someone touched a thread of the web, the entire group had to start the exercise all over 
again. Their training aim was to achieve quality in the performance of their jobs for 
which this exercise was a learning substitute. While doing the exercise, members of the 
team were constantly touching the web. When interfered with the remark that they were 
reducing the quality of their work, the team got angry and wanted to continue, because 
they wanted to finish their exercise as quickly as possible to beat their competitor. The 
(Singaporean) programme-director let them continue in order "not to spoil their fun". 
After they had finished within the allotted time, the team was very satisfied with their 
achievement and so was the director. Their follow-up processing focused on why they 
thought they were so successful. Apparently the quality of the work did not matter any 
more as long as the final goal was achieved.202 
Although Singaporeans were paying continuous lip service to Quality, they rather 
seemed to go for short term and easily rewarding solutions. Viewed from an economic 
perspective the Wirtschaftsethik was good, from a moral perspective there was much to 
be improved. Although the government had always emphasised the importance of long 
term solutions, the national culture had developed in such a way that a successful image 
became the most important to the majority of the people. For instance, many younger 
Singaporeans were more focused on making a career which would give them social 
status than in doing their job well. The Wow-mentality on top of this attitude made 
them vulnerable to any criticism; they did not like to be confronted with their flaws. 
One readily admitted Singaporeans' preference for "packaging" over content by 
introducing all kinds of topics - in private as well as in public - as: "As we all know 
how image-conscious Singapore is, it is important to ...". One was rather proud of a 
smooth image than ashamed by a lack of substance. In HRD an example was the non-
professional use of ready-made, mostly American, psycho-metric instruments in 
selection and training of personnel. This praxis was very popular. American companies 
would offer a few hours training in how to use the instrument and Singaporeans would 
freely go about administering the tests, not being hindered by any psychological or 
social scientific knowledge. But the fast and easy results enhanced their credibility and 
success. 
When the NPB organised a national forum on quality with Deming as speaker203, the 
turnout was enormous. Attendants were interested in the theories, but many informally 
showed themselves sceptical about the application in Singapore. They scanned the 
American business concepts and management theories in a utilitarian way. The ones 
with clear direct results would be implemented rapidly, but more abstract and vague 
concepts were readily dismissed.204 "Empowerment", empowering workers and work 
teams was popular, but it had to be done the Singaporean way. 
One way Singapore attempted to achieve its goals was to visualise its dreams. The 
government's "Vision '99"205 created a picture of Singapore as a developed economy, 
a cultivated society leading to a nation of excellence, modelled after the Swiss standard 
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of living, with a rise in the educational level and similar progress in social and cultural 
fields. Goh described a society of well-read, well-informed citizens, a refined and 
gracious people, a thoughtful people, a society of sparkling ideas, a place where art, 
literature and music flourish. It would not be a materialistic, consumerist society where 
wealth is flaunted and money spent thoughtlessly, in short a parvenu society. In 
Singapore's envisioned society each person would be given the chance to achieve his 
highest potential and he, in tum, would have to give of his best to others. The more 
able and more successful would have to make the greater contribution. This suggested 
the possession of the cultural values of compassion, thrift, perseverance, achievement 
orientation and industry. The message of the national leaders was to keep the price of 
knowledge, of modernism as low as possible: be modern, but not "Western"; be 
educated, but not without compassion; be free, but not undisciplined; be personally 
well-off, but not without sacrifice to the nation.206 
In order for Singapore to thrive in the post-industrial world and to retain its much 
valued Asian values, Goh wanted Singapore to ride the Third Wave and make the vision 
of a cultural synergy a "necessity...not a dream."207 Singapore was now "charting a 
course towards a high-tech future by which is meant the concentration of economic 
investment and manpower investment in such "brain-intensive" industries as 
telecommunications, robotics, plant genetics, computers, aerospace and general 
consulting services." This was termed the "third industrial revolution" to emphasise the 
epochal change in primary industry and its likely impact on the Singapore society. A 
very different future would emerge, replacing industrial era values, attitudes and 

PART m 
EVALUATION OF SINGAPORE'S DEVELOPMENT 

CHAPTER 9 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
In this research the general development of Singapore into a modern Asian city-state 
was analysed, with a focus on the interrelationship between the cultural and economic 
development. In this final chapter a summary of the main findings is given, from which 
a number of conclusions follow. Finally, some points of discussion have been added 
regarding the potential of the Singaporean development as a model for other countries. 
9.1 Summary 
The main research questions centred on the extent to which Singapore's cultural 
background influenced its recent, rapid economic growth and vice versa to what extent 
this rapid economic growth influenced Singapore's cultural development. The concept 
of culture was taken in the broad anthropological sense. The underlying question was 
about the extent to which the general assumption that a modernisation process implies 
westernisation was applicable to Singapore. The two complementary research questions 
are reflected in the division of this dissertation into two parts. The first part - chapters 
2 through 4 - analyses the major cultural influences on Singapore's economic 
development and the second part - chapters 5 through 8 - reviews the direction of 
Singapore's cultural development since its rapid economic development. 
The introductory first chapter gives the background from which this study was 
undertaken. Singapore evolved from a poor developing country into a rich industrialised 
country within thirty years. Since the increase in economic importance of Japan and the 
East Asian NICs, the probing question is why these countries in particular made such 
developmental progress. Many decades ago Max Weber was the first to establish a link 
between Wirtschaftsethik and economic development. Since the eighties a number of 
other scholars have suggested a correlation between Confucianism and East Asia's 
economic success. 
The problem definition and interdisciplinary, holistic research approach have been 
derived from several theoretical contributions. Regarding the approach, this research 
relied on both Verhelst, who emphasised the importance of local, cultural knowledge 
from his fieldwork experience, and Huizer, who showed the benefits of action research 
in the study of local cultures. Participatory observation, as defined by anthropologists, 
was an important means to acquire this type of knowledge. Sivaraksa's struggle against 
the de-rooting process of the Thai culture provided the inspiration to study the extent 
of westernisation in Singapore due to its modernisation process. 
In chapter two the geographical and historical aspects of Singapore's cultural 
background are shown. The fact that Singapore on the one hand lacked natural 
resources and a rural hinterland, but on the other hand was strategically located on main 
trade routes, influenced its economic development. This situation provided mainly 
economic opportunities, which were internationally oriented. Singapore's commercial 
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trade routes, influenced its economic development. This situation provided mainly 
economic opportunities, which were internationally oriented. Singapore's commercial 
trade-entrepot economy drew many immigrants, who were out to make material profits. 
The majority was Chinese with a Confucian background. These immigrants were 
achievement-oriented, materialistic, aspiring to social mobility, receptive to change, 
rational and pragmatic. This combination of factors drove Singapore towards a modern 
industrial rather than a traditional development. 
Singapore's external relations were dominated by the fact that Singapore was a small, 
predominantly Chinese-inhabited island surrounded by Muslim countries. Internally 
Singapore was culturally heterogeneous. The combination of these two factors gave rise 
to a cautious multi-ethnic development strategy. The Malays, who had the longest 
history in the area, were more traditional and feudalistic than the other ethnic groups. 
There was an intense political struggle between the Malays and the Chinese culminating 
in "racial" riots in the sixties. In the first decades after independence in 1965, the 
Malays in Singapore remained the least interested in modern economic development and 
thus lagged behind socio-economically. Since the nineties the Malay Singaporeans have 
tried to narrow the gap and participate in Singapore's rat race. 
Chapter three provides insight into the religious background of the Singaporeans. 
Singapore is a secular state, allowing its people to practise their own religion as long 
as they do not interfere with politics and disrupt public harmony. The majority of the 
population adhered to an amalgam of Confucian, Buddhist, Taoist and Traditional 
Chinese Religionist beliefs, called Neo-Confucianism, but mostly simply referred to as 
Confucianism. Strictly speaking, this was not a religion, but it had the importance of 
a religion. In Confucianism three dimensions could be distinguished: philosophy, way 
of life and political ideology. It was a rational, humanistic Weltanschauung without a 
salvation theory. Human relationships were all-important. 
Since 1979 the Confucian ethic was linked to the economic growth in the East Asian 
NICs by a number of researchers. Values such as hard work, thrift, harmony and 
cooperation, respect for education and reverence for authority, also called "Confucian 
dynamism" by Hofstede and Bond, were perceived to have contributed to the rapid 
economic development. Max Weber had tried to show how Confucianism inhibited 
China's industrialisation. But he had made mistakes such as underestimating historical 
Chinese achievements, theorising from a heuristic Eurocentric point of view, 
overpolarisation between Confucianism and the Protestant ethic and a lack of distinction 
between classical Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism, as practised by the Overseas 
Chinese. Although Singapore's culture showed a number of Confucian traits, 
Singaporean scholars raised objections to the attribution of Singapore's economic 
growth to Confucianism. Despite the lack of consensus over its retrospective 
contribution, Confucianism was pragmatically scrutinised for positive aspects which 
would be of benefit to the future and could mitigate negative consequences of 
modernisation. The Confucian collectivism, relationships based on mutual respect, care 
for the common people, disciplined work, emphasis on education and educational 
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institutions such as family, school and state, and the Confucian concept of keji (one 
must learn and be ready to move) were suggested as valuable to post-modem societies. 
The syncretic Chinese Traditional Religion also played an important role in the daily 
lives of Chinese Singaporeans. It was manifested in ancestor worship, shenism, 
"automatic writing", divination and feng shui. The aim of most of these traditional 
religious practices was to acquire wealth, health and honour. The beliefs, practices and 
institutions not only showed a wide variety, but also appeared to be in transition. The 
most important feature of the Chinese in Singapore was their pragmatism. 
In chapter four the pervasive impact of politics on Singapore's modern development is 
described. The People's Action Party (PAP), established in 1954 under the leadership 
of Lee Kuan Yew, came into power since the 1959 elections. The initial phase of self-
government focused on integration into the Federation of Malaya, which took place in 
1963. But the differences between the Malayan and the Chinese Singaporean political 
ideas were so great, that Singapore had to leave the Federation and declare 
independence in 1965. Since then the PAP managed to build up a one-party dominance 
in the democratic Republic of Singapore using practically all possible means. Lee, an 
English-educated Peranakan lawyer, whose political dominance was so overwhelming 
that he shaped Singapore's modem development the most. He had a clear vision of 
Singapore's future as a modem Asian city-state and was able to translate his theories 
into practice with such all-encompassing, interrelated policies that one speaks of "social 
engineering". His strategy was a non-ideological, pragmatic combination of a free 
market, internationally oriented economy with state participation and socialist policies 
to fulfil the basic needs of the Singaporeans. Grassroots organisations, more or less 
incorporated into the state bureaucracy, played an important role. The collective goal 
became a general socio-economic upward mobility by means of economic growth. 
Singapore's politics distinctly showed a number of Confucian elements: leading by good 
moral example, emphasis on excellence, elitist attitude, paternalistic government, 
obedience to authorities, institutionalisation and pragmatism. 
There was little political opposition in Singapore, due to a number of factors both on 
the side of the government and on the side of the opposition itself. The PAP 
government applied both direct and indirect methods to sustain its belief that long term 
political stability was in the best national interest of Singapore. Direct methods 
comprised detainment of dissidents under the Internal Security Act and reduced 
organisational opportunities for political opponents. Indirect methods consisted of 
financial and legal proceedings, threats to deny housing and education facilities, 
intelligent policy and election tactics, manipulation of the public opinion by the mass 
media and control of the labour movement. The opposition itself suffered from internal 
frictions, lack of credible and effective leaders and a lack of political alternatives. A 
general complacency among the population due to the rapid economic growth of which 
many benefits were returned to the people, sparked little interest in the opposition. 
Moreover, stepping in the opposition limelight was a risky enterprise in Singapore. 
Chapter five describes the modernisation process which took place in Singapore. For 
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the PAP government it was not a question of whether or not to modernise, but mainly 
how to modernise. In the economic sense, rapid growth was first and foremost achieved 
by attracting foreign investments. Thus Singapore's development can be roughly 
characterised as economic survival in the sixties, fulfilment of basic needs in the 
seventies, a second industrial revolution from labour-intensive to capital-intensive 
industries at the end of the seventies, coping with international economic recession in 
the mid-eighties, towards the status of industrialised country in the early nineties and 
preparation for the leap to join ranks of the developed countries in the mid-nineties. All 
major economic indicators showed an enormous increase in standard of living since 
independence. 
Socio-culturally speaking, a number of changes took place. Small family businesses 
were relocated to new industrial estates and had to compete with government-owned or 
government-linked companies and MNCs. The traditional Chinese bang associations lost 
their influence. Urbanisation along with massive public housing schemes removed 
kampong life structures. Community spirit gave way to impersonal relations, often 
based on calculation of monetary remuneration. However, this did not entail a huge 
transformation, as Singapore already was a commercial city with many nuclear families. 
For the last stage of the development process there was much less of a blueprint than 
for the earlier stage involving the fulfilment of basic needs. Economic and technological 
development took place at a faster pace than socio-cultural development. This led to a 
Singaporean search to strike a balance between economic and moral values in a modem 
society, which showed more variety in lifestyles and demands than the traditional 
society. Positive effects of modernisation were deemed to be to be the better education, 
higher incomes, more leisure time and travel opportunities, better recreational facilities, 
higher achievement orientation, more materialistic outlook and emancipation from 
certain traditional aspects, such as the unequal status of women. Negative consequences 
were deemed to be to be excessive individualism, conspicuous consumption, hedonism, 
complacency, increased insecurities, a sense of alienation, social isolation, more 
emotional disturbances related to stress from the rat race and environmental pollution. 
To counter the undesirable socio-cultural effects of modernisation, filial responsibility 
encouraging self-sufficiency of the family, hard work and thrift were emphasised. 
The polity in Singapore rejected Western demands for greater democracy. Nevertheless, 
although Singapore already claimed to be a democratic republic, some changes did take 
place. The PAP maintained its one-party dominance, but a process from political 
convergence to a growing divergence seemed to take place. In the nineties former Prime 
Minister Lee's dominant and decisive style was replaced by Goh's more consultative 
and people-oriented style. The government promised that gradually more political 
participation would be allowed in a more "mature" Singapore. But perceived interests 
of the state remained priority over individual interests. This led to such cautious and 
controlled political modernisation that some complained that there was little change in 
the political scene. The government made a very strong claim justifying an Asian style 
of leadership, amongst others expressed in the initiator and mediating role Singapore 
took up in international relations between Western and South East Asian countries. 
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The significant upward socio-economic mobility during Singapore's modem 
development is described in chapter six. Generally speaking, higher educational levels 
had contributed to higher prestige jobs with higher incomes and thus to higher socio-
economic class positions. Women profited from this upward trend in improved status 
trend too, although less than men. 
In the early nineties a comprehensive Singaporean study of class differences rectified 
two popular notions in Singapore. First of all, it was generally assumed that Singapore 
had grown into a middle class society. But this middle class appeared to consist of five 
distinct clusters. Although most Singaporeans perceived themselves to be in the middle 
class, the people in each of the clusters differed significantly regarding the three major 
class components: education, income and occupation. Secondly, the stereotype that 
Malays formed the lowest and Chinese the highest class appeared to be an 
oversimplification. Malays were mostly found in the lower middle and middle class 
respectively and Chinese in the respectively upper, upper middle and lower classes. The 
lowest class was dominated by the Chinese. The Malays, however, did show the least 
upward socio-economic mobility for a variety of reasons. 
Inter-ethnic mixing in Singapore was limited. The government's policies of 'multi-
racialism', bilingualism and communal tolerance did lead to a more positive inter-ethnic 
attitude, but the incidence of inter-communal marriages remained relatively low. One 
could not speak of an ethnic 'melting pot'. 
The consensus in Singapore was that the rapid economic development had not increased 
the income gap. Free or subsidised education, subsidised housing, company welfarism 
related to the state pension fund, health services and a progressive income tax system 
had served as a social safety net. Although opposition politician Chee highlighted an 
emerging trend of uneven distribution of wealth and resources in the mid-nineties, 
general opinion seemed to have it that the gap had not so much grown between the 
'haves' and 'have-nots', but rather between the modern Western and traditionally 
Eastern educated. 
Singapore's upward intra- and intergenerational socio-economic mobility appeared to 
be structural, but as it was mainly due to the rapid economic development, an expected 
outcome would be a levelling out process related to a maturation of the economy. This 
was hardest to accept for the younger generation, as their needs and expectations had 
risen along with the general trend of upward mobility. The government tried to 
moderate rather than to accommodate these high expectations. 
Chapter seven shows the way Singapore developed its most important economic asset: 
its human resources. The perceived link between human resources and economic growth 
explained why the government devised policies which pervaded private realms of life 
to a great extent. Key areas of interest were the controversial population size and 
structure on the one hand, and on the other hand the "quality of the people", which was 
translated into policies on wages, productivity and training. The cooperative tripartite 
relationship between the government, labour and employers played an important role 
in the implementation of these policies. Where income is concerned, Singapore 
managed to match that of a developed country's by the nineties, but in the fields of 
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productivity and training much was left to be improved. High quality of the human 
resources provided a competitive edge over other countries. It was a challenge to strike 
a balance between wage and productivity growth. In Singapore's human resource 
development (HRD) a drive for excellence therefore remained top priority. In HRD 
Singapore aimed at joining the ranks of the structurally developed countries by 2010 
and took a leading role in Asia. After studying and copying American and Japanese 
models, Singapore began its search for a self-sufficient HRD model in the nineties. This 
mostly entailed an efficient combination of modern and Confucian elements. 
As the positive impact of literacy improvement on economic output was paramount, the 
government emphasised education right from the start of independence. Educational 
opportunities were raised and tertiary educational and training institutions saw a 
phenomenal growth. For one thing a love of learning seemed to be the cultural stimulus 
towards the general educational improvement, for another the instrumental use of 
education and training as a means towards upward socio-economic mobility seemed to 
have the upper hand. To achieve even higher standards of living, the Wirtschafisethik 
to work hard remained strong. The dilemma for the government was how to raise the 
general educational level of the population without an accompanying more prominent 
demand for more democracy due to greater intellectual participation. 
A crucial part of Singapore's modern development was the creation of a common 
Singaporean identity, the dual process of which is shown in chapter eight. 
On the one hand, one had to achieve internal harmony. In the sixties the people in 
Singapore identified predominantly with their own ethnic group. To prevent the existing 
tensions between these groups from culminating into more ethnic riots, Lee embarked 
on a comprehensive and long term campaign of multi-racial tolerance and co-existence. 
He used all vehicles of political socialisation and acknowledged the minority status of 
the Malays and Indians in Singapore while attempting to avoid overt sinification. From 
the seventies onwards gradually a new common identity started to develop. In the mid-
nineties communalism had become a non-issue. Singaporeans had found a compromise 
in identification as respectively Chinese, Malay or Indian Singaporean. 
On the other hand, a balance had to be struck between internal and external influences. 
The Singapore government set out to achieve the "best of both worlds": emulate the 
desired achievements in science and technology of the Western developed countries, but 
not to their seemingly adverse effects, mainly in the (interpersonal realm. Asian values 
were to play a morally moderating and rectifying role against excesses of 
modernisation. A "Confucian renaissance" played an important role. 
In the early nineties a survey showed that the majority of Singaporeans adhered to a 
pragmatically eclectic combination of both value systems. More than one-third clung 
to their Eastern values and only a minority showed more Western than Eastern values. 
Although the main Weltanschauung of Confucianism had started disintegrating a long 
time ago, modernisation had not caused the official religions to give way to a spiritual 
and moral vacuum. However, the professed religions did shift. The largest shifts took 
place from Taoism and Buddhism to 'free-thought' and from 'free-thought' to 
Christianity. At the end of the eighties and in the mid-nineties a modified Buddhism 
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MNCs had much influence on Singapore's economic development, which created a 
dependency situation, but whose influence was negligible in the personal and cultural 
realm, where "dependency reversal" was the case. Singapore's economic success had 
bred a self-confidence which allowed space for respect for one's own cultural roots. 
Singapore thus radiated the appeal of a new East Asian development model with the 
attractive combination of a high standard of living and the creation of its own cultural 
identity. 
9.2 Conclusions 
With regard to the main research question whether there was a relationship between 
cultural and economic development in Singapore and if so, what it entailed, the 
following conclusions can be drawn. 
(1) The cultural background of Singapore did influence the direction of its economic 
development at independence, in the sense that the majority of the population consisted 
of Chinese immigrants who were more open to modern industrial development than 
local Malays. 
(2) The cultural values of the majority of the Singaporeans could be attributed both to 
Confucianism and to the fact that they were immigrants, but in any case they supported 
economic growth. 
(3) There was a complex relationship between ethno-cultural differences, political ideas 
and economic development strategies. The fact that the Malays were less participatory 
in economic modernisation not only had to do with political motives in relation to 
historical and geographical roots, but also with psychological motives to give religious 
values priority over economic ones in contrast to the Chinese. 
(4) The fact that externally Singapore formed a "cultural island" and internally was 
culturally heterogeneous, made it important to emphasise common goals in development 
rather than show differences between the interest groups. Neither was explicitly chosen 
for a capitalist, nor for a communist development strategy. A pragmatic compromise 
of a free market economy with socialist policies was the result. 
(5) Although Singapore's culture was too complex to be simply called Confucian, 
Confucianism was the Weltanschauung most linked to the East Asian NICs, including 
Singapore. A Confucian Wirtschafisethik did not inhibit economic growth. A number 
of elements, labelled "Confucian dynamism", were even found to be positively 
correlated to rapid economic growth. 
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(6) The fact that a one-party or one-person dominance in Singapore's politics could 
exist for several decades, made not only long term, comprehensive economic strategies, 
but also "social engineering" possible. The extreme impact of politics on Singapore's 
modem development thus formed a cultural factor of influence on the rapid economic 
growth. 
(7) The cultural factor in Singapore's modernisation process was found in its economic 
pragmatism, adaptability, priority of economic values over other values and the 
willingness to put state interests above individual interests. 
(8) The rapid economic development did influence the cultural development of 
Singapore. On the one hand, the economic, technological development of Singapore 
took place at a faster pace than the socio-cultural transformations. On the other hand, 
for the development process beyond the fulfilment of basic needs there was no real 
blueprint, as the government considered the way Western countries developed socio-
culturally undesirable. This led to a pragmatic search to strike a balance between 
economic and moral values. The values of hard work, thrift and focus on the family, 
often called "Asian values", were re-introduced as a counterbalance to excesses of 
modernisation. 
(9) The Singapore government rejected Western demands for democracy, but did 
modernise its political system in the sense that more political participation was allowed. 
This was monitored closely, however. An Asian style of leadership was emphasised. 
(10) Singapore's economic development led to structural upward socio-economic 
mobility, especially by means of improved educational levels. However, it could be 
expected that a levelling off process would occur, once a maturation of the economy 
was reached. Therefore the government tried to moderate expectations. 
(11) Poverty had largely been overcome in Singapore since independence. Furthermore, 
the general consensus was that the rapid economic development had not increased the 
income gap, although some showed dissent. 
(12) Singapore had not completely become a "middle class society". Most Singaporeans 
perceived themselves to belong to the middle class, but five clusters could be 
distinguished in the large middle category. These clusters differed significantly 
regarding education, income and occupational prestige. 
(13) The popular notion that Chinese formed the upper and Malays the lower class was 
an oversimplification. The lowest class was dominated by Chinese. On average, 
however, the Malays did lag behind the other ethnic groups in the socio-economic field, 
for which there were a number of reasons. In the nineties, however, they decided to 
narrow the gap and be part of the rat race - as they saw it - in Singapore. 
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(14) The general economic upgrading of the Singapore population had not resulted in 
an ethnic "melting pot". Identification as a Chinese, Malay or Indian Singaporean was 
an acceptable compromise. 
(15) Human resource development was perceived as essential to Singapore's economic 
growth. On the one hand, keeping a competitive edge internationally was deemed to be 
ciuciai for survival; on the other hand, Singaporeans were searching for a locally 
adapted HRD model. The rapid economic development had provided Singaporeans with 
the self-confidence to influence their own cultural development. 
(16) The fact that education and training was instrumentally perceived as beneficial to 
upward socio-economic mobility, played an important role in the improvement of 
educational levels. This in turn had positive effects on the economic growth. 
(17) For the development of the multi-ethnic society in Singapore, stability and a new 
common identity were of paramount importance. The common goal was found in a 
higher standard of living for all. 
(18) The PAP government's strategy was to achieve the "best of both worlds": to 
emulate the scientific and technological - mostly material - achievements of Western 
developed countries, but to keep an Asian - mostly non-material - identity in the 
(interpersonal realm. 
(19) Modernisation did not lead to a spiritual vacuum in Singapore. Although scientific 
and technological rationalism and the secularism of the state had confined traditional 
moral and religious life - including folk ideas and practices - to the private sphere, a 
pluralism of new lifestyles, ideologies and moralities filled the vacuum that was 
created.' Moreover, religious adherence did not disappear as could be expected from 
Western developments, but a number of religious shifts took place. At first the number 
of Christians and "free-thinkers" rose, later a modified Buddhism showed a revival. 
However, the number of psychological disorders, probably linked to the rat race in 
Singapore, increased. 
(20) Although the Singaporean society was one of the most Western-influenced in Asia, 
the majority of the population showed a pragmatically eclectic combination of Eastern 
and Western values, norms and behaviour patterns. In the early nineties more than one-
third (still) mostly adhered to Eastern values. However, as Western values were mostly 
adopted by the younger generation, in the future one might expect an even greater 
group with mixed values. A complete westernisation due to the economic development 
is not likely to take place. Many transformations could be attributed to a modernisation 
process ipso facto rather than to westernisation. Thus "latecomers" in development do 
not necessarily have to follow the same process as the "early developers". 
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9.3 Considerations for further discussion: 
potential of Singapore as a development model 
Besides the above conclusions, one could go one step further and pose the question of 
the extent to which Singapore's development could serve as a model of constructive, 
post-colonial development. 
As an alternative to the dominant Western model, Singapore could provide an example. 
Developing countries are more able to identify with another developing country which 
has become rich, while it is still recognisable as inhabited and moulded by a Third 
World people. Singapore generally seems appealing as a thriving society radiating 
order, conformity and discipline. Many Asians perceive Singapore's social structure as 
a clear and effective alternative to the Western societies. Although Singapore is 
geographically, culturally and historically unique, an increasing number of developing 
countries aspire to its level of development. 
According to Verhelst's dual development theory, Singapore should be categorised as 
"catching up with the West". Although Singapore has caught up with the West in 
technological and economic areas, it has also fostered a uniquely Singaporean identity2. 
Despite the fact that some deplore Singapore's westernisation3, it has unmistakenly 
remained (or become) an Asian city-state while achieving a high level of economic 
development within a relatively short period of time. 
Just as Singapore took advantage of its status of "latecomer" in modem development, 
other developing countries could learn from the successes and pitfalls of Singapore's 
rapid economic and socio-cultural development. 
In the following section firstly the strengths and weaknesses of Singapore with regard 
to its development are addressed, in other words the factors that made Singapore unique 
and which thus could constrain possible emulation. The factors which worked to the 
benefit of Singapore's development, could pose limitations to its function as a model 
for other countries. Secondly, the potential of the Singaporean development model as 
an example is discussed. 
9.3.1. Constraints in view of possible emulation 
Economic constraints 
Singaporeans were proud of their economic achievements. However, Singaporean 
politicians such as Lee Kuan Yew were well aware of the limitations for emulation. The 
Economic Planning Committee (EPC) in Singapore made an analysis of Singapore's 
strengths and weaknesses. The strengths identified were: 
"1. Stability: A very stable country politically, economically, socially and 
climatically is important for business. It provides an environment which is 
predictable and positive for business activities. Such stability also enables the 
government to take a long-term view, by investing in infrastructure and training 
where the rewards are seen in the years and even decades later. 
2. Good government: A government that is clean, rational, competent, strong and 
united is able to move effectively and speedily whenever there is a need. 
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3. Consensus: There is a high level of consensus between employers and 
employees, as well as between the government and the people. This unity of 
action is vital for the effective implementation of major programmes. 
4. Strategic location: One of the few natural resources Singapore has is its excellent 
location on sea and air routes, as well as its position straddling the time zones 
of Asia and Europe. 
5. Infrastructure: Singapore's deliberate policy of investing heavily in land, sea, 
air and telecommunications infrastructure, together with its good natural 
harbour, have enabled it to have the best facilities in the world. 
The weaknesses identified were: 
1. "Vulnerability: Because of its small size, Singapore lacks ballast and when there 
are changes in the world environment, the economy can be acutely affected."5 
2. "Small size: Singapore lacks the market size to develop a full scale industrial or 
economic structure. The economy is constrained by limited resources, not only 
in workers, but also in talent, land, sea-front land, sea space and water. But, 
small size can be an asset. Trade friction is not a significant problem and there 
is no significant rural sector. "6 
Albeit Singapore's small size formed a limitation to a market economy, it was an asset 
in the sense that processes could be controlled easily. Singapore has been spared many 
of the problems of big countries such as China where many policies failed due to a lack 
of rapid communication and an effective coordination of efforts. 
Singapore's small size was also an asset in the sense that there was no contrast and 
tension between the urban capital and the rural hinterland. According to the Economist, 
the notion that the trickle-down theory of development could work, first took hold as 
an observation of the Asian dragons, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea. 
But the first two are mainly cities and the last two are more heavily urbanised than most 
other developing countries. Therefore their model function is limited. In countries 
where the gap between the cities and the rural areas is large, income inequality seems 
to have increased. Although absolute poverty has often declined, the have-nots in some 
of these countries are becoming more restless. The conspicuous consumption of the 
wealthy elite feeds the resentment of those who feel left out of the rapid developments.7 
Another factor to take into account when contemplating Singapore as a model, was its 
stage of development. As was shown in chapter five, Singapore passed through the 
stages of industrialisation and modernisation and was given the status of "developed 
country" by the EEC in 1992. But scholars and politicians in Singapore realised that it 
was not a fully developed country yet, although it was not entirely clear what "fully 
developed" entailed. 
The basic needs of the population had been fulfilled and Singapore had achieved a high 
standard of living. But the government still emphasised the necessity of economic 
growth to sustain these achievements. Considering the global economic competition, 
Singapore still had to move into the innovation-driven category to become a developed 
country. Each stage of development needed a different approach. 
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Singapore now wanted to make the last leap to join the league of the richest nations in 
the world, realising that this perceived last stretch of the development process would 
be the most difficult. 
In Singapore the contemporary Western demand for fewer working hours and more 
leisure time, was often regarded as misplaced complacency and lack of good work 
values. This was seen as an important factor in Europe's economic recession in the 
early nineties. Whether or not Singaporeans will follow a similar development pattern 
as the earlier developed countries, where the limitations of economic growth have 
become visible, remains to be seen. According to Schluchter, Singapore was still in a 
transitional period from a secondary society to a tertiary society. As soon as it becomes 
a tertiary society, it would have a totally different set of problems. For example, then 
the trade-off between the authority of the government and economic growth might not 
work any more.8 Or would Maslow's highest level in the hierarchy of needs, self-
actualisation, meet with a different interpretation and implementation than in the West? 
Socio-cultural limitations 
In the socio-cultural realm, Singapore also showed a number of unique features, which 
could present limits to emulation. 
1) Singapore had opted for a cultural integration model, while its internal cultural 
heterogeneity was of a special kind. The Chinese formed the majority ethnic group and 
were not only dominant numerically, but also economically, politically and socially. As 
such it was easier to accommodate other (minority) groups without their constituting a 
threat to the majority's status and power. Moreover, secession ideas of minority groups 
would have been virtually impossible to realise due to the pervasive control possibilities 
in the small island-state. However, at the regional level Chinese Singaporeans were in 
the minority. 
2) Cultural tradition in Singapore did not clash with the objectives of economic 
development and modernisation. Singapore was more or less "bom into modernity".9 
On the one hand the Singaporean population consisted mainly of immigrants who were 
more aware than non-immigrants of the necessity to change in order to survive. On the 
other hand, the predominantly Chinese cultural mindset was already very pragmatic and 
put the interests of the society above those of the individual. 
3) In Singapore a new identity was forged by redirecting the loyalties from the wider 
political and cultural units of China, India and Malaysia and Indonesia to the smaller 
unit of Singapore. Whereas in most countries it is the opposite; particular, parochial 
loyalties have to be widened to match national interests (see chapter seven). 
4) In such plural societies as Singapore and in the traditional societies of many 
developing countries, a strong leadership is considered important. This is a crucial 
factor in uniting the country towards a common goal of development. In Singapore Lee 
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Kuan Yew's personality and singular dedication and the PAP's integrity, realism, 
cohesion and energy stood out. These characteristics enabled the government in 
Singapore to mobilise the population and to achieve many of its goals. A strong 
leadership with different features could produce a less positive result. 
9.3.2. Singapore as development model 
Singapore was not in the first place studied as a development model. But it appeared 
that "... the Singapore case has great relevance for the social scientists and social 
planners in other developing countries ... it is particularly relevant in Southeast Asia, 
an area which has observed with close interest the successful "model" of Singapore's 
social and economic development".10 
A number of general observations, both from fieldwork and from foreign study 
missions in Singapore, have been made regarding the development process in 
Singapore, which could provide interesting examples for both developing and developed 
countries. The most important observations were: 
1. integrated, long term policies imbedded in a vision 
2. optimistic, pragmatic developmental approach 
3. unique economic and political system 
4. economic success with social redistribution 
5. creation of one's own cultural identity 
ad 1) As observed in chapter four, former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew was well-
known for his so-called satellite view. Due to a clear vision of Singapore's future, he 
was able to act pro-actively. Integrated, all-encompassing policies supported by political 
consensus, made rapid implementation possible. 
Due to Singapore's success story, Lee Kuan Yew had obtained the status of a patriarch 
whose advice carried weight." After he stepped down as Prime Minister and became 
Senior Minister in 1990, Lee travelled widely. Not only was he asked for advice on 
development during these visits, but also Singapore was visited by a number of study 
missions from abroad. Reflecting on the importance of long term vision for a country's 
development, Lee suggested that China's top leaders move away from an ad-hoc 
approach of policy-making and solve problems in a macro-perspective.12 Once the big 
picture would be clear, various issues could be fitted into it. Implementation had to 
follow directly, regardless of the popularity of the measures. 
ad 2) Lee could tum weaknesses into assets, making the best of a given situation. 
Thinking in terms of opportunities, as opposed to thinking in terms of problems, was 
an asset of the empirically problem-solving Chinese (see chapter two). As shown in 
chapter four, the government timely recognised a number of problems, had them 
analysed, and put them in perspective in relation to the overall vision before making 
policies. 
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The Singapore government was not too proud to learn from the earlier developed 
countries, both from their achievements as well as from their mistakes. Due to an 
instrumental openness, the government could be relatively flexible in its policies and 
seize opportunities.13 When Singapore started to modernise, it did not know its exact 
destination nor the path leading to it, but the government made five-year plans which 
it used as guidelines. These were reviewed according to the prevailing conditions14 
(see chapters four and five). 
The expression "success breeds success" seemed to apply to Singapore. The rapid 
economic development accompanied by a rapid rise in the standard of living, not only 
increased the self-confidence of Singaporeans, but also radiated a positive energy. In 
the early nineties Singapore seemed to be driven by an optimistic momentum. People 
were caught up in an upward spiral. The Economic Planning Committee was confident 
that "the old order will give way to a new order".15 
ad 3) Singapore showed that Eastern societies cannot simply be categorised in terms of 
the Western frame of reference, nor be expected to simply follow the Western 
development model. 
Regarding its economy, Singapore was often perceived as "capitalist", whereas Lee 
Kuan Yew referred to its political economic system as "East-Asian, Confucian 
capitalism". What made the Singaporean system unique was its free market system 
combined with social redistribution. Former First Deputy Prime Minister Goh Keng 
Swee made the Singaporean approach clear: "The selection of Western models needs 
careful study, diligent application and intelligent adjustment. "16 Although UNDP inputs 
- especially financial -were acknowledged by Singapore, the most oft-cited problem was 
the suitability of the UNDP experts. Though highly technically qualified, some experts 
were "not culturally oriented to the host-country's environment... And some could not 
catch up with the quick pace of activity in Singapore."17 
Politically speaking, Singapore showed that it could dramatically improve the quality 
of life for its population, without being or becoming a Western liberal democracy. As 
Chan showed, a rigid compartmentalisation of countries as democratic or non-
democratic with the "gospel of Western textbooks" in the hand18, underestimates the 
cultural factor. In the nineties, the increased self-confidence of the Asian NICs saw 
them enter a global debate about the universality of the concept of democracy. 
According to Chan, Westerners argue that the order of democracy, human rights and 
social justice are the key factors in balanced development, but the Asian experience 
suggests a different sequence: social justice, human rights and democracy. Asian 
leading philosophers such as Confucius and Mencius had concerned themselves with the 
same issues of democracy and development as the Greek philosophers Plato and 
Aristotle, but the former did not produce the same continuous discourse through the 
ages. It was about what constituted good society and what kind of government best 
promoted and preserved the values of such a society19 (see also chapter three). 
In 1993 an international conference was held in Singapore on the Asian and American 
perspectives on capitalism and democracy.20 
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Sceptics about an "Asian democracy" argued that this concept was self-serving to the 
powerful elites (see chapter three, four and five). But, in defence of the existence of an 
"Asian democracy", Huntington, one of the participants, claimed that they 
underestimated the fact that the principles of liberal democracy were rooted in a 
Western socio-economic environment and intellectual tradition. He claimed that no non-
Western nation had developed a democratic system of its own.21 He observed that, 
globally speaking, there appeared to be a clear correlation between level of development 
and democracy. The processes associated with development, such as urbanisation, rising 
levels of education and well-being and the rise of alternative sources of power 
facilitated the transition to democracy. However, paradoxically, the East Asian NICs 
had achieved tremendous economic success despite weak political institutionalisation in 
the Western sense. Given its high level of economic development, Singapore should 
have been more democratic than it was, according to Huntington's theory. But here a 
cultural countercurrent was prevalent. Generally, Singaporeans perceived their own 
political system as a modified version of liberal democracy, placing emphasis more on 
the role of principled men and women in government than on the presence of political 
opposition as a means of ensuring good government.22 The distinctive Asian form of 
democracy entailed an equal emphasis on responsibilities and rights. State intervention 
played a constructive role in managing the structural transformations associated with 
economic development. Key features are a communitarian sense that places greater 
emphasis on the common good than on individual rights, a greater acceptance of 
authority and hierarchy, dominant party systems and centralised bureaucracies. 
With Singapore in mind, Huntington warned against the danger that in a post-Cold War 
world the West uses "democracy" as an international merit test, while democracy itself 
is a somewhat ambiguous concept and the degree of tolerable deviation changes with 
the prevailing ideological mood in the West. 
Asians emphasised that one should distinguish whether democracy is defined by process 
or results. The Asian model is oriented towards results achieved by "good government", 
as explained in chapters three and four. In the Asian perspective, "Asian democracy" 
has "produced the good life and a wholesome society, economic and social progress and 
a political and social system that is consonant with the values and traditions of their 
society."23 Chan did not perceive Westerners and Asians as ideological adversaries. 
In the end, both are reaching for the same result - good government and a good political 
community.24 If the Asian variant of democracy would be taken more seriously, 
liberalism would only be one of many criteria by which the quality of a society's 
democracy is judged.25 
During the 1993 conference on capitalism and democracy, one of the conclusions was 
that Westerners often speak of convergence and a homogenising influence of world 
trends, but - often non-Western - participants suggested that the differences will remain 
and are legitimate, reflecting cultural diversity.26 
Mahbubani, Deputy Secretary of the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that 
"the aggressive Western promotion of democracy, human rights and freedom of the 
press to the Third World is a colossal mistake".27 Referring to China, Lee Kuan Yew 
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stated that the United States and Europe "have not been very wise in saying 'Be like 
me'...You cant' go around telling them, 'Look, do this, do that'. This is a very ancient 
people, with very long memories of deep humiliation... I understand it because I am 
part of that culture."28 Mahbubani argued that the West was often hypocritical and 
inconsistent in its application of human rights criteria, depending on its interests. If the 
United States truly wanted to liberate the Third World from oppression, it should 
instead promote economic development.29 This idea reflected general opinion in East 
Asia.30 
Nevertheless, the conference showed that there was no monolithic Asian perspective on 
capitalism and democracy. A fear of cultural determinism was expressed, because it 
could diminish the capacity for change, while there was an ongoing need for reform and 
adaptation31 (See chapter five). 
ad 4) Singapore's development success not only lay in its economic growth (see chapter 
five), but also in its social redistribution (see chapter six). With a massive public-
housing programme - the urban equivalent of land reform - free education, health and 
social security policies and general improvement in the quality of life (see chapter five), 
Singapore "had and has one of the most advanced programmes of social redistribution 
in Asia and in the world".32 
The appeal of this combination was noted by countries such as China and South Africa. 
Lee's economic advice in a keynote address at the International Economic Forum in 
Beijing in 1992, organised by the China International Trust and Investment Corporation 
(Citic), was taken to heart.33 Coming from an ethnic Chinese who promoted Confucian 
ethics, the promotion of a free market economic system was not perceived as a threat. 
Lee's suggestions were received as "very instructive".34 
The post-apartheid regime in South Africa also welcomed an exchange of Lee's views. 
Lee advised a focus on stability and economic growth as crucial factors for South 
Africa's future development. As an example, he stated that Singapore's first priority 
after independence also had been to restore stability, social and work discipline. Lee 
said: "After 1959, we had to do a U-turn, from agitation and disruption of society and 
the economy to a restoration of law and order, to establish stable, normal conditions of 
daily life so that learning, hard work and constructive endeavour became rewarding. "" 
Real compromises between the relevant parties were essential for further 
implementation. Nelson Mandela was so impressed that he invited Lee to be a financial 
and economic adviser to South Africa, but Lee had to decline due to his semi-
retirement. 
ad 5) The Singapore government consciously attempted to create a well-balanced 
modem, Asian, cosmopolitan society. This endeavour was so encompassing, that the 
term "cultural project"36 was used. This project was particularly interesting due to the 
question of the moral values, which could curb the negative consequences of the 
Western economic development. The Singaporean experience could serve as an 
interesting experimenting ground for moral guidance of the population (see chapter 
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seven). It was remarkable that (mostly Western) critics were cynical about the 
Singapore government's introduction of the "right" Wirtschaftsethik, but simultaneously 
wished to impose Western-style democracy on an Asian country such as Singapore. 
One would do Singapore more justice to acknowledge the integrity and possible 
usefulness of its search for a balanced society. In 1983 the Institute of East Asian 
Philosophies was established to serve as a thinktank regarding the modem 
transformation of Confucian humanism. A workshop, seminar and international 
conference were organised to study the possibility of "mobilising spiritual resources in 
the Confucian tradition in order to minimise the negative influence of highly 
industrialised Western countries, such as aggressive anomie, radical individualism, 
disintegration of society and vulgarisation of culture"37 (see chapters three and seven). 
In the early nineties, China's former leader Deng Xiaoping's call to learn from 
Singapore how to maintain social order and discipline, was followed by several study 
missions.38 Xu, vice-minister of the Department of Propaganda in the Chinese 
Communist Party, headed a mission of eleven people to Singapore to study its social 
and legal structure. He said that he had learned from the visit to make a distinction 
between accepting Western technology - which was deemed to be inevitable in order 
to modernise - and absorbing negative Western values. Furthermore, "lessons" drawn 
from Singapore were that "a country must create wealth first before quarrelling about 
how it should be distributed" and "nip problems [between different ethnic groups] in 
the bud, rather than allow it to explode before taking action". Xu also stated that: 
"Before I came here, I wondered why, despite its open and free market 
economy, Singapore's goods were more expensive than those sold in Hong 
Kong. Then I saw the reason. There are less pirated goods on sale here. 
Singapore has earned a brand name for selling genuine stuff. It is a credibility 
which gives you the right to sell at a premium, and which gives foreign 
investors the confidence to do bigger business with you. This is the type of 
business ethics which China can learn from Singapore. Our moral education 
programme should be based on this approach. "39 
On a visit to Kazakhstan, Lee stressed the importance of a constructive socio-cultural 
basis of the society for development. Every country has to use its own resources. Lee 
readily admitted that each culture is unique. Therefore, instead of telling Kazakhs how 
to use their own culture to their advantage, he explained the role of Confucian values 
in Singapore's development.40 
On the one hand, Lee perceived Confucian ethics as an important facilitator in the 
development process for Sino-influenced cultures. Family members were deemed to be 
instrumental in passing on moral values to children. They played a bigger role than 
schools and societal pressure, according to Lee41. Singaporean scholars studied which 
Confucian elements were conducive to and which inhibited modern development (see 
chapter three). 
On the other hand, given Singapore's plural ethnic society, the government chose three 
more or less neutral core values for Singaporeans, which people of various religious 
backgrounds could identify with: hard work, thrift and family-centredness. This way 
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the government emphasised the common ground in the Singaporean cultural identity. 
Singaporean scholars and politicians did not only undertake this cultural search, but also 
learned from their own mistakes during the process. For example, in the process of "a 
lot of soul-searching about our values and the kind of society we want to have"42, 
initially the debate not only had become polarised between "traditionalism" and 
"cosmopolitanism", but also between East and West. Lim, Minister without Portfolio, 
remarked that in 1994 it was politically correct in Singapore to "thumb-down the West 
for its many social ills - high rate of family break-up, high rate of illegitimate births by 
unmarried mothers, its free-reigning individualism, weak social discipline, high crime 
rate, poor work ethic and over-reliance on welfare. In contrast, the East, especially the 
East Asian Confucianist tradition, is held up as a model of virtue"43. He warned, 
however, that the values debate should not be about rejecting the West, but rather about 
learning from the negative experiences of others. Moreover, Singapore had no intention 
of changing the moral values of people in the West. The aim was rather to strengthen 
the values which would help Singaporeans progress. For instance, one was aware that 
the notion of family as the building block of society was not exactly exclusively 
Eastern. But that was not the issue. What was important was which values, whatever 
background they had, would be conducive to future development. 
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
Singapore, een moderne, Aziatische stadsstaat; 
relatie tussen culturele en economische ontwikkeling 
Deze dissertatie betreft een case study van de algemene ontwikkeling van Singapore tot 
modern Aziatische stadsstaat. De belangrijkste onderzoeksvraag betreft de interrelatie 
tussen de culturele en economische ontwikkeling; in welke mate heeft Singapore's 
culturele achtergrond haar recente, snelle economische groei beïnvloed en, vice versa, 
in welke mate heeft deze economische groei Singapore's culturele ontwikkeling 
beïnvloed. De onderliggende vraag hierbij is in hoeverre de veronderstelling dat het 
modemisatieproces een westemisering impliceert, opgaat. De twee complementaire 
onderzoeksvragen worden gereflecteerd in de verdeling van deze dissertatie in twee 
onderdelen. In het eerste deel - hoofdstuk 2 t/m 4 - worden de voornaamste culturele 
invloeden op Singapore's economische ontwikkeling geanalyseerd. In het tweede deel 
- hoofdstuk 5 t/m 8 - wordt de richting van Singapore's culturele ontwikkeling sinds de 
snelle economische groei in kaart gebracht. In het derde deel - hoofdstuk 9 - wordt, na 
de samenvatting en de algemene conclusies, ingegaan op de vraag in hoeverre Singapore 
kan gelden als ontwikkelingsmodel. 
In het inleidende eerste hoofdstuk worden de achtergronden voor het hoe en waarom 
van deze studie gegeven. Singapore ontwikkelde zich binnen dertig jaar van een arm 
ontwikkelingsland tot een rijk geïndustrialiseerd land. Sinds de toename in economisch 
belang van Japan en de Oostaziatische NIC's is de vraag gerezen waarom juist deze 
landen een dergelijk ontwikkelingssucces hebben geboekt. Max Weber was de eerste 
die een verband legde tussen ethiek en economische ontwikkeling. Hoewel zijn analyse 
van de betekenis van het confucianisme voor China niet juist was, geldt zijn brede 
perspectief en vergelijkende methode als voorbeeld voor verder onderzoek. Het verband 
tussen de confucianistische ethiek en de economische groei in Oost Azië is vooral sinds 
de jaren tachtig duidelijk geworden. Hofstede introduceerde de term "Confucian 
dynamism" en Redding de "spirit of Chinese capitalism". De Вагу belichtte de inherente 
waarde van de confucianistische cultuur en vroeg zich af of de stelling dat Azië het 
Westen moet bijbenen niet zou moeten worden omgedraaid. Sivaraksa's strijd tegen het 
ontwortelen van de Thaise cultuur bood invalshoeken om het modernisatie-proces in 
Singapore te bestuderen. Vanuit deze verschillende theoretische bijdragen werd een 
probleemdefinitie geformuleerd en werd gekozen voor een interdisciplinaire, holistische 
onderzoeksbenadering. Hierbij werd zoveel mogelijk rekening gehouden met lokale 
culturele kennis, zoals benadrukt door Verhelst en Huizer. Dit werd gedaan door 
participatieve observatie en een vorm van action research. 
In het tweede hoofdstuk wordt, uitgaande van een brede antropologische 
cultuurdefmitie, Singapore's culturele achtergrond in de vorm van haar geografische 
ligging en historie gegeven. De combinatie van een gebrek aan natuurlijke hulpbronnen 
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en achterland met een strategische lokatie op belangrijke handelsroutes, bood vooral 
economische mogelijkheden die internationaal georiënteerd waren. Singapore's 
economische functie als opslagplaats voor de handel, trok vele immigranten die uit 
waren op materiële voordelen. De meerderheid van hen had een confucianistische 
achtergrond. Deze immigranten bleken prestatie-gericht, materialistisch, strevend naar 
sociale vooruitgang, ontvankelijk voor veranderingen en economisch rationeel en 
pragmatisch ingesteld. Hierdoor kozen zij liever voor een modem, industriële dan een 
traditionele ontwikkeling. 
Enerzijds was Singapore een klein, door Chinezen gedomineerd eiland omgeven door 
moslimlanden, anderzijds was het intern cultureel heterogeen. Deze gevoelige situatie 
gaf aanleiding tot een omzichtige, multi-etnische ontwikkelingsstrategie. De Maleiers, 
die de groep met de langste historie in het gebied vormden, waren traditioneler en 
feodaler dan de andere etnische groepen. De onderlinge verschillen leidden tot een 
intensieve politieke machtsstrijd tussen de Maleiers en de Chinezen, uitlopend op 
rassenrellen in de jaren zestig. De eerste decennia na de onafhankelijkheid bleven de 
Maleiers in Singapore weinig geïnteresseerd in een moderne, economische 
ontwikkeling. Zo liepen zij sociaal-economisch een achterstand op. Pas sinds de jaren 
negentig probeerden de Maleise Singaporeanen de ratrace in te lopen. 
In hoofdstuk drie wordt inzicht gegeven in de religieuze en wereldbeschouwelijke 
achtergrond van Singaporezen. Singapore is een seculiere staat, waarin iedereen zijn 
eigen religie mag uitoefenen zolang dit geen invloed heen op de politiek en de openbare 
harmonie. Hoewel officieel zeven religies plus een restcategorie van "vrijdenkers" 
geteld werden, hing de meerderheid een amalgaam aan van confucianisme, boeddhisme, 
taoïsme en traditioneel Chinese godsdienstige opvattingen, ook met neo-confucianisme 
aangeduid. Hun geloof, praktijken en instituties lieten niet alleen een grote 
verscheidenheid zien, maar verkeerden ook nog in een overgangsfase. Desondanks werd 
een verband gevonden tussen de sterke economische groei en confucianistische factoren 
als hard werken, spaarzaamheid, gerichtheid op het gezin, harmonie, consensus, respect 
voor educatie en eerbied voor autoriteiten. Deze factoren bleken echter eerder door 
westerse dan door Singaporese onderzoekers benadrukt te worden. De Singaporezen 
vonden dat deze factoren net zo goed konden worden toegeschreven aan andere 
processen, zoals het feit dat Singapore een immigranten-maatschappij was. De Chinese 
immigranten waren niet bepaald de "Cultuur-dragers" geweest. Bovendien bleek de 
selectie van gunstige factoren uit het confucianisme arbitrair. Toch leek het 
confucianisme op zijn minst indirekt als een van de factoren te hebben bijgedragen tot 
Singapore's economische ontwikkeling. 
In hoofdstuk vier wordt de extreme mate van politieke invloed op Singapore's moderne 
ontwikkeling getoond. De People's Action Party (PAP), die in 1954 onder leiderschap 
van Lee Kuan Yew werd opgericht, verkreeg de macht sinds de verkiezingen van 1939. 
De eerste fase van zelfbeheer richtte zich op integratie met de Maleise Federatie, die 
plaatsvond in 1963. Maar de verschillen tussen de Maleis en Chinees Singaporese 
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politieke ideeën waren zo groot, dat Singapore volledig onafhankelijk moest worden in 
1965. Sindsdien is de PAP erin geslaagd met vrijwel alle mogelijke middelen een één-
partij dominantie op te bouwen in de democratische republiek van Singapore. Lee, een 
Engels-opgeleideperanafort advocaat, was de overweldigend dominante persoonlijkheid. 
Derhalve heeft hij Singapore's moderne ontwikkeling het duidelijkst gevormd. Hij had 
een duidelijke visie op Singapore's toekomst als een modern Aziatische stadsstaat en 
was in staat zijn theorieën in praktijk om te zetten met een dusdanig alomvattend, 
geïnterrelateerd beleid dat men spreekt van "social engineering". Zijn strategie was een 
non-ideologische, pragmatische combinatie van een internationaal georiënteerde, vrije-
markt economie met staatsparticipatie en socialistische maatregelen om de 
basisbehoeften van de Singaporezen te vervullen. Grassroots organisaties, die min of 
meer in de staatsbureaucratie werden opgenomen, speelden een belangrijke politieke rol. 
Het collectieve doel werd sociaal-economische vooruitgang door middel van 
economische groei. 
De Singaporese politiek toonde een aantal confucianistische kenmerken: leiders als 
morele voorbeelden, nadruk op excelleren, elitaire attitude, paternalistische regering, 
gehoorzaamheid aan autoriteiten, institutionalisering en pragmatisme. 
Singapore kende weinig politieke oppositie door een aantal factoren zowel aan de zijde 
van de regering als aan die van de oppositie zelf. De PAP-regering paste directe en 
indirecte methoden toe om politieke stabiliteit te verkrijgen en te behouden met als 
argument dat dit in het beste lange termijn belang van Singapore was. Tot de directe 
methoden behoorden opsluiting van dissidenten onder de Internal Security Act en 
belemmering van mogelijkheden tot organisatie voor politieke tegenstanders. Indirecte 
methoden konden bestaan uit gerechtelijke processen met grote financiële gevolgen, 
bedreiging met beperking van huisvestings- en educatieve faciliteiten, intelligente 
beleids- en verkiezingstactieken, manipulatie van de publieke opinie via de massa media 
en controle van de vakbonden. De oppositie zelf leed onder inteme fricties, gebrek aan 
geloofwaardige en effectieve leiders, gebrek aan politieke alternatieven en een algemene 
zelfgenoegzaamheid onder de bevolking door de snelle economische groei waarvan zij 
meeprofiteerde. Voor het oppositie-voetlicht treden was een riskante onderneming in 
Singapore. 
In hoofdstuk vijf wordt het modernisatie-proces beschreven, zoals dat in Singapore 
plaatsvond. Economisch gezien werd het snelle groeiproces vooral bereikt door 
buitenlandse investeringen aan te trekken. Zo ontwikkelde Singapore zich grofweg van 
economische overleving in de jaren zestig, vervulling van basisbehoeften in de jaren 
zeventig, omgaan met een internationale economische recessie midden jaren tachtig tot 
de status van geïndustrialiseerd land beginjaren negentig en het zich opmaken voor een 
sprong naar volledige deelname aan de rangen van ontwikkelde landen. Alle belangrijke 
economische indicatoren lieten een enorme stijging in levensstandaard zien sinds de 
onafhankelijkheid. 
Ook socio-cultureel gezien vond een aantal veranderingen plaats. Nieuwe industriële 
gebieden vervingen kleine familie-ondernemingen, die moesten gaan concurreren met 
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multinationals en bedrijven in bezit van of gelieerd aan de regering. Traditionele 
Chinese bang organisaties moesten flink aan invloed inboeten. Urbanisatie door middel 
van massa-verhuizingen vernietigden de sociale structuren in de voormalige kampmgs. 
Gemeenschapszin maakte plaats voor onpersoonlijker relaties, vaak gebaseerd op 
berekening van financieel voordeel. Desalniettemin betrof dit in Singapore geen totale 
verschuiving binnen de maatschappij, omdat er reeds sprake was van een commerciële 
stad met veel één-generatie-gezinnen. 
Voor de laatste fase van de transformatie tot "ontwikkeld land" bleek niet zo'n 
duidelijke blauwdruk te bestaan als voor de eerdere fasen. De economische en 
technologische ontwikkeling was sneller verlopen dan de socio-culturele. Dit leidde in 
Singapore tot een zoektocht naar de juiste balans tussen economische en morele waarden 
in een moderne samenleving, die een grotere verscheidenheid aan leefstijlen en eisen 
met zich meebracht. 
Als positieve effecten van de modernisatie beschouwde men de verbeterde educatie, 
hogere inkomens, meer vrije tijd en reismogelijkheden, betere recreatie-faciliteiten, een 
hogere prestatie-motivatie, een materialistischer kijk op de wereld en minder 
gebondenheid aan traditionele levenswijzen waarin bijvoorbeeld vrouwen een ongelijke 
status hadden. Tot de negatieve gevolgen werden gerekend een buitensporig 
individualisme, geldsmijterij, hedonisme, zelfgenoegzaamheid, grotere onzekerheden, 
vervreemding, sociale isolatie, meer ziekten en emotionele stoornissen gerelateerd aan 
de rat race en milieuvervuiling. Om deze laatste gevolgen tegen te gaan, legde de 
regering de nadruk op de zogenoemde Aziatische waarden van familiale 
verantwoordelijkheid, hard werken en spaarzaamheid. 
Op politiek terrein vertoonde Singapore de minste veranderingen. De PAP behield haar 
allesoverheersende positie, hoewel er onder de bevolking een proces in gang leek gezet 
van politieke convergentie naar meer divergentie. Daarin passend, werd Lee's 
dominante en resolute stijl van leidinggeven ingenomen door de meer consultatieve en 
menselijke stijl van de nieuwe premier Goh in de jaren negentig. Geleidelijkaan zou 
meer politieke participatie in het "volwassener" Singapore geoorloofd worden. 
Staatsbelangen bleven echter voorrang behouden boven individuele belangen. Dit gaf 
aanleiding tot een dusdanig voorzichtige en gecontroleerde politieke modernisatie dat 
er stemmen opgingen dat er in politiek opzicht weinig veranderde. Het begrip 
"democratie" en de invulling daarvan vormden een belangrijk onderwerp van discussie. 
De regering maakte sterker dan ooit aanspraak op een gerechtvaardigde Aziatische 
leiderschapsstijl, tot uiting komend in de initiërende en mediërende rol die Singapore 
in internationale relaties tussen Westerse en Oostaziatische landen op zich nam. De 
vraag rees of de brede acceptatie van het paternalistische bewind, geworteld in het 
confucianisme, stand zou houden als er een einde zou komen aan de economische groei 
en de bevolking er niet meer beter op zou worden. 
De significante sociaal-economische vooruitgang tijdens Singapore's moderne 
ontwikkeling, wordt in hoofdstuk zes beschreven. Het hogere opleidingsniveau in 
Singapore had bijgedragen aan meer banen met een hoger beroepsprestige met meer 
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inkomen. Op die manier was de algemene sociaal-economische status gestegen. 
Vrouwen profiteerden ook van deze status trend, ofschoon minder dan mannen. 
Een uitgebreid Singaporees klasse-onderzoek, gepubliceerd in het begin van de jaren 
negentig, zette twee populaire opvattingen in Singapore recht. Ten eerste nam men aan 
dat Singapore was uitgegroeid tot een middenklasse maatschappij. Maar de zogenaamde 
middenklasse bleek te onderscheiden in vijf duidelijk verschillende lagen. Hoewel de 
meeste Singaporezen zichzelf als behorend tot de middenklasse beschouwden, 
verschilden de mensen in elke laag van de andere in de drie belangrijkste componenten 
van sociaal-economische klasse: opleidingsniveau, inkomen en beroepspres tige. Ten 
tweede bleek de algemene veronderstelling dat Maleiers de laagste en Chinezen de 
hoogste klasse vormden, een oversimplificatie. Maleiers werden vooral in de lagere 
midden- en middenklasse gevonden en Chinezen in de hogere, hogere midden- en lagere 
klasse. De laagste klasse werd gedomineerd door Chinezen. Maleiers vertoonden echter 
wel de minste sociaal-economische mobiliteit vanwege een complex van redenen. Inter-
etnische mobiliteit was beperkt in Singapore. Het regeringsbeleid van multi-culturaliteit, 
twee-taligheid en etnische tolerantie had wel tot een positievere inter-etnische attitude 
geleid, maar inter-etnische huwelijken bleven zeldzaam. Men kan niet spreken van een 
smeltkroes van culturen. 
De consensus in Singapore was dat de snelle economische groei de inkomenskloof niet 
had vergroot. Dit werd toegeschreven aan de buffer van gratis en gesubsidieerde 
educatie, gesubsidieerde huisvesting, bedrijfsvoorzieningen, het pensioenfonds van de 
staat, gezondheidszorg en een progressief belastingsysteem. Hoewel oppositie-politicus 
Chee in het midden van de jaren negentig een opkomende trend van ongelijke 
welvaartsverdeling meende waar te nemen, geloofde men vooral dat er niet zozeer een 
kloof tussen de haves en have-nots was ontstaan, maar eerder tussen de modem Westers 
en traditioneel Oosters opgeleiden. 
Singapore's intra- en intergenerationele opwaartse sociaal-economische mobiliteit leek 
structureel, maar omdat het vooral samenhing met de economische groei, werd er ook 
rekening gehouden met een nivelleringsproces gerelateerd aan de rijpwording van de 
economie. Dit zou vooral moeilijk te accepteren kunnen worden voor de jongere 
generatie, daar hun behoeften en verwachtingen waren meegegroeid met de algemene 
welvaartsstijging. De PAP-regering probeerde deze hoge verwachtingen eerder te 
matigen dan eraan tegemoet te komen. 
Een essentieel onderdeel van Singapore's moderne ontwikkeling was de creatie van een 
gezamenlijke Singaporese identiteit, waarvan het tweeledige proces in hoofdstuk zeven 
wordt beschreven. Aan de ene kant moest een interne balans gevonden worden. Ieder 
identificeerde zich in de jaren zestig voornamelijk met zijn eigen etnische groep. Om 
te voorkomen dat de spanningen tussen deze groepen zou uitlopen op nog meer 
rassenrellen, begon Lee met campagnes van multi-culturele tolerantie en co-existentie 
gericht op de lange termijn. Hij gebruikte daartoe allerlei mogelijke middelen van 
politieke socialisatie. Ook erkende hij de minderheidsstatus van de Maleiers en Indiërs 
in Singapore, terwijl getracht werd openlijke sinificatie te vermijden. Zo groeide 
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geleidelijkaan vanaf de jaren zeventig een nieuwe gezamenlijke identiteit. Midden jaren 
negentig was communalisme een non-issue geworden. Men had een compromis 
gevonden in een identificatie als Chinese, Maleise of Indiase Singaporees. 
Aan de andere kant moest een externe balans worden gevonden. Singapore streefde naar 
"the best of both worlds": wel de gewenste Westerse prestaties op het gebied van 
wetenschap en technologie, maar niet de in Ρ AP-ogen negatieve neveneffecten, die met 
name op (interpersoonlijk gebied lagen. Aziatische waarden, waarbij sprake was van 
een "confucianistische renaissance", dienden daarbij een morele rol te spelen om de 
uitwassen van modernisatie te verzachten en recht te zetten. 
In het begin van de jaren negentig liet een onderzoek zien dat bijna de helft van de 
Singaporezen op pragmatische wijze een eclectische combinatie van Westerse en 
Oosterse waarden aanhing, ruim een derde overwegend vasthield aan Oosterse waarden 
en slechts een minderheid meer Westerse dan Oosterse waarden bezat. Het 
modernisatie-proces had niet geleid tot een spiritueel en/of moreel vacuum, maar 
Singaporezen hadden eerder het ene geloof voor het andere verruild. De grootste 
verschuivingen hadden plaatsgevonden van taoisme en boeddhisme naar "vrij-denken" 
en van "vrij-denken" naar christendom. Het christendom in Singapore had vooral een 
sociaal element en de soms al te enthousiaste geloofsverkondiging leidde tot 
interreligieus ongenoegen. Eind jaren tachtig en midden jaren negentig liet een aan de 
moderne tijd aangepast boeddhisme een opleving in aanhang zien. Het modernisatie-
proces had in Singapore met name geleid tot uiterlijke transformaties, terwijl de inhoud 
van de rituelen in essentie hetzelfde bleef. 
Multinationals hadden grote invloed op Singapore's economische ontwikkeling, leidend 
tot een bepaalde mate van afhankelijkheid, maar die invloed was verwaarloosbaar op 
persoonlijk en cultureel gebied. Daarin was veeleer sprake van "omkering van 
afhankelijkheid". Het economische succes had grond gegeven voor een zelfvertrouwen 
dat ruimte bood aan respect voor de eigen culturele wortels. 
Hoofdstuk acht laat een voorbeeld zien van een van Singapore's "re-rooting" effecten: 
op de ontwikkeling van Singapore's belangrijkste economische troef, de menselijke 
hulpbronnen. Het waargenomen verband tussen menselijke hulpbronnen en economische 
groei, verklaarde waarom de regering beleid maakte dat het privé-leven van 
Singaporezen ver binnendrong. In het oog springende beleidsterreinen waren enerzijds 
de controversiële bevolkingsomvang en -structuur, anderzijds de "kwaliteit van de 
mensen", uitgedrukt in beleid op het gebied van salarissen, produktiviteit en training. 
De coöperatieve driehoeksverhouding tussen de regering, werkgevers en werknemers 
speelde een belangrijke rol in de implementatie van dit beleid. Het lukte Singapore een 
inkomensniveau te bereiken ter hoogte van die in "ontwikkelde landen" in de jaren 
negentig, maar op het gebied van produktiviteit en training viel nog veel te verbeteren. 
Een hoge kwaliteit van de human resources zou Singapore moeten onderscheiden van 
concurrerende landen. Het was een uitdaging een balans te vinden tussen salaris- en 
produktiviteitsgroei. In Singapore's human resource development (HRD) vormde het 
streven naar excellentie dan ook top-prioriteit. Op dit gebied wilde Singapore zich in 
Samenvatting 405 
2010 tot de rangen van structureel ontwikkelde landen kunnen rekenen. In de jaren 
negentig mat het zich de voortrekkersrol in Azië aan. Nadat jarenlang Amerikaanse en 
Japanse modellen waren bestudeerd en gekopieerd, zocht Singapore nu naar een HRD-
model aangepast aan de eigen situatie. Dit betrof met name een efficiënte combinatie 
van moderne en confucianistische elementen. 
Vanaf Singapore's onafhankelijkheid was het belang van educatie steeds benadrukt. 
Allereerst werd het aantal educatieve mogelijkheden vergroot, later maakten tertiaire 
educatie- en trainingsinstellingen enorme groei door. Enerzijds leek leergierigheid de 
culturele stimulans tot de algemene educatieve verbetering, anderzijds leek het 
instrumentele nut van educatie en training als middel tot sociaal-economische 
verbetering de bovenhand te voeren. Om een steeds hogere levensstandaard te bereiken, 
moest de Wirtschafisethik om hard te werken sterk blijven. Het dilemma voor de 
regering hierbij was hoe het opleidingsniveau van de bevolking verhoogd kon worden 
zonder een sterkere roep om democratie vanwege grotere intellectuele participatie. 
In hoofdstuk negen worden twintig conclusies getrokken met betrekking tot de 
belangrijkste onderzoeksvragen. Deze duiden op een positieve beantwoording; 
Singapore's culturele achtergrond heeft een niet onaanzienlijke rol gespeeld in de 
werking van de politiek in Singapore en de economische beslissingen daaruit 
voortvloeiend. Ook blijkt Singapore's snelle economische groei invloed te hebben gehad 
op het culturele zelfbewustzijn van Singaporezen. Bovendien bleek de herwaardering 
van de Aziatische waarden weer zijn invloed te hebben op Singapore's Wirtschafisethik. 
Zo liet Singapore zien dat zelfs een verregaande modernisatie niet op alle gebieden 
westemisering hoeft te betekenen, met name niet op het (interpersoonlijke, morele en 
politieke vlak. Zelfs op andere terreinen zoals HRD begon kruisbestuiving plaats te 
vinden. 
Singapore straalde in Azië een sterke aantrekkingskracht uit als Oostaziatisch 
ontwikkelingsmodel door haar combinatie van een snel verkregen hoge levensstandaard 
met behoud van eigen culturele identiteit. Singapore toonde enerzijds een aantal unieke 
kenmerken, die nabootsing bemoeilijken, maar liet anderzijds ook een aantal 
ontwikkelingsprocessen zien, die interessant kunnen zijn voor zowel 
ontwikkelingslanden als "eerder ontwikkelde" landen. 
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